SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON
THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair
ZOE LOFGREN, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
PETE AGUILAR, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
COMMITTEE STAFF
David B. Buckley, Staff Director
Kristin L. Amerling, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Hope Goins, Senior Counsel to the Chairman
Joseph B. Maher, Senior Counsel to the Vice Chair
Timothy J. Heaphy, Chief Investigative Counsel
Jamie Fleet, Senior Advisor
Timothy R. Mulvey, Communications Director
Candyce Phoenix, Senior Counsel and Senior Advisor
John F. Wood, Senior Investigative Counsel and Of Counsel to
the Vice Chair
Katherine B. Abrams, Staff Associate
Temidayo Aganga-Williams, Senior Investigative Counsel
Alejandra Apecechea, Investigative Counsel
Lisa A. Bianco, Director of Member Services and Security
Manager
Jerome P. Bjelopera, Investigator
Bryan Bonner, Investigative Counsel
Richard R. Bruno, Senior Administrative Assistant
Marcus Childress, Investigative Counsel
John Marcus Clark, Security Director
Jacqueline N. Colvett, Digital Director
Heather I. Connelly, Professional Staff Member
Meghan E. Conroy, Investigator
Heather L. Crowell, Printer Proofreader
William C. Danvers, Senior Researcher
Soumyalatha O. Dayananda, Senior Investigative Counsel
Stephen W. DeVine, Senior Counsel
Lawrence J. Eagleburger, Professional Staff Member
Kevin S. Elliker, Investigative Counsel
Margaret E. Emamzadeh, Staff Associate
Sadallah A. Farah, Professional Staff Member
Daniel A. George, Senior Investigative Counsel
Jacob H. Glick, Investigative Counsel
Aaron S. Greene, Clerk
Marc S. Harris, Senior Investigative Counsel
Alice K. Hayes, Clerk
Quincy T. Henderson, Staff Assistant
Jenna Hopkins, Professional Staff Member
Camisha L. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Thomas E. Joscelyn, Senior Professional Staff Member
Rebecca L. Knooihuizen, Financial Investigator
Casey E. Lucier, Investigative Counsel
Damon M. Marx, Professional Staff Member
Evan B. Mauldin, Chief Clerk
Yonatan L. Moskowitz, Senior Counsel
Hannah G. Muldavin, Deputy Communications Director
Jonathan D. Murray, Professional Staff Member
Jacob A. Nelson, Professional Staff Member
Elizabeth Obrand, Staff Associate
Raymond O’Mara, Director of External Affairs
Elyes Ouechtati, Technology Partner
Robin M. Peguero, Investigative Counsel
Sandeep A. Prasanna, Investigative Counsel
Barry Pump, Parliamentarian
Sean M. Quinn, Investigative Counsel
Brittany M. J. Record, Senior Counsel
Denver Riggleman, Senior Technical Advisor
Joshua D. Roselman, Investigative Counsel
James N. Sasso, Senior Investigative Counsel
Grant H. Saunders, Professional Staff Member
Samantha O. Stiles, Chief Administrative Officer
Sean P. Tonolli, Senior Investigative Counsel
David A. Weinberg, Senior Professional Staff Member
Amanda S. Wick, Senior Investigative Counsel
Darrin L. Williams, Jr., Staff Assistant
Zachary S. Wood, Clerk
CONTRACTORS & CONSULTANTS
Rawaa Alobaidi
Melinda Arons
Steve Baker
Elizabeth Bisbee
David Canady
John Coughlin
Aaron Dietzen
Gina Ferrise
Angel Goldsborough
James Goldston
Polly Grube
L. Christine Healey
Danny Holladay
Percy Howard
Dean Jackson
Stephanie J. Jones
Hyatt Mamoun
Mary Marsh
Todd Mason
Ryan Mayers
Jeff McBride
Fred Muram
Alex Newhouse
John Norton
Orlando Pinder
Owen Pratt
Dan Pryzgoda
Brian Sasser
William Scherer
Driss Sekkat
Chris Stuart
Preston Sullivan
Brian Young
Innovative Driven
Foreword: Speaker of the House
“THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH”
“I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the
office on which I am about to enter: So help me God.”
All Members of the United States Congress take this sacred
oath. On January 6, 2021, Democrats and Republicans agreed
that we would fulfill this oath—and that we had an
obligation to signal to the world that American Democracy
would prevail.
In furtherance of fulfilling this duty, the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol was charged with investigating the facts,
circumstances and causes that led to this domestic terror
attack on the Capitol, the Congress and the Constitution.
We owe a debt of gratitude to Chairman Bennie Thompson, Vice
Chair Liz Cheney, the patriotic Members of Congress and
dedicated staff—who devoted themselves to this
investigation, to uncovering the truth and to writing a
report that is a “Roadmap for Justice.”
The Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
has succeeded in bringing clarity and demonstrating with
painstaking detail the fragility of our Democracy. Above
all, the work of the Select Committee underscores that our
democratic institutions are only as strong as the commitment
of those who are entrusted with their care.
As the Select Committee concludes its work, their words must
be a clarion call to all Americans: to vigilantly guard our
Democracy and to give our vote only to those dutiful in
their defense of our Constitution.
Let us always honor our oath to, as Abraham Lincoln said,
“nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.”
So help us God.
Nancy Pelosi
Nancy Pelosi Signature
NANCY PELOSI
Speaker of the House
Foreword: Chairman
We were told to remove our lapel pins.
At the start of every new Congress, House Members are
presented with lapel pins. They are about the size of a
quarter and carry a seal of a bald eagle.
On a routine day in the Capitol, there are thousands of
tourists, advocates, and workers. Typically, the pins are an
easy way to spot House members.
However, on January 6, 2021, the pin that once was a badge
of honor and distinction turned into a bullseye.
On that day, tear gas fogged the air as gunfire rang out,
and a violent mob crashed against the sealed doors.
Concerned for our safety, Capitol Police officers told us
that our lapel pins would make us a target for rioters.
As the Capitol Police rushed Members of Congress and staff
to safety, that simple and, in context, sensible warning
stuck with me. On January 6, 2021, my colleagues and I came
to work with the intent of fulfilling our oaths of office
and constitutional duty to carry out the peaceful transfer
of power. We were the people’s representatives in the
people’s House doing the people’s business. Sadly, on that
day, the danger was too great for our work to continue and
for us to remain in the Capitol. It was too dangerous to be
identified as a representative of the American people.
I’ve been a Member of the House for nearly 30 years. In that
time, there’s not a day that goes by that I don’t feel a
profound sense of duty and responsibility to the men and
women who sent me to Congress to be their voice. After all,
I’m from a part of the country where, in my lifetime, Black
people were excluded entirely from political processes. Jim
Crow laws prevented my father from registering to vote, and
tragically during his life, he never cast a vote.
For generations, the people in communities I represent have
struggled to have their voices heard by their government.
Therefore, I take my duties and responsibilities seriously,
advocating for greater economic opportunity, robust
infrastructure, better schools, and safer housing for my
constituents.
However, that long struggle to overcome oppression and
secure basic civil and human rights continues to be my
highest priority. I am always mindful of the journey that
brought me to Washington as a member of Congress to be the
voice of the women and men of Mississippi. As a violent mob
stormed the Capitol trying to take away people’s votes,
rioters carried the battle flag from a failed rebellion of
confederate states. This moment resonated deeply with me
because of my personal history. Additionally, I continually
think about the ongoing struggle to ensure justice and
equality for all Americans.
The Capitol building itself is a fixture in our country’s
history, of both good and bad. After all, this structure is
among the most recognizable symbols of American democracy.
The Capitol’s shining dome, topped with the statue of
goddess Freedom, was built partially by the labor of
enslaved people in the 18th and 19th centuries. Dark
chapters of America’s history are written into the
building’s marble, sandstone, and mortar. And yet in the
halls and chambers of this building, leaders of courage
passed amendments to our Constitution and enacted the laws
that banned slavery, guaranteed equal rights under the law,
expanded the vote, promoted equality, and moved our country,
and her people, forward. The Capitol Building itself is a
symbol of our journey toward a more perfect union. It is a
temple to our democracy.
Those great moments in our history have come when men and
women put loyalty to our country and Constitution ahead of
politics and party. They did the right thing. The work of
the Select Committee certainly originates from the same
tradition. Our bipartisan membership has moved politics to
the side and focused on the facts, circumstances, and causes
of January 6th.
When I think back to January 6th, after nearly a year and a
half of investigation, I am frightened about the peril our
democracy faced. Specifically, I think about what that mob
was there to do: to block the peaceful transfer of power
from one president to another based on a lie that the
election was rigged and tainted with widespread fraud.
I also think about why the rioters were there, besieging the
legislative branch of our government. The rioters were
inside the halls of Congress because the head of the
executive branch of our government, the then-President of
the United States, told them to attack. Donald Trump
summoned that mob to Washington, D.C. Afterward, he sent
them to the Capitol to try to prevent my colleagues and me
from doing our Constitutional duty to certify the election.
They put our very democracy to the test.
Trump’s mob came dangerously close to succeeding. Courageous
law enforcement officers put their lives on the line for
hours while Trump sat in the White House, refusing to tell
the rioters to go home, while watching the assault on our
republic unfold live on television.
When it was clear the insurrection would fail, Trump finally
called off the mob, telling them, “We love you.” Afterward,
Congress was able to return to this Capitol Building and
finish the job of counting the Electoral College votes and
certifying the election.
This is the key conclusion of the Select Committee, all nine
of us, Republicans and Democrats alike.
But who knows what would have happened if Trump’s mob had
succeeded in stopping us from doing our job? Who knows what
sort of constitutional grey zone our country would have slid
into? Who would have been left to correct that wrong?
As required by House Resolution 503, which established the
Select Committee, we’ve explored in great detail the facts,
circumstances, and causes of the attack. This report will
provide new details that supplement those findings the
committee already presented during our hearings.
But there are some questions for which there are still no
clear answers, even if all the facts, circumstances, and
causes are brought to bear. The “What If?” questions. For
the good of American democracy, those questions must never
again be put to the test. So, while it’s important that this
report lays out what happened, it’s just as important to
focus on how to make sure that January 6th was a one-time
event—to identify the ongoing threats that could lead us
down that dangerous path again—with hopes and humble prayers
that the committee’s work is carried on through corrective
action.
This report will provide greater detail about the multistep
effort devised and driven by Donald Trump to overturn the
2020 election and block the transfer of power. Building on
the information presented in our hearings earlier this year,
we will present new findings about Trump’s pressure campaign
on officials from the local level all the way up to his Vice
President, orchestrated and designed solely to throw out the
will of the voters and keep him in office past the end of
his elected term.
As we’ve shown previously, this plan faltered at several
points because of the courage of officials (nearly all of
them Republicans) who refused to go along with it. Donald
Trump appeared to believe that anyone who shared his
partisan affiliation would also share the same callous
disregard for his or her oath to uphold the rule of law.
Fortunately, he was wrong.
The failure of Trump’s plan was not assured. To the
contrary, Trump’s plan was successful at several turns. When
his scheme to stay in power through political pressure hit
roadblocks, he relentlessly pushed ahead with a parallel
plan: summoning a mob to gather in Washington, DC on January
6th, promising things “will be wild!”
That mob showed up. They were armed. They were angry. They
believed the “Big Lie” that the election had been stolen.
And when Donald Trump pointed them toward the Capitol and
told them to “fight like hell,” that’s exactly what they
did.
Donald Trump lit that fire. But in the weeks beforehand, the
kindling he ultimately ignited was amassed in plain sight.
That’s why as part of the Select Committee’s investigation,
we took a hard look at whether enough was done to mitigate
that risk. Our investigative teams focused on the way
intelligence was gathered, shared, and assessed. We probed
preparations by law enforcement agencies and security
responses on the day of the attack. We followed the money,
to determine who paid for a number of events in the run-up
to the attack and to gain a clearer understanding of the way
the former President’s campaign apparatus cashed in on the
big lie. And we pulled back the curtain at certain major
social media companies to determine if their policies and
protocols were up to the challenge when the President spread
a message of violence and his supporters began to plan and
coordinate their descent on Washington.
The Select Committee’s conclusion on these
matters—particularly dealing with intelligence and law
enforcement—is consistent with our broader findings about
the causes of January 6th. Were agencies perfect in their
preparations for January 6th and their responses as the
violence unfolded? Of course not. Relevant oversight
committees and watchdogs should continue to find
efficiencies and improvements, some of which are laid out in
Committee’s recommendations.
But the shortfall of communications, intelligence and law
enforcement around January 6th was much less about what they
did or did not know. It was more about what they could not
know. The President of the United States inciting a mob to
march on the Capitol and impede the work of Congress is not
a scenario our intelligence and law enforcement communities
envisioned for this country. Prior to January 6th, it was
unimaginable. Whatever weaknesses existed in the policies,
procedures, or institutions, they were not to blame for what
happened on that day.
And so, when I think about the ongoing threats—when I think
about how to avoid having to confront those “What-Ifs?” in
the future—my concerns are less with the mechanics of
intelligence gathering and security posture, as important as
those questions are. My concerns remain first and foremost
with those who continue to seek power at the expense of
American democracy.
What if those election officials had given in to Donald
Trump’s pressure? What if the Justice Department had gone
along with Trump’s scheme to declare the 2020 election
fraudulent? What if the Vice President had tried to throw
out electoral votes? What if the rioters bent on stopping
the peaceful transfer of power hadn’t been repelled?
To cast a vote in the United States of America is an act of
both hope and faith. When you drop that ballot in the ballot
box, you do so with the confidence that every person named
on that ballot will hold up their end of the bargain. The
person who wins must swear an oath and live up to it. The
people who come up short must accept the ultimate results
and abide by the will of the voters and the rule of law.
This faith in our institutions and laws is what upholds our
democracy.
If that faith is broken—if those who seek power accept only
the results of elections that they win—then American
democracy, only a few centuries old, comes tumbling down.
That’s the danger.
What’s the solution?
The Committee believes a good starting point is the set of
recommendations we set forth in our report, pursuant to
House Resolution 503. Driven by our investigative findings,
these recommendations will help strengthen the guardrails of
our democracy.
Beyond what we recommend, in my view and as I said during
our hearings, the best way to prevent another January 6th is
to ensure accountability for January 6th. Accountability at
all levels.
I have confidence in our Department of Justice and
institutions at the state and local level to ensure
accountability under the law. As this report is released, we
see those processes moving forward.
But preventing another January 6th will require a broader
sort of accountability. Ultimately, the American people
chart the course for our country’s future. The American
people decide whom to give the reins of power. If this
Select Committee has accomplished one thing, I hope it has
shed light on how dangerous it would be to empower anyone
whose desire for authority comes before their commitment to
American democracy and the Constitution.
I believe most Americans will turn their backs on those
enemies of democracy.
But some will rally to the side of the election deniers, and
when I think about who some of those people are, it troubles
me deep inside. White supremacists. Violent extremists.
Groups that subscribe to racism, anti-Semitism, and violent
conspiracy theories; those who would march through the halls
of the Capitol waving the Confederate battle flag.
These are people who want to take America backward, not
toward some imagined prior greatness, but toward repression.
These are people who want to roll back what we’ve
accomplished. I believe that those who aligned with the
scheme to overturn the election heeded Donald Trump’s call
to march on the Capitol because they thought taking up
Donald Trump’s cause was a way to advance their vile
ambitions.
That is why I did not remove my lapel pin on January 6th.
Our country has come too far to allow a defeated President
to turn himself into a successful tyrant by upending our
democratic institutions, fomenting violence, and, as I saw
it, opening the door to those in our country whose hatred
and bigotry threaten equality and justice for all Americans.
We can never surrender to democracy’s enemies. We can never
allow America to be defined by forces of division and
hatred. We can never go backward in the progress we have
made through the sacrifice and dedication of true patriots.
We can never and will never relent in our pursuit of a more
perfect union, with liberty and justice for all Americans.
I pray that God continues to bless the United States of
America.
Bennie Thompson
Bennie Thompson Signature
BENNIE G. THOMPSON
Chairman
Foreword: Vice Chair
In April 1861, when Abraham Lincoln issued the first call
for volunteers for the Union Army, my great-great
grandfather, Samuel Fletcher Cheney, joined the 21st Ohio
Volunteer Infantry. He fought through all four years of the
Civil War, from Chickamauga to Stones River to Atlanta. He
marched with his unit in the Grand Review of Troops up
Pennsylvania Avenue in May 1865, past a reviewing stand
where President Johnson and General Grant were seated.
Silas Canfield, the regimental historian of the 21st OVI,
described the men in the unit this way:
Industry had taught them perseverance, and they had learned
to turn aside for no obstacle. Their intelligence gave them
a just appreciation of the value and advantage of free
government, and the necessity of defending and maintaining
it, and they enlisted prepared to accept all the necessary
labors, fatigues, exposures, dangers, and even death for the
unity of our Nation, and the perpetuity of our institutions.
1
I have found myself thinking often, especially since January
6th, of my great-great grandfather, and all those in every
generation who have sacrificed so much for “the unity of our
Nation and the perpetuity of our institutions.”
At the heart of our Republic is the guarantee of the
peaceful transfer of power. Members of Congress are reminded
of this every day as we pass through the Capitol Rotunda.
There, eight magnificent paintings detail the earliest days
of our Republic. Four were painted by John Trumbull,
including one depicting the moment in 1793 when George
Washington resigned his commission, handing control of the
Continental Army back to Congress. Trumbull called this,
“one of the highest moral lessons ever given the world.”
With this noble act, George Washington established the
indispensable example of the peaceful transfer of power in
our nation.
Standing on the West Front of the Capitol in 1981, President
Ronald Reagan described it this way:
To a few of us here today, this is a solemn and most
momentous occasion, and yet in the history of our nation it
is a commonplace occurrence. The orderly transfer of
authority as called for in the Constitution routinely takes
place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us
stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many
in the world, this every-4-year ceremony we accept as normal
is nothing less than a miracle.
Every President in our history has defended this orderly
transfer of authority, except one. January 6, 2021 was the
first time one American President refused his Constitutional
duty to transfer power peacefully to the next.
In our work over the last 18 months, the Select Committee
has recognized our obligation to do everything we can to
ensure this never happens again. At the outset of our
investigation, we recognized that tens of millions of
Americans had been persuaded by President Trump that the
2020 Presidential election was stolen by overwhelming fraud.
We also knew this was flatly false, and that dozens of state
and federal judges had addressed and resolved all manner of
allegations about the election. Our legal system functioned
as it should, but our President would not accept the
outcome.
What most of the public did not know before our
investigation is this: Donald Trump’s own campaign officials
told him early on that his claims of fraud were false.
Donald Trump’s senior Justice Department officials —each
appointed by Donald Trump himself —investigated the
allegations and told him repeatedly that his fraud claims
were false. Donald Trump’s White House lawyers also told him
his fraud claims were false. From the beginning, Donald
Trump’s fraud allegations were concocted nonsense, designed
to prey upon the patriotism of millions of men and women who
love our country.
Most Americans also did not know exactly how Donald Trump,
along with a handful of others, planned to defeat the
transfer of Presidential power on January 6th. This was not
a simple plan, but it was a corrupt one. This report lays
that plan out in detail—a plan that ultimately had seven
parts, anticipating that Vice President Pence, serving in
his role as President of the Senate, would refuse to count
official Biden electoral slates from multiple states. We
understood from the beginning that explaining all the
planning and machinations would be complex and would require
many hours of public presentations and testimony. We also
understood that our presentations needed to be organized
into a series of hearings that presented the key evidence
for the American public to watch live or streamed over a
reasonable time period, rather than rely on second-hand
accounts as reported by media organizations with their own
editorial biases. We organized our hearings in segments to
meet that goal. Tens of millions of Americans watched.
Among the most shameful findings from our hearings was this:
President Trump sat in the dining room off the Oval Office
watching the violent riot at the Capitol on television. For
hours, he would not issue a public statement instructing his
supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol, despite urgent
pleas from his White House staff and dozens of others to do
so. Members of his family, his White House lawyers,
virtually all those around him knew that this simple act was
critical. For hours, he would not do it. During this time,
law enforcement agents were attacked and seriously injured,
the Capitol was invaded, the electoral count was halted and
the lives of those in the Capitol were put at risk. In
addition to being unlawful, as described in this report,
this was an utter moral failure—and a clear dereliction of
duty. Evidence of this can be seen in the testimony of his
White House Counsel and several other White House witnesses.
No man who would behave that way at that moment in time can
ever serve in any position of authority in our nation again.
He is unfit for any office.
* * *
In presenting all of the information in our hearings, we
decided that the vast majority of our witnesses needed to be
Republicans. They were. We presented evidence from two
former Trump Administration Attorneys General, a former
White House Counsel, many former Trump-appointed White
House, Justice Department, and Trump Campaign staff, a
respected former conservative judge, the former Secretary of
Labor, and many others.
Like our hearings, this report is designed to deliver our
findings in detail in a format that is accessible for all
Americans. We do so in an executive summary, while also
providing immense detail for historians and others. We are
also releasing transcripts and evidence for the public to
review, consistent with a small number of security and
privacy concerns. A section of this report also explains the
legal conclusions we draw from the evidence, and our
concerns about efforts to obstruct our investigation.
The Committee recognizes that this investigation is just a
beginning; it is only an initial step in addressing
President Trump’s effort to remain in office illegally.
Prosecutors are considering the implications of the conduct
we describe in this report. As are voters. John Adams wrote
in 1761, “The very ground of our liberties is the freedom of
elections.” Faith in our elections and the rule of law are
paramount to our Republic. Election-deniers—those who refuse
to accept lawful election results—purposely attack the rule
of law and the foundation of our country.
As you read this report, please consider this: Vice
President Pence, along with many of the appointed officials
who surrounded Donald Trump, worked to defeat many of the
worst parts of Trump’s plan to overturn the election. This
was not a certainty. It is comforting to assume that the
institutions of our Republic will always withstand those who
try to defeat our Constitution from within. But our
institutions are only strong when those who hold office are
faithful to our Constitution. We do not know what would have
happened if the leadership of the Department of Justice
declared, as Donald Trump requested, that the election was
“corrupt,” if Jeff Clark’s letters to State Legislatures had
been sent, if Pat Cipollone, Jeff Rosen, Richard Donoghue,
Steve Engel and others were not serving as guardrails on
Donald Trump’s abuses.
Part of the tragedy of January 6 th is the conduct of those
who knew that what happened was profoundly wrong, but
nevertheless tried to downplay it, minimize it or defend
those responsible. That effort continues every day. Today, I
am perhaps most disappointed in many of my fellow
conservatives who know better, those who stood against the
threats of communism and Islamic terrorism but concluded
that it was easier to appease Donald Trump, or keep their
heads down. I had hoped for more from them.
The late Charles Krauthammer wrote, “The lesson of our
history is that the task of merely maintaining strong and
sturdy the structures of a constitutional order is unending,
the continuing and ceaseless work of every generation.” This
task is unending because democracy can be fragile and our
institutions do not defend themselves.
The history of our time will show that the bravery of a
handful of Americans, doing their duty, saved us from an
even more grave Constitutional crisis. Elected officials,
election workers, and public servants stood against Donald
Trump’s corrupt pressure. Many of our witnesses showed
selfless patriotism and their words and courage will be
remembered.
The brave men and women of the Capitol Police, Metropolitan
Police and all the other law enforcement officers who fought
to defend us that day undoubtedly saved lives and our
democracy.
Finally, I wish to thank all who honorably contributed to
the work of the Committee and to this Report. We
accomplished much over a relatively short period of time,
and many of you sacrificed for the good of your nation. You
have helped make history and, I hope, helped right the ship.
Liz Cheney
Liz Cheney Signature
LIZ CHENEY
Vice Chair
ENDNOTE
1. Silas S. Canfield, History of the 21st Regiment Ohio
Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Rebellion (Vrooman,
Anderson & Bateman, printers, 1893), p. 10.
Table of Contents
Preliminaries
Foreword: Speaker of the House
Foreword: Chairman
Foreword: Vice Chair
Executive Summary
Executive Summary: Overview of the Evidence Developed
Referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel
and House Ethics Committee
Efforts to Avoid Testifying, Evidence of Obstruction, and
Assessments of Witness Credibility
Summary: Creation of the Select Committee; Purposes.
Select Committee Witnesses Were Almost Entirely Republican
Narrative
Chapter 1. THE BIG LIE
1.1 The Big Lie Reflected Deliberate Exploitation of the
“Red Mirage”
1.2 Trump’s Pre-Election Plans to Declare Victory
1.3 Trump’s Pre-Election Efforts to Delegitimize the
Election Process
1.4 President Trump’s Launch of the Big Lie
1.5 Post-Election: President Trump Replaces His Campaign
Team
1.6 President Trump’s Campaign Team Told Him He Lost the
Election and There Was No Significant Fraud
1.7 President Trump Had His Day in Court
1.8 President Trump Repeatedly Promoted Conspiracy Theories
1.9 President Trump’s January 6th Speech
Chapter 2. “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES”
2.1 The Electoral College, and President Trump’s Attempt to
Subvert It
2.2 The Plan Emerges
2.3 Outreach and Implementation of the Plan
2.4 An Outright Request for Victory
2.5 Some Officials Eagerly Assisted President Trump With His
Plans
2.6 The Final Outreach to State Legislators
2.7 The Harm Caused by Demonizing Public Servants
Chapter 3. FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE STRATEGY”
3.1 Laying the Groundwork for the Fake Elector Plan: The
Chesebro Memos
3.2 President Trump and the Campaign Adopt the Fake Elector
Scheme
3.3 The Campaign Legal Team Bows Out, and Giuliani Steps In
3.4 Some of the Proposed Fake Electors Express Concerns
About the Plan
3.5 On December 14th, The Fake Electors Meet and Vote
3.6 The Fallout from the Fake Elector Plan
Chapter 4. “JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME”
4.1 The DOJ Found No Significant Evidence of Fraud
4.2 November 23, 2020: Barr Challenges President Trump’s
Election Lies
4.3 December 1, 2020: President Trump is Irate After Barr
Says There is No Significant Fraud
4.4 December 14, 2020: Barr Submits His Resignation
4.5 Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen and Acting Deputy
Attorney General Richard Donoghue Hold the Line
4.6 President Trump is Introduced to Jeffrey Clark
4.7 December 27th Phone Call
4.8 Congressman Scott Perry Calls Donoghue
4.9 December 28, 2020: The Clark Letter
4.10 December 29th Meeting
4.11 Rosen’s December 30th Call with President Trump
4.12 December 31st Meeting
4.13 January 2, 2021: Rosen and Donoghue Confront Clark
Again
4.14 January 3, 2021: Clark Informs DOJ Leadership that He
Will Accept President Trump’s Offer
4.15 President Trump’s Unprecedented Attempt to Subvert the
DOJ
Chapter 5. “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY”
5.1 President Trump and His Allies Embark on a Desperate
Gambit to Block Certification of the 2020 Presidential
Election.
5.2 President Trump and his Allies Exert Intense Public and
Private Pressure on the Vice President in Advance of the
Joint Session of Congress on January 6th
5.3 President Trump and his Allies Continue to Pressure the
Vice President on January 6th, Threatening His Life and Our
Democracy.
5.4 President Trump Endangers Pence’s Life, Causing the Vice
President, His Family, and Staff to Narrowly Miss the
Rioters as They Flee the Mob Attacking the Capitol.
5.5 Aftermath of the Attack.
Chapter 6. “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!”
6.1 How Far-right Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists
Planned for January 6th
6.2 The Proud Boys: “[Y]ou Want to Storm the Capitol”
6.3 The Oath Keepers: “He Called Us All to the Capitol and
Wants Us to Make it Wild!!!”
6.4 “Trump Said It’s Gonna be Wild!!!!!!! It’s Gonna be
Wild!!!!!!!”
6.5 “Ready to Step in And Do What Is Needed”
6.6 “Friends of Stone”
6.7 White Nationalists: “The Capitol Siege was Fucking
Awesome…”
6.8 The Three (III%) Percenters: “#OccupyCongress”
6.9 QAnon: “Operation Occupy the Capitol”
6.10 TheDonald.win: “Occupy the Capitol”
6.11 How the White House and Rally Organizers Prepared for
January 6th
6.12 “He’s Calling on You, He Needs Your Help”
6.13 “Trump is Supposed to Order Us to the Capitol”
6.14 “Well, I Should Walk With the People.”
6.15 “POTUS…Likes the Crazies.”
6.16 January 5, 2021: “Fort Trump”
6.17 “Together, We Will STOP THE STEAL.”
Chapter 7. 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION
7.1 “Reinsert the Mike Pence Lines”
7.2 “I’ll Be There With You”
7.3 The President’s Anger When He Could Not March to the
Capitol
7.4 “We’re Going to Try to Get the President to Put Out a
Statement”
7.5 “He Doesn’t Want to Do Anything”
7.6 “He Thinks Mike Deserves It”
7.7 “I Guess They’re Just More Upset About the Election
Theft Than You Are”
7.8 “Stay Peaceful!”
7.9 “The President Needs to Stop This ASAP”
7.10 “We Love You. You’re Very Special”
7.11 “Remember This Day Forever!”
7.12 President Trump Still Sought to Delay the Joint Session
7.13 He “Just Didn’t Want to Talk About It Anymore”
7.14 President Trump’s “Rhetoric Killed Someone”
Chapter 8. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK
8.1 The Mob Assembles in Washington
8.2 March of the Proud Boys
8.3 The Initial Attack
8.4 President Trump’s Mob Descends on the U.S. Capitol
8.5 The Mob Surges
8.6 The United States Capitol is Breached
8.7 President Trump Pours Fuel on the Fire
8.8 The Evacuation
8.9 Clearing the U.S. Capitol Building and Restricted
Grounds
Recommendations
Recommendations
Appendices
APPENDIX 1: GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO JANUARY 6TH
APPENDIX 2: DC NATIONAL GUARD PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO JANUARY 6TH
APPENDIX 3: THE BIG RIP-OFF: FOLLOW THE MONEY
APPENDIX 4: MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE
Executive Summary
On October 31, 2022, in a Federal courthouse in Washington,
DC, Graydon Young testified against Stewart Rhodes and other
members of the Oath Keepers militia group. The defendants
had been charged with seditious conspiracy against the
United States and other crimes related to the January 6,
2021, attack on Congress.1
In his testimony that day, Young explained to the jury how
he and other Oath Keepers were provoked to travel to
Washington by President Donald Trump’s tweets and by Trump’s
false claims that the 2020 Presidential election was
“stolen” from him.2 And, in emotional testimony, Young
acknowledged what he and others believed they were doing on
January 6th: attacking Congress in the manner the French had
attacked the Bastille at the outset of the French
Revolution.3 Reflecting on that day more than a year and
half later, Young testified:
Prosecutor: And so how do you feel about the fact that you
were pushing towards a line of police officers?
Young: Today I feel extremely ashamed and embarrassed. . . .
Prosecutor: How did you feel at the time?
Young: I felt like, again, we were continuing in some kind
of historical event to achieve a goal.
* * *
Prosecutor: Looking back now almost two years later, what
would that make you as someone who was coming to D.C. to
fight against the government?
Young: I guess I was [acting] like a traitor, somebody
against my own government.4
Young’s testimony was dramatic, but not unique. Many
participants in the attack on the Capitol acknowledged that
they had betrayed their own country:
Reimler: “And I’m sorry to the people of this country for
threatening the democracy that makes this country so great .
. . My participation in the events that day were part of an
attack on the rule of law.” 5
Pert: “I know that the peaceful transition of power is to
ensure the common good for our nation and that it is
critical in protecting our country’s security needs. I am
truly sorry for my part and accept full responsibility for
my actions.” 6
Markofski: “My actions put me on the other side of the line
from my brothers in the Army. The wrong side. Had I lived in
the area, I would have been called up to defend the Capitol
and restore order . . . My actions brought dishonor to my
beloved U.S. Army National Guard.” 7
Witcher: “Every member—every male member of my family has
served in the military, in the Marine Corps, and most have
saw combat. And I cast a shadow and cast embarrassment upon
my family name and that legacy.” 8
Edwards: “I am ashamed to be for the first time in my 68
years, standing before a judge, having pleaded guilty to
committing a crime, ashamed to be associated with an attack
on the United States Capitol, a symbol of American democracy
and greatness that means a great deal to me.” 9
Protestors gather at the Capitol.
Protestors gather at the Capitol.
(Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)
Hundreds of other participants in the January 6th attack
have pleaded guilty, been convicted, or await trial for
crimes related to their actions that day. And, like Young,
hundreds of others have acknowledged exactly what provoked
them to travel to Washington, and to engage in violence. For
example:
Ronald Sandlin, who threatened police officers in the
Capitol saying, “[y]ou’re going to die,” posted on December
23, 2020: “I’m going to be there to show support for our
president and to do my part to stop the steal and stand
behind Trump when he decides to cross the rubicon. If you
are a patriot I believe it’s your duty to be there. I see it
as my civic responsibility.” 10
Garret Miller, who brought a gun to the Capitol on January
6th, explained: “I was in Washington, D.C. on January 6,
2021, because I believed I was following the instructions of
former President Trump and he was my president and the
commander-in-chief. His statements also had me believing the
election was stolen from him.” 11
John Douglas Wright explained that he brought busloads of
people to Washington, DC, on January 6th “because [Trump]
called me there, and he laid out what is happening in our
government.” 12
Lewis Cantwell testified: If “the President of the United
States . . . [is] out on TV telling the world that it was
stolen, what else would I believe, as a patriotic American
who voted for him and wants to continue to see the country
thrive as I thought it was?” 13
Likewise, Stephen Ayres testified that “with everything the
President was putting out” ahead of January 6th that “the
election was rigged . . . the votes were wrong and stuff. .
. it just got into my head.” “The President [was] calling on
us to come” to Washington, DC. 14 Ayres “was hanging on
every word he [President Trump] was saying” 15 Ayres posted
that “Civil War will ensue” if President Trump did not stay
in power after January 6th.16
The Committee has compiled hundreds of similar statements
from participants in the January 6th attack.17
House Resolution 503 instructed the Select Committee to
“investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and
causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist
attack upon the United States Capitol Complex” and to “issue
a final report” containing “findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for corrective measures.” The Select
Committee has conducted nine public hearings, presenting
testimony from more than 70 witnesses. In structuring our
investigation and hearings, we began with President Trump’s
contentions that the election was stolen and took testimony
from nearly all of the President’s principal advisors on
this topic. We focused on the rulings of more than 60
Federal and State courts rejecting President Trump’s and his
supporters’ efforts to reverse the electoral outcome.
Despite the rulings of these courts, we understood that
millions of Americans still lack the information necessary
to understand and evaluate what President Trump has told
them about the election. For that reason, our hearings
featured a number of members of President Trump’s inner
circle refuting his fraud claims and testifying that the
election was not in fact stolen. In all, the Committee
displayed the testimony of more than four dozen
Republicans—by far the majority of witnesses in our
hearings—including two of President Trump’s former Attorneys
General, his former White House Counsel, numerous members of
his White House staff, and the highest-ranking members of
his 2020 election campaign, including his campaign manager
and his campaign general counsel. Even key individuals who
worked closely with President Trump to try to overturn the
2020 election on January 6th ultimately admitted that they
lacked actual evidence sufficient to change the election
result, and they admitted that what they were attempting was
unlawful.18
This Report supplies an immense volume of information and
testimony assembled through the Select Committee’s
investigation, including information obtained following
litigation in Federal district and appellate courts, as well
as in the U.S. Supreme Court. Based upon this assembled
evidence, the Committee has reached a series of specific
findings,19 including the following:
Beginning election night and continuing through January 6th
and thereafter, Donald Trump purposely disseminated false
allegations of fraud related to the 2020 Presidential
election in order to aid his effort to overturn the election
and for purposes of soliciting contributions. These false
claims provoked his supporters to violence on January 6th.
Knowing that he and his supporters had lost dozens of
election lawsuits, and despite his own senior advisors
refuting his election fraud claims and urging him to concede
his election loss, Donald Trump refused to accept the lawful
result of the 2020 election. Rather than honor his
constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” President Trump instead plotted to
overturn the election outcome.
Despite knowing that such an action would be illegal, and
that no State had or would submit an altered electoral
slate, Donald Trump corruptly pressured Vice President Mike
Pence to refuse to count electoral votes during Congress’s
joint session on January 6th.
Donald Trump sought to corrupt the U.S. Department of
Justice by attempting to enlist Department officials to make
purposely false statements and thereby aid his effort to
overturn the Presidential election. After that effort
failed, Donald Trump offered the position of Acting Attorney
General to Jeff Clark knowing that Clark intended to
disseminate false information aimed at overturning the
election.
Without any evidentiary basis and contrary to State and
Federal law, Donald Trump unlawfully pressured State
officials and legislators to change the results of the
election in their States.
Donald Trump oversaw an effort to obtain and transmit false
electoral certificates to Congress and the National
Archives.
Donald Trump pressured Members of Congress to object to
valid slates of electors from several States.
Donald Trump purposely verified false information filed in
Federal court.
Based on false allegations that the election was stolen,
Donald Trump summoned tens of thousands of supporters to
Washington for January 6th. Although these supporters were
angry and some were armed, Donald Trump instructed them to
march to the Capitol on January 6th to “take back” their
country.
Knowing that a violent attack on the Capitol was underway
and knowing that his words would incite further violence,
Donald Trump purposely sent a social media message publicly
condemning Vice President Pence at 2:24 p.m. on January 6th.
Knowing that violence was underway at the Capitol, and
despite his duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed, Donald Trump refused repeated requests over a
multiple hour period that he instruct his violent supporters
to disperse and leave the Capitol, and instead watched the
violent attack unfold on television. This failure to act
perpetuated the violence at the Capitol and obstructed
Congress’s proceeding to count electoral votes.
Each of these actions by Donald Trump was taken in support
of a multi-part conspiracy to overturn the lawful results of
the 2020 Presidential election.
The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies did
successfully detect the planning for potential violence on
January 6th, including planning specifically by the Proud
Boys and Oath Keeper militia groups who ultimately led the
attack on the Capitol. As January 6th approached, the
intelligence specifically identified the potential for
violence at the U.S. Capitol. This intelligence was shared
within the executive branch, including with the Secret
Service and the President’s National Security Council.
Intelligence gathered in advance of January 6th did not
support a conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups
would likely engage in a violent counter-demonstration, or
attack Trump supporters on January 6th. Indeed, intelligence
from January 5th indicated that some left-wing groups were
instructing their members to “stay at home” and not attend
on January 6th.20 Ultimately, none of these groups was
involved to any material extent with the attack on the
Capitol on January 6th.
Neither the intelligence community nor law enforcement
obtained intelligence in advance of January 6th on the full
extent of the ongoing planning by President Trump, John
Eastman, Rudolph Giuliani and their associates to overturn
the certified election results. Such agencies apparently did
not (and potentially could not) anticipate the provocation
President Trump would offer the crowd in his Ellipse speech,
that President Trump would “spontaneously” instruct the
crowd to march to the Capitol, that President Trump would
exacerbate the violent riot by sending his 2:24 p.m. tweet
condemning Vice President Pence, or the full scale of the
violence and lawlessness that would ensue. Nor did law
enforcement anticipate that President Trump would refuse to
direct his supporters to leave the Capitol once violence
began. No intelligence community advance analysis predicted
exactly how President Trump would behave; no such analysis
recognized the full scale and extent of the threat to the
Capitol on January 6th.
Hundreds of Capitol and DC Metropolitan police officers
performed their duties bravely on January 6th, and America
owes those individuals immense gratitude for their courage
in the defense of Congress and our Constitution. Without
their bravery, January 6th would have been far worse.
Although certain members of the Capitol Police leadership
regarded their approach to January 6th as “all hands on
deck,” the Capitol Police leadership did not have sufficient
assets in place to address the violent and lawless crowd.21
Capitol Police leadership did not anticipate the scale of
the violence that would ensue after President Trump
instructed tens of thousands of his supporters in the
Ellipse crowd to march to the Capitol, and then tweeted at
2:24 p.m. Although Chief Steven Sund raised the idea of
National Guard support, the Capitol Police Board did not
request Guard assistance prior to January 6th. The
Metropolitan Police took an even more proactive approach to
January 6th, and deployed roughly 800 officers, including
responding to the emergency calls for help at the Capitol.
Rioters still managed to break their line in certain
locations, when the crowd surged forward in the immediate
aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet. The Department
of Justice readied a group of Federal agents at Quantico and
in the District of Columbia, anticipating that January 6th
could become violent, and then deployed those agents once it
became clear that police at the Capitol were overwhelmed.
Agents from the Department of Homeland Security were also
deployed to assist.
President Trump had authority and responsibility to direct
deployment of the National Guard in the District of
Columbia, but never gave any order to deploy the National
Guard on January 6th or on any other day. Nor did he
instruct any Federal law enforcement agency to assist.
Because the authority to deploy the National Guard had been
delegated to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of
Defense could, and ultimately did deploy the Guard. Although
evidence identifies a likely miscommunication between
members of the civilian leadership in the Department of
Defense impacting the timing of deployment, the Committee
has found no evidence that the Department of Defense
intentionally delayed deployment of the National Guard. The
Select Committee recognizes that some at the Department had
genuine concerns, counseling caution, that President Trump
might give an illegal order to use the military in support
of his efforts to overturn the election.
* * *
This Report begins with a factual overview framing each of
these conclusions and summarizing what our investigation
found. That overview is in turn supported by eight chapters
identifying the very specific evidence of each of the
principal elements of President Trump’s multi-part plan to
overturn the election, along with evidence regarding
intelligence gathered before January 6th and security
shortfalls that day.
Although the Committee’s hearings were viewed live by tens
of millions of Americans and widely publicized in nearly
every major news source,22 the Committee also recognizes
that other news outlets and commentators have actively
discouraged viewers from watching, and that millions of
other Americans have not yet seen the actual evidence
addressed by this Report. Accordingly, the Committee is also
releasing video summaries of relevant evidence on each major
topic investigated.
This Report also examines the legal implications of Donald
Trump and his co-conspirators’ conduct and includes criminal
referrals to the Department of Justice regarding President
Trump and certain other individuals. The criminal referrals
build upon three relevant rulings issued by a Federal
district court and explain in detail how the facts found
support further evaluation by the Department of Justice of
specific criminal charges. To assist the public in
understanding the nature and importance of this material,
this Report also contains sections identifying how the
Committee has evaluated the credibility of its witnesses and
suggests that the Department of Justice further examine
possible efforts to obstruct our investigation. We also note
that more than 30 witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, others invoked
Executive Privilege or categorically refused to appear
(including Steve Bannon, who has since been convicted of
contempt of Congress).
Finally, this report identifies a series of legislative
recommendations, including the Presidential Election Reform
Act, which has already passed the House of Representatives.
Executive Summary: Overview of the Evidence Developed
In the Committee’s hearings, we presented evidence of what
ultimately became a multi-part plan to overturn the 2020
Presidential election. That evidence has led to an
overriding and straightforward conclusion: the central cause
of January 6th was one man, former President Donald Trump,
whom many others followed. None of the events of January 6th
would have happened without him.
The Big Lie
In the weeks before election day 2020, Donald Trump’s
campaign experts, including his campaign manager Bill
Stepien, advised him that the election results would not be
fully known on election night.23 This was because certain
States would not begin to count absentee and other mail-in
votes until election day or after election-day polls had
closed.24 Because Republican voters tend to vote in greater
numbers on election day and Democratic voters tend to vote
in greater numbers in advance of election day, it was widely
anticipated that Donald Trump could initially appear to have
a lead, but that the continued counting of mail-in, absentee
and other votes beginning election night would erode and
could overcome that perceived lead.25 Thus, as President
Trump’s campaign manager cautioned, understanding the
results of the 2020 election would be a lengthy “process,”
and an initial appearance of a Trump lead could be a “red
mirage.” 26 This was not unique to the 2020 election;
similar scenarios had played out in prior elections as
well.27
Prior to the 2020 election, Donald Trump’s campaign manager
Bill Stepien, along with House Republican Leader Kevin
McCarthy, urged President Trump to embrace mail-in voting as
potentially beneficial to the Trump Campaign.28 Presidential
advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner recounted others giving
Donald Trump the same advice: “[M]ail in ballots could be a
good thing for us if we looked at it correctly.” 29 Multiple
States, including Florida, had successfully utilized mail-in
voting in prior elections, and in 2020.30 Trump White House
Counselor Hope Hicks testified: “I think he [President
Trump] understood that a lot of people vote via absentee
ballot in places like Florida and have for a long time and
that it’s worked fine.” 31 Donald Trump won in numerous
States that allowed no-excuse absentee voting in 2020,
including Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Wyoming.32
On election night 2020, the election returns were reported
in almost exactly the way that Stepien and other Trump
Campaign experts predicted, with the counting of mail-in and
absentee ballots gradually diminishing President Trump’s
perceived lead. As the evening progressed, President Trump
called in his campaign team to discuss the results. Stepien
and other campaign experts advised him that the results of
the election would not be known for some time, and that he
could not truthfully declare victory.33 “It was far too
early to be making any calls like that. Ballots—ballots were
still being counted. Ballots were still going to be counted
for days.” 34
Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Select
Committee that he argued against declaring victory at that
time as well, because “it was too early to say one way [or]
the other” who had won.35 Stepien advised Trump to say that
“votes were still being counted. It’s too early to tell, too
early to call the race but, you know, we are proud of the
race we run—we ran and we, you know, think we’re—think we’re
in a good position” and would say more in the coming days.36
President Trump refused, and instead said this in his public
remarks that evening: “This is a fraud on the American
public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were
getting ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this
election. We did win this election . . . . We want all
voting to stop.” 37 And on the morning of November 5th, he
tweeted “STOP THE COUNT!” 38 Halting the counting of votes
at that point would have violated both State and Federal
laws.39
According to testimony received by the Select Committee, the
only advisor present who supported President Trump’s
inclination to declare victory was Rudolph Giuliani, who
appeared to be inebriated.40 President Trump’s Attorney
General, William Barr, who had earlier left the election
night gathering, perceived the President’s statement this
way:
[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President
claimed that there was major fraud underway. I mean, this
happened, as far as I could tell, before there was actually
any potential of looking at evidence. He claimed there was
major fraud. And it seemed to be based on the dynamic that,
at the end of the evening, a lot of Democratic votes came in
which changed the vote counts in certain States, and that
seemed to be the basis for this broad claim that there was
major fraud. And I didn’t think much of that, because people
had been talking for weeks and everyone understood for weeks
that that was going to be what happened on election night .
. . . 41
President Trump declares victory in a speech at an election
night party.
President Trump declares victory in a speech at an election
night party.
(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
President Trump’s decision to declare victory falsely on
election night and, unlawfully, to call for the vote
counting to stop, was not a spontaneous decision. It was
premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of
evidence of President Trump’s preplanning for a false
declaration of victory. This includes multiple written
communications on October 31 and November 3, 2020, to the
White House by Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.42 This
evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with
President Trump and understood that President Trump would
falsely declare victory on election night and call for vote
counting to stop. The evidence also includes an audio
recording of President Trump’s advisor Steve Bannon, who
said this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates
from China:
And what Trump’s gonna do is just declare victory, right?
He’s gonna declare victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s a
winner. He’s just gonna say he’s a winner . . . The
Democrats—more of our people vote early that count. Theirs
vote in mail. And so they’re gonna have a natural
disadvantage, and Trump’s going to take advantage of
it—that’s our strategy. He’s gonna declare himself a winner.
So when you wake up Wednesday morning, it’s going to be a
firestorm . . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by 10
or 11 o’clock at night, it’s going to be even crazier. No,
because he’s gonna sit right there and say “They stole it.
I’m directing the Attorney General to shut down all ballot
places in all 50 states.” It’s going to be, no, he’s not
going out easy. If Trump—if Biden’s winning, Trump is going
to do some crazy shit.43
Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another
outside advisor to President Trump, made this statement:
I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When
that happens, the key thing to do is to claim victory.
Possession is nine-tenths of the law. No, we won. Fuck you,
Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong. Fuck you.44
On election day, Vice President Pence’s staff, including his
Chief of Staff and Counsel, became concerned that President
Trump might falsely claim victory that evening. The Vice
President’s Counsel, Greg Jacob, testified about their
concern that the Vice President might be asked improperly to
echo such a false statement.45 Jacob drafted a memorandum
with this specific recommendation: “[I]t is essential that
the Vice President not be perceived by the public as having
decided questions concerning disputed electoral votes prior
to the full development of all relevant facts.” 46
Millions of Americans believed that President Trump was
telling the truth on election night—that President Trump
actually had proof the election was stolen and that the
ongoing counting of votes was an act of fraud.
As votes were being counted in the days after the election,
President Trump’s senior campaign advisors informed him that
his chances of success were almost zero.
Former Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien testified that he
had come to this conclusion by November 7th, and told
President Trump:
Committee Staff: What was your view on the state of the
election at that point?
Stepien: You know, very, very, very bleak. You know, I—we
told him—the group that went over there outlined, you know,
my belief and chances for success at this point. And then we
pegged that at, you know, 5, maybe 10 percent based on
recounts that were—that, you know, either were automatically
initiated or could be—could be initiated based on, you know,
realistic legal challenges, not all the legal challenges
that eventually were pursued. But, you know, it was—you
know, my belief is that it was a very, very—5 to 10 percent
is not a very good optimistic outlook.47
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller testified to the
Committee about this exchange:
Miller: I was in the Oval Office. And at some point in the
conversation Matt Oczkowski, who was the lead data person,
was brought on, and I remember he delivered to the President
in pretty blunt terms that he was going to lose.
Committee Staff: And that was based, Mr. Miller, on Matt and
the data team’s assessment of this sort of county-by-county,
State-by-State results as reported?
Miller: Correct.48
In one of the Select Committee’s hearings, former Fox News
political editor Chris Stirewalt was asked what the chance
President Trump had of winning the election after November
7th, when the votes were tallied and every news organization
had called the race for now-President Biden. His response:
“None.” 49
As the Committee’s hearings demonstrated, President Trump
made a series of statements to White House staff and others
during this time period indicating his understanding that he
had lost.50 President Trump also took consequential actions
reflecting his understanding that he would be leaving office
on January 20th. For example, President Trump personally
signed a Memorandum and Order instructing his Department of
Defense to withdraw all military forces from Somalia by
December 31, 2020, and from Afghanistan by January 15,
2021.51 General Keith Kellogg (ret.), who had been appointed
by President Trump as Chief of Staff for the National
Security Council and was Vice President Pence’s National
Security Advisor on January 6th, told the Select Committee
that “[a]n immediate departure that that memo said would
have been catastrophic. It’s the same thing what President
Biden went through. It would have been a debacle.” 52
In the weeks that followed the election, President Trump’s
campaign experts and his senior Justice Department officials
were informing him and others in the White House that there
was no genuine evidence of fraud sufficient to change the
results of the election. For example, former Attorney
General Barr testified:
And I repeatedly told the President in no uncertain terms
that I did not see evidence of fraud, you know, that would
have affected the outcome of the election. And, frankly, a
year and a half later, I haven’t seen anything to change my
mind on that.53
Former Trump Campaign lawyer Alex Cannon, who was asked to
oversee incoming information about voter fraud and set up a
voter fraud tip line, told the Select Committee about a
pertinent call with White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows
in November 2020:
Cannon: So I remember a call with Mr. Meadows where Mr.
Meadows was asking me what I was finding and if I was
finding anything. And I remember sharing with him that we
weren’t finding anything that would be sufficient to change
the results in any of the key States.
Committee Staff: When was that conversation?
Cannon: Probably in November. Mid- to late November . . . .
Committee Staff: And what was Mr. Meadows’s reaction to that
information?
Cannon: I believe the words he used were: “So there is no
there there?” 54
President Trump’s Campaign Manager Bill Stepien recalled
that President Trump was being told “wild allegations” and
that it was the Campaign’s job to “track [the allegations]
down”:
Committee Staff: You said that you were very confident that
you were telling the President the truth in your dealings
with [him]. And had your team been able to verify any of
these allegations of fraud, would you have reported those to
the President?
Stepien: Sure.
Committee Staff: Did you ever have to report that—
Stepien: One of my frustrations would be that, you know,
people would throw out, you know, these reports, these
allegations, these things that they heard or saw in a State,
and they’d tell President Trump. And, you know, it would be
the campaign’s job to track down the information, the facts.
And, you know, President Trump, you know—if someone’s
saying, hey, you know, all these votes aren’t counted or
were miscounted, you know, if you’re down in a State like
Arizona, you liked hearing that. It would be our job to
track it down and come up dry because the allegation didn’t
prove to be true. And we’d have to, you know, relay the news
that, yeah, that tip that someone told you about those votes
or that fraud or, you know, nothing came of it.
That would be our job as, you know, the truth telling squad
and, you know, not—not a fun job to be, you know, much—it’s
an easier job to be telling the President about, you know,
wild allegations. It’s a harder job to be telling him on the
back end that, yeah, that wasn’t true.
Committee Staff: How did he react to those types of
conversations where you [told] him that an allegation or
another wasn’t true?
Stepien: He was—he had—usually he had pretty clear eyes.
Like, he understood, you know—you know, we told him where we
thought the race was, and I think he was pretty realistic
with our viewpoint, in agreement with our viewpoint of kind
of the forecast and the uphill climb we thought he had.55
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the
Committee that he informed President Trump “several” times
that “specific to election day fraud and irregularities,
there were not enough to overturn the election.” 56
Vice President Pence has also said publicly that he told
President Trump there was no basis to allege that the
election was stolen. When a reporter recently asked “Did you
ever point blank say to the President [that] we lost this
election?,” Pence responded that “I did . . . Many
times.” 57 Pence has also explained:
There was never evidence of widespread fraud. I don’t
believe fraud changed the outcome of the election. But the
President and the Campaign had every right to have those
examined in court. But I told the President that, once those
legal challenges played out, he should simply accept the
outcome of the election and move on.58
The General Counsel of President Trump’s campaign, Matthew
Morgan, informed members of the White House staff, and
likely many others, of the Campaign’s conclusion that none
of the allegations of fraud and irregularities could be
sufficient to change the outcome of the election:
What was generally discussed on that topic was whether the
fraud, maladministration, abuse, or irregularities, if
aggregated and read most favorably to the campaign, would
that be outcome determinative. And I think everyone’s
assessment in the room, at least amongst the staff, Marc
Short, myself, and Greg Jacob, was that it was not
sufficient to be outcome determinative.59
In a meeting on November 23rd, Barr told President Trump
that the Justice Department was doing its duty by
investigating every fraud allegation “if it’s specific,
credible, and could’ve affected the outcome,” but that
“they’re just not meritorious. They’re not panning out.” 60
Barr then told the Associated Press on December 1st that the
Department had “not seen fraud on a scale that could have
effected a different outcome in the election.” 61 Next, he
reiterated this point in private meetings with the President
both that afternoon and on December 14th, as well as in his
final press conference as Attorney General later that
month.62 The Department of Homeland Security had reached a
similar determination two weeks earlier: “There is no
evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes,
changed votes, or was in any way compromised.” 63
In addition, multiple other high ranking Justice Department
personnel appointed by President Trump also informed him
repeatedly that the allegations were false. As January 6th
drew closer, Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy
Attorney General Donoghue had calls with President Trump on
almost a daily basis explaining in detail what the
Department’s investigations showed.64 Acting Deputy Attorney
General Richard Donoghue told the Select Committee that he
and Acting Attorney General Rosen tried “to put it in very
clear terms to the President. And I said something to the
effect of ‘Sir, we’ve done dozens of investigations,
hundreds of interviews. The major allegations are not
supported by the evidence developed. We’ve looked in
Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada. We’re doing our
job.’” 65 On December 31st, Donoghue recalls telling the
President that “people keep telling you these things and
they turn out not to be true.” 66 And then on January 3rd,
Donoghue reiterated this point with the President:
[A]s in previous conservations, we would say to him, you
know, “We checked that out, and there’s nothing to it.” 67
Acting Attorney General Rosen testified before the Select
Committee that “the common element” of all of his
communications with President Trump was President Trump
urging the Department to find widespread fraud that did not
actually exist. None of the Department’s investigations
identified any genuine fraud sufficient to impact the
election outcome:
During my tenure as the Acting Attorney General, which began
on December 24 of [2020], the Department of Justice
maintained the position, publicly announced by former
Attorney General William Barr, that the Department had been
presented with no evidence of widespread voter fraud in a
scale sufficient to change the outcome of the 2020
election.68
As President Trump was hearing from his campaign and his
Justice Department that the allegations of widespread fraud
were not supported by the evidence, his White House legal
staff also reached the same conclusions, and agreed
specifically with what Barr told President Trump. Both White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor
Eric Herschmann reinforced to President Trump that the
Justice Department was doing its duty to investigate
allegations of supposed voter fraud.69
Cipollone told the Select Committee that he “had seen no
evidence of massive fraud in the election” and that he
“forcefully” made this point “over and over again.” For
example, during a late-night group meeting with President
Trump on December 18th, at which he and Herschmann urged
Trump not to heed the advice of several election
conspiracists at the meeting:
Cipollone: They didn’t think that we were, you know—they
didn’t think we believed this, you know, that there had been
massive fraud in the election, and the reason they didn’t
think we believed it is because we didn’t.
Committee Staff: And you articulated that forcefully to them
during the meeting?
Cipollone: I did, yeah. I had seen no evidence of massive
fraud in the election. . . . At some point, you have to
deliver with the evidence. And I—again, I just to go back to
what [Barr] said, he had not seen and I was not aware of any
evidence of fraud to the extent that it would change the
results of the election. That was made clear to them, okay,
over and over again.70
Similarly, White House Attorney Eric Herschmann was also
very clear about his views:
[T]hey never proved the allegations that they were making,
and they were trying to develop.71
In short, President Trump was informed over and over again,
by his senior appointees, campaign experts and those who had
served him for years, that his election fraud allegations
were nonsense.
How did President Trump continue to make false allegations
despite all of this unequivocal information? President Trump
sought out those who were not scrupulous with the facts, and
were willing to be dishonest. He found a new legal team to
assert claims that his existing advisors and the Justice
Department had specifically informed him were false.
President Trump’s new legal team, headed by Rudolph
Giuliani, and their allies ultimately lost dozens of
election lawsuits in Federal and State courts.
The testimony of Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien helps
to put this series of events in perspective. Stepien
described his interaction with Giuliani as an intentional
“self-demotion,” with Stepien stepping aside once it became
clear that President Trump intended to spread falsehoods.
Stepien knew the President’s new team was relying on
unsupportable accusations, and he refused to be associated
with their approach:
There were two groups of family. We called them kind of my
team and Rudy’s team. I didn’t mind being characterized as
being part of “team normal,” as reporters, you know, kind of
started to do around that point in time.72
Having worked for Republican campaigns for over two decades,
Stepien said, “I think along the way I’ve built up a pretty
good—I hope a good reputation for being honest and
professional, and I didn’t think what was happening was
necessarily honest or professional at that point in
time.” 73
As Giuliani visited Campaign headquarters to discuss
election litigation, the Trump Campaign’s professional staff
began to view him as unhinged.74 In addition, multiple law
firms previously engaged to work for the Trump Campaign
decided that they could not participate in the strategy
being instituted by Giuliani. They quit. Campaign General
Counsel Matthew Morgan explained that he had conversations
with “probably all of our counsel who [we]re signed up to
assist on election day as they disengaged with the
campaign.” 75 The “general consensus was that the law firms
were not comfortable making the arguments that Rudy Giuliani
was making publicly.” 76 When asked how many outside firms
expressed this concern, Morgan recalled having “a similar
conversation with most all of them.” 77
Stepien grew so wary of the new team that he locked Giuliani
out of his office:
Committee Staff: Yeah. I’m getting the sense from listening
to you here for a few hours that you sort of chose to pull
back, that you were uncomfortable with what Mr. Giuliani and
others were saying and doing and, therefore, you were
purposefully stepping back from a day-to-day role as the
leader of the campaign. Is that—I don’t want to put words in
your mouth. Is that accurate?
Stepien: That’s accurate. That’s accurate. You know, I had
my assistant—it was a big glass kind of wall office in our
headquarters, and I had my assistant lock my door. I told
her, don’t let anyone in. You know, I’ll be around when I
need to be around. You know, tell me what I need to know.
Tell me what’s going on here, but, you know, you’re going to
see less of me.
And, you know, sure enough, you know, Mayor Giuliani tried
to, you know, get in my office and ordered her to unlock the
door, and she didn’t do that, you know. She’s, you know,
smart about that. But your words are ones I agree with.78
Over the weeks that followed, dozens of judges across the
country specifically rejected the allegations of fraud and
irregularities being advanced by the Trump team and their
allies. For example, courts described the arguments as “an
amalgamation of theories, conjecture, and speculation,”
“allegations . . . sorely wanting of relevant or reliable
evidence,” “strained legal arguments without merit,”
assertions that “did not prove by any standard of proof that
any illegal votes were cast and counted,” and even a
“fundamental and obvious misreading of the Constitution.” 79
Reflecting back on this period, Trump Campaign
Communications Director Tim Murtaugh texted colleagues in
January 2021 about a news report that the New York State Bar
was considering expelling Rudolph Giuliani over the Ellipse
rally: “Why wouldn’t they expel him based solely on the
outrageous lies he told for 2 1/2 months?” 80
This is exactly what ultimately came to pass. When
suspending his license, a New York court said that Giuliani
“communicated demonstrably false and misleading statements
to courts, lawmakers and the public at large in his capacity
as lawyer for former President Donald J. Trump and the Trump
campaign in connection with Trump’s failed effort at
reelection in 2020.” 81 The court added that “[t]he
seriousness of [Giuliani’s] uncontroverted misconduct cannot
be overstated.” 82
Other Trump lawyers were sanctioned for making outlandish
claims of election fraud without the evidence to back them
up, including Sidney Powell, Lin Wood and seven other
pro-Trump lawyers in a case that a Federal judge described
as “a historic and profound abuse of the judicial process”:
It is one thing to take on the charge of vindicating rights
associated with an allegedly fraudulent election. It is
another to take on the charge of deceiving a federal court
and the American people into believing that rights were
infringed, without regard to whether any laws or rights were
in fact violated. This is what happened here.83
A group of prominent Republicans have more recently issued a
report—titled Lost, Not Stolen—examining “every count of
every case brought in these six battleground states” by
President Trump and his allies. The report concludes “that
Donald Trump and his supporters had their day in court and
failed to produce substantive evidence to make their
case.” 84 President Trump and his legal allies “failed
because of a lack of evidence and not because of erroneous
rulings or unfair judges . . . . In many cases, after making
extravagant claims of wrongdoing, Trump’s legal
representatives showed up in court or state proceedings
empty-handed, and then returned to their rallies and media
campaigns to repeat the same unsupported claims.” 85
There is no reasonable basis for the allegation that these
dozens of rulings by State and Federal courts were somehow
politically motivated.86 The outcome of these suits was
uniform regardless of who appointed the judges. One of the
authors of Lost, Not Stolen, longtime Republican election
lawyer Benjamin Ginsberg, testified before the Select
Committee that “in no instance did a court find that the
charges of fraud were real,” without variation based on the
judges involved.87 Indeed, eleven of the judges who ruled
against Donald Trump and his supporters were appointed by
Donald Trump himself.
One of those Trump nominees, Judge Stephanos Bibas of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rejected an
appeal by the Trump Campaign claiming that Pennsylvania
officials “did not undertake any meaningful effort” to fight
illegal absentee ballots and uneven treatment of voters
across counties.88 Judge Bibas wrote in his decision that
“calling an election unfair does not make it so. Charges
require specific allegations and then proof. We have neither
here.” 89 Another Trump nominee, Judge Brett Ludwig of the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, ruled against President
Trump’s lawsuit alleging that the result was skewed by
illegal procedures that governed drop boxes, ballot address
information, and individuals who claimed “indefinitely
confined” status to vote from home.90 Judge Ludwig wrote in
his decision, that “[t]his Court has allowed plaintiff the
chance to make his case and he has lost on the merits”
because the procedures used “do not remotely rise to the
level” of breaking Wisconsin’s election rules.91
Nor is it true that these rulings focused solely on
standing, or procedural issues. As Ginsberg confirmed in his
testimony to the Select Committee, President Trump’s team
“did have their day in court.” 92 Indeed, he and his
co-authors determined in their report that 30 of these
post-election cases were dismissed by a judge after an
evidentiary hearing had been held, and many of these judges
explicitly indicated in their decisions that the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs was wholly insufficient on the
merits.93
Rudolph Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, and other hold a press
conference at Four Seasons Total Landscaping on November 7,
2020 falsely claiming Donald Trump had won the state of
Pennsylvania.
Rudolph Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, and other hold a press
conference at Four Seasons Total Landscaping on November 7,
2020 falsely claiming Donald Trump had won the state of
Pennsylvania.
(Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images)
Ultimately, even Rudolph Giuliani and his legal team
acknowledged that they had no definitive evidence of
election fraud sufficient to change the election outcome.
For example, although Giuliani repeatedly had claimed in
public that Dominion voting machines stole the election, he
admitted during his Select Committee deposition that “I do
not think the machines stole the election.” 94 An attorney
representing his lead investigator, Bernard Kerik, declared
in a letter to the Select Committee that “it was impossible
for Kerik and his team to determine conclusively whether
there was widespread fraud or whether that widespread fraud
would have altered the outcome of the election.” 95 Kerik
also emailed President Trump’s chief of staff on December
28, 2020, writing: “We can do all the investigations we want
later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the
legislators that have to be moved and this will do just
that.” 96 Other Trump lawyers and supporters, Jenna Ellis,
John Eastman, Phil Waldron, and Michael Flynn, all invoked
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
when asked by the Select Committee what supposed proof they
uncovered that the election was stolen.97 Not a single
witness--nor any combination of witnesses--provided the
Select Committee with evidence demonstrating that fraud
occurred on a scale even remotely close to changing the
outcome in any State.98
By mid-December 2020, Donald Trump had come to what most of
his staff believed was the end of the line. The Supreme
Court rejected a lawsuit he supported filed by the State of
Texas in the Supreme Court, and Donald Trump had this
exchange, according to Special Assistant to the President
Cassidy Hutchinson:
The President was fired up about the Supreme Court decision.
And so I was standing next to [Chief of Staff Mark] Meadows,
but I had stepped back . . . The President [was] just raging
about the decision and how it’s wrong, and why didn’t we
make more calls, and just this typical anger outburst at
this decision . . . And the President said I think—so he had
said something to the effect of, “I don’t want people to
know we lost, Mark. This is embarrassing. Figure it out. We
need to figure it out. I don’t want people to know that we
lost.” 99
On December 14, 2020, the Electoral College met to cast and
certify each State’s electoral votes. By this time, many of
President Trump’s senior staff, and certain members of his
family, were urging him to concede that he had lost.
Labor Secretary Gene Scalia told the Committee that he
called President Trump around this time and gave him such
feedback quite directly:
[S]o, I had put a call in to the President—I might have
called on the 13th; we spoke, I believe, on the 14th—in
which I conveyed to him that I thought that it was time for
him to acknowledge that President Biden had prevailed in the
election . . . . But I communicated to the President that
when that legal process is exhausted and when the electors
have voted, that that’s the point at which that outcome
needs to be expected . . . . And I told him that I did
believe, yes, that once those legal processes were run, if
fraud had not been established that had affected the outcome
of the election, that, unfortunately, I believed that what
had to be done was concede the outcome.100
Deputy White House Press Secretary Judd Deere also told
President Trump that he should concede. He recalled other
staffers advising President Trump at some point to concede
and that he “encouraged him to do it at least once after the
electoral college met in mid-December.” 101 White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone also believed that President Trump
should concede: “[I]f your question is did I believe he
should concede the election at a point in time, yes, I
did.” 102
Attorney General Barr told the Select Committee this: “And
in my view, that [the December 14 electoral college vote]
was the end of the matter. I didn’t see—you know, I thought
that this would lead inexorably to a new administration. I
was not aware at that time of any theory, you know, why this
could be reversed. And so I felt that the die was cast . . .
.” 103
Barr also told the Committee that he suggested several weeks
earlier that the President’s efforts in this regard needed
to come to an end soon, in conversation with several White
House officials after his meeting with Trump on November
23rd:
[A]s I walked out of the Oval Office, Jared was there with
Dan Scavino, who ran the President’s social media and who I
thought was a reasonable guy and believe is a reasonable
guy. And I said, how long is he going to carry on with this
‘stolen election’ stuff? Where is this going to go?
And by that time, Meadows had caught up with me and—leaving
the office, and caught up to me and said that—he said, look,
I think that he’s becoming more realistic and knows that
there’s a limit to how far he can take this. And then Jared
said, you know, yeah, we’re working on this, we’re working
on it.104
Despite all that Donald Trump was being told, he continued
to purposely and maliciously make false claims. To
understand the very stark differences between what he was
being told and what he said publicly and in fundraising
solicitations, the Committee has assembled the following
examples.
Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen (12/15/20):
“And so he said, ‘Well, what about this? I saw it on the
videotape, somebody delivering a suitcase of ballots.’ And
we said, ‘It wasn’t a suitcase. It was a bin. That’s what
they use when they’re counting ballots. It’s benign.’” 105
President Trump one week later (12/22/20):
“There is even security camera footage from Georgia that
shows officials telling poll watchers to leave the room
before pulling suitcases of ballots out from under the
tables and continuing to count for hours.” 106
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue (12/27 &
12/31/20):
“I told the President myself that several times, in several
conversations, that these allegations about ballots being
smuggled in in a suitcase and run through the machine
several times, it was not true, that we looked at it, we
looked at the video, we interviewed the witnesses, that it
was not true . . . . I believe it was in the phone call on
December 27th. It was also in a meeting in the Oval Office
on December 31st.” 107
President Trump later that week (1/2/21):
“[S]he stuffed the machine. She stuffed the ballot. Each
ballot went three times, they were showing: Here’s ballot
number one. Here it is a second time, third time, next
ballot.” 108
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21):
“You’re talking about the State Farm video. And I think it’s
extremely unfortunate that Rudy Giuliani or his people, they
sliced and diced that video and took it out of context.” . .
. “[W]e did an audit of that and we proved conclusively that
they were not scanned three times. . . . Yes, Mr. President,
we’ll send you the link from WSB.”
[Trump]: “I don’t care about a link. I don’t need it.” 109
President Trump one day later (1/3/21):
“I spoke to Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger yesterday
about Fulton County and voter fraud in Georgia. He was
unwilling, or unable, to answer questions such as the
‘ballots under table’ scam, ballot destruction, out of state
‘voters’, dead voters, and more. He has no clue!” 110
Attorney General Barr (12/1/20):
“Then he raised the ‘big vote dump,’ as he called it, in
Detroit. And, you know, he said, people saw boxes coming
into the counting station at all hours of the morning and so
forth. . . . I said, ‘Mr. President, there are 630 precincts
in Detroit, and unlike elsewhere in the State, they
centralize the counting process, so they’re not counted in
each precinct, they’re moved to counting stations, and so
the normal process would involve boxes coming in at all
different hours.’
And I said, ‘Did anyone point out to you—did all the people
complaining about it point out to you, you actually did
better in Detroit than you did last time? I mean, there’s no
indication of fraud in Detroit.’” 111
President Trump one day later (12/2/20):
“I’ll tell you what’s wrong, voter fraud. Here’s an example.
This is Michigan. At 6:31 in the morning, a vote dump of
149,772 votes came in unexpectedly. We were winning by a
lot. That batch was received in horror. . . .
In Detroit everybody saw the tremendous conflict. . . there
were more votes than there were voters.” 112
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue (12/27/20):
“The President then continued, there are ‘more votes than
voters. . .’. But I was aware of that allegation, and I
said, you know, that was just a matter of them ‘comparing
the 2020 votes cast to 2016 registration numbers.’ That is
‘not a valid complaint.’” 113
President Trump ten days later (1/6/21):
“More votes than they had voters. And many other States
also.” 114
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue (1/3/21):
“[W]e would say to him, you know, ‘We checked that out, and
there’s nothing to it. . . . And we would cite to certain
allegations. And so—like such as Pennsylvania, right. ‘No,
there were not 250,000 more votes reported than were
actually cast. That’s not true.’ So we would say things like
that.” 115
President Trump three days later (1/6/21):
“In Pennsylvania, you had 205,000 more votes than you had
voters. And the number is actually much greater than that
now. That was as of a week ago. And this is a mathematical
impossibility unless you want to say it’s a total
fraud.” 116
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21):
[Trump]: “[I]t’s 4,502 who voted, but they weren’t on the
voter registration roll, which they had to be. You had
18,325 vacant address voters. The address was vacant, and
they’re not allowed to be counted. That’s 18,325.” . . .
[Raffensperger]: “Well, Mr. President, the challenge that
you have is the data you have is wrong.” 117
President Trump two days later (1/4/21):
“4,502 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who do not
appear on the state’s voter rolls. Well, that’s sort of
strange. 18,325 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who
registered to vote using an address listed as vacant
according to the postal service.” 118
GA Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21):
[Trump]: “So dead people voted, and I think the number is
close to 5,000 people. And they went to obituaries. They
went to all sorts of methods to come up with an accurate
number, and a minimum is close to about 5,000 voters.” . . .
[Raffensperger]: “The actual number were two. Two. Two
people that were dead that voted. So that’s wrong.” 119
President Trump four days later (1/6/21):
“[T]he number of fraudulent ballots that we’ve identified
across the state is staggering. Over 10,300 ballots in
Georgia were cast by individuals whose names and dates of
birth match Georgia residents who died in 2020 and prior to
the election.” 120
GA Sec. State General Counsel Ryan Germany (1/2/21):
[Trump]: “You had out-of-state voters. They voted in
Georgia, but they were from out of state, of 4,925.” . . .
[Germany]: “Every one we’ve been through are people that
lived in Georgia, moved to a different state, but then moved
back to Georgia legitimately.” . . . “They moved back in
years ago. This was not like something just before the
election. So there’s something about that data that, it’s
just not accurate.” 121
President Trump four days later (1/6/21):
“And at least 15,000 ballots were cast by individuals who
moved out of the state prior to November 3rd election. They
say they moved right back.” 122
White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany (n.d.):
“[T]he one specific I remember referencing was I don’t agree
with the Dominion track.” . . .
“I specifically referenced waving him off of the Dominion
theory earlier in my testimony.” . . .
[Q] “Are you saying you think he still continued to tweet
that after you waved him off of it?”
[A] “Yeah. . .” 123
President Trump:
Between mid-November and January 5, 2021, President Trump
tweeted or retweeted conspiracy theories about Dominion
nearly three dozen times.124
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller:
“. . .the international allegations for Dominion were not
valid.”
[Q] “Okay. Did anybody communicate that to the President?”
[A]: “I know that that was—I know that was communicated. I
know I communicated it” 125
President Trump:
“You have Dominion, which is very, very suspect to start off
with. Nobody knows the ownership. People say the votes are
counted in foreign countries and much worse. . .” 126
Attorney General Barr (11/23/20):
“I specifically raised the Dominion voting machines, which I
found to be one of the most disturbing allegations—
‘disturbing’ in the sense that I saw absolutely zero basis
for the allegations . . . I told him that it was crazy stuff
and they were wasting their time on that and it was doing
great, great disservice to the country.” 127
President Trump three days later (11/26/20):
“[T]hose machines are fixed, they’re rigged. You can press
Trump and the vote goes to Biden. . . . All you have to do
is play with a chip, and they played with a chip, especially
in Wayne County and Detroit.” 128
Attorney General Barr (12/1/20):
“I explained, I said, look, if you have a machine and it
counts 500 votes for Biden and 500 votes for Trump, and then
you go back later and you have a—you will have the 1,000
pieces of paper put through that machine, and you can see if
there’s any discrepancy. . . there has been no
discrepancy.” 129
President Trump one day later (12/2/20):
“In one Michigan County, as an example, that used Dominion
systems, they found that nearly 6,000 votes had been wrongly
switched from Trump to Biden, and this is just the tip of
the iceberg. This is what we caught. How many didn’t we
catch?” 130
Attorney General Barr (12/14/20):
“‘I will, Mr. President. But there are a couple of things,’
I responded. ‘My understanding is that our experts have
looked at the Antrim situation and are sure it was a human
error that did not occur anywhere else. And, in any event,
Antrim is doing a hand recount of the paper ballots, so we
should know in a couple of days whether there is any real
problem with the machines.’” 131
President Trump one day later (12/15/20):
“This is BIG NEWS. Dominion Voting Machines are a disaster
all over the Country. Changed the results of a landslide
election. Can’t let this happen. . . .” 132
Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen (12/15/20):
“[O]ther people were telling him there was fraud, you know,
corruption in the election. The voting machines were no
good. And we were telling him that is inconsistent, by ‘we,’
I mean Richard Donoghue and myself, that that was not what
we were seeing.” . . . “There was this open issue as to the
Michigan report. And—I think it was Mr. Cuccinelli, not
certain, but had indicated that there was a hand recount.
And I think he said, ‘That’s the gold standard.’” 133
President Trump one day later (12/16/20):
“’Study: Dominion Machines shifted 2-3% of Trump Votes to
Biden. Far more votes than needed to sway election.’
Florida, Ohio, Texas and many other states were won by even
greater margins than projected. Did just as well with Swing
States, but bad things happened. @OANN” 134
National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien (12/18/20):
“I got a call from, I think, Molly Michael in outer oval,
the President’s assistant, and she said, ‘I’m connecting you
to the Oval’. . . somebody asked me, was there—did I have
any evidence of election fraud in the voting machines or
foreign interference in our voting machines. And I said, no,
we’ve looked into that and there’s no evidence of it.” 135
President Trump one day later (12/19/20):
“. . .There could also have been a hit on our ridiculous
voting machines during the election, which is now obvious
that I won big, making it an even more corrupted
embarrassment for the USA. @DNI_Ratcliffe @SecPompeo” 136
Acting Deputy AG Richard Donoghue (12/31/20):
“We definitely talked about Antrim County again. That was
sort of done at that point, because the hand recount had
been done and all of that. But we cited back to that to say,
you know, this is an example of what people are telling you
and what’s being filed in some of these court filings that
are just not supported by the evidence.” 137
President Trump two days later (1/2/21):
“Well, Brad. Not that there’s not an issue, because we have
a big issue with Dominion in other states and perhaps in
yours. . . . in other states, we think we found tremendous
corruption with Dominion machines, but we’ll have to see.” .
. . “I won’t give Dominion a pass because we found too many
bad things.” 138
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21):
“I don’t believe that you’re really questioning the Dominion
machines. Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent
re-tally of all the ballots, and compared them to what the
machines said and came up with virtually the same result.
Then we did the recount, and we got virtually the same
result.” 139
President Trump four days later (1/6/21):
“In addition, there is the highly troubling matter of
Dominion Voting Systems. In one Michigan county alone, 6,000
votes were switched from Trump to Biden and the same systems
are used in the majority of states in our country.” . . .
“There is clear evidence that tens of thousands of votes
were switched from President Trump to former Vice President
Biden in several counties in Georgia.” 140
Evidence gathered by the Committee indicates that President
Trump raised roughly one quarter of a billion dollars in
fundraising efforts between the election and January 6th.141
Those solicitations persistently claimed and referred to
election fraud that did not exist. For example, the Trump
Campaign, along with the Republican National Committee, sent
millions of emails to their supporters, with messaging
claiming that the election was “rigged,” that their
donations could stop Democrats from “trying to steal the
election,” and that Vice President Biden would be an
“illegitimate president” if he took office.
Taped footage of William Barr speaking to the January 6th
Select Committee is shown at one of its hearings.
Taped footage of William Barr speaking to the January 6th
Select Committee is shown at one of its hearings.
(Photo by Mandel Ngan-Pool/Getty Images)
Ultimately, Attorney General Barr suggested that the
Department of Justice’s investigations disproving President
Trump’s fraud claims may have prevented an even more serious
series of events:
[F]rankly, I think the fact that I put myself in the
position that I could say that we had looked at this and
didn’t think there was fraud was really important to moving
things forward. And I sort of shudder to think what the
situation would have been if the position of the Department
was, “We’re not even looking at this until after Biden’s in
office.” I’m not sure we would’ve had a transition at
all.142
Rather than Concede, Donald Trump Chooses to Obstruct the
January 6th Proceeding
President Trump disregarded the rulings of the courts and
rejected the findings and conclusions and advice from his
Justice Department, his campaign experts, and his White
House and Cabinet advisors. He chose instead to try to
overturn the election on January 6th and took a series of
very specific steps to attempt to achieve that result.
A central element of Donald Trump’s plan to overturn the
election relied upon Vice President Mike Pence. As Vice
President, Pence served as the President of the Senate, the
presiding officer for the joint session of Congress on
January 6th. Beginning in December, and with greater
frequency as January 6th approached, Trump repeatedly and
unlawfully pressured Pence in private and public to prevent
Congress from counting lawful electoral votes from several
States.
To understand the plan President Trump devised with attorney
and law professor John Eastman, it is necessary to
understand the constitutional structure for selecting our
President.
At the Constitutional Convention 233 years ago, the framers
considered but rejected multiple proposals that Congress
itself vote to select the President of the United States.143
Indeed the Framers voiced very specific concerns with
Congress selecting the President. They viewed it as
important that the electors, chosen for the specific purpose
of selecting the President, should make the determination
rather than Congress:
It was desireable, that the sense of the people should
operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a
trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by
committing the right of making it, not to any
pre-established body, but to men, chosen by the people for
the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.144
The Framers understood that a thoughtful structure for the
appointment of the President was necessary to avoid certain
evils: “Nothing was more to be desired, than that every
practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue
and corruption.” 145 They were careful to ensure that “those
who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion
to the president in office” “were not among those that chose
the president.” 146 For that reason, “[n]o senator,
representative, or other person holding a place of trust or
profit under the United States, can be of the number of the
electors.” 147
Article II of our Constitution, as modified by the Twelfth
Amendment, governs election of the President. Article II
created the electoral college, providing that the States
would select electors in the manner provided by State
legislatures, and those electors would in turn vote for the
President. Today, every State selects Presidential electors
by popular vote, and each State’s laws provide for
procedures to resolve election disputes, including through
lawsuits if necessary. After any election issues are
resolved in State or Federal court, each State’s government
transmits a certificate of the ascertainment of the
appointed electors to Congress and the National Archives.
The electoral college meets in mid-December to cast their
votes, and all of these electoral votes are then ultimately
counted by Congress on January 6th. The Vice President, as
President of the Senate, presides over the joint session of
Congress to count votes. The Twelfth Amendment provides this
straightforward instruction: “The president of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes
shall then be counted; The person having the greatest number
of votes for President shall be the President. . .” The Vice
President has only a ministerial role, opening the envelopes
and ensuring that the votes are counted. Likewise, the
Electoral Count Act of 1887 provides no substantive role for
the Vice President in counting votes, reinforcing that he or
she can only act in a ministerial fashion—the Vice President
may not choose, for example, to decline to count particular
votes. In most cases (e.g., when one candidate has a
majority of votes submitted by the States) Congress has only
a ministerial role, as well. It simply counts electoral
college votes provided by each State’s governor. Congress is
not a court and cannot overrule State and Federal court
rulings in election challenges.
As January 6th approached, John Eastman and others devised a
plan whereby Vice President Pence would, as the presiding
officer, declare that certain electoral votes from certain
States could not be counted at the joint session.148 John
Eastman knew before proposing this plan that it was not
legal. Indeed, in a pre-election document discussing
Congress’s counting of electoral votes, Dr. Eastman
specifically disagreed with a colleague’s proposed argument
that the Vice President had the power to choose which
envelopes to “open” and which votes to “count.” Dr. Eastman
wrote:
I don’t agree with this. The 12th Amendment only says that
the President of the Senate opens the ballots in the joint
session then, in the passive voice, that the votes shall
then be counted. 3 USC § 12 [of the Electoral Count Act]
says merely that he is the presiding officer, and then it
spells out specific procedures, presumptions, and default
rules for which slates will be counted. Nowhere does it
suggest that the president of the Senate gets to make the
determination on his own. § 15 [of the Electoral Count Act]
doesn’t either.149
Despite recognizing prior to the 2020 election that the Vice
President had no power to refuse to count certain electoral
votes, Eastman nevertheless drafted memoranda two months
later proposing that Pence could do exactly that on January
6th—refuse to count certified electoral votes from Arizona,
Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin.150
Eastman’s theory was related to other efforts overseen by
President Trump (described in detail below, see infra) to
create and transmit fake electoral slates to Congress and
the National Archives, and to pressure States to change the
election outcome and issue new electoral slates. Eastman
supported these ideas despite writing two months earlier
that:
Article II [of the Constitution] says the electors are
appointed “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct,” but I don’t think that entitles the Legislature to
change the rules after the election and appoint a different
slate of electors in a manner different than what was in
place on election day. And 3 U.S.C. §15 [of the Electoral
Count Act] gives dispositive weight to the slate of electors
that was certified by the Governor in accord with 3 U.S.C.
§5.151
Even after Eastman proposed the theories in his December and
January memoranda, he acknowledged in conversations with
Vice President Pence’s counsel Greg Jacob that Pence could
not lawfully do what his own memoranda proposed.152 Eastman
admitted that the U.S. Supreme Court would unanimously
reject his legal theory. “He [Eastman] had acknowledged that
he would lose 9-0 at the Supreme Court.” 153 Moreover,
Eastman acknowledged to Jacob that he didn’t think Vice
President Al Gore had that power in 2001, nor did he think
Vice President Kamala Harris should have that power in
2025.154
In testimony before the Select Committee, Jacob described in
detail why the Trump plan for Pence was illegal:
[T]he Vice President’s first instinct, when he heard this
theory, was that there was no way that our Framers, who
abhorred concentrated power, who had broken away from the
tyranny of George III, would ever have put one
person—particularly not a person who had a direct interest
in the outcome because they were on the ticket for the
election—in a role to have decisive impact on the outcome of
the election. And our review of text, history, and, frankly,
just common sense, all confirmed the Vice President’s first
instinct on that point. There is no justifiable basis to
conclude that the Vice President has that kind of
authority.155
This is how the Vice President later described his views in
a public speech:
I had no right to overturn the election. The Presidency
belongs to the American people, and the American people
alone. And frankly, there is no idea more un-American than
the notion that any one person could choose the American
President. Under the Constitution, I had no right to change
the outcome of our election.156
But as January 6th approached, President Trump nevertheless
embraced the new Eastman theories, and attempted to
implement them. In a series of meetings and calls, President
Trump attempted to pressure Pence to intervene on January
6th to prevent Congress from counting multiple States’
electoral votes for Joe Biden. At several points in the days
before January 6th, President Trump was told directly that
Vice President Pence could not legally do what Trump was
asking. For example, at a January 4th meeting in the Oval
Office, Eastman acknowledged that any variation of his
proposal—whether rejecting electoral votes outright or
delaying certification to send them back to the States—would
violate several provisions of the Electoral Count Act.
According to Greg Jacob:
In the conversation in the Oval Office on the 4th, I had
raised the fact that . . . [ Eastman’s] preferred course had
issues with the Electoral Count Act, which he had
acknowledged was the case, that there would be an
inconsistency with the Electoral Count Act[.]157
Jacob recorded Eastman’s admission in an internal memo he
drafted for Vice President Pence on the evening of January
4th: “Professor Eastman acknowledges that his proposal
violates several provisions of statutory law.” 158 And,
during a phone call with President Trump and Eastman on the
evening of January 5, 2021, Eastman again acknowledged that
his proposal also would violate several provisions of the
Electoral Count Act.
[W]e did have an in-depth discussion about [the Electoral
Count Act] in the subsequent phone calls as I walked him
through provision after provision on the recess and on the
fact that . . . Congressmen and Senators are supposed to get
to object and debate. And he acknowledged, one after
another, that those provisions would—in order for us to send
it back to the States, we couldn’t do those things as well.
We can’t do a 10-day, send it back to the States, and honor
an Electoral Count Act provision that says you can’t recess
for more than one day and, once you get to the 5th, you have
to stay continuously in session.159
As Pence’s Chief of Staff, Marc Short, testified that the
Vice President also repeatedly informed President Trump that
the Vice President’s role on January 6th was only
ministerial.
Committee Staff: But just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was
it your impression that the Vice President had directly
conveyed his position on these issues to the President, not
just to the world through a Dear Colleague Letter, but
directly to President Trump?
Marc Short: Many times.
Committee Staff: And had been consistent in conveying his
position to the President?
Short: Very consistent.160
As the situation grew increasingly acrimonious, Vice
President Pence’s private counsel Richard Cullen contacted
former Fourth Circuit Judge Michael Luttig, a renowned
conservative judge for whom Eastman had previously clerked,
and asked Luttig to make a public statement. On January 5th,
Luttig wrote the following on Twitter: “The only
responsibility and power of the Vice President under the
Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral college
votes as they have been cast.” 161 As Judge Luttig testified
in the Committee’s hearings, “there was no basis in the
Constitution or laws of the United States at all for the
theory espoused by Dr. Eastman—at all. None.” 162 Judge
Luttig completely rejected Eastman’s “blueprint to overturn
the 2020 election” as “constitutional mischief” and ‘the
most reckless, insidious, and calamitous failure[] in both
legal and political judgment in American history.” 163
Greg Jacob and Judge Michael Luttig testify at January 6th
Select Committee hearing.
Greg Jacob and Judge Michael Luttig testify at January 6th
Select Committee hearing.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
Contemporaneous written correspondence also confirms both
that: (1) Eastman himself recognized Pence could not
lawfully refuse to count electoral votes, and (2) President
Trump also knew this. While sheltering in a loading dock
with the Vice President during the violent January 6th
attack, Greg Jacob asked Eastman in an email, “Did you
advise the President that in your professional judgment the
Vice President DOES NOT have the power to decide things
unilaterally?” Eastman’s response stated that the President
had “been so advised,” but then indicated that President
Trump continued to pressure the Vice President to act
illegally: “But you know him—once he gets something in his
head, it is hard to get him to change course.” 164
To be absolutely clear, no White House lawyer believed Pence
could lawfully refuse to count electoral votes. White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee this:
I thought that the Vice President did not have the authority
to do what was being suggested under a proper reading of the
law. I conveyed that, ok? I think I actually told somebody,
you know, in the Vice President’s— “Just blame me.” You know
this is—I’m not a politician, you know. . . but, you know, I
just said, “I’m a lawyer. This is my legal opinion.” 165
Cipollone also testified that he was “sure [he] conveyed”
his views.166 Indeed, other testimony from Cipollone
indicates that Trump knew of Cipollone’s view and suggests
that Trump purposely excluded Cipollone from the meeting
with Pence and Pence’s General Counsel on January 4th.167
Indeed, at one point, Cipollone confronted Eastman in the
hallway outside the Oval Office and expressed his
disapproval of and anger with Eastman’s position. According
to Jason Miller, “Pat Cipollone thought the idea was nutty
and had at one point confronted Eastman basically with the
same sentiment” outside the Oval Office.168 Pat Cipollone
did not deny having an angry confrontation with Eastman
outside of the Oval Office—though he said he didn’t have a
specific recollection, he had no reason to contradict what
Jason Miller said and, moreover, said that Eastman was aware
of his views.169
Likewise, Eric Herschmann, another White House lawyer,
expressed the same understanding that Eastman’s plan
“obviously made no sense” and “had no practical ability to
work.” 170 Herschmann also recounted telling Eastman
directly that his plan was “completely crazy”:
And I said to [Eastman], hold on a second, I want to
understand what you’re saying. You’re saying you believe the
Vice President, acting as President of the Senate, can be
the sole decisionmaker as to, under your theory, who becomes
the next President of the United States? And he said, yes.
And I said, are you out of your F’ing mind, right. And that
was pretty blunt. I said, you’re completely crazy.171
Deputy White House Counsel Pat Philbin also had the same
understanding.172 Indeed, as Herschmann testified, even
Rudolph Giuliani doubted that Vice President Mike Pence had
any legal ability to do what Eastman had proposed.173
Despite all this opposition from all White House lawyers,
Trump nevertheless continued to exert immense pressure on
Pence to refuse to count electoral votes.
The pressure began before the January 4th Oval Office
meeting with Pence, Eastman, Jacob, Short, and Trump, but
became even more intense thereafter. On the evening of
January 5, 2021, the New York Times published an article
reporting that “Vice President Mike Pence told President
Trump on Tuesday that he did not believe he had the power to
block congressional certification of Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s
victory in the Presidential election despite President
Trump’s baseless insistence that he did.” 174 This reporting
was correct—both as to the Vice President’s power and as to
Vice President Pence having informed President Trump that he
did not have the authority to change the outcome of the
election. But in response to that story, late in the evening
before the January 6th joint session, President Trump
dictated to Jason Miller a statement falsely asserting, “The
Vice President and I are in total agreement that the Vice
President has the power to act.” 175 This statement was
released at President Trump’s direction and was false.176
Thereafter, Trump continued to apply public pressure in a
series of tweets. At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, “[i]f Vice
President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the
Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they
made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a
process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it
must be). Mike can send it back!” 177 At 8:17 a.m. on
January 6th, he tweeted again: “States want to correct their
votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and
fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative
approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the
States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme
courage!” 178
President Trump tried to reach the Vice President early in
the morning of January 6th, but the Vice President did not
take the call. The President finally reached the Vice
President later that morning, shouting from the Oval Office
to his assistants to “get the Vice President on the
phone.” 179 After again telling the Vice President that he
had “the legal authority to send [electoral votes] back to
the respective states,” President Trump grew very heated.180
Witnesses in the Oval Office during this call told the
Select Committee that the President called Vice President
Pence a “wimp,” 181 told him it would be “a political career
killer” to certify the lawful electoral votes electing
President Biden,182 and accused him of “not [being] tough
enough to make the call.” 183 As Ivanka Trump would recount
to her chief of staff moments later, her father called the
Vice President “the p-word” for refusing to overturn the
election.184
President Trump speaks with Vice President Pence over the
phone in the Oval Office on the morning of January 6th.
President Trump speaks with Vice President Pence over the
phone in the Oval Office on the morning of January 6th.
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration)
In response, Vice President Pence again refused to take any
action other than counting the lawfully certified electoral
votes of the States. But President Trump was angry and
undeterred. After the conclusion of this call, he edited his
speech for the Ellipse to insert language to which his
lawyers objected—targeting Vice President Pence directly.185
Earlier that morning, Eric Herschmann had tried to remove
the reference to Vice President Pence from the speech. As he
told speechwriter Stephen Miller, he “didn’t concur with the
legal analysis” that John Eastman had advanced and believed
it “wouldn’t advance the ball” to discuss it publicly.186
But after the call with Vice President Pence, speechwriters
were instructed to reinsert the line. Although the final
written draft of his speech referred to Pence just once—a
line President Trump didn’t end up reading187—the President
went off-script five different times to pressure the Vice
President:
“I hope Mike is going to do the right thing. I hope so.
Because if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the
election,” Trump first told the crowd.188
“Mike Pence is going to have to come through for us,” Trump
later said, “and if he doesn’t, that will be a, a sad day
for our country because you’re sworn to uphold our
Constitution.” 189
Addressing Pence directly, Trump told the assembled crowd:
“Mike Pence, I hope you’re going to stand up for the good of
our Constitution and for the good of our country.” Trump
said at another point, “And if you’re not, I’m going to be
very disappointed in you. I will tell you right now. I’m not
hearing good stories.” 190
“So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And
I hope he doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people
that he’s listening to,” Trump said.191
These statements to the assembled crowd at the Ellipse had
Trump’s intended effect—they produced substantial anger
against Pence. When Pence released a statement confirming
that he would not act to prevent Congress from counting
electoral votes, the crowd’s reaction was harshly negative:
“I’m telling you what, I’m hearing that Pence — hearing the
Pence just caved. No. Is that true? I didn’t hear it. I’m
hear — I’m hearing reports that Pence caved. No way. I’m
telling you, if Pence caved, we’re going to drag
motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking politicians
are going to get fucking drug through the streets.” 192
Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: “Ok. And that’s
when all this started?”] Yup. That’s when we marched on the
Capitol. 193
“We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any
fraudulent electoral votes. [Other speaker: “Boo. You’re a
traitor!”] That’s right. You’ve heard it here first. Mike
Pence has betrayed the United States of America. [Other
speaker: “Fuck you, Mike Pence!”] Mike Pence has betrayed
this President and he has betrayed the people of the United
States and we will never, ever forget.” [Cheers]194
“This woman cames [sic] up to the side of us and she says
Pence folded. So it was kind of, like, Ok, well — in my mind
I was thinking, well that’s it. You know. Well, my
son-in-law looks at me and he says I want to go in.” 195
[Q] “What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol?”
[A] [Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins]: “One hundred percent. It
has, it has spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us,
and everybody’s marching on the Capitol. All million of us.
It’s insane.” 196
“Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out
Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring
out Pence.” 197
“Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang
Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence.” 198
Once Trump returned to the White House, he was informed
almost immediately that violence and lawlessness had broken
out at the Capitol among his supporters.199 At 2:24 p.m.,
President Trump applied yet further pressure to Pence (see
infra), posting a tweet accusing Vice President Mike Pence
of cowardice for not using his role as President of the
Senate to change the outcome of the election: “Mike Pence
didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to
protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a
chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the
fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to
previously certify. USA demands the truth!” 200 Almost
immediately thereafter, the crowd around the Capitol surged,
and more individuals joined the effort to confront police
and break further into the building.
The sentiment expressed in President Trump’s 2:24 p.m.
tweet, already present in the crowd, only grew more powerful
as the President’s words spread. Timothy Hale-Cusanelli—a
white supremacist who expressed Nazi sympathies—heard about
the tweet while in the Crypt around 2:25 p.m., and he,
according to the Department of Justice, “knew what that
meant.” Vice President Pence had decided not to keep
President Trump in power.201 Other rioters described what
happened next as follows:
Once we found out Pence turned on us and that they had
stolen the election, like officially, the crowd went crazy.
I mean, it became a mob. We crossed the gate.202
Then we heard the news on [P]ence. . . And lost it . . . So
we stormed.203
They’re making an announcement right now saying if Pence
betrays us you better get your mind right because we’re
storming that building.204
Minutes after the tweet—at 2:35 p.m.—rioters continued their
surge and broke a security line of the DC Metropolitan
Police Department, resulting in the first fighting
withdrawal in the history of that force.205
President Trump issued this tweet after he had falsely
claimed to the angry crowd that Vice President Mike Pence
could “do the right thing” and ensure a second Trump term,
after that angry crowd had turned into a violent mob
assaulting the Capitol while chanting, “Hang Mike
Pence!” 206 and after the U.S. Secret Service had evacuated
the Vice President from the Senate floor.207 One minute
after the President’s tweet, at 2:25 p.m., the Secret
Service determined they could no longer protect the Vice
President in his ceremonial office near the Senate Chamber,
and evacuated the Vice President and his family to a secure
location, missing the violent mob by a mere 40 feet.208
Further evidence presented at our hearing shows the violent
reaction following President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet and the
efforts to protect Vice President Pence in the time that
followed.209
The day after the attack on the Capitol, Eastman called Eric
Herschmann to talk about continuing litigation on behalf of
the Trump Presidential Campaign in Georgia. Herschmann
described his reaction to Eastman this way:
And I said to him, are you out of your F’ing mind? Right? I
said, because I only want to hear two words coming out of
your mouth from now on: Orderly transition. I said, I don’t
want to hear any other F’ing words coming out of your mouth,
no matter what, other than orderly transition. Repeat those
words to me.” 210
Herschmann concluded the call by telling Eastman: “Now I’m
going to give you the best free legal advice you’re ever
getting in your life. Get a great F’ing criminal defense
lawyer, you’re going to need it,” and hanging up the
phone.211
In the course of investigating this series of facts, the
Select Committee subpoenaed Eastman’s emails from his
employer, Chapman University.212 Eastman sued to prevent
Chapman from producing the emails, arguing that the emails
were attorney-client privileged. Federal District Court
Judge David Carter reviewed Eastman’s emails in camera to
determine, among other things, whether the emails had to be
produced because they likely furthered a crime committed by
one of Eastman’s clients or by Eastman himself. In addition
to reviewing the emails themselves, Judge Carter reviewed
substantial additional evidence presented by the Select
Committee and by Eastman.
After reciting a series of factual findings regarding
President Trump’s multi-part plan to overturn the election,
Judge Carter concluded that President Trump likely violated
two criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (corruptly
obstructing, impeding or influencing Congress’s official
proceeding to count electoral votes); and 18 U.S.C. § 371
(conspiring to defraud the United States). The Court also
concluded that John Eastman likely violated at least one of
these criminal laws. As to §1512(c), Judge Carter explained:
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that President
Trump likely knew the electoral count plan had no factual
justification.
The plan not only lacked factual basis but also legal
justification. . . .
The illegality of the plan was obvious. Our nation was
founded on the peaceful transition of power, epitomized by
George Washington laying down his sword to make way for
democratic elections. Ignoring this history, President Trump
vigorously campaigned for the Vice President to
single-handedly determine the results of the 2020 election.
. . . Every American—and certainly the President of the
United States—knows that in a democracy, leaders are
elected, not installed. With a plan this “BOLD,” President
Trump knowingly tried to subvert this fundamental principle.
Based on the evidence, the Court finds it more likely than
not that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct the
Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.213
As to 18 U.S.C. § 371, Judge Carter identified evidence
demonstrating that both President Trump and John Eastman
knew their electoral count plan was illegal, and knew it
could not “survive judicial scrutiny” in any of its
iterations:
Dr. Eastman himself repeatedly recognized that his plan had
no legal support. . . . Dr. Eastman likely acted deceitfully
and dishonestly each time he pushed an outcome-driven plan
that he knew was unsupported by the law.214
Finally, Judge Carter concluded:
Dr. Eastman and President Trump launched a campaign to
overturn a democratic election, an action unprecedented in
American history. Their campaign was not confined to the
ivory tower—it was a coup in search of a legal theory. The
plan spurred violent attacks on the seat of our nation’s
government, led to the deaths of several law enforcement
officers, and deepened public distrust in our political
process.215
Judge Luttig reached similar conclusions during his live
hearing testimony: “I have written, as you said, Chairman
Thompson, that, today, almost two years after that fateful
day in January 2021, that, still, Donald Trump and his
allies and supporters are a clear and present danger to
American democracy.” 216
During the hearing, Judge Luttig took issue with certain of
Greg Jacob’s characterizations of the 12th Amendment’s text,
explaining that the applicable text was not ambiguous in any
way. The Committee agrees with Judge Luttig: the application
of the Twelfth Amendment’s text is plain in this context; it
does not authorize Congress to second-guess State and
Federal courts and refuse to count State electoral votes
based on concerns about fraud. See infra. Although Jacob did
not discuss his position in great detail during the hearing,
his private testimony gives more insight on his actual
views:
In my view, a lot has been said about the fact that the role
of the Vice President in the electoral count on January 6th
is purely ministerial, and that is a correct conclusion. But
if you look at the constitutional text, the role of Congress
is purely ministerial as well. You open the certificates and
you count them. Those are the only things provided for in
the Constitution.217
Efforts to Pressure States to Change the Election Outcome,
and to Create and Transmit Fake Election Certificates
Anticipating that the Eastman strategy for January 6th would
be implemented, President Trump worked with a handful of
others to prepare a series of false Trump electoral slates
for seven States Biden actually won. President Trump
personally conducted a teleconference with Eastman and
Republican National Committee Chair Ronna McDaniel “a few
days before December 14” and solicited the RNC’s assistance
with the scheme.218 McDaniel agreed to provide that
assistance.219
A series of contemporaneous documents demonstrate what
President Trump and his allies, including attorney Kenneth
Chesebro, were attempting to accomplish: they anticipated
that the President of the Senate (which, under the
Constitution, is the Vice President) could rely upon these
false slates of electors on January 6th to justify refusing
to count genuine electoral votes.220
Graphic depicting the difference between the real and the
fake elector certificates.
Graphic depicting the difference between the real and the
fake elector certificates.
The false slates were created by fake Republican electors on
December 14th, at the same time the actual, certified
electors in those States were meeting to cast their States’
Electoral College votes for President Biden. By that point
in time, election-related litigation was over in all or
nearly all of the subject States, and Trump Campaign
election lawyers realized that the fake slates could not be
lawful or justifiable on any grounds. Justin Clark, the
Trump Campaign Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel
told the Select Committee that he “had real problems with
the process.” 221 Clark warned his colleagues, “unless we
have litigation pending like in these States, like, I don’t
think this is appropriate or, you know, this isn’t the right
thing to do. I don’t remember how I phrased it, but I got
into a little bit of a back and forth and I think it was
with Ken Chesebro, where I said, ‘Alright, you know, you
just get after it, like, I’m out.’” 222
Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign General Counsel, told the
Select Committee that without an official State certificate
of ascertainment,223 “the [fake] electors were, for lack of
a better way of saying it, no good or not—not valid.” 224
The Office of White House Counsel also appears to have
expressed concerns with this fake elector plan. In his
interview by the Select Committee, White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-December, the
process was “done” and that his deputy, Pat Philbin, may
have advised against the fake elector strategy.225 In an
informal Committee interview, Philbin described the fake
elector scheme as one of the “bad theories” that were like
“Whac-A-Mole” in the White House during this period.226
Cipollone agreed with this characterization.227
In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she
heard at least one member of the White House Counsel’s
Office say that the plan was not legal:
Committee Staff: [T]o be clear, did you hear the White House
Counsel’s Office say that this plan to have alternate
electors meet and cast votes for Donald Trump in States that
he had lost was not legally sound?
Hutchinson: Yes, sir.228
Multiple Republicans who were persuaded to sign the fake
certificates also testified that they felt misled or
betrayed, and would not have done so had they known that the
fake votes would be used on January 6th without an
intervening court ruling. One elector told the Select
Committee that he thought his vote would be strictly
contingent: “[I]t was a very consistent message that we were
told throughout all of that, is this is the only reason why
we’re doing this, is to preserve the integrity of being able
to have a challenge.” 229
The “Chairperson” of the Wisconsin fake electors, who was
also at the time Chairman of the Wisconsin Republican Party,
insisted in testimony to the Select Committee that he “was
told that these would only count if a court ruled in our
favor” and that he wouldn’t have supported anyone using the
Trump electors’ votes without a court ruling.230
Despite the fact that all major election lawsuits thus far
had failed, President Trump and his co-conspirators in this
effort, including John Eastman and Kenneth Chesebro, pressed
forward with the fake elector scheme. Ultimately, these
false electoral slates, five of which purported to represent
the “duly elected” electoral college votes of their States,
were transmitted to Executive Branch officials at the
National Archives, and to the Legislative Branch, including
to the Office of the President of the Senate, Vice President
Mike Pence.231
The fake electors followed Chesebro’s step-by-step
instructions for completing and mailing the fake
certificates to multiple officials in the U.S.
Government,232 complete with registered mail stickers and
return address labels identifying senders like the “Arizona
Republican Party” and the “Georgia Republican Party.” 233
The Wisconsin Republican Party’s fake certificates
apparently weren’t properly delivered, however, so the Trump
Campaign arranged to fly them to Washington just before the
joint session on January 6th, and try to deliver them to the
Vice President via Senator Ron Johnson and Representative
Mike Kelly’s offices.234 Both Johnson and Kelly’s offices
attempted to do so, but Vice President Pence’s aide refused
the delivery.235
Despite pressure from President Trump, Vice President Pence
and the Senate parliamentarian refused to recognize or count
the unofficial fake electoral votes. Greg Jacob testified
that he advised Vice President Pence on January 2nd that
“none of the slates that had been sent in would qualify as
an alternate slate” under the law and that the Senate
Parliamentarian “was in agreement” with this conclusion.236
* * *
In addition to this plan to create and transmit fake
electoral slates, Donald Trump was also personally and
substantially involved in multiple efforts to pressure State
election officials and State legislatures to alter official
lawful election results. As U.S. District Judge Carter
stated in his June 7, 2022, opinion:
Dr. Eastman’s actions in these few weeks [in December 2020]
indicate that his and President Trump’s pressure campaign to
stop the electoral count did not end with Vice President
Pence—it targeted every tier of federal and state elected
officials. Convincing state legislatures to certify
competing electors was essential to stop the count and
ensure President Trump’s reelection.237
Judge Carter also explained that “Dr. Eastman and President
Trump’s plan to disrupt the Joint Session was fully formed
and actionable as early as December 7, 2020.” 238
Chapter 2 of this report provides substantial detail on many
of President Trump’s specific efforts to apply pressure to
State officials and legislators. We provide a few examples
here:
During a January 2, 2021, call, President Trump pressured
Georgia’s Republican Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger
to “find 11,780 votes.” During that call, President Trump
asserted conspiracy theories about the election that
Department of Justice officials had already debunked.
President Trump also made a thinly veiled threat to
Raffensperger and his attorney about his failure to respond
to President Trump’s demands: “That’s a criminal, that’s a
criminal offense . . . That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan,
your lawyer . . . I’m notifying you that you’re letting it
happen.” 239
Judge Carter drew these conclusions:
Mr. Raffensperger debunked the President’s allegations
“point by point” and explained that “the data you have is
wrong;” however, President Trump still told him, “I just
want to find 11,780 votes.” 240
* * *
President Trump’s repeated pleas for Georgia Secretary of
State Raffensperger clearly demonstrate that his
justification was not to investigate fraud, but to win the
election. . . . Taken together, this evidence demonstrates
that President Trump likely knew the electoral count plan
had no factual justification. The plan not only lacked
factual basis but also legal justification.241
That call to Raffensperger came on the heels of President
Trump’s repeated attacks on Raffensperger, election workers,
and other public servants about President Trump’s loss in
the election. A month earlier, the Georgia Secretary of
State’s Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, had given
this explicit public warning to President Trump and his
team, a warning that the Select Committee has determined
President Trump apparently saw and disregarded:242
[I]t has all gone too far. All of it. . . .
A 20-something tech in Gwinnett County today has death
threats and a noose put out, saying he should be hung for
treason because he was transferring a report on batches from
an EMS to a county computer so he could read it.
It has to stop.
Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this
language. Senators, you have not condemned this language or
these actions. This has to stop. We need you to step up. And
if you’re going to take a position of leadership, show some.
My boss, Secretary Raffensperger—his address is out there.
They have people doing caravans in front of their house,
they’ve had people come onto their property. Tricia, his
wife of 40 years, is getting sexualized threats through her
cellphone.
It has to stop.
This is elections, this is the backbone of democracy, and
all of you who have not said a damn word are complicit in
this. It’s too much. . . .
What you don’t have the ability to do—and you need to step
up and say this—is stop inspiring people to commit potential
acts of violence. Someone’s going to get hurt. Someone’s
going to get shot. Someone’s going to get killed.243
Gabriel Sterling at a press conference on November 6, 2020
in Atlanta, Georgia.
Gabriel Sterling at a press conference on November 6, 2020
in Atlanta, Georgia.
(Photo by Jessica McGowan/Getty Images)
The stark warning was entirely appropriate, and prescient.
In addition to the examples Sterling identified, President
Trump and his team were also fixated on Georgia election
workers Ruby Freeman and Wandrea “Shaye” Moss. He and
Giuliani mentioned Freeman repeatedly in meetings with State
legislators, at public rallies, and in the January 2nd call
with Raffensperger. Referring to a video clip, Giuliani even
accused Freeman and Moss of trading USB drives to affect
votes “as if they [were] vials of heroin or cocaine.” 244
This was completely bogus: it was not a USB drive; it was a
ginger mint.245
After their contact information was published, Trump
supporters sent hundreds of threats to the women and even
showed up at Freeman’s home.246 As Freeman testified to the
Select Committee, President Trump and his followers’ conduct
had a profound impact on her life. She left her home based
on advice from the FBI, and wouldn’t move back for
months.247 And she explained, “I’ve lost my sense of
security—all because a group of people, starting with Number
45 [Donald Trump] and his ally Rudy Giuliani, decided to
scapegoat me and my daughter Shaye to push their own lies
about how the Presidential election was stolen.” 248 The
treatment of Freeman and Moss was callous, inhumane, and
inexcusable. Rudolph Giuliani and others with responsibility
should be held accountable.
In Arizona, a primary target of President Trump’s pressure,
and ire, was House Speaker Russell “Rusty” Bowers, a
longtime Republican who had served 17 years in the State
legislature. Throughout November and December, Bowers spoke
to President Trump, Giuliani, and members of Giuliani’s
legal team, in person or on the phone. During these calls,
President Trump and others alleged that the results in
Arizona were affected by fraud and asked that Bowers
consider replacing Presidential electors for Biden with
electors for Trump.249 Bowers demanded proof for the claims
of fraud, but never got it. At one point, after Bowers
pressed Giuliani on the claims of fraud, Giuliani responded,
“we’ve got lots of theories, we just don’t have the
evidence.” 250 Bowers explained to Giuliani: “You are asking
me do something against my oath, and I will not break my
oath.” 251
President Trump and his supporters’ intimidation tactics
affected Bowers, too. Bowers’s personal cell phone and home
address were doxed,252 leading demonstrators to show up at
his home and shout insults until police arrived. One
protestor who showed up at his home was armed and believed
to be a member of an extremist militia.253 Another hired a
truck with a defamatory and profane allegation that Bowers,
a deeply religious man, was a pedophile, and drove it
through Bowers’s neighborhood.254 This, again, is the
conduct of thugs and criminals, each of whom should be held
accountable.
In Michigan, President Trump focused on Republican Senate
Majority Leader Mike Shirkey and Republican House Speaker
Lee Chatfield. He invited them to the White House for a
November 20, 2020, meeting during which President Trump and
Giuliani, who joined by phone, went through a “litany” of
false allegations about supposed fraud in Michigan’s
election.255 Chatfield recalled President Trump’s more
generic directive for the group to “have some backbone and
do the right thing,” which he understood to mean overturning
the election by naming Michigan’s Electoral College electors
for Trump.256 Shirkey told President Trump that he wouldn’t
do anything that would violate Michigan law,257 and after
the meeting ended, issued a joint statement with Chatfield:
“We have not yet been made aware of any information that
would change the outcome of the election in Michigan and as
legislative leaders, we will follow the law and follow the
normal process regarding Michigan’s electors, just as we
have said throughout this election.” 258
When President Trump couldn’t convince Shirkey and Chatfield
to change the outcome of the election in Michigan during
that meeting or in calls after, he or his team maliciously
tweeted out Shirkey’s personal cell phone number and a
number for Chatfield that turned out to be wrong.259 Shirkey
received nearly 4,000 text messages after that, and another
private citizen reported being inundated with calls and
texts intended for Chatfield.260
None of Donald Trump’s efforts ultimately succeeded in
changing the official results in any State. That these
efforts had failed was apparent to Donald Trump and his
co-conspirators well before January 6th. By January 6th,
there was no evidence at all that a majority of any State
legislature would even attempt to change its electoral
votes.261
This past October, U.S. District Court Judge David Carter
issued a further ruling relating to one of President Trump’s
lawsuits in Georgia. Judge Carter applied the crime-fraud
exception to attorney-client privilege again, and identified
potential criminal activity related to a knowingly false
representation by Donald Trump to a Federal court. He wrote:
The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific
numbers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout
those numbers, both in court and in public.262
As John Eastman wrote in an email on December 31, 2020,
President Trump was “made aware that some of the allegations
(and evidence proffered by the experts)” in a verified State
court complaint was “inaccurate.” 263 Dr. Eastman noted that
“with that knowledge” President Trump could not accurately
verify a Federal court complaint that incorporated by
reference the “inaccurate” State court complaint: “I have no
doubt that an aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go
after both the President and his lawyers once all the dust
settles on this.” 264 Despite this specific warning,
“President Trump and his attorneys ultimately filed the
complaint with the same inaccurate numbers without
rectifying, clarifying, or otherwise changing them.” 265 And
President Trump personally “signed a verification swearing
under oath that the incorporated, inaccurate numbers ‘are
true and correct’ or ‘believed to be true and correct’ to
the best of his knowledge and belief.” 266 The numbers were
not correct, and President Trump and his legal team knew it.
Efforts to Corrupt the Department of Justice
Steven Engel, Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue at a Select
Committee hearing on June 23, 2022.
Steven Engel, Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue at a Select
Committee hearing on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
In the weeks after the 2020 election, Attorney General Barr
advised President Trump that the Department of Justice had
not seen any evidence to support Trump’s theory that the
election was stolen by fraud. Acting Attorney General
Jeffrey Rosen and his Deputy repeatedly reinforced to
President Trump that his claims of election fraud were false
when they took over in mid-December. Also in mid-December
2020, Attorney General Barr announced his plans to resign.
Between that time and January 6th, Trump spoke with Acting
Attorney General Jeff Rosen and Acting Deputy Richard
Donoghue repeatedly, attempting to persuade them and the
Department of Justice to find factual support for his stolen
election claims and thereby to assist his efforts to reverse
election results.
As Rosen publicly testified, “. . . between December 23rd
and January 3rd, the President either called me or met with
me virtually every day, with one or two exceptions, like
Christmas Day.” 267 As discussed earlier, Justice Department
investigations had demonstrated that the stolen election
claims were false; both Rosen and Donoghue told President
Trump this comprehensively and repeatedly.
One of those conversations occurred on December 27th, when
President Trump called Rosen to go through a “stream of
allegations” about the election.268 Donoghue described that
call as an “escalation of the earlier conversations” they
had.269 Initially, President Trump called Rosen directly.
When Donoghue joined the call, he sought to “make it clear
to the President [that] these allegations were simply not
true.” 270
So [the President] went through [the allegations]—in what
for me was a 90-minute conversation or so, and what for the
former Acting AG was a 2-hour conversation—as the President
went through them I went piece by piece to say “no, that’s
false, that is not true,” and to correct him really in a
serial fashion as he moved from one theory to another.271
The President raised, among others, debunked claims about
voting machines in Michigan, a truck driver who allegedly
moved ballots from New York to Pennsylvania, and a purported
election fraud at the State Farm Arena in Georgia.272 None
of the allegations were credible, and Rosen and Donoghue
said so to the President.273
At one point during the December 27th call in which Donoghue
refuted President Trump’s fraud allegations, Donoghue
recorded in handwritten notes a request President Trump made
specifically to him and Acting Attorney General Rosen: “Just
say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and
the Republican Congressmen.” 274 Donoghue explained: “[T]he
Department had zero involvement in anyone’s political
strategy,” and “he wanted us to say that it was
corrupt.” 275 “We told him we were not going to do
that.” 276 At the time, neither Rosen nor Donoghue knew the
full extent to which Republican Congressmen, including
Representative Scott Perry, were attempting to assist
President Trump to overturn the election results.
The Committee’s investigation has shown that Congressman
Perry was working with one Department of Justice official,
Jeffrey Clark, regarding the stolen election claims. Perry
was working with Clark and with President Trump and Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows with this goal: to enlist Clark to
reverse the Department of Justice’s findings regarding the
election and help overturn the election outcome.277
After introducing Clark to the President, Perry sent
multiple text messages to Meadows between December 26th and
December 28th, pressing that Clark be elevated within the
Department. Perry reminded Meadows that there are only “11
days to 1/6. . .We gotta get going!,” and, as the days went
on, one asking, “Did you call Jeff Clark?” 278
Acting Attorney General Rosen first learned about Clark’s
contact with President Trump in a call on Christmas Eve. On
that call, President Trump mentioned Clark to Rosen, who was
surprised to learn that Trump knew Clark and had met with
him. Rosen later confronted Clark about the contact: “Jeff,
anything going on that you think I should know about?” 279
Clark didn’t “immediately volunteer” the fact that he had
met with the President, but ultimately “acknowledged that he
had been at a meeting with the President in the Oval Office,
not alone, with other people.” 280 Clark was “kind of
defensive” and “somewhat apologetic,” “casting it as that he
had had a meeting with Congressman Perry from Pennsylvania
and that, to his surprise, or, you know, he hadn’t
anticipated it, that they somehow wound up at a meeting in
the Oval Office.” 281 Clark’s contact with President Trump
violated both Justice Department and White House policies
designed to prevent political pressure on the Department.282
While Clark initially appeared apologetic and assured Rosen
that “[i]t won’t happen again,” 283 he nevertheless
continued to work and meet secretly with President Trump and
Congressman Perry. Less than five days after assuring Rosen
that he would comply with the Department’s White House
contacts policy, Clark told Rosen and Donoghue that he had
again violated that policy. Donoghue confronted him: “I
reminded him that I was his boss and that I had directed him
to do otherwise.” 284
Around the same time, Representative Perry called Acting
Deputy Attorney General Donoghue, criticized the FBI, and
suggested that the Department hadn’t been doing its job.
Perry told Donoghue that Clark “would do something about
this.” 285
On December 28th, Clark worked with a Department employee
named Kenneth Klukowski—a political appointee who had
earlier worked with John Eastman—to produce a draft letter
from the Justice Department to the State legislature of
Georgia.286 That letter mirrored a number of the positions
President Trump and Eastman were taking at the time.287
(Although both Clark and Eastman refused to answer questions
by asserting their Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, evidence shows that Clark and Eastman
were in communication in this period leading up to January
6th.288 The draft letter to Georgia was intended to be one
of several Department letters to State legislatures in swing
States that had voted for Biden.289
The letter read: “The Department of Justice is investigating
various irregularities in the 2020 election for President of
the United States.” 290 Clark continued: “The Department
will update you as we are able on investigatory progress,
but at this time we have identified significant concerns
that may have impacted the outcome of the election in
multiple States, including the State of Georgia.” 291 This
was affirmatively untrue. The Department had conducted many
investigations of election fraud allegations by that point,
but it absolutely did not have “significant concerns” that
fraud “may have impacted the outcome of the election” in any
State. Jeff Clark knew this; Donoghue confirmed it again in
an email responding to Clark’s letter: “[W]e simply do not
currently have a basis to make such a statement. Despite
dramatic claims to the contrary, we have not seen the type
of fraud that calls into question the reported (and
certified) results of the election.” 292
The letter also explicitly recommended that Georgia’s State
legislature should call a special session to evaluate
potential election fraud. “In light of these developments,
the Department recommends that the Georgia General Assembly
should convene in special session so that its legislators
are in a special position to take additional testimony,
receive new evidence, and deliberate on the matter
consistent with its duties under the U.S. Constitution.” 293
Clark’s draft letter also referenced the fake electors that
President Trump and his campaign organized—arguing falsely
that there were currently two competing slates of legitimate
Presidential electors in Georgia:294
The Department believes that in Georgia and several other
States, both a slate of electors supporting Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., and a separate slate of electors supporting Donald J.
Trump, gathered on [December 14, 2020] at the proper
location to cast their ballots, and that both sets of those
ballots have been transmitted to Washington, D.C., to be
opened by Vice President Pence.295
This, of course, was part of Donald Trump and John Eastman’s
plan for January 6th. This letter reflects an effort to use
the Department of Justice to help overturn the election
outcome in Georgia and elsewhere. Rosen and Donoghue reacted
immediately to this draft letter:
“[T]here’s no chance that I would sign this letter or
anything remotely like this,” Donoghue wrote.296 The plan
set forth by Clark was “not even within the realm of
possibility,” 297 and Donoghue warned that if they sent
Clark’s letter, it “would be a grave step for the Department
to take and it could have tremendous Constitutional,
political and social ramifications for the country.” 298
As Richard Donoghue testified when describing his response
to Clark’s proposed letter:
Well, I had to read both the email and the attached letter
twice to make sure I really understood what he was proposing
because it was so extreme to me I had a hard time getting my
head around it initially.
But I read it, and I did understand it for what he intended,
and I had to sit down and sort of compose what I thought was
an appropriate response. . . .
In my response I explained a number of reasons this is not
the Department’s role to suggest or dictate to State
legislatures how they should select their electors. But more
importantly, this was not based on fact. This was actually
contrary to the facts as developed by Department
investigations over the last several weeks and months.
So, I respond to that. And for the department to insert
itself into the political process this way I think would
have had grave consequences for the country. It may very
well have spiraled us into a constitutional crisis.299
Rosen and Donoghue also met with Clark about the letter.
Their conversation “was a very difficult and contentious”
one, according to Donoghue.300 “What you’re proposing is
nothing less than the United States Justice Department
meddling in the outcome of a Presidential election,”
Donoghue admonished Clark, to which Clark indignantly
responded, “I think a lot of people have meddled in this
election.” 301
Both Rosen and Donoghue refused to sign the letter, and
confronted Clark with the actual results of the Department’s
investigations.302 They also permitted Clark access to a
classified briefing from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (“ODNI”) showing Clark that
allegations he made to Rosen and Donoghue about foreign
interference with voting machines were not true. According
to Rosen, the decision to give Clark the briefing at that
point “was a difficult question because, if he’s going to
brief the President, I reluctantly think it’s probably
better that he’s heard from Director Ratcliffe than that he
not, even if—I don’t think he should brief the President.
But, at this point, he’s telling me that this is happening
whether I agree with it or not. So, so I let him have that
briefing.” 303
After Clark received the ODNI briefing, “he acknowledged [to
Donoghue] that there was nothing in that briefing that would
have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign
involvement.” 304 While Clark then dropped his claims about
foreign interference, he continued to press to send the
letter to Georgia and other States, despite being told that
the Department of Justice investigations had found no fraud
sufficient to overturn the election outcome in Georgia or
any other States. This was an intentional choice by Jeff
Clark to contradict specific Department findings on election
fraud, and purposely insert the Department into the
Presidential election on President Trump’s behalf and risk
creating or exacerbating a constitutional crisis.
By this point, President Trump recognized that neither Rosen
nor Donoghue would sign the letter or support his false
election claims. President Trump and his team then
communicated further with Clark and offered him the job of
Acting Attorney General. On January 2nd, Clark told Rosen
that he “would turn down the President’s offer if [Rosen]
reversed [his] position and signed the letter” that he and
Klukowski had drafted.305 The next day, Clark decided to
accept and informed Rosen, who then called White House
Counsel to seek a meeting directly with President Trump. As
Rosen put it, “I wasn’t going to accept being fired by my
subordinate, so I wanted to talk to the President
directly.” 306
On January 3rd, that meeting was convened. Although
contemporaneous White House documents suggest that Clark had
already been appointed as the Acting Attorney General,307
all the participants in the meeting other than Clark and
President Trump aggressively opposed Clark’s appointment.
At that point, Rosen decided to “broaden the circle” and ask
that his subordinates inform all the other Assistant
Attorneys General (AAGs) what was afoot.308 Rosen wanted to
know how the AAGs would respond if Jeff Clark was installed
as the Acting Attorney General. Pat Hovakimian, who worked
for Rosen, then set up a conference call. The AAGs almost
immediately agreed that they would resign if Rosen was
removed from office.309
Rosen, Donoghue, and Steve Engel, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, attended the
meeting. White House lawyers Pat Cipollone, Eric Herschmann
and Pat Philbin joined as well.
When the meeting started, Clark attempted to defend his
appointment. Clark declared that this was the “last
opportunity to sort of set things straight with this
defective election,” and he had the “intelligence,” the
“will,” and “desire” to “pursue these matters in the way
that the President thought most appropriate.” 310 Everyone
else present disagreed that Clark could conceivably
accomplish these things.
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as
well, describing Clark’s letter as a “murder-suicide
pact.” 311 Cipollone warned that the letter would “damage
everyone who touches it” and no one should have anything to
do with it.312
President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do
if Clark took office. Both confirmed they would resign.313
Steve Engel recalled that the President next asked if he
would resign:
At some point, [] I believe Rich Donoghue said that senior
Department officials would all resign if Mr. Clark were put
in, and the President turned to me and said, “Steve, you
wouldn’t resign, would you?” I said, “Well, Mr. President,
I’ve been with you through four Attorneys General, including
two Acting Attorneys General, and I just couldn’t be part of
this if Mr. Clark were here.” And I said, “And I believe
that the other senior Department officials would resign as
well. And Mr. Clark would be here by himself with a hostile
building, those folks who remained, and nothing would get
done.” 314
Donoghue added that they would not be the only ones to
resign. “You should understand that your entire Department
leadership will resign,” Donoghue recalled saying. This
included every Assistant Attorney General. “Mr. President,
these aren’t bureaucratic leftovers from another
administration,” Donoghue reminded Trump, “You picked them.
This is your leadership team.” Donoghue added, “And what
happens if, within 48 hours, we have hundreds of
resignations from your Justice Department because of your
actions? What does that say about your leadership?” 315
Steve Engel then reinforced Donoghue’s point, saying that
Clark would be leading a “graveyard.”
Faced with mass resignations and recognizing that the
“breakage” could be too severe, Donald Trump decided to
rescind his offer to Clark and drop his plans to use the
Justice Department to aid in his efforts to overturn the
election outcome.316 The President looked at Clark and said,
“I appreciate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you
being willing to suffer the abuse. But the reality is,
you’re not going to get anything done. These guys are going
to quit. Everyone else is going to resign. It’s going to be
a disaster. The bureaucracy will eat you alive. And no
matter how much you want to get things done in the next few
weeks, you won’t be able to get it done, and it’s not going
to be worth the breakage.” 317
* * *
Evidence gathered by the Committee also suggests that
President Trump offered Sidney Powell the position of
Special Counsel for election related matters during a highly
charged White House meeting on December 18, 2020.318 White
House lawyers vehemently opposed Powell’s appointment, and
it also was not ultimately made formal.
Summoning a Mob to Washington, and Knowing they were Angry
and Armed, Instructing them to March to the Capitol
In the early morning hours of December 19th, shortly after
the contentious December 18th White House meeting with
Sidney Powell and others, Donald Trump sent a tweet urging
his supporters to travel to Washington for January 6th. In
that tweet, President Trump attached false allegations that
the election was stolen and promised a “wild” time on
January 6th.319 This Twitter invitation was followed by over
a dozen other instances in which he used Twitter to
encourage supporters to rally for him in Washington, DC on
January 6th.320
The Committee has assembled detailed material demonstrating
the effects of these communications on members of far-right
extremist groups, like the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three
Percenters, and others, and on individuals looking to
respond to their president’s call to action. President
Trump’s supporters believed the election was stolen because
they listened to his words,321 and they knew what he had
called them to do; stop the certification of the electoral
count.322
For example, one supporter, Charles Bradford Smith, noted on
December 22, 2020, that “Trump is asking everyone to go” to
Washington, DC on January 6th “to fill the streets” on the
“day Pence counts up the votes.” 323 Derek Sulenta posted to
Facebook on December 23, 2020, that “I’ll be there Jan 6th
to support the president no matter what happens” because
“That’s the day he called for patriots to show up.” 324 By
December 31, 2020, Robert Morss believed January 6th stood
for the moment when “1776 Will Commence Again” because
President Trump asked them to “Be there, Will be Wild.” 325
Kenneth Grayson predicted what would eventually happen on
January 6th, when on December 23, 2020, he wrote on Facebook
that President Trump called people to Washington, DC through
his December 19th tweet and then added “IF TRUMP TELLS US TO
STORM THE FUKIN CAPITAL IMA DO THAT THEN!” 326 Some
demonstrated their inspiration for January 6th by
circulating flyers, which proclaimed “#OccupyCongress” over
images of the United States Capitol.327 Robert Gieswein, a
Coloradan affiliated with Three Percenters who was among the
first to breach the Capitol, said that he came to
Washington, DC “to keep President Trump in.” 328
Chapter 8 of this report documents how the Proud Boys led
the attack, penetrated the Capitol, and led hundreds of
others inside. Multiple Proud Boys reacted immediately to
President Trump’s December 19th tweet and began their
planning. Immediately, Proud Boys leaders reorganized their
hierarchy, with Enrique Tarrio, Joseph Biggs, and Ethan
Nordean messaging groups of Proud Boys about what to expect
on January 6th.329 Tarrio created a group chat known as the
Ministry of Self-Defense for hand-selected Proud Boys whom
he wanted to “organize and direct” plans for January 6th.330
On social media, Tarrio referenced “revolt” and
“[r]evolution,” and conspicuously asked “What if we invade
it?” on Telegram.331 As of December 29, 2020, Tarrio told
the group the events on January 6th would be “centered
around the Capitol.” 332
At the time of publication of this report, prosecutions of
certain Proud Boys are ongoing. To date, one Proud Boy has
pled guilty to seditious conspiracy and other Proud Boys
have pled guilty to other crimes, including conspiracy to
obstruct Congress.333 Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boy who pled
guilty to seditious conspiracy, admitted that he:
understood from internal discussions among the Proud Boys
that in the leadup to January 6, the willingness to resort
to unlawful conduct increasingly included a willingness to
use and promote violence to achieve political objectives.334
Moreover,
Bertino believed that the 2020 election had been “stolen”
and, as January 6, 2021, approached, believed that drastic
measures, including violence, were necessary to prevent
Congress from certifying the Electoral College Vote on
January 6, 2021. Bertino made his views in this regard known
publicly, as well as in private discussions with MOSD
leadership. Bertino understood from his discussions with
MOSD leadership that they agreed that the election had been
stolen, that the purpose of traveling to Washington, D.C.,
on January 6, 2021, was to stop the certification of the
Electoral College Vote, and that the MOSD leaders were
willing to do whatever it would take, including using force
against police and others, to achieve that objective.335
As set out in Bertino’s plea agreement, members of MOSD:
openly discussed plans for potential violence at the Capitol
[. . . and] members of MOSD leadership were discussing the
possibility of storming the Capitol. Bertino believed that
storming the Capitol would achieve the group’s goal of
stopping Congress from certifying the Electoral College
Vote. Bertino understood that storming the Capitol or its
grounds would be illegal and would require using force
against police or other government officials.336
Another Proud Boy who has pled guilty to conspiracy and
assault charges, Charles Donohoe, understood that the Proud
Boys planned to storm the Capitol. Donohoe, a Proud Boys
local chapter leader from North Carolina:
was aware [as early as January 4, 2021] that members of MOSD
leadership were discussing the possibility of storming the
Capitol. Donohoe believed that storming the Capitol would
achieve the group’s goal of stopping the government from
carrying out the transfer of presidential power.337
The Department of Justice has charged a number of Oath
Keepers with seditious conspiracy. Specifically, the
government alleges that “[a]fter the Presidential Election,
Elmer Stewart Rhodes III conspired with his co-defendants,
introduced below, and other co-conspirators, known and
unknown to the Grand Jury, to oppose by force the lawful
transfer of presidential power.” 338 A jury agreed,
convicting Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggs—the leader of the
Florida Oath Keepers chapter—of seditious conspiracy. The
jury also convicted Rhodes and Meggs, as well as fellow Oath
Keepers Jessica Watkins, Kenneth Harrelson, and Thomas
Caldwell,339 of other serious felonies for their actions on
January 6th.340
Meggs celebrated the December 19th tweet, sending an
encrypted Signal message to Florida Oath Keepers that
President Trump “wants us to make it WILD that’s what he’s
saying. He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make
it wild!!! . . . Gentlemen we are heading to DC pack your
shit!!” 341 Similarly, Oath Keeper Joshua James—who pleaded
guilty to seditious conspiracy—told Oath Keepers that there
was now a “NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION FOR DC JAN 6TH” following
President Trump’s words.342
Stewart Rhodes, the Oath Keepers’ founder, felt that “the
time for peaceful protest is over” after December 19th and,
according to the government, “urged President Trump to use
military force to stop the lawful transfer of presidential
power, describing January 6, 2021, as “a hard constitutional
deadline” to do so.343 Rhodes created a “an invitation-only
Signal group chat titled, ‘DC OP: Jan 6 21’” on December 30,
2020, which he and other Oath Keepers, like Meggs and James,
used to plan for January 6th, including by creating a “quick
reaction force” of firearms to be stashed in Virginia.344
Multiple members of the Oath Keepers have pleaded guilty to
seditious conspiracy. Brian Ulrich started planning for
January 6th right after President Trump sent out his
December 19th tweet. The Department of Justice summarized
Ulrich’s communications, as follows:
Ulrich messaged the “Oath Keepers of Georgia” Signal group
chat, “Trump acts now maybe a few hundred radicals die
trying to burn down cities . . . Trump sits on his hands
Biden wins . . . millions die resisting the death of the 1st
and 2nd amendment.” On December 20, 2020, an individual in
the “Oath Keepers of Georgia” Signal group chat, who later
traveled with Ulrich to Washington, D.C., and breached the
Capitol grounds with Ulrich on January 6, 2021, messaged,
“January 6th. The great reset. America or not.” 345
The Justice Department’s Statement of Offense for Oath
Keeper Joshua James provided these details:
In advance of and on January 6, 2021, James and others
agreed to take part in the plan developed by Rhodes to use
any means necessary, up to and including the use of force,
to stop the lawful transfer of presidential power. In the
weeks leading up to January 6, 2021, Rhodes instructed James
and other coconspirators to be prepared, if called upon, to
report to the White House grounds to secure the perimeter
and use lethal force if necessary against anyone who tried
to remove President Trump from the White House, including
the National Guard or other government actors who might be
sent to remove President Trump as a result of the
Presidential Election.346
The former President’s call also galvanized Three Percenters
to act. A group known as The Three Percenters Original sent
a message to its members on December 16, 2020, noting they
“stand ready and are standing by to answer the call from our
President should the need arise” to combat the “pure evil
that is conspiring to steal our country away from the
american people” through the “2020 presidential
election.” 347 After President Trump’s tweet, the group put
out another letter instructing “any member who can attend .
. . to participate” on January 6th because “[t]he President
of the United States has put out a general call for the
patriots of this Nation to gather” in Washington, DC.348
Other Three Percenter groups also responded. Alan Hostetter
and Russell Taylor led a group of Three Percenters calling
themselves the California Patriots—DC Brigade, who have been
charged with conspiracy to obstruct Congress because they
organized to fight to keep President Trump in power on
January 6th after President Trump’s December 19th tweet
inspired them to come to Washington, DC.349 On December
19th, Hostetter posted on Instagram:
President Trump tweeted that all patriots should descend on
Washington DC on Wednesday l/6/2021. This is the date of the
Joint Session of Congress in which they will either accept
or reject the fake/phony/stolen electoral college votes.350
Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor,
and other members of the California Patriots—DC Brigade
exchanged messages and posted to social media about bringing
gear, including “weaponry,” like “hatchet[s],” “bat[s],” or
“[l]arge metal flashlights,” and possibly “firearms,” and,
about being “ready and willing to fight” like it was “1776.”
Taylor even spoke in front of the Supreme Court on January
5, 2021, explaining that “[p]atriots” would “not return to
our peaceful way of life until this election is made right .
. . .” 351 On December 29, 2020, Taylor exclaimed “I
personally want to be on the front steps and be one of the
first ones to breach the doors!” 352
Similarly, members of the Florida Guardians of Freedom,
Three Percent sent around a flyer on December 24, 2020,
saying they were “responding to the call from President
Donald J. Trump to assist in the security, protection, and
support of the people as we all protest the fraudulent
election and re-establish liberty for our nation.” 353 Their
leader, Jeremy Liggett, posted a meme to Facebook stating
that “3% Will Show In Record Numbers In DC” 354 and put out
a “safety video” instructing people that they could bring
“an expandable metal baton, a walking cane and a folding
knife” 355 to Washington, DC on January 6th. Several have
been arrested for participating in the violence around the
tunnel on January 6th.356
When interviewed by the FBI on March 31, 2021, Danny
Rodriguez—a Three Percenter from California who tased
Officer Michael Fanone in the neck as rioters tried to break
through a door on the west side of the Capitol—reflected on
his decision to go to Washington, DC357:
Trump called us to D.C. . . . and he’s calling for help—I
thought he was calling for help. I thought he was—I thought
we were doing the right thing. . . . [W]e thought we were
going to hit it like a civil war. There was going to be a
big battle. . . . I thought that the main fight, the main
battle, was going to be in D.C. because Trump called
everyone there.358
These groups were not operating in silos. Meggs bragged on
Facebook that following President Trump’s December 19th
tweet he had formed an alliance between the Oath Keepers,
the Florida Three Percenters, and the Proud Boys “to work
together to shut this shit down.” 359 On December 19th,
Meggs called Enrique Tarrio and they spoke for more than
three minutes.360 Three days later, Meggs messaged Liggett,
echoing his excitement about the December 19th tweet and
specifically referencing the seat of Congress: “He called us
all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!!” 361
Liggett said “I will have a ton of men with me” and Meggs
replied that “we have made Contact [sic] with PB [Proud
Boys] and they always have a big group. Force multiplier. .
. . I figure we could splinter off the main group of PB and
come up behind them. Fucking crush them for good.” 362 Aside
from Meggs, Stewart Rhodes brought in at least one local
militia leader363 and Three Percenters into the Oath Keepers
January 6th planning chats that came about following
President Trump’s tweet.364
Even on January 6th, rioters referenced the tweet. An
unknown rioter was caught on video as they ascended the
Capitol steps saying “He said it was gonna be wild. He
didn’t lie.” 365 MPD body-worn cameras captured Cale Clayton
around 3:15 p.m. as he taunted officers from under the
scaffolding: “Your fucking president told us to be here. You
should be on this side, right here, going with us. You are
an American citizen. Your fucking President told you to do
that. You too. You too. You. All of you guys. That Tweet was
for you guys. For us. For you.” 366
As January 6th neared, intelligence emerged indicating that
January 6th was likely to be violent, and specifically that
the Capitol was a target. On January 3rd, an intelligence
summary informed Department of Justice officials of plans to
“occupy the Capitol” and “invade” the Capitol on January
6th. This summarized a “SITE Intelligence Group” report
about the “online rhetoric focused on the 6 Jan event.” Some
of the reporting includes: “Calls to occupy federal
buildings.” “intimidating Congress and invading the capitol
building.” The email also quoted WUSA9 local reporting: “one
of the websites used for organizing the event was
encouraging attendees to bring guns.” 367
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue testified:
And we knew that if you have tens of thousands of very upset
people showing up in Washington, DC, that there was
potential for violence.368
At the same time, a Defense Department official predicted on
a White House National Security Council call that violence
could be targeted at the Capitol on January 6th. According
to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley:
So during these calls, I — I only remember in hindsight
because he was almost like clairvoyant. [Deputy Secretary of
Defense David] Norquist says during one of these calls, the
greatest threat is a direct assault on the Capitol. I’ll
never forget it.369
Likewise, documentation received by the Committee from the
Secret Service demonstrates a growing number of warnings
both that January 6th was likely to be violent, and
specifically that the Capitol would likely be the target,
including intelligence directly regarding the Proud Boys and
Oath Keepers militia groups.
Even two weeks ahead of January 6th, the intelligence
started to show what could happen. On December 22, 2020, the
FBI received a screenshot of an online chat among Oath
Keepers, seemingly referring to the State capitols besieged
by protesters across the country earlier that year: “if they
were going to go in, then they should have went all the
way.” 370 “There is only one way. It is not signs. It’s not
rallies. It’s fucking bullets,” one user replied.371
A public source emailed the Secret Service a document titled
“Armed and Ready, Mr. President,” on December 24th, which
summarized online comments responding to President Trump’s
December 19th tweet.372 Protestors should “start marching
into the chambers,” one user wrote.373 Trump “can’t exactly
openly tell you to revolt,” another replied. “This is the
closest he’ll ever get.” 374 “I read [the President’s tweet]
as armed,” someone said.375 “[T]here is not enough cops in
DC to stop what is coming,” replied yet another.376 “[B]e
already in place when Congress tries to get to their
meeting,” the comments continued, and “make sure they know
who to fear.’” 377 “[W]aiting for Trump to say the word,” a
person said, and “this is what Trump expects,” exclaimed
another.378 Capitol Police’s head of intelligence, Jack
Donohue, got the same compilation from a former colleague at
the New York Police Department on December 28, 2020.379
On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip
about the Proud Boys detailing plans to have “a large enough
group to march into DC armed [that] will outnumber the
police so they can’t be stopped.” 380 “Their plan is to
literally kill people,” the informant stated. “Please please
take this tip seriously . . . .” 381 On December 29, 2020,
Secret Service forwarded related warnings to Capitol Police
that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to “occupy
federal building[s],” including “march[ing] into the capital
building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere
presence.” 382
Civilians also tipped off Capitol Police about people
bringing weapons to besiege the Capitol. One tipster, who
had “track[ed] online far right extremism for years,”
emailed Capitol Police warning “I’ve seen countless tweets
from Trump supporters saying they will be armed,” and
“I[’]ve also seen tweets from people organizing to ‘storm
the Capitol’ on January 6th.” 383
On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related
warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were
being urged to “occupy federal building,” including
“march[ing] into the capital building and mak[ing] them
quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” 384 Indeed, a
Secret Service intelligence briefing on December 30th
entitled “March for Trump,” highlighted the President’s
“Will be wild!” tweet alongside hashtags #WeAreTheStorm,
#1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols, writing “President Trump
supporters have proposed a movement to occupy Capitol
Hill.” 385
On January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch
at DC Police forwarded a civilian tip about “a website
planning terroristic behavior on Jan 6th, during the rally”
to Capitol Police intelligence.386 “There are detailed plans
to storm federal buildings,” including “the capitol in DC on
Jan 6th,” the tipster reported, linking to thedonald.win.387
On January 2, 2021, the FBI discovered a social media
posting that read, “This is not a rally and it’s no longer a
protest. This is a final stand . . . many are ready to die
to take back #USA . . . . And don’t be surprised if we take
the #capital building.” 388
On January 3, 2021, a Parler user’s post—under the name
1776(2.0) Minuteman—noting “after weds we are going to need
a new congress” and “Jan 6 may actually be their [Members of
Congress] last day in office” reached the FBI and Capitol
Police.389
The FBI field office in Norfolk, Virginia issued an alert to
law enforcement agencies on January 5th tiled “Potential for
Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned
‘StopTheSteal’ Protest on 6 January 2021,” which noted:
An online thread discussed specific calls for violence to
include stating, “Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear
glass breaking, doors being kicked in, and blood. . . being
spilled. Get violent. . .stop calling this a march, or
rally, or a protest. Go there ready for war. We get our
President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this
goal.” 390
In addition, the alert copied “perimeter maps [of the
Capitol] and caravan pictures [that] were posted” on
thedonald.win, particularly worrying that the “caravans . .
. had the same colors as the sections of the perimeter” of
the Capitol.391 Secret Service also knew about caravans
planning to come to DC to “Occupy the Capitol.” 392
That same day, representatives from DHS, FBI, DC’s Homeland
Security and Emergency Management Agency, Secret Service, DC
Police, and Capitol Police shared a website, Red State
Secession, which had a post titled “Why the Second American
Revolution Starts Jan 6.” A user asked visitors to post
where they could find the home addresses of Democratic
congressmen and “political enemies” and asked if “any of our
enemies [will] be working in offices in DC that afternoon.”
393 “What are their routes to and from the event?” the post
continued.394 “[T]he crowd will be looking for enemies.” 395
A Secret Service open-source unit flagged an account on
thedonald.win that threatened to bring a sniper rifle to a
rally on January 6th. The user also posted a picture of a
handgun and rifle with the caption, “Sunday Gun Day
Providing Overwatch January 6th Will be Wild.” 396
The Secret Service learned from the FBI on January 5th about
right-wing groups establishing armed quick reaction forces
in Virginia, where they could amass firearms illegal in
DC.397 Trump supporters staged there waiting across the
river “to respond to ‘calls for help.’” 398 The Oath Keepers
were such a group.399
President Trump’s closest aides knew about the political
power of sites like thedonald.win, which is where much of
this violent rhetoric and planning happened. On December 30,
2020, Jason Miller—a Senior Adviser to and former spokesman
for the former President—texted Chief of Staff Mark Meadows
a link to the thedonald.win, adding “I got the base FIRED
UP.” 400 The link connected to a page with comments like
“Gallows don’t require electricity,” “if the filthy commie
maggots try to push their fraud through, there will be hell
to pay,” and Congress can certify Trump the winner or leave
“in a bodybag.” 401 Symbolic gallows were constructed on
January 6th at the foot of the Capitol.402
Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6th.
Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6th.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
After President Trump’s signal, his supporters did not hide
their plans for violence at the Capitol, and those threats
made their way to national and local law enforcement
agencies. As described in this report, the intelligence
agencies did detect this planning, and they shared it with
the White House and with the U.S. Secret Service.
Testimony from White House staff also suggests real concerns
about the risk of violence as January 6th approached.
Cassidy Hutchinson, for example, testified about a
conversation she had with her boss, Mark Meadows, on January
2nd:
Mark Meadows walks along the South Lawn on October 30, 2020.
Mark Meadows walks along the South Lawn on October 30, 2020.
(Photo by Sarah Silbiger/Getty Images)
I went into Mark’s office, and he was still on his phone. .
. . . I said to Mark, “Rudy [Giuliani] said these things to
me. What’s going on here? Anything I should know about?”
This was—he was, like, looking at his phone. He was like,
“Oh, it’s all about the rally on Wednesday. Isn’t that what
he was talking to you about?”
I said, “Yeah. Yeah, sounds like we’re going to the
Capitol.”
He said, “Yeah. Are you talking with Tony?”
“I’m having a conversation, sir.”
He said—still looking at his phone. I remember he was
scrolling. He was like, “Yeah. You know, things might get
real, real bad on the 6th.”
And I remember saying to him, “What do you mean?”
He was like, “I don’t know. There’s just going to be a lot
of people here, and there’s a lot of different ideas right
now. I’m not really sure of everything that’s going on.
Let’s just make sure we keep tabs on it.” 403
Hutchinson also testified about a conversation she had with
Director of National Intelligence, Ratcliffe:
He had expressed to me that he was concerned that it could
spiral out of control and potentially be dangerous, either
for our democracy or the way that things were going for the
6th.404
Hope Hicks texted Trump Campaign spokesperson Hogan Gidley
in the midst of the January 6th violence, explaining that
she had “suggested . . . several times” on the preceding
days (January 4th and January 5th) that President Trump
publicly state that January 6th must remain peaceful and
that he had refused her advice to do so.405 Her recollection
was that Herschmann earlier advised President Trump to make
a preemptive public statement in advance of January 6th
calling for no violence that day.406 No such statement was
made.
The District of Columbia Homeland Security office explicitly
warned that groups were planning to “occupy the [Capitol] to
halt the vote.” 407
[W]e got derogatory information from OSINT suggesting that
some very, very violent individuals were organizing to come
to DC, and not only were they organized to come to DC, but
they were — these groups, these nonaligned groups were
aligning. And so all the red flags went up at that point,
you know, when you have armed militia, you know,
collaborating with White supremacy groups, collaborating
with conspiracy theory groups online all toward a common
goal, you start seeing what we call in, you know, terrorism,
a blended ideology, and that’s a very, very bad sign. . . .
[T]hen when they were clearly across — not just across one
platform but across multiple platforms of these groups
coordinating, not just like chatting, “Hey, how’s it going,
what’s the weather like where you’re at,” but like, “what
are you bringing, what are you wearing, you know, where do
we meet up, do you have plans for the Capitol.” That’s
operational—that’s like preoperational intelligence, right,
and that is something that’s clearly alarming.408
Again, this type of intelligence was shared, including
obvious warnings about potential violence prior to January
6th.409 What was not shared, and was not fully understood by
intelligence and law enforcement entities, is what role
President Trump would play on January 6th in exacerbating
the violence, and later refusing for multiple hours to
instruct his supporters to stand down and leave the Capitol.
No intelligence collection was apparently performed on
President Trump’s plans for January 6th, nor was there any
analysis performed on what he might do to exacerbate
potential violence. Certain Republican members of Congress
who were working with Trump and the Giuliani team may have
had insight on this particular risk, but none appear to have
alerted the Capitol Police or any other law enforcement
authority.
On January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson wrote in an email to
fellow rally organizers, “POTUS expectations are to have
something intimate at the [E]llipse, and call on everyone to
march to the Capitol.” 410 And, on January 4, 2021, another
rally organizer texted Mike Lindell, the MyPillow CEO, that
President Trump would “unexpectedly” call on his supporters
to march to the Capitol:
This stays only between us . . . . It can also not get out
about the march because I will be in trouble with the
national park service and all the agencies but POTUS is
going to just call for it “unexpectedly.” 411
Testimony obtained by the Committee also indicates that
President Trump was specifically aware that the crowd he had
called to Washington was fired up and angry on the evening
of January 5th. Judd Deere, a deputy White House press
secretary recalled a conversation with President Trump in
the Oval Office on the evening of January 5th:
Judd Deere: I said he should focus on policy
accomplishments. I didn’t mention the 2020 election.
Committee Staff: Okay. What was his response?
Deere: He acknowledged that and said, “We’ve had a lot,”
something along those lines, but didn’t—he fairly quickly
moved to how fired up the crowd is, or was going to be.
Committee Staff: Okay. What did he say about it?
Deere: Just that they were—they were fired up. They were
angry. They feel like the election’s been stolen, that the
election was rigged, that—he went on and on about that for a
little bit.412
Testimony indicated that President Trump was briefed on the
risk of violence on the morning of the 6th before he left
the White House. Cassidy Hutchinson provided this testimony:
Vice Chair Cheney: So, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your
understanding that Mr. Ornato told the President about
weapons at the rally on the morning of January 6th?
Hutchinson: That is what Mr. Ornato relayed to me.413
The head of President Trump’s security detail, Bobby Engel,
told the Select Committee that when he shared critical
information with White House Deputy Chief of Staff Anthony
Ornato, it was a means of conveying that information with
the Oval Office: “So, when it came to passing information to
Mr. Ornato, I—my assumption was that it would get to the
chief [of staff, Mark Meadows], or that he was sharing the
information with the chief. I don’t—and the filtering
process, or if the chief thinks it needs to get to the
President, then he would share it with the President.” 414
Also, Engel confirmed that if “information would come to my
attention, whether it was a protective intelligence issue or
a concern or—primarily, I would—I would make sure that the
information got filtered up through the appropriate chain
usually through Mr. Ornato. So if I received a report on
something that was happening in the DC area, I’d either
forward that information to Mr. Ornato, or call him about
that information or communicate in some way.” 415
The Select Committee also queried Deputy Chief of Staff
Ornato this November about what he generally would have done
in this sort of situation, asking him the following:
“Generally you receive information about things like the
groups that are coming, the stuff that we talked earlier.
You would bring that to Mr. Meadows and likely did here,
although you don’t have a specific recollection?” 416 Ornato
responded: “That is correct, sir.” 417 Ornato also explained
to the Committee that “. . . in my normal daily functions,
in my general functions as my job, I would’ve had a
conversation with him about all the groups coming in and
what was expected from the secret service.” 418 As for the
morning of January 6th itself, he had the following answer:
Committee Staff: Do you remember talking to Chief of Staff
Mark Meadows about any of your concerns about the threat
landscape going into January 6th?
Ornato: I don’t recall; however, in my position I would’ve
made sure he was tracking the demos, which he received a
daily brief, Presidential briefing. So he most likely was
getting all this in his daily brief as well. I wouldn’t know
what was in his intelligence brief that day, but I would’ve
made sure that he was tracking these things and just
mentioned, “Hey, are you tracking the demos?” If he gave me
a “yeah”, I don’t recall it today, but I’m sure that was
something that took place.419
Ornato had access to intelligence that suggested violence at
the Capitol on January 6th, and it was his job to inform
Meadows and President Trump of that. Although Ornato told us
that he did not recall doing so, the Select Committee found
multiple parts of Ornato’s testimony questionable. The
Select Committee finds it difficult to believe that neither
Meadows nor Ornato told President Trump, as was their job,
about the intelligence that was emerging as the January 6th
rally approached.
President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the
Ellipse.
President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the
Ellipse.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration)
Hours before the Ellipse rally on January 6th, the fact that
the assembled crowd was prepared for potential violence was
widely known. In addition to intelligence reports indicating
potential violence at the Capitol, weapons and other
prohibited items were being seized by police on the streets
and by Secret Service at the magnetometers for the Ellipse
speech. Secret Service confiscated a haul of weapons from
the 28,000 spectators who did pass through the
magnetometers: 242 cannisters of pepper spray, 269 knives or
blades, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body
armor, 3 gas masks, 30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17
miscellaneous items like scissors, needles, or
screwdrivers.420 And thousands of others purposely remained
outside the magnetometers, or left their packs outside.421
Others brought firearms. Three men in fatigues from Broward
County, Florida brandished AR-15s in front of Metropolitan
police officers on 14th Street and Independence Avenue on
the morning of January 6th.422 MPD advised over the radio
that one individual was possibly armed with a “Glock” at
14th and Constitution Avenue, and another was possibly armed
with a “rifle” at 15th and Constitution Avenue around 11:23
a.m.423 The National Park Service detained an individual
with a rifle between 12 and 1 p.m.424 Almost all of this was
known before Donald Trump took the stage at the Ellipse.
By the time President Trump was preparing to give his
speech, he and his advisors knew enough to cancel the rally.
And he certainly knew enough to cancel any plans for a march
to the Capitol. According to testimony obtained by the
Select Committee, President Trump knew that elements of the
crowd were armed, and had prohibited items, and that many
thousands would not pass through the magnetometers for that
reason. Testimony indicates that the President had received
an earlier security briefing, and testimony indicates that
the Secret Service mentioned the prohibited items again as
they drove President Trump to the Ellipse.
Cassidy Hutchinson was with the President backstage. Her
contemporaneous text messages indicate that President Trump
was “effing furious” about the fact that a large number of
his supporters would not go through the magnetometers:
Cassidy Hutchinson: But the crowd looks good from this
vanish [sic] point. As long as we get the shot. He was
fucking furious
Tony Ornato: He doesn’t get it that the people on the
monument side don’t want to come in. They can see from there
and don’t want to come in. They can see from there and don’t
have to go through mags. With 30k magged inside.
Cassidy Hutchinson: That’s what was relayed several times
and in different iterations
Cassidy Hutchinson: Poor max got chewed out
Cassidy Hutchinson: He also kept mentioning [an off the
record trip] to Capitol before he took the stage
Tony Ornato: Bobby will tell him no. It’s not safe to do. No
assets available to safely do it.425
And Hutchinson described what President Trump said as he
prepared to take the stage:
When we were in the off-stage announce area tent behind the
stage, he was very concerned about the shot. Meaning the
photograph that we would get because the rally space wasn’t
full. One of the reasons, which I’ve previously stated, was
because he wanted it to be full and for people to not feel
excluded because they had come far to watch him at the
rally. And he felt the mags were at fault for not letting
everybody in, but another leading reason and likely the
primary reasons is because he wanted it full and he was
angry that we weren’t letting people through the mags with
weapons—what the Secret Service deemed as weapons, and are,
are weapons. But when we were in the off-stage announce
tent, I was a part of a conversation, I was in the vicinity
of a conversation where I overheard the President say
something to the effect of, “I don’t F’ing care that they
have weapons. They’re not here to hurt me. Take the F’ing
mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol
from here. Let the people in. Take the F’ing mags away.” 426
The Secret Service special agent who drove the President
after his speech told the Select Committee that Trump made a
similar remark in the vehicle when his demand to go to the
Capitol was refused—essentially that Trump did not believe
his supporters posed a security risk to him personally.427
Minutes after the exchange that Hutchinson described—when
President Trump took the stage—he pointedly expressed his
concern about the thousands of attendees who would not enter
the rally area and instructed Secret Service to allow that
part of the crowd to enter anyway:
. . . I’d love to have if those tens of thousands of people
would be allowed. The military, the secret service. And we
want to thank you and the police law enforcement. Great.
You’re doing a great job. But I’d love it if they could be
allowed to come up here with us. Is that possible? Can you
just let [them] come up, please?428
Although President Trump and his advisors knew of the risk
of violence, and knew specifically that elements of the
crowd were angry and some were armed, from intelligence and
law enforcement reports that morning, President Trump
nevertheless went forward with the rally, and then
specifically instructed the crowd to march to the Capitol:
“Because you’ll never take back our country with weakness.
You have to show strength and you have to be strong. We have
come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only
count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully
slated.” 429 Much of President Trump’s speech was
improvised. Even before his improvisation, during the review
of President Trump’s prepared remarks, White House lawyer
Eric Herschmann specifically requested that “if there were
any factual allegations, someone needed to independently
validate or verify the statements.” 430 And in the days just
before January 6th, Herschmann “chewed out” John Eastman and
told him he was “out of [his] F’ing mind” to argue that the
Vice President could be the sole decision-maker as to who
becomes the next President.431 Herschmann told us, “I so
berated him that I believed that theory would not go
forward.” 432 But President Trump made that very argument
during his speech at the Ellipse and made many false
statements. Herschmann attended that speech, but walked out
during the middle of it.433
President Trump’s speech to the crowd that day lasted more
than an hour. The speech walked through dozens of known
falsehoods about purported election fraud. And Trump again
made false and malicious claims about Dominion voting
systems.434 As discussed earlier, he again pressured Vice
President Mike Pence to refuse to count lawful electoral
votes, going off script repeatedly, leading the crowd to
believe falsely that Pence could and would alter the
election outcome:
And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: “Mike, that
doesn’t take courage. What takes courage is to do nothing.
That takes courage.” And then we’re stuck with a president
who lost the election by a lot and we have to live with that
for four more years. We’re just not going to let that
happen. . . .
When you catch somebody in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by
very different rules.
So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And
I hope he doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people
that he’s listening to.435
This characterization of Vice President Pence’s decision had
a direct impact on those who marched to and approached the
Capitol, as illustrated by this testimony from a person
convicted of crimes committed on January 6th:
So this woman came up to the side of us, and she, says,
Pence folded. So it was kind of, like, okay. Well, in my
mind I was thinking, “Well, that’s it,” you know. Well, my
son-in-law looks at me, and he says, “I want to go in.” 436
Trump used the word “peacefully,” written by speech writers,
one time. But he delivered many other scripted and
unscripted comments that conveyed a very different message:
Because you’ll never take back our country with weakness.
You have to show strength and you have to be strong. We have
come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only
count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully
slated. . . .
And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight
like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore. . .
.437
Trump also was not the only rally speaker to do these
things. Giuliani, for instance, also said, “Let’s have trial
by combat.” 438 Likewise, Eastman used his two minutes on
the Ellipse stage to make a claim already known to be
false—that corrupted voted machines stole the election.439
The best indication of the impact of President Trump’s
words, both during the Ellipse speech and beforehand, are
the comments from those supporters who attended the Ellipse
rally and their conduct immediately thereafter. Videoclips
show several of the attendees on their way to the Capitol or
shortly after they arrived:
I’m telling you what, I’m hearing that Pence — hearing the
Pence just caved. No. Is that true? I didn’t hear it. I’m
hear — I’m hearing reports that Pence caved. No way. I’m
telling you, if Pence caved, we’re going to drag
motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking politicians
are going to get fucking drug through the streets.440
Yes. I guess the hope is that there’s such a show of force
here that Pence will decide do the right thing, according to
Trump.441
Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: Ok. And that’s when
all this started?] Yup. That’s when we marched on the
Capitol.442
We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any
fraudulent electoral votes. [Other speaker: Boo. You’re a
traitor! Boo!] That’s right. You’ve heard it here first.
Mike Pence has betrayed the United States of America. [Other
speaker: Boo! Fuck you, Mike Pence!] Mike Pence has betrayed
this President and he has betrayed the people of the United
States and we will never, ever forget. [Cheers]443
[Q] What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol?
[A] [Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins]: One hundred percent. It
has, it has spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us,
and everybody’s marching on the Capitol. All million of us.
It’s insane.444
Another criminal defendant—charged with assaulting an
officer with a flagpole and other crimes—explained in an
interview why he went to the Capitol and fought:
Dale Huttle: We were not there illegally, we were invited
there by the President himself. . . . Trump’s backers had
been told that the election had been stolen. . . .
Reporter Megan Hickey: But do you think he encouraged
violence?
Dale Huttle: Well, I sat there, or stood there, with half a
million people listening to his speech. And in that speech,
both Giuliani and [Trump] said we were going to have to
fight like hell to save our country. Now, whether it was a
figure of speech or not—it wasn’t taken that way.
Reporter Megan Hickey: You didn’t take it as a figure of
speech?
Dale Huttle: No.445
President Trump concluded his speech at 1:10 p.m.
Among other statements from the Ellipse podium, President
Trump informed the crowd that he would be marching to the
Capitol with them:
Now, it is up to Congress to confront this egregious assault
on our democracy. And after this, we’re going to walk down,
and I’ll be there with you, we’re going to walk down, we’re
going to walk down. Anyone you want, but I think right here,
we’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to
cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women, and
we’re probably not going to be cheering so much for some of
them.446
Hutchinson testified that she first became aware of
President Trump’s plans to attend Congress’s session to
count votes on or about January 2nd. She learned this from a
conversation with Giuliani: “It’s going to be great. The
President’s going to be there. He’s going to look powerful.
He’s—he’s going to be with the members. He’s going to be
with the Senators.” 447 Evidence also indicates that
multiple members of the White House staff, including White
House lawyers, were concerned about the President’s apparent
intentions to go to the Capitol.448
After he exited the stage, President Trump entered the
Presidential SUV and forcefully expressed his intention that
Bobby Engel, the head of his Secret Service detail, direct
the motorcade to the Capitol. The Committee has now obtained
evidence from several sources about a “furious interaction”
in the SUV. The vast majority of witnesses who have
testified before the Select Committee about this topic,
including multiple members of the Secret Service, a member
of the Metropolitan police, and national security officials
in the White House, described President Trump’s behavior as
“irate,” “furious,” “insistent,” “profane” and “heated.”
Hutchinson heard about the exchange second-hand and related
what she heard in our June 28, 2022, hearing from Ornato (as
did another witness, a White House employee with national
security responsibilities, who shared that Ornato also
recounted to him President Trump’s “irate” behavior in the
Presidential vehicle). Other members of the White House
staff and Secret Service also heard about the exchange after
the fact. The White House employee with national security
responsibilities gave this testimony:
Committee Staff: But it sounds like you recall some rumor or
some discussion around the West Wing about the President’s
anger about being told that he couldn’t go to the Capitol.
Is that right?
Employee: So Mr. Ornato said that he was angry that he
couldn’t go right away. In the days following that, I do
remember, you know, again, hearing again how angry the
President was when, you know, they were in the limo. But
beyond specifics of that, that’s pretty much the extent of
the cooler talk.449
The Committee has regarded both Hutchinson and the
corroborating testimony by the White House employee with
national security responsibilities as earnest and has no
reason to conclude that either had a reason to invent their
accounts. A Secret Service agent who worked on one of the
details in the White House and was present in the Ellipse
motorcade had this comment:
Committee Staff: Ms. Hutchinson has suggested to the
committee that you sympathized with her after her testimony,
and believed her account. Is that accurate?
Special Agent: I have no—yeah, that’s accurate. I have no
reason—I mean, we—we became friends. We worked—I worked
every day with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend
of mine. We had a good working relationship. I have no
reason—she’s never done me wrong. She’s never lied that I
know of.450
The Committee’s principal concern was that the President
actually intended to participate personally in the January
6th efforts at the Capitol, leading the attempt to overturn
the election either from inside the House Chamber, from a
stage outside the Capitol, or otherwise. The Committee
regarded those facts as important because they are relevant
to President Trump’s intent on January 6th. There is no
question from all the evidence assembled that President
Trump did have that intent.451
As it became clear that Donald Trump desired to travel to
the Capitol on January 6th, a White House Security Official
in the White House complex became very concerned about his
intentions:
To be completely honest, we were all in a state of shock. .
. . it just—one, I think the actual physical feasibility of
doing it, and then also we all knew what that implicated and
what that meant, that this was no longer a rally, that this
was going to move to something else if he physically walked
to the Capitol. I—I don’t know if you want to use the word
“insurrection,” “coup,” whatever. We all knew that this
would move from a normal, democratic, you know, public event
into something else.452
President Trump continued to push to travel to the Capitol
even after his return to the White House, despite knowing
that a riot was underway. Kayleigh McEnany, the White House
press secretary, spoke with President Trump about his desire
to go to the Capitol after he returned to the White House
from the Ellipse. “So to the best of my recollection, I
recall him being—wanting to—saying that he wanted to
physically walk and be a part of the march and then saying
that he would ride the Beast if he needed to, ride in the
Presidential limo.” 453
Later in the afternoon, Mark Meadows relayed to Cassidy
Hutchinson that President Trump was still upset that he
would not be able to go to the Capitol that day. As he told
Hutchinson, “the President wasn’t happy that Bobby [Engel]
didn’t pull it off for him and that Mark didn’t work hard
enough to get the movement on the books.” 454
187 Minutes: Trump’s Dereliction of Duty
Just after 1:00 p.m., Vice President Pence, serving as
President of the Senate under Article I of the Constitution,
gaveled the Congress into its Joint Session. President Trump
was giving a speech at the Ellipse, which he concluded at
1:10 pm. For the next few hours, an attack on our Capitol
occurred, perpetrated by Trump supporters many of whom were
present at the Ellipse for President Trump’s speech. More
than 140 Capitol and Metropolitan police were injured, some
very seriously.455 A perimeter security line of Metropolitan
Police intended to secure the Capitol against intrusion
broke in the face of thousands of armed rioters—more than
2,000 of whom gained access to the interior of the Capitol
building.456 A woman who attempted to forcibly enter the
Chamber of the House of Representatives through a broken
window while the House was in session was shot and killed by
police guarding the chamber. Vice President Pence and his
family were at risk, as were those Secret Service
professionals protecting him. Congressional proceedings were
halted, and legislators were rushed to secure locations.
From the outset of the violence and for several hours that
followed, people at the Capitol, people inside President
Trump’s Administration, elected officials of both parties,
members of President Trump’s family, and Fox News
commentators sympathetic to President Trump all tried to
contact him to urge him to do one singular thing—one thing
that all of these people immediately understood was
required: Instruct his supporters to stand down and
disperse—to leave the Capitol.
As the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates, President Trump
specifically and repeatedly refused to do so—for multiple
hours—while the mayhem ensued. Chapter 8 of this report
explains in meticulous detail the horrific nature of the
violence taking place, that was directed at law enforcement
officers at the Capitol and that put the lives of American
lawmakers at risk. Yet in spite of this, President Trump
watched the violence on television from a dining room
adjacent to the Oval Office, calling Senators to urge them
to help him delay the electoral count, but refusing to
supply the specific help that everyone knew was
unequivocally required. As this report shows, when Trump
finally did make such a statement at 4:17 p.m. —after hours
of violence—the statement immediately had the expected
effect; the rioters began to disperse immediately and leave
the Capitol.457
To fully understand the President’s behavior during those
hours—now commonly known as the “187 minutes”—it is
important to understand the context in which it occurred. As
outlined in this report, by the afternoon of January 6th,
virtually all of President Trump’s efforts to overturn the
outcome of the 2020 election had failed. Virtually all the
lawsuits had already been lost. Vice President Mike Pence
had refused Trump’s pressure to stop the count of certain
electoral votes. State officials and legislators had refused
to reverse the election outcomes in every State where Trump
and his team applied pressure. The Justice Department’s
investigations of alleged election fraud had all
contradicted Trump’s allegations.
The only factor working in Trump’s favor that might succeed
in materially delaying the counting of electoral votes for
President-elect Biden was the violent crowd at the Capitol.
And for much of the afternoon of January 6th, it appeared
that the crowd had accomplished that purpose. Congressional
leaders were advised by Capitol Police at one or more points
during the attack that it would likely take several days
before the Capitol could safely be reopened.458
By the time the President’s speech concluded, the
lawlessness at the United States Capitol had already begun,
but the situation was about to get much worse.
By 1:25 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol
was under attack.
Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the
President ran into a member of the White House staff and
asked if they had watched his speech on television. “Sir,
they cut it off because they’re rioting down at the
Capitol,” the employee said. The President asked what they
meant by that. “[T]hey’re rioting down there at the
Capitol,” the employee repeated. “Oh really?” the President
asked. “All right, let’s go see.” 459 A photograph taken by
the White House photographer—the last one permitted until
later in the day—captures the moment the President was made
aware of the violent uprising at the Capitol.460
Not long thereafter, as thousands of Trump supporters from
the Ellipse speech continued to arrive at the Capitol, the
DC Metropolitan Police Department declared a riot at the
Capitol at 1:49 p.m., the same time Capitol Police Chief
Steven Sund informed the DC National Guard “that there was a
dire emergency on Capitol Hill and requested the immediate
assistance” of as many national guard troops as possible.461
No photographs exist of the President for the remainder of
the afternoon until after 4 p.m. President Trump appears to
have instructed that the White House photographer was not to
take any photographs.462 The Select Committee also was
unable to locate any official records of President Trump’s
telephone calls that afternoon.463 And the President’s
official Daily Diary contains no information for this
afternoon between the hours of 1:19 p.m. and 4:03 p.m., at
the height of the worst attack on the seat of the United
States Congress in over two centuries.464
The Select Committee did, however, obtain records from
non-official sources that contained data of some phone calls
President Trump made that afternoon. Even though “he was
placing lots of calls” that afternoon, according to his
personal assistant,465 the Select Committee was given no
records of any calls from the President to security or law
enforcement officials that afternoon, and that absence of
data is consistent with testimony of witnesses who would
have knowledge of any such calls, who said that he did not
do so.466 Based on testimony from President Trump’s close
aides, we know that President Trump remained in the Dining
Room adjacent to the Oval Office for the rest of the
afternoon until after 4:03 p.m.467
In fact, from cellular telephone records, it appears that at
1:39 p.m. and 2:03 p.m., after being informed of the riot at
the Capitol, President Trump called his lawyer, Rudolph
Giuliani. These calls lasted approximately four minutes and
eight minutes, respectively.468 And Press Secretary Kayleigh
McEnany testified that President Trump also called a number
of Senators.469 The number or names of all such Members of
Congress is unknown, although Senator Mike Lee (R–UT)
received one such outgoing call from the President within
the hour that followed.470
At 1:49 p.m., just as the DC Metropolitan Police officially
declared a riot and the Capitol Police were calling for help
from the National Guard to address the crisis, President
Trump sent a tweet with a link to a recording of his speech
at the Ellipse.471
At about that point, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone
became aware of the Capitol riot. The Committee collected
sworn testimony from several White House officials, each
with similar accounts. The President’s White House Counsel
Pat Cipollone testified that he raced downstairs, and went
to the Oval Office Dining Room as soon as he learned about
the violence at the Capitol—likely just around or just after
2 p.m. Cipollone knew immediately that the President had to
deliver a message to the rioters—asking them to leave the
Capitol.
Here is how he described this series of events:
. . . the first time I remember going downstairs was when
people had breached the Capitol. . . But I went down with
[Deputy White House Counsel] Pat [Philbin], and I remember
we were both very upset about what was happening. And we
both wanted, you know, action to be taken related to that. .
. But we went down to the Oval Office, we went through the
Oval office, and we went to the back where the President
was. . . . I think he was already in the dining room. . . I
can’t talk about conversations [with the President]. I think
I was pretty clear there needed to be an immediate and
forceful response, statement, public statement, that people
need to leave the Capitol now.472
Cipollone also left little doubt that virtually everyone
among senior White House staff had the same view:
There were a lot of people in the White House that day . . .
Senior people who, you know, felt the same way that I did
and who were working very hard to achieve that result. There
were—I think Ivanka was one of them. And Eric Herschmann was
there, Pat Philbin was there, and a number of other people.
. . . many people suggested it. . . . Many people felt the
same way. I’m sure I had conversations with Mark [Meadows]
about this during the course of the day and expressed my
opinion very forcefully that this needs to be done.473
Likewise, senior staff cooperated to produce a message for
the President on a notecard, which read:
ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY474
The President declined to make the statement. Cipollone also
made it clear that the advice they were giving to the
President never changed throughout this three-hour period.
Trump refused to do what was necessary.
Committee Staff: [I]t sounds like you from the very onset of
violence at the Capitol right around 2 o’clock were pushing
for a strong statement that people should leave the Capitol.
Is that right?
Cipollone: I was, and others were as well.475
Cassidy Hutchinson, who worked closely with Mark Meadows and
sat directly outside his office, confirmed this account and
described several additional details:
I see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway towards our
office. And he rushed right in, looked at me, said, “Is Mark
in his office?” And I said, “Yes.” And on a normal day he
would’ve said, “Can I pop in,” or, “Is he talking to
anyone,” or, “Is it an appropriate time for me to go chat
with him,” and myself or Eliza would go let him in or tell
him no. But after I had said yes, he just looked at me and
started shaking his head and went over, opened Mark’s office
door, stood there with the door propped open, and said
something to the—Mark was still sitting on his phone. I
remember, like, glancing in. He was still sitting on his
phone.
And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of,
“The rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go
down and see the President now.” And Mark looked up at him
and said, “He doesn’t want to do anything, Pat.” And Pat
said something to the effect of—and very clearly said this
to Mark—something to the effect of, “Mark, something needs
to be done, or people are going to die and the blood’s gonna
be on your F’ing hands. This is getting out of control. I’m
going down there.” 476
The Select Committee believes that the entire White House
senior staff was in favor of a Presidential statement
specifically instructing the violent rioters to leave. But
President Trump refused. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone
answered certain questions from the Select Committee on this
subject as follows:
Vice Chair Cheney: And when you talk about others on the
staff thinking more should be done, or thinking that the
President needed to tell people to go home, who would you
put in that category?
Cipollone: Well, I would put . . . Pat Philbin, Eric
Herschmann. Overall, Mark Meadows, Ivanka. Once Jared got
there, Jared. General Kellogg. I’m probably missing some,
but those are—Kayleigh I think was there. But I don’t—Dan
Scavino.
Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people
to leave the Capitol?”
Cipollone: On the staff?
Vice Chair Cheney In the White House?
Cipollone: I can’t think of anybody on that day who didn’t
want people to get out of the Capitol once the—particularly
once the violence started. No. I mean—
Mr. Schiff: What about the President?
Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.
. . .
[Consultation between Mr. Cipollone and his counsel.]
Cipollone: Yeah. I can’t reveal communications. But
obviously I think, you know— yeah.477
The testimony of a White House employee with national
security responsibilities also corroborated these facts.
This employee testified about a conversation between Pat
Cipollone and Eric Herschmann in which Herschmann indicated
that the President did not want to do anything to halt the
violence. That employee told the Select Committee that he
overheard Herschmann saying something to the effect of “the
President didn’t want anything done.” 478
Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere also testified to the
Select Committee that as soon as it was clear that the
Capitol’s outer perimeter had been breached, he urged that
the President make a statement telling the rioters to go
home:
Committee Staff: And so what did you do at that point?
Judd Deere: If I recall, I went back up to [Press Secretary]
Kayleigh [McEnany]’s office and indicated that we now likely
needed to say something.
Committee Staff: Okay. And why did you think it was
necessary to say something?
Deere: Well, I mean, it appears that individuals are
storming the U.S. Capitol building. They also appear to be
supporters of Donald Trump, who may have been in attendance
at the rally. We’re going to need to say something.
Committee Staff: And did you have a view as to what should
be said by the White House?
Deere: If I recall, I told Kayleigh that I thought that we
needed to encourage individuals to stop, to respect law
enforcement, and to go home. . . . And it was—it was
incumbent upon us to encourage those individuals, should
they be supporters of ours, to stop.479
Testimony from both Deputy Press Secretary Matthews and
White House Counsel Cipollone indicated that it would have
been easy, and nearly instantaneous, for Trump to make a
public statement insisting that the crowd disperse. As
Matthews explained, he could have done so in under a minute:
. . . it would take probably less than 60 seconds from the
Oval Office dining room over to the Press Briefing Room.
And, for folks that might not know, the Briefing Room is the
room that you see the White House Press Secretary do
briefings from with the podium and the blue backdrop. And
there is a camera that is on in there at all times. And so,
if the President had wanted to make a statement and address
the American people, he could have been on camera almost
instantly.480
Cipollone also shared that assessment:
Committee Staff: Would it have been possible at any moment
for the President to walk down to the podium in the briefing
room and talk to the nation at any time between when you
first gave him that advice at 2 o’clock and 4:17 when the
video statement went out? Would that have been possible?
Cipollone: Would it have been possible?
Committee Staff: Yes.
Cipollone: Yes, it would have been possible.481
At 2:13 p.m., rioters broke into the Capitol and flooded the
building.482
As the violence began to escalate, many Trump supporters and
others outside the White House began urgently seeking his
intervention. Mark Meadows’s phone was flooded with text
messages. These are just some of them:
2:32 p.m. from Fox News anchor Laura Ingraham: “Hey Mark,
The president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go
home.” 483
2:35 p.m. from Mick Mulvaney: “Mark: he needs to stop this,
now. Can I do anything to help?” 484
2:46 p.m. from Rep. William Timmons (R–SC): “The president
needs to stop this ASAP” 485
2:53 p.m. from Donald Trump, Jr.: “He’s got to condem [sic]
this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not
enough.” 486
3:04 p.m. from Rep. Jeff Duncan (R–SC): “POTUS needs to calm
this shit down” 487
3:09 p.m. from former White House Chief of Staff Reince
Priebus: “TELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!” 488
3:13 p.m. from Alyssa Farah Griffin: “Potus has to come out
firmly and tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to
get killed.” 489
3:15 p.m. from Rep. Chip Roy (R–TX): “Fix this now.” 490
3:31 p.m. from Fox News anchor Sean Hannity: “Can he make a
statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave
the capital [sic]” 491
3:58 p.m. from Fox News anchor Brian Kilmeade: “Please get
him on tv. Destroying every thing you guys have
accomplished” 492
Others on Capitol Hill appeared in the media, or otherwise
appeared via internet. Representative Mike Gallagher (R–WI)
issued a video appealing directly to the President:
Mr. President, you have got to stop this. You are the only
person who can call this off. Call it off. The election is
over. Call it off!493
Some Members of Congress sent texts to President Trump’s
immediate staff or took to Twitter, where they knew the
President spent time:
Sen. Bill Cassidy (R–LA) issued a tweet: @realDonaldTrump
please appear on TV, condemn the violence and tell people to
disband.494
Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R–WA) sent a text to Mark
Meadows: We need to hear from the president. On TV. I hate
that Biden jumped him on it.495
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy tried repeatedly to reach
President Trump, and did at least once. He also reached out
for help to multiple members of President Trump’s family,
including Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.496 Kushner
characterized Leader McCarthy’s demeanor on the call as
“scared”:
Kushner: I could hear in his voice that he really was
nervous, and so, obviously, I took that seriously. And, you
know, I didn’t know if I’d be able to have any impact, but I
said, you know, it’s better to at least try. And so I—like I
said, I turned the shower off, threw on a suit, and, you
know, and rushed into the White House as quickly as I could.
Committee Staff: Yeah. What did he ask you to do? When you
say have an impact, what is it specifically that he needed
your help with?
Kushner: I don’t recall a specific ask, just anything you
could do. Again, I got the sense that, you know, they
were—they were—you know, they were scared.
Committee Staff: “They” meaning Leader McCarthy and people
on the Hill because of the violence?
Kushner: That he was scared, yes.497
Kevin McCarthy told Fox News at 3:09 p.m. about his call
with the President498 and elaborated about its contents in a
conversation with CBS News’s Norah O’Donnell at around 3:30
p.m.:
O’Donnell: Have you spoken with the President and asked him
to perhaps come to the Capitol and tell his supporters it’s
time to leave?
Leader McCarthy: I have spoken to the President. I asked him
to talk to the nation and tell them to stop this. . . .
* * *
O’Donnell: The President invited tens of thousands of people
to quote unquote stop the steal. I don’t know if you heard
his more-than-hour-long remarks or the remarks of his son,
who was the wind-up. It was some heated stuff, Leader
McCarthy. I just wonder whether someone is going to
accurately call a spade a spade, and I am giving you the
opportunity right now that your precious and beloved United
States Capitol and our democracy is witnessing this. Call a
spade a spade.
Leader McCarthy: I was very clear with the President when I
called him. This has to stop. And he has to, he’s gotta go
to the American public and tell them to stop this.
* * *
O’Donnell: Leader McCarthy, the President of the United
States has a briefing room steps from the Oval Office. It
is, the cameras are hot 24/7, as you know. Why hasn’t he
walked down and said that, now?
Leader McCarthy: I conveyed to the President what I think is
best to do, and I’m hopeful the President will do it.499
The Committee has evidence from multiple sources regarding
the content of Kevin McCarthy’s direct conversation with
Donald Trump during the violence.
Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R–WA), to whom McCarthy spoke
soon after, relayed more of the conversation between
McCarthy and President Trump:
And he said [to President Trump], “You have got to get on
TV. You’ve got to get on Twitter. You’ve got to call these
people off.” You know what the President said to him? This
is as it’s happening. He said, “Well Kevin, these aren’t my
people. You know, these are Antifa. And Kevin responded and
said, “No, they’re your people. They literally just came
through my office windows and my staff are running for
cover. I mean they’re running for their lives. You need to
call them off.” And the President’s response to Kevin to me
was chilling. He said, “Well Kevin, I guess they’re just
more upset about the election, you know, theft than you
are”.500
Rep. Herrera Beutler’s account of the incident was also
corroborated by former Acting White House Chief of Staff
Mick Mulvaney, who testified that Leader McCarthy told him
several days later that President Trump had said during
their call: “Kevin, maybe these people are just more angry
about this than you are. Maybe they’re more upset.” 501
Mulvaney was also trying to reach administration officials
to urge President Trump to instruct his supporters to leave
the Capitol.502 As were many elected officials in both
parties, including Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer, and
several Republican Members of Congress.503
As already noted, Cipollone and others in the White House
repeatedly urged President Trump to tell his supporters to
leave the Capitol. Cipollone described his conversations
with Meadows after they failed to convince President Trump
to deliver the necessary message:
Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion with Mark
Meadows with respect to his view that the President didn’t
want to do anything or was somehow resistant to wanting to
say something along the lines that you suggested.
Pat Cipollone: Not just—just to be clear, many people
suggested it.
Committee Staff: Yeah.
Cipollone: Not just me. Many people felt the same way. I’m
sure I had conversations with Mark about this during the
course of the day and expressed my opinion very forcefully
that this needs to be done.504
* * *
Committee Staff: So your advice was tell people to leave the
Capitol, and that took over 2 hours when there were
subsequent statements made, tweets put forth, that in your
view were insufficient. Did you continue, Mr. Cipollone,
throughout the period of time up until 4:17, continue, you
and others, to push for a stronger statement?
Cipollone: Yes.505
* * *
Committee Staff: . . . at the onset of the violence when you
first notice on television or wherever that rioters have
actually breached the Capitol, did you have a conversation
with Mark Meadows in which Meadows indicated he doesn’t want
to do anything, “he” meaning the President?
Cipollone: I don’t—I had a conversation I’m sure with Mark
Meadows, I’m sure with other people, of what I thought
should be done. Did Mark say that to me? I don’t have a
recollection of him saying that to me, but he may have said
something along the lines.506
At 2:16 p.m., security records indicate that the Vice
President was “being pulled” to a safer location.507
In an interview with the Select Committee, a White House
Security Official on duty at the White House explained his
observations as he listened to Secret Service communications
and made contemporaneous entries into a security log. In
particular, he explained an entry he made at 2:24 p.m.:
Committee Staff: Ok. That last entry on this page is:
“Service at the Capitol does not sound good right now.”
Official: Correct.
Committee Staff: What does that mean?
Official: The members of the VP detail at this time were
starting to fear for their own lives. There were a lot
of—there was a lot of yelling, a lot of—I don’t know—a lot
[of] very personal calls over the radio. So—it was
disturbing. I don’t like talking about it, but there were
calls to say good-bye to family members, so on and so forth.
It was getting—for whatever the reason was on the ground,
the VP detail thought that this was about to get very ugly.
Committee Staff: And did you hear that over the radio?
Official: Correct.
. . .
Committee Staff: . . . obviously, you’ve conveyed that’s
disturbing, but what prompted you to put it into an entry as
it states there, “Service at the Capitol—”
Official: That they’re running out of options, and they’re
getting nervous. It sounds like that we came very close to
either Service having to use lethal options or worse. At
that point, I don’t know. Is the VP compromised? Is the
detail—like, I don’t know. Like, we didn’t have visibility,
but it doesn’t—if they’re screaming and saying things, like,
say good-bye to the family, like, the floor needs to know
this is going to a whole another level soon.508
Also at 2:24 p.m., knowing the riot was underway and that
Vice President Pence was at the Capitol, President Trump
sent this tweet:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have
been done to protect our Country and our Constitution,
giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts,
not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked
to previously certify. USA demands the truth!509
Police officers attempt to clear rioters inside the Capitol
building.
Police officers attempt to clear rioters inside the Capitol
building.
(Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images)
Evidence shows that the 2:24 p.m. tweet immediately
precipitated further violence at the Capitol. Immediately
after this tweet, the crowds both inside and outside of the
Capitol building violently surged forward.510 Outside the
building, within ten minutes thousands of rioters overran
the line on the west side of the Capitol that was being held
by the Metropolitan Police Force’s Civil Disturbance Unit,
the first time in history of the DC Metro Police that such a
security line had ever been broken.511
Virtually everyone on the White House staff the Select
Committee interviewed condemned the 2:24 p.m. tweet in the
strongest terms.
Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Pottinger told the
Select Committee that the 2:24 p.m. tweet was so destructive
that it convinced him to resign as soon as possible:
One of my aides handed me a sheet of paper that contained
the tweet that you just read. I read it and was quite
disturbed by it. I was disturbed and worried to see that the
President was attacking Vice President Pence for doing his
constitutional duty.
So the tweet looked to me like the opposite of what we
really needed at that moment, which was a de-escalation. And
that is why I had said earlier that it looked like fuel
being poured on the fire.
So that was the moment that I decided that I was going to
resign, that that would be my last day at the White House. I
simply didn’t want to be associated with the events with the
events that were unfolding at the Capitol.512
Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Matthews had a similar
reaction:
So it was obvious that the situation at the Capitol was
violent and escalating quickly. And so I thought that the
tweet about the Vice President was the last thing that was
needed in that moment.
And I remember thinking that this was going to be bad for
him to tweet this, because it was essentially him giving the
green light to these people, telling them that what they
were doing at the steps of the Capitol and entering the
Capitol was okay, that they were justified in their anger.
And he shouldn’t have been doing that. He should have been
telling these people to go home and to leave and to condemn
the violence that we were seeing.
And I am someone who has worked with him, you know, I worked
on the campaign, traveled all around the country, going to
countless rallies with him, and I have seen the impact that
his words have on his supporters. They truly latch onto
every word and every tweet that he says.
And so, I think that in that moment for him to tweet out the
message about Mike Pence, it was him pouring gasoline on the
fire and making it much worse.513
Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere stated the following:
Committee Staff: What was your reaction when you saw that
tweet?
Deere: Extremely unhelpful.
Committee Staff: Why?
Deere: It wasn’t the message that we needed at that time. It
wasn’t going to—the scenes at the U.S. Capitol were only
getting worse at that point. This was not going to help
that.514
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee,
“I don’t remember when exactly I heard about that tweet, but
my reaction to it is that’s a terrible tweet, and I
disagreed with the sentiment. And I thought it was
wrong.” 515
Likewise, Counselor to the President Hope Hicks texted a
colleague that evening: “Attacking the VP? Wtf is wrong with
him.” 516
At 2:26 p.m., Vice President Pence was again moved to a
different location.517
President Trump had the TV on in the dining room.518 At 2:38
p.m., Fox News was showing video of the chaos and attack,
with tear gas filling the air in the Capitol Rotunda. And a
newscaster reported, “[T]his is a very dangerous
situation.” 519 This is the context in which Trump sent the
tweet.
Testimony obtained by the Committee indicates that President
Trump knew about the rioters’ anger at Vice President Pence
and indicated something to the effect that the Vice
President “deserves it.” 520 As Cassidy Hutchinson
explained:
I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, “Mark, we
need to do something more. They’re literally calling for the
Vice President to be f’ing hung.” And Mark had responded
something to the effect of, “You heard him, Pat. He thinks
Mike deserves it. He doesn’t think they’re doing anything
wrong.” To which Pat said something, “[t]his is f’ing crazy,
we need to be doing something more,” briefly stepped into
Mark’s office, and when Mark had said something—when Mark
had said something to the effect of, “He doesn’t think
they’re doing anything wrong,” knowing what I had heard
briefly in the dining room coupled with Pat discussing the
hanging Mike Pence chants in the lobby of our office and
then Mark’s response, I understood “they’re” to be the
rioters in the Capitol that were chanting for the Vice
President to be hung.521
Although White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was limited in
what he would discuss because of privilege concerns, he
stated the following:
Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion at any point
during the day about rioters at the Capitol chanting “hang
Mike Pence?”
Cipollone: Yes. I remember—I remember hearing that—about
that. Yes.
Committee Staff: Yeah. And—
Cipollone: I don’t know if I observed that myself on TV. I
don’t remember.
Committee Staff: I’m just curious, I understand the
privilege line you’ve drawn, but do you remember what you
can share with us about the discussion about those chants,
the ‘hang Mike Pence’ chants?
Cipollone: I could tell you my view of that.
Committee Staff: Yeah. Please.
Cipollone: My view of that is that is outrageous.
Committee Staff: Uh-huh.
Cipollone: And for anyone to suggest such a thing as the
Vice President of the United States, for people in that
crowd to be chanting that I thought was terrible. I thought
it was outrageous and wrong. And I expressed that very
clearly to people.522
Almost immediately after the 2:24 p.m. tweet, Eric
Herschmann went upstairs in the West Wing to try to enlist
Ivanka Trump’s assistance to persuade her father to do the
right thing.523 Ivanka rushed down to the Oval Office dining
room. Although no one could convince President Trump to call
for the violent rioters to leave the Capitol, Ivanka
persuaded President Trump that a tweet could be issued to
discourage violence against the police.
At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this tweet:
“Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They
are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” 524
While some in the meeting invoked executive privilege, or
failed to recall the specifics, others told us what happened
at that point. Sarah Matthews, the White House Deputy Press
Secretary, had urged her boss, Kayleigh McEnany, to have the
President make a stronger statement. But she informed us
that President Trump resisted using the word “peaceful” in
his message:
Committee Staff: Ms. Matthews, Ms. McEnany told us she came
right back to the press office after meeting with the
President about this particular tweet. What did she tell you
about what happened in that dining room?
Sarah Matthews: When she got back, she told me that a tweet
had been sent out. And I told her that I thought the tweet
did not go far enough, that I thought there needed to be a
call to action and he needed to condemn the violence. And we
were in a room full of people, but people weren’t paying
attention. And so, she looked directly at me and in a hushed
tone shared with me that the President did not want to
include any sort of mention of peace in that tweet and that
it took some convincing on their part, those who were in the
room. And she said that there was a back and forth going
over different phrases to find something that he was
comfortable with. And it wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested
the phrase ‘stay peaceful’ that he finally agreed to include
it.525
At 3:13 p.m., President Trump sent another tweet, but again
declined to tell people to go home:
“I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain
peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law &
Order—respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue.
Thank you!” 526
Almost everyone, including staff in the White House also
found the President’s 2:38 p.m. and 3:13 p.m. tweets to be
insufficient because they did not instruct the rioters to
leave the Capitol. As mentioned, President Trump’s son,
Donald Trump Jr., texted Meadows:
He’s got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic]
police tweet is not enough.527
Sean Hannity also texted Mark Meadows:
Can he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to
peacefully leave the capital [sic].528
None of these efforts resulted in President Trump
immediately issuing the message that was needed. White House
staff had these comments:
Pottinger: Yeah. It was insufficient. I think what—you could
count me among those who was hoping to see an unequivocal
strong statement clearing out the Capitol, telling people to
stand down, leave, go home. I think that’s what we were
hoping for.529
. . .
Matthews: Yeah. So a conversation started in the press
office after the President sent out those two tweets that I
deemed were insufficient. . . . I thought that we should
condemn the violence and condemn it unequivocally. And I
thought that he needed to include a call to action and to
tell these people to go home.530
And they were right. Evidence showed that neither of these
tweets had any appreciable impact on the violent rioters.
Unlike the video-message tweet that did not come until 4:17
finally instructing rioters to leave, neither the 2:38 nor
the 3:13 tweets made any difference.
At some point after 3:05 p.m. that afternoon, President
Trump’s Chief of Staff—and President Trump himself—were
informed that someone had been shot.531 That person was
Ashli Babbitt, who was fatally shot at 2:44 p.m. as she and
other rioters tried to gain access to the House chamber.532
There is no indication that this affected the President’s
state of mind that day, and we found no evidence that the
President expressed any remorse that day.
Meanwhile, leaders in Congress—including Speaker Pelosi,
Senator Schumer, Senator McConnell—and the Vice President,
were taking action. They called the Secretary of Defense,
the Attorney General, governors and officials in Virginia,
Maryland, and the District of Columbia, begging for
assistance.533
President-elect Biden also broadcast a video calling on
President Trump to take action:
I call on President Trump to go on national television now
to fulfill his oath and defend the Constitution and demand
an end to this siege.534
President Trump could have done this, of course, anytime
after he learned of the violence at the Capitol. At 4:17
p.m., 187 minutes after finishing his speech (and even
longer after the attack began), President Trump finally
broadcast a video message in which he asked those attacking
the Capitol to leave:
I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election
that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and
everyone knows it, especially the other side, but you have
to go home now. We have to have peace.535
President Trump’s Deputy Press Secretary, Sarah Matthews
testified about her reaction to this video message:
[H]e told the people who we had just watched storm our
nation’s Capitol with the intent on overthrowing our
democracy, violently attack police officers, and chant
heinous things like, “Hang Mike Pence,” “We love you. You’re
very special.” As a spokesperson for him, I knew that I
would be asked to defend that. And to me, his refusal to act
and call off the mob that day and his refusal to condemn the
violence was indefensible. And so, I knew that I would be
resigning that evening.536
By this time, the National Guard and other additional law
enforcement had begun to arrive in force and started to turn
the tide of the violence. Many of those attackers in the
Capitol saw or received word of President Trump’s 4:17 p.m.
message, and they understood this message as an instruction
to leave:537
Stephen Ayres testified in front of the Select Committee
that: “Well, we were there. As soon as that come out,
everybody started talking about it, and it seemed like it
started to disperse, you know, some of the crowd. Obviously,
you know, once we got back to the hotel room, we seen that
it was still going on, but it definitely dispersed a lot of
the crowd.” 538
Jacob Chansley, also known as the QAnon-Shaman answered
President Trump’s directive: “I’m here delivering the
President’s message. Donald Trump has asked everybody to go
home.” Another responded to Chansley: “That’s our
order.” 539
Other unknown individuals also listened to President Trump’s
message while outside the Capitol, and responded: “He says,
go home. He says, go home.” And “Yeah. Here. He said to go
home.” 540
At 6:01 p.m., President Trump sent his last tweet of the
day, not condemning the violence, but instead attempting to
justify it:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred
election landslide victory is so unceremoniously & viciously
stripped away from great patriots who have been badly &
unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace.
Remember this day forever!541
Staff in President Trump’s own White House and campaign had
a strong reaction to this message:
Sarah Matthews: At that point I had already made the
decision to resign and this tweet just further cemented my
decision. I thought that January 6, 2021, was one of the
darkest days in our Nation’s history and President Trump was
treating it as a celebratory occasion with that tweet. And
so, it just further cemented my decision to resign.542
Tim Murtaugh: I don’t think it’s a patriotic act to attack
the Capitol. But I have no idea how to characterize the
people other than they trespassed, destroyed property, and
assaulted the U.S. Capitol. I think calling them patriots is
a, let’s say, a stretch, to say the least. . . . I don’t
think it’s a patriotic act to attack the U.S. Capitol.543
Pat Cipollone: [W]hat happened at the Capitol cannot be
justified in any form or fashion. It was wrong, and it was
tragic. And a lot—and it was a terrible day. It was a
terrible day for this country.544
Greg Jacob: I thought it was inappropriate. . . . To my
mind, it was a day that should live in infamy.545
At 6:27 p.m., President Trump retired to his residence for
the night. As he did, he had one final comment to an
employee who accompanied him to the residence. The one
takeaway that the President expressed in that moment,
following a horrific afternoon of violence and the worst
attack against the U.S. Capitol building in over two
centuries, was this: “Mike Pence let me down.” 546
President Trump’s inner circle was still trying to delay the
counting of electoral votes into the evening, even after the
violence had been quelled. Rudolph Giuliani tried calling
numerous Members of Congress in the hour before the joint
session resumed, including Rep. Jim Jordan (R–OH) and
Senators Marsha Blackburn (R–TN), Tommy Tuberville (R–AL),
Bill Hagerty (R–TN), Lindsey Graham (R–SC), Josh Hawley
(R–MO), and Ted Cruz (R–TX).547 His voicemail intended for
Senator Tuberville at 7:02 p.m. that evening eventually was
made public:
Guiliani: Sen. Tuberville? Or I should say Coach Tuberville.
This is Rudy Giuliani, the President’s lawyer. I’m calling
you because I want to discuss with you how they’re trying to
rush this hearing and how we need you, our Republican
friends, to try to just slow it down so we can get these
legislatures to get more information to you.548
A Trump sign with Vice President Mike Pence’s name removed.
A Trump sign with Vice President Mike Pence’s name removed.
(Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images)
Reflecting on President Trump’s conduct that day, Vice
President Pence noted that President Trump “had made no
effort to contact me in the midst of the rioting or any
point afterward.” 549 He wrote that President Trump’s
“reckless words had endangered my family and all those
serving at the Capitol.” 550
President Trump did not contact a single top national
security official during the day. Not at the Pentagon, nor
at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Department, or the
D.C. Mayor’s office.551 As Vice President Pence has
confirmed, President Trump didn’t even try to reach his own
Vice President to make sure that Pence was safe.552
President Trump did not order any of his staff to facilitate
a law enforcement response of any sort.553 His Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who is by statute the primary
military advisor to the President—had this reaction:
General Milley: You know, you’re the Commander in Chief.
You’ve got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United
States of America. And there’s nothing? No call? Nothing?
Zero?554
General Milley did, however, receive a call from President
Trump’s Chief of Staff Mark Meadows that day. Here is how he
described that call:
He said, “We have to kill the narrative that the Vice
President is making all the decisions. We need to establish
the narrative, you know, that the President is still in
charge and that things are steady or stable,” or words to
that effect. I immediately interpreted that as politics,
politics, politics. Red flag for me, personally. No action.
But I remember it distinctly. And I don’t do political
narratives.555
Some have suggested that President Trump gave an order to
have 10,000 troops ready for January 6th.556 The Select
Committee found no evidence of this. In fact, President
Trump’s Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller
directly refuted this when he testified under oath:
Committee Staff: To be crystal clear, there was no direct
order from President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the
ready for January 6th, correct?
Miller: No. Yeah. That’s correct. There was no direct—there
was no order from the President.557
Later, on the evening of January 6th, President Trump’s
former campaign manager, Brad Parscale, texted Katrina
Pierson, one of President Trump’s rally organizers, that the
events of the day were the result of a “sitting president
asking for civil war” and that “This week I feel guilty for
helping him win” now that “. . . a woman is dead.” Pierson
answered: “You do realize this was going to happen.”
Parscale replied: “Yeah. If I was Trump and knew my rhetoric
killed someone.” “It wasn’t the rhetoric,” Pierson
suggested. But Parscale insisted: “Yes it was.” 558
The Immediate Aftermath of January 6th
In days following January 6th, President Trump’s family and
staff attempted repeatedly to persuade him not to repeat his
election fraud allegations, to concede defeat, and to allow
the transition to President Biden to proceed. Trump did make
two video recordings, which initially appeared contrite. But
evidence suggests that these statements were designed at
least in part to ward off other potential consequences of
January 6th, such as invocation of the 25th Amendment or
impeachment.
In fact, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy indicated after the
attack, in a discussion with House Republican leaders, that
he would ask President Trump to resign:
Rep. Cheney: I guess there’s a question when we were talking
about the 25th Amendment resolution, and you asked what
would happen after he’s gone? Is there any chance? Are you
hearing that he might resign? Is there any reason to think
that might happen?
Leader McCarthy: I’ve had a few discussions. My gut tells me
no. I’m seriously thinking of having that discussion with
him tonight. I haven’t talked to him in a couple of days.
From what I know of him, I mean, you guys all know him too,
do you think he’d ever back away? But what I think I’m going
to do is I’m going to call him. This is what I think. We
know [the 25th Amendment resolution] will pass the House. I
think there’s a chance it will pass the Senate, even when
he’s gone. And I think there’s a lot of different
ramifications for that. . . . Again, the only discussion I
would have with him is that I think this will pass, and it
would be my recommendation you should resign.559
Before January 6th, Fox News personality Sean Hannity warned
that January 6th could be disastrous:
Dec. 31, 2020 text from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows: “We
can’t lose the entire WH counsels office. I do NOT see
January 6 happening the way he is being told. After the 6 th
[sic]. He should announce will lead the nationwide effort to
reform voting integrity. Go to Fl and watch Joe mess up
daily. Stay engaged. When he speaks people will listen.” 560
January 5, 2021 texts from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows:
“Im very worried about the next 48 hours”
“Pence pressure. WH counsel will leave.”
“Sorry, I can’t talk right now.”
“On with boss” 561
A member of the Republican Freedom caucus also warned, on
December 31, 2020, and on January 1, 2021:
The President should call everyone off. It’s the only path.
If we substitute the will of states through electors with a
vote by Congress every 4 years. . . we have destroyed the
electoral college. . . Respectfully.562 If POTUS allows this
to occur. . . we’re driving a stake in the heart of the
federal republic. . .563
After January 6th, Hannity worked to persuade President
Trump to stop talking about election fraud, proposed that
Trump pardon Hunter Biden, and discussed attending the
Inauguration:
No more stolen election talk.
Yes, impeachment and 25th amendment are real, and many
people will quit.
He was intrigued by the Pardon idea!! (Hunter)
Resistant but listened to Pence thoughts, to make it right.
Seemed to like attending Inauguration talk.564
Ultimately, President Trump took little of the advice from
Hannity and his White House staff. A few days later, Hannity
wrote again to Meadows and Jim Jordan:
Guys, we have a clear path to land the plane in 9 days. He
can’t mention the election again. Ever. I did not have a
good call with him today. And worse, I’m not sure what is
left to do or say, and I don t like not knowing if it’s
truly understood. Ideas?565
Likewise, despite her many contrary public statements,
Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene privately
texted her concerns on January 6th about a continuing and
real threat of violence:
Mark I was just told there is an active shooter on the first
floor of the Capitol Please tell the President to calm
people This isn’t the way to solve anything566
Donald Trump was impeached on January 13th. In a speech that
day, Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy made this statement
from the House floor, but voted against impeachment:
The President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on
Congress by mob rioters. He should have immediately
denounced the mob when he saw what was unfolding. These
facts require immediate action by President Trump, accept
his share of responsibility, quell the brewing unrest and
ensure President-elect Biden is able to successfully begin
his term. The President’s immediate action also deserves
congressional action, which is why I think a fact-finding
commission and a censure resolution would be prudent.567
Kevin McCarthy speaks at a press conference at the Capitol
building on August 27, 2021.
Kevin McCarthy speaks at a press conference at the Capitol
building on August 27, 2021.
(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)
Later, McCarthy told members of the House Republican
conference that Trump had acknowledged that he was at least
partially responsible for the January 6th attack.
I asked him personally today, does he hold responsibility
for what happened? Does he feel bad about what happened? He
told me he does have some responsibility for what happened.
And he need to acknowledge that.568
Since January 6th, President Trump has continued to claim
falsely that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen. Not
only that, he has urged other politicians to push this
argument as well. Representative Mo Brooks has issued a
public statement appearing to represent Trump’s private
views and intentions:
President Trump asked me to rescind the 2020 elections,
immediately remove Joe Biden from the White House,
immediately put President Trump back in the White House, and
hold a new special election for the presidency.569
Referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel
and House Ethics Committee
The Committee’s work has produced a substantial body of new
information. We know far more about the President’s plans
and actions to overturn the election than almost all Members
of Congress did when President Trump was impeached on
January 13, 2021, or when he was tried by the Senate in
February of that year. Fifty-seven of 100 Senators voted to
convict President Trump at that time, and more than 20
others condemned the President’s conduct and said they were
voting against conviction because the President’s term had
already expired.570 At the time, the Republican Leader of
the U.S. Senate said this about Donald Trump: “A mob was
assaulting the Capitol in his name. These criminals were
carrying his banners, hanging his flags, and screaming their
loyalty to him. It was obvious that only President Trump
could end this. He was the only one who could.” 571 House
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, who spoke directly with
President Trump during the violence of January 6th,
expressed similar views both in private and in public.
Privately, Leader McCarthy stated: “But let me be very clear
to you and I have been very clear to the President. He bears
responsibility for his words and actions. No if, ands or
buts.” 572 In public, Leader McCarthy concluded: “The
President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on
Congress by mob rioters.” 573
Today we know that the planning to overturn the election on
January 6th was substantially more extensive, and involved
many other players, and many other efforts over a longer
time period. Indeed, the violent attack and invasion of the
Capitol, and what provoked it, are only a part of the story.
From the outset of its hearings, the Committee has explained
that President Trump and a number of other individuals made
a series of very specific plans, ultimately with multiple
separate elements, but all with one overriding objective: to
corruptly obstruct, impede, or influence the counting of
electoral votes on January 6th, and thereby overturn the
lawful results of the election. The underlying and
fundamental feature of that planning was the effort to get
one man, Vice President Mike Pence, to assert and then
exercise unprecedented and lawless powers to unilaterally
alter the actual election outcome on January 6th. Evidence
obtained by the Committee demonstrates that John Eastman,
who worked with President Trump to put that and other
elements of the plan in place, knew, even before the 2020
Presidential election, that Vice President Pence could not
lawfully refuse to count official, certified electoral
slates submitted by the Governors of the States.574
Testimony and contemporaneous documentary evidence also
indicate that President Trump knew that the plan was
unlawful before January 6th.575 When the Vice President’s
counsel wrote to Eastman on January 6th to ask whether the
latter had informed the President that the Vice President
did not have authority to decide the election unilaterally,
Eastman responded: “He’s been so advised,” and added, “[b]ut
you know him—once he gets something in his head, it is hard
to get him to change course.” 576
Many of the other elements of President Trump’s plans were
specifically designed to create a set of circumstances on
January 6th to assist President Trump in overturning the
lawful election outcome during Congress’s joint session that
day. For example, President Trump pressured State
legislatures to adopt new electoral slates that Vice
President Pence could, unlawfully, count. Trump solicited
State officials to “find” a sufficient number of votes to
alter the final count, and instructed the Department of
Justice to “just say that the election was was [sic] corrupt
+ leave the rest to me and the R[epublican]
Congressmen.” 577 President Trump offered the job of Acting
Attorney General to Jeffrey Clark. As our evidence has
unequivocally demonstrated, Clark intended to use that
position to send a series of letters from the Department of
Justice to multiple States falsely asserting that the
Department had found fraud and urging those States to
convene their legislatures to alter their official electoral
slates.578 And President Trump, with the help of the
Republican National Committee and others, oversaw an effort
to create and transmit to Government officials a series of
intentionally false electoral slates for Vice President
Pence to utilize on January 6th to alter or delay the count
of lawful votes.579
Of course, other elements of the plan complemented these
efforts too. As this Report documents, President Trump was
advised by his own experts and the Justice Department that
his election fraud allegations were false, and he knew he
had lost virtually all the legal challenges to the election,
but he nevertheless engaged in a successful but fraudulent
effort to persuade tens of millions of Americans that the
election was stolen from him. This effort was designed to
convince Americans that President Trump’s actions to
overturn the election were justified. President Trump then
urged his supporters to travel to Washington on January 6th
to apply pressure to Congress to halt the count and change
the election outcome, explaining to those who were coming to
Washington that they needed to “take back” their country and
“stop the steal.” 580
It is helpful in understanding these facts to focus on
specific moments in time when President Trump made corrupt,
dishonest and unlawful choices to pursue his plans. For
example, by December 14th when the electoral college met and
certified Joe Biden’s victory, President Trump knew that he
had failed in all the relevant litigation; he had been
advised by his own experts and the Justice Department that
his election fraud claims were false; and he had been told
by numerous advisors that he had lost and should concede.
But despite his duty as President to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, he chose instead to ignore all of
the judicial rulings and the facts before him and push
forward to overturn the election. Likewise, in the days and
hours before the violence of January 6th, President Trump
knew that no State had issued any changed electoral slate.
Indeed, neither President Trump nor his co-conspirators had
any evidence that any majority of any State legislature was
willing to do so. President Trump also knew that Vice
President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count
legitimate votes. Despite all of these facts, President
Trump nevertheless proceeded to instruct Vice President
Pence to execute a plan he already knew was illegal. And
then knowing that a violent riot was underway, President
Trump breached his oath of office; our Commander in Chief
refused for hours to take the one simple step that his
advisors were begging him to take—to instruct his supporters
to disperse, stand down, and leave the Capitol. Instead,
fully understanding what had unfolded at the Capitol,
President Trump exacerbated the violence with a tweet
attacking Vice President Pence.581 Any rational person who
had watched the events that day knew that President Trump’s
2:24 p.m. tweet would lead to further violence. It did. And,
at almost exactly the same time, President Trump continued
to lobby Congress to delay the electoral count.
As the evidence demonstrates, the rioters at the Capitol had
invaded the building and halted the electoral count. They
did not begin to relent until President Trump finally issued
a video statement instructing his supporters to leave the
Capitol at 4:17 p.m., which had an immediate and helpful
effect: rioters began to disperse582—but not before the
Capitol was invaded, the election count was halted, feces
were smeared in the Capitol, the Vice President and his
family and many others were put in danger, and more than 140
law enforcement officers were attacked and seriously injured
by mob rioters. Even if it were true that President Trump
genuinely believed the election was stolen, this is no
defense. No President can ignore the courts and purposely
violate the law no matter what supposed “justification” he
or she presents.
These conclusions are not the Committee’s alone. In the
course of its investigation, the Committee had occasion to
present evidence to Federal District Court Judge David
Carter, who weighed that evidence against submissions from
President Trump’s lawyer, John Eastman. Judge Carter
considered this evidence in the context of a discovery
dispute—specifically whether the Committee could obtain
certain of Eastman’s documents pursuant to the “crime-fraud”
exception to the attorney-client privilege. That exception
provides that otherwise privileged documents may lose their
privilege if they were part of an effort to commit a crime
or a fraud, in this case by President Trump. Judge Carter
set out his factual findings, discussing multiple elements
of President Trump’s multi-part plan to overturn the
election,583 and then addressed whether the evidence,
including Eastman’s email communications, demonstrated that
Trump and Eastman committed crimes. “Based on the evidence,”
Judge Carter explained, “the Court finds it more likely than
not” that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct
the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021,” and “more
likely than not that President Trump and Dr. Eastman
dishonestly conspired to obstruct the Joint Session of
Congress on January 6th.” 584 Judge Carter also concluded
that President Trump’s and Eastman’s “pressure campaign to
stop the electoral count did not end with Vice President
Pence—it targeted every tier of federal and state elected
officials” 585 and was “a coup in search of a legal
theory.” 586 “The plan spurred violent attacks on the seat
of our nation’s government,” Judge Carter wrote, and it
threatened to “permanently end[] the peaceful transition of
power. . . .” 587
The U.S. Department of Justice has been investigating and
prosecuting persons who invaded the Capitol, engaged in
violence, and planned violence on that day. The Department
has charged more than 900 individuals, and nearly 500 have
already been convicted or pleaded guilty as we write.588 As
the Committee’s investigation progressed through its
hearings, public reporting emerged suggesting that the
Department of Justice had also begun to investigate several
others specifically involved in the events being examined by
the Committee. Such reports indicated that search warrants
had been issued, based on findings of probable cause, for
the cell phones of John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, and
Representative Scott Perry.589 Other reports suggested that
the Department had empaneled one or more grand juries and
was pursuing a ruling compelling several of this Committee’s
witnesses, including Pat Cipollone and Greg Jacob, to give
testimony on topics for which President Trump had apparently
asserted executive privilege. Recent reporting suggests that
a Federal district court judge has now rejected President
Trump’s executive privilege claims in that context.590
Criminal referrals from a congressional committee are often
made in circumstances where prosecutors are not yet known to
be pursuing some of the same facts and evidence. That is not
the case here. During the course of our investigation, both
the U.S. Department of Justice and at least one local
prosecutor’s office (Fulton County, Georgia) have been
actively conducting criminal investigations concurrently
with this congressional investigation.591 In fact, the U.S.
Department of Justice has recently taken the extraordinary
step of appointing a Special Counsel to investigate the
former President’s conduct.592
The Committee recognizes that the Department of Justice and
other prosecutorial authorities may be in a position to
utilize investigative tools, including search warrants and
grand juries, superior to the means the Committee has for
obtaining relevant information and testimony. Indeed, both
the Department of Justice and the Fulton County District
Attorney may now have access to witness testimony and
records that have been unavailable to the Committee,
including testimony from President Trump’s Chief of Staff
Mark Meadows, and others who either asserted privileges or
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.593 The Department may
also be able to access, via grand jury subpoena or
otherwise, the testimony of Republican Leader Kevin
McCarthy, Representative Scott Perry, Representative Jim
Jordan and others, each of whom appears to have had
materially relevant communications with Donald Trump or
others in the White House but who failed to comply with the
Select Committee’s subpoenas.
Taking all of these facts into account, and based on the
breadth of the evidence it has accumulated, the Committee
makes the following criminal referrals to the Department of
Justice’s Special Counsel.
I. Obstruction of an Official Proceeding (18 U.S.C. §
1512(c))
Section 1512(c)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code
makes it a crime to “corruptly” “obstruct[], influence[], or
impede[] any official proceeding, or attempt[] to do
so.” 594 Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential
violations of this statute for a criminal referral of
President Trump and others.595
First, there should be no question that Congress’s joint
session to count electoral votes on January 6th was an
“official proceeding” under section 1512(c). Many Federal
judges have already reached that specific conclusion.596
Second, there should be no doubt that President Trump knew
that his actions were likely to “obstruct, influence or
impede” that proceeding. Based on the evidence developed,
President Trump was attempting to prevent or delay the
counting of lawful certified electoral college votes from
multiple States.597 President Trump was directly and
personally involved in this effort, personally pressuring
Vice President Pence relentlessly as the joint session on
January 6th approached.598
Third, President Trump acted with a “corrupt” purpose. Vice
President Pence, Greg Jacob, and others repeatedly told the
President that the Vice President had no unilateral
authority to prevent certification of the election.599
Indeed, in an email exchange during the violence of January
6th, Eastman admitted that President Trump had been
“advised” that Vice President Pence could not lawfully
refuse to count votes under the Electoral Count Act, but
“once he gets something in his head, it’s hard to get him to
change course.” 600 In addition, President Trump knew that
he had lost dozens of State and Federal lawsuits, and that
the Justice Department, his campaign and his other advisors
concluded that there was insufficient fraud to alter the
outcome. President Trump also knew that no majority of any
State legislature had taken or manifested any intention to
take any official action that could change a State’s
electoral college votes.601 But President Trump pushed
forward anyway. As Judge Carter explained, “[b]ecause
President Trump likely knew that the plan to disrupt the
electoral count was wrongful, his mindset exceeds the
threshold for acting ‘corruptly’ under § 1512(c).” 602
Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) for a criminal referral of
President Trump based solely on his plan to get Vice
President Pence to prevent certification of the election at
the joint session of Congress. Those facts standing alone
are sufficient. But such a charge under that statute can
also be based on the plan to create and transmit to the
executive and legislative branches fraudulent electoral
slates, which were ultimately intended to facilitate an
unlawful action by Vice President Pence—to refuse to count
legitimate, certified electoral votes during Congress’s
official January 6th proceeding.603 Additionally, evidence
developed about the many other elements of President Trump’s
plans to overturn the election, including soliciting State
legislatures, State officials, and others to alter official
electoral outcomes, provides further evidence that President
Trump was attempting through multiple means to corruptly
obstruct, impede, or influence the counting of electoral
votes on January 6th. This is also true of President Trump’s
personal directive to the Department of Justice to “just say
that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave the rest to
me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.” 604
We also stress in particular the draft letter to the Georgia
legislature authored by Jeffrey Clark and another Trump
political appointee at the Department of Justice. The draft
letter embraces many of the same theories that John Eastman
and others were asserting in President Trump’s effort to
lobby State legislatures. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone
described that letter as “a murder-suicide pact,” and other
White House and Justice Department officials offered similar
descriptions.605 As described herein, that draft letter was
intended to help persuade a State legislature to change its
certified slate of electoral college electors based on false
allegations of fraud, so Vice President Pence could
unilaterally and unlawfully decide to count a different
slate on January 6th.606 The letter was transparently false,
improper, and illegal. President Trump had multiple
communications with Clark in the days before January 6th,
and there is no basis to doubt that President Trump offered
Clark the position of Acting Attorney General knowing that
Clark would send the letter and others like it.607
Of course, President Trump is also responsible for
recruiting tens of thousands of his supporters to Washington
for January 6th, and knowing they were angry and some were
armed, instructing them to march to the Capitol and “fight
like hell.” 608 And then, while knowing a violent riot was
underway, he refused for multiple hours to take the single
step his advisors and supporters were begging him to take to
halt the violence: to make a public statement instructing
his supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol.609 Through
action and inaction, President Trump corruptly obstructed,
delayed, and impeded the vote count.
In addition, the Committee believes sufficient evidence
exists for a criminal referral of John Eastman and certain
other Trump associates under 18 U.S.C. §1512(c). The
evidence shows that Eastman knew in advance of the 2020
election that Vice President Pence could not refuse to count
electoral votes on January 6th.610 In the days before
January 6th, Eastman was warned repeatedly that his plan was
illegal and “completely crazy,” and would “cause riots in
the streets.” 611 Nonetheless, Eastman continued to assist
President Trump’s pressure campaign in public and in
private, including in meetings with the Vice President and
in his own speech at the Ellipse on January 6th. And even as
the violence was playing out at the Capitol, Eastman
admitted in writing that his plan violated the law but
pressed for Pence to do it anyway.612 In the immediate
aftermath of January 6th, White House lawyer Eric Herschmann
told Eastman that he should “[g]et a great F’ing criminal
defense lawyer, you’re going to need it.” 613 Others working
with Eastman likely share in Eastman’s culpability. For
example, Kenneth Chesebro was a central player in the scheme
to submit fake electors to the Congress and the National
Archives.
The Committee notes that multiple Republican Members of
Congress, including Representative Scott Perry, likely have
material facts regarding President Trump’s plans to overturn
the election. For example, many Members of Congress attended
a White House meeting on December 21, 2020, in which the
plan to have the Vice President affect the outcome of the
election was disclosed and discussed. Evidence indicates
that certain of those Members unsuccessfully sought
Presidential pardons from President Trump after January
6th,614 as did Eastman,615 revealing their own clear
consciousness of guilt.
II. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. §
371)
Section 371 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides that “[i]f
two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The Committee
believes sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral
of President Trump and others under this statute.616
First, President Trump entered into an agreement with
individuals to obstruct a lawful function of the government
(the certification of the election). The evidence of this
element overlaps greatly with the evidence of the section
1512(c)(2) violations, so we will not repeat it at length
here. President Trump engaged in a multi-part plan described
in this Report to obstruct a lawful certification of the
election. Judge Carter focused his opinions largely on John
Eastman’s role, as Eastman’s documents were at issue in that
case, concluding that “the evidence shows that an agreement
to enact the electoral count plan likely existed between
President Trump and Eastman.” 617 But President Trump
entered into agreements—whether formal or informal618—with
several other individuals who assisted with the multi-part
plan. With regard to the Department of Justice, Jeffrey
Clark stands out as a participant in the conspiracy, as the
evidence suggests that Clark entered into an agreement with
President Trump that if appointed Acting Attorney General,
he would send a letter to State officials falsely stating
that the Department of Justice believed that State
legislatures had a sufficient factual basis to convene to
select new electors. This was false—the Department of
Justice had reached the conclusion that there was no factual
basis to contend that the election was stolen. Again, as
with section 1512(c), the conspiracy under section 371
appears to have also included other individuals such as
Chesebro, Rudolph Giuliani, and Mark Meadows, but this
Committee does not attempt to determine all of the
participants of the conspiracy, many of whom refused to
answer this Committee’s questions.
Second, there are several bases for finding that the
conspirators used “deceitful or dishonest means.” For
example, President Trump repeatedly lied about the election,
after he had been told by his advisors that there was no
evidence of fraud sufficient to change the results of the
election.619 In addition, the plot to get the Vice President
to unilaterally prevent certification of the election was
manifestly (and admittedly) illegal, as discussed above.
Eastman and others told President Trump that it would
violate the Electoral Count Act if the Vice President
unilaterally rejected electors. Thus Judge Carter once again
had little trouble finding that the intent requirement
(“deceitful or dishonest means”) was met, stating that
“President Trump continuing to push that plan despite being
aware of its illegality constituted obstruction by
‘dishonest’ means under § 371.” 620 Judge Carter rejected
the notion that Eastman’s plan—which the President adopted
and actualized—was a “good faith interpretation” of the law,
finding instead that it was “a partisan distortion of the
democratic process.” 621 Similarly, both President Trump and
Clark had been told repeatedly that the Department of
Justice had found no evidence of significant fraud in any of
its investigations, but they nonetheless pushed the
Department of Justice to send a letter to State officials
stating that the Department had found such fraud. And
Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and others
made clear to President Trump that they had no authority to
“find” him 11,780 votes, but the President relentlessly
insisted that they do exactly that, even to the point of
suggesting there could be criminal consequences if they
refused.622
Third, there were numerous overt acts in furtherance of the
agreement, including each of the parts of the President’s
effort to overturn the election. As Judge Carter concluded,
President Trump and Eastman participated in “numerous overt
acts in furtherance of their shared plan.” 623 These
included, but certainly were not limited to, direct pleas to
the Vice President to reject electors or delay
certification, including in Oval Office meetings and the
President’s vulgar comments to the Vice President on the
morning of January 6th. Judge Carter also addressed evidence
that President Trump knowingly made false representations to
a court. Judge Carter concluded that Eastman’s emails showed
“that President Trump knew that the specific numbers of
voter fraud” cited in a complaint on behalf of President
Trump “were wrong but continued to tout those numbers, both
in court and to the public.” Judge Carter found that the
emails in question were related to and in furtherance of a
conspiracy to defraud the United States.624
In finding that President Trump, Eastman, and others engaged
in conspiracy to defraud the United States under section
371, Judge Carter relied on the documents at issue (largely
consisting of Eastman’s own emails) and evidence presented
to the court by this Committee. This Committee’s
investigation has progressed significantly since Judge
Carter issued his first crime-fraud ruling in March 2022.
The evidence found by this Committee and discussed in detail
in this Report further documents that the conspiracy to
defraud the United States under section 371 extended far
beyond the effort to pressure the Vice President to prevent
certification of the election. The Committee believes there
is sufficient evidence for a criminal referral of the
multi-part plan described in this Report under section 371,
as the very purpose of the plan was to prevent the lawful
certification of Joe Biden’s election as President.
III. Conspiracy to Make a False Statement (18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
1001)
President Trump, through others acting at his behest,
submitted slates of fake electors to Congress and the
National Archives. Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United
States Code applies, in relevant part, to “whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry.”
According to the Department of Justice, whether a false
statement is criminal under section 1001 “depends on whether
there is an affirmative response to each of the following
questions:
Was the act or statement material?
Was the act within the jurisdiction of a department or
agency of the United States?
Was the act done knowingly and willfully?” 625
In addition, and as explained above, 18 U.S.C. § 371 makes
it a crime to conspire to “commit any offense against the
United States.” 626
The evidence suggests President Trump conspired with others
to submit slates of fake electors to Congress and the
National Archives. Sufficient evidence exists of a violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001 for a criminal referral of
President Trump and others.
As explained earlier and in Chapter 3 of this Report, the
certifications signed by Trump electors in multiple States
were patently false. Vice President Biden won each of those
States, and the relevant State authorities had so certified.
It can hardly be disputed that the false slates of electors
were material, as nothing can be more material to the joint
session of Congress to certify the election than the
question of which candidate won which States. Indeed,
evidence obtained by the Committee suggests that those
attempting to submit certain of the electoral votes regarded
the need to provide that material to Vice President Pence as
urgent.627
There should be no question that section 1001 applies here.
The false electoral slates were provided both to the
executive branch (the National Archives) and the legislative
branch.628 The statute applies to “any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States.” 629 It is
well established that false statements to Congress can
constitute violations of section 1001.630
Finally, the false statement was made knowingly and
willfully. There is some evidence suggesting that some
signatories of the fake certificates believed that the
certificates were contingent, to be used only in the event
that President Trump prevailed in litigation challenging the
election results in their States. That may be relevant to
the question whether those electors knowingly and willfully
signed a false statement at the time they signed the
certificates. But it is of no moment to President Trump’s
conduct, as President Trump (including acting through
co-conspirators such as John Eastman and Kenneth Chesebro)
relied on the existence of those fake electors as a basis
for asserting that the Vice President could reject or delay
certification of the Biden electors. In fact, as explained
earlier and in Chapter 5 of this Report, Eastman’s
memorandum setting out a six-step plan for overturning the
election on January 6th begins by stating that “7 states
have transmitted dual slates of electors to the President of
the Senate.”
The remaining question is who engaged in this conspiracy to
make the false statement to Congress under section 1001. The
evidence is clear that President Trump personally
participated in a scheme to have the Trump electors meet,
cast votes, and send their votes to the joint session of
Congress in several States that Vice President Biden won,
and then his supporters relied on the existence of these
fake electors as part of their effort to obstruct the joint
session. Republican National Committee (RNC) Chairwoman
Ronna McDaniel testified before this Committee that
President Trump and Eastman directly requested that the RNC
organize the effort to have these fake (i.e., Trump)
electors meet and cast their votes.631 Thus, the Committee
believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal
referral of President Trump for illegally engaging in a
conspiracy to violate section 1001; the evidence indicates
that he entered into an agreement with Eastman and others to
make the false statement (the fake electoral certificates),
by deceitful or dishonest means, and at least one member of
the conspiracy engaged in at least one overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy (e.g., President Trump and
Eastman’s call to Ronna McDaniel).
IV. “Incite,” “Assist” or “Aid and Comfort” an Insurrection
(18 U.S.C. § 2383)
Section 2383 of Title 18 of the United States Code applies
to anyone who “incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in
any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the
United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort
thereto.” 632 The Committee recognizes that section 2383
does not require evidence of an “agreement” between
President Trump and the violent rioters to establish a
violation of that provision; instead, the President need
only have incited, assisted, or aided and comforted those
engaged in violence or other lawless activity in an effort
to prevent the peaceful transition of the Presidency under
our Constitution. A Federal court has already concluded that
President Trump’s statements during his Ellipse speech were
“plausibly words of incitement not protected by the First
Amendment.” 633 Moreover, President Trump was impeached for
“Incitement of Insurrection,” and a majority of the Senate
voted to convict, with many more suggesting they might have
voted to convict had President Trump still been in office at
the time.634
As explained throughout this Report and in this Committee’s
hearings, President Trump was directly responsible for
summoning what became a violent mob to Washington, DC,
urging them to march to the Capitol, and then further
provoking the already violent and lawless crowd with his
2:24 p.m. tweet about the Vice President. Even though
President Trump had repeatedly been told that Vice President
Pence had no legal authority to stop the certification of
the election, he asserted in his speech on January 6th that
if the Vice President “comes through for us” that he could
deliver victory to Trump: “[I]f Mike Pence does the right
thing, we win the election.” This created a desperate and
false expectation in President Trump’s mob that ended up
putting the Vice President and his entourage and many others
at the Capitol in physical danger. When President Trump
tweeted at 2:24 p.m., he knew violence was underway. His
tweet exacerbated that violence.635
During the ensuing riot, the President refused to condemn
the violence or encourage the crowd to disperse despite
repeated pleas from his staff and family that he do so. The
Committee has evidence from multiple sources establishing
these facts, including testimony from former White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone. Although Cipollone’s testimony did
not disclose a number of direct communications with
President Trump in light of concerns about executive
privilege, the Department now appears to have obtained a
ruling that Cipollone can testify before a grand jury about
these communications. Based on the information it has
obtained, the Committee believes that Cipollone and others
can provide direct testimony establishing that President
Trump refused repeatedly, for multiple hours, to make a
public statement directing his violent and lawless
supporters to leave the Capitol. President Trump did not
want his supporters (who had effectively halted the vote
counting) to disperse. Evidence obtained by the Committee
also indicates that President Trump did not want to provide
security assistance to the Capitol during that violent
period.636 This appalling behavior by our Commander in Chief
occurred despite his affirmative constitutional duty to act
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.637
The Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a
criminal referral of President Trump for “assist[ing]” or
“ai[ding] and comfort[ing]” those at the Capitol who engaged
in a violent attack on the United States. The Committee has
developed significant evidence that President Trump intended
to disrupt the peaceful transition of power and believes
that the Department of Justice can likely elicit testimony
relevant to an investigation under section 2383.
For example, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows told White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone that the President “doesn’t want to do
anything” to stop the violence.638 Worse, at 2:24 p.m., the
President inflamed and exacerbated the mob violence by
sending a tweet stating that the Vice President “didn’t have
the courage to do what should have been done.” 639 The
President threw gasoline on the fire despite knowing that
there was a violent riot underway at the Capitol. Indeed,
video and audio footage from the attack shows that many of
the rioters specifically mentioned Vice President Pence.640
And immediately after President Trump sent his tweet, the
violence escalated. Between 2:25 p.m. and 2:28 p.m., rioters
breached the East Rotunda doors, other rioters breached the
police line in the Capitol Crypt, Vice President Pence had
to be evacuated from his Senate office, and Leader McCarthy
was evacuated from his Capitol office.641
Evidence developed in the Committee’s investigation showed
that the President, when told that the crowd was chanting
“Hang Mike Pence,” responded that perhaps the Vice President
deserved to be hanged.642 And President Trump rebuffed pleas
from Leader McCarthy to ask that his supporters leave the
Capitol stating, “Well, Kevin, I guess these people are more
upset about the election than you are.” After hours of
deadly riot, President Trump eventually released a
videotaped statement encouraging the crowd to disperse,
though openly professing his “love” for the members of the
mob and empathizing with their frustration at the “stolen”
election. President Trump has since expressed a desire to
pardon those involved in the attack.643
Both the purpose and the effect of the President’s actions
were to mobilize a large crowd to descend on the Capitol.
Several defendants in pending criminal cases identified the
President’s allegations about the “stolen election” as the
key motivation for their activities at the Capitol. Many of
them specifically cited the President’s tweets asking his
supporters to come to Washington, DC, on January 6th. For
example, one defendant who later pleaded guilty to
threatening House Speaker Nancy Pelosi texted a family
member on January 6th to say: “[Trump] wants heads and I’m
going to deliver.” 644 Another defendant released a
statement through his attorney stating: “I was in
Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, because I believed I was
following the instructions of former President Trump and he
was my President and the commander-in-chief. His statements
also had me believing the election was stolen from him.” 645
As the violence began to subside and law enforcement
continued to secure the Capitol, President Trump tweeted
again, at 6:01 pm to justify the actions of the rioters:
“These are the things and events that happen,” he wrote,
when his so-called victory was “so unceremoniously &
viciously stripped away. . . .” 646 When he wrote those
words, he knew exactly what he was doing. Before President
Trump issued the tweet, a White House staffer cautioned him
that the statement would imply that he “had something to do
with the events that happened at the Capitol”—but he tweeted
it anyway.647 The final words of that tweet leave little
doubt about President Trump’s sentiments toward those who
invaded the Capitol: “Remember this day forever!” 648
V. Other Conspiracy Statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 372 and 2384)
Depending on evidence developed by the Department of
Justice, the President’s actions with the knowledge of the
risk of violence could also constitute a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 372 and § 2384, both of which require proof of a
conspiracy. Section 372 prohibits a conspiracy between two
or more persons “to prevent, by force, intimidation, or
threat, any person from accepting or holding any office,
trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or
from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like
means any officer of the United States to leave the place,
where his duties as an officer are required to be performed,
or to injure him in the discharge of his official
duties.” 649 Oath Keepers Kelly Meggs, Kenneth Harrelson,
and Jessica Watkins were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §
372 in connection with the January 6th attack on the
Capitol.650 The Committee believes that former Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows (who refused to testify and was held in
contempt of Congress) could have specific evidence relevant
to such charges, as may witnesses who invoked their Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination before this
Committee.
Section 2384, the seditious conspiracy statute, prohibits
“conspir[acy] to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force
the Government of the United States . . . or to oppose by
force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder
or delay the execution of any law of the United States . . .
.” 651 A jury has already determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that a conspiracy existed under section 2384, as the
leader of the Oath Keepers and at least one other individual
were convicted of seditious conspiracy under section 2384
for their actions related to the attack on the Capitol.652 A
trial regarding a series of other “Proud Boy” defendants may
also address similar issues.653
The Department of Justice, through its investigative tools
that exceed those of this Committee, may have evidence
sufficient to prosecute President Trump under sections 372
and 2384. Accordingly, we believe sufficient evidence exists
for a criminal referral of President Trump under these two
statutes.
VI. The Committee’s Concerns Regarding Possible Obstruction
of its Investigation
The Committee has substantial concerns regarding potential
efforts to obstruct its investigation, including by certain
counsel (some paid by groups connected to the former
President) who may have advised clients to provide false or
misleading testimony to the Committee.654 Such actions could
violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512. The Committee is aware that
both the U.S. Department of Justice and the Fulton County
District Attorney’s Office have already obtained information
relevant to these matters, including from the Committee
directly. We urge the Department of Justice to examine the
facts to discern whether prosecution is warranted. The
Committee’s broad concerns regarding obstruction and witness
credibility are addressed in the Executive Summary to this
Report.
VII. Accountability for Those Who Plotted Unlawfully to
Overturn the Election is Critical.
To date, the Justice Department has pursued prosecution of
hundreds of individuals who planned and participated in the
January 6th invasion of and attack on our Capitol. But the
Department has not yet charged individuals who engaged in
the broader plan to overturn the election through the means
discussed in this Report. The Committee has concluded that
it is critical to hold those individuals accountable as
well, including those who worked with President Trump to
create and effectuate these plans.
In his speech from the Ellipse on January 6th, President
Trump recited a host of election fraud allegations he knew
to be false, and then told tens of thousands of his angry
supporters this:
And fraud breaks up everything, doesn’t it? When you catch
somebody in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very different
rules. So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to
do. And I hope he doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid
people that he’s listening to. 655
The meaning of President Trump’s comments was sufficiently
clear then, but he recently gave America an even more
detailed understanding of his state of mind. Trump wrote
that allegations of “massive fraud” related to the 2020
election “allow[] for the termination of all rules,
regulations and articles, even those found in the
Constitution.” 656 And President Trump considered pardoning
those involved in the attack and has since expressed a
desire to pardon them—and even give them an apology—if he
returns to the Oval Office.657
In the Committee’s judgment, based on all the evidence
developed, President Trump believed then, and continues to
believe now, that he is above the law, not bound by our
Constitution and its explicit checks on Presidential
authority. This recent Trump statement only heightens our
concern about accountability. If President Trump and the
associates who assisted him in an effort to overturn the
lawful outcome of the 2020 election are not ultimately held
accountable under the law, their behavior may become a
precedent, and invitation to danger, for future elections. A
failure to hold them accountable now may ultimately lead to
future unlawful efforts to overturn our elections, thereby
threatening the security and viability of our Republic.
VIII. Referral of Members to the House Ethics Committee for
Failure to Comply with Subpoenas
During the course of the Select Committee’s investigation of
President Trump’s efforts to subvert the election, the
Committee learned that various Members of Congress had
information relevant to the investigation. Accordingly, the
Committee wrote letters to a number of Members involved in
that activity inviting them to participate voluntarily in
the Select Committee’s investigation. None of the members
was willing to provide information, which forced the Select
Committee to consider alternative means of securing evidence
about the conduct of these Members and the information they
might have. On May 12, 2022, the Select Committee subpoenaed
several members of Congress—including House Minority Leader
Kevin McCarthy, Representative Jim Jordan, Representative
Scott Perry, and Representative Andy Biggs—to obtain
information related to the Committee’s investigation.
This was a significant step, but it was one that was
warranted by the certain volume of information these Members
possessed that was relevant to the Select Committee’s
investigation, as well as the centrality of their efforts to
President Trump’s multi-part plan to remain in power.
Representative McCarthy, among other things, had multiple
communications with President Trump, Vice President Pence,
and others on and related to January 6th. For example,
during the attack on the Capitol, Representative McCarthy
urgently requested that the former President issue a
statement calling off the rioters, to which President Trump
responded by “push[ing] back” and said: “Well, Kevin, I
guess these people are more upset about the election than
you are.” 658 And, after the attack, Representative McCarthy
spoke on the House floor and said that, “[t]here is
absolutely no evidence” that Antifa caused the attack on the
Capitol and instead called on President Trump to “accept his
share of responsibility” for the violence.659 As noted
above, Representative McCarthy privately confided in
colleagues that President Trump accepted some responsibility
for the attack on the Capitol.660
Representative Jordan was a significant player in President
Trump’s efforts. He participated in numerous post-election
meetings in which senior White House officials, Rudolph
Giuliani, and others, discussed strategies for challenging
the election, chief among them claims that the election had
been tainted by fraud. On January 2, 2021, Representative
Jordan led a conference call in which he, President Trump,
and other Members of Congress discussed strategies for
delaying the January 6th joint session. During that call,
the group also discussed issuing social media posts
encouraging President Trump’s supporters to “march to the
Capitol” on the 6th.661 An hour and a half later, President
Trump and Representative Jordan spoke by phone for 18
minutes.662 The day before January 6th, Representative
Jordan texted Mark Meadows, passing along advice that Vice
President Pence should “call out all the electoral votes
that he believes are unconstitutional as no electoral votes
at all.” 663 He spoke with President Trump by phone at least
twice on January 6th, though he has provided inconsistent
public statements about how many times they spoke and what
they discussed.664 He also received five calls from Rudolph
Giuliani that evening, and the two connected at least twice,
at 7:33 p.m. and 7:49 p.m.665 During that time, Giuliani has
testified, he was attempting to reach Members of Congress
after the joint session resumed to encourage them to
continue objecting to Joe Biden’s electoral votes.666 And,
in the days following January 6th, Representative Jordan
spoke with White House staff about the prospect of
Presidential pardons for Members of Congress.667
Like Representative Jordan, Representative Perry was also
involved in early post-election messaging strategy. Both
Representative Jordan and Representative Perry were involved
in discussions with White House officials about Vice
President Pence’s role on January 6th as early as November
2020.668 Representative Perry was present for conversations
in which the White House Counsel’s Office informed him and
others that President Trump’s efforts to submit fake
electoral votes were not legally sound.669 But perhaps most
pivotally, he was involved in President Trump’s efforts to
install Jeffrey Clark as the Acting Attorney General in
December 2020 and January 2021. Beginning in early December
2020, Representative Perry suggested Clark as a candidate to
Mark Meadows,670 then introduced Clark to President
Trump.671 In the days before January 6th, Representative
Perry advocated for President Trump to speak at the Capitol
during the joint session, speaking to Mark Meadows on at
least one occasion about it.672 He was also a participant in
the January 2, 2021, call in which Representative Jordan,
President Trump, and others discussed issuing social media
posts to encourage Trump supporters to march to the Capitol
on January 6th.673 After January 6th, Representative Perry
reached out to White House staff asking to receive a
Presidential pardon.674
Representative Biggs was involved in numerous elements of
President Trump’s efforts to contest the election results.
As early as November 6, 2020, Representative Biggs texted
Mark Meadows, urging him to “encourage the state
legislatures to appoint [electors].” 675 In the following
days, Representative Biggs told Meadows not to let President
Trump concede his loss.676 Between then and January 6th,
Representative Biggs coordinated with Arizona State
Representative Mark Finchem to gather signatures from
Arizona lawmakers endorsing fake Trump electors.677 He also
contacted fake Trump electors in at least one State seeking
evidence related to voter fraud.678
To date, none of the subpoenaed Members has complied with
either voluntary or compulsory requests for participation.
Representative McCarthy initially responded to the Select
Committee’s subpoena in two letters on May 27 and May 30,
2022, in which he objected to the Select Committee’s
composition and validity of the subpoena and offered to
submit written interrogatories in lieu of deposition
testimony. Although the Select Committee did not release
Representative McCarthy from his subpoena obligations,
Representative McCarthy failed to appear for his scheduled
deposition on May 31, 2022. The Select Committee responded
to Representative McCarthy’s letters this same day,
rejecting his proposal to participate via written
interrogatories and compelling his appearance for deposition
testimony no later than June 11, 2022. Although
Representative McCarthy again responded via letter on June
9, 2022, he did not appear for deposition testimony on or
before the specified June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Jordan also responded to the Select
Committee’s subpoena just before his scheduled deposition in
a letter on May 25, 2022, containing a variety of
objections. Representative Jordan also requested material
from the Select Committee, including all materials
referencing him in the Select Committee’s possession and all
internal legal analysis related to the constitutionality of
Member subpoenas. Although the Select Committee did not
release Representative Jordan from his subpoena obligations,
Representative Jordan failed to appear for his scheduled
deposition on May 27, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select
Committee responded to the substance of Representative
Jordan’s May 25th letter and indicated that Representative
Jordan should appear for deposition testimony no later than
June 11, 2022. On June 9, 2022, Representative Jordan again
wrote to reiterate the points from his May 25th letter. That
same day, Representative Jordan sent out a fundraising email
with the subject line: “I’VE BEEN SUBPOENED.” 679
Representative Jordan did not appear before the Select
Committee on or before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Perry likewise responded to the Select
Committee’s subpoena on May 24, 2022, in a letter,
“declin[ing] to appear for deposition” and requesting that
the subpoena be “immediately withdrawn.” 680 Although the
Select Committee did not release Representative Perry from
his subpoena obligations, Representative Perry failed to
appear on May 26, 2022, for his scheduled deposition.
Representative Perry sent a second letter to the Select
Committee on May 31, 2022, with additional objections. That
same day, the Select Committee responded to Representative
Perry’s letters and stated that he should appear before the
Select Committee no later than June 11, 2022, for deposition
testimony. Representative Perry responded via letter on June
10, 2022, maintaining his objections. He did not appear
before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Biggs issued a press release on the day the
Select Committee issued its subpoena, calling the subpoena
“illegitimate” and “pure political theater.” The day before
his scheduled deposition, Representative Biggs sent a letter
to the Select Committee with a series of objections and an
invocation of Speech or Debate immunity. Although the Select
Committee did not release Representative Biggs from his
subpoena obligations, Representative Biggs did not appear
for his scheduled deposition on May 26, 2022. On May 31,
2022, the Select Committee responded to the substance of
Representative Biggs’s May 25th letter and indicated that
Representative Biggs should appear for deposition testimony
no later than June 11, 2022. Although Representative Biggs
responded with another letter on June 9th, he did not appear
before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Despite the Select Committee’s repeated attempts to obtain
information from these Members and the issuance of
subpoenas, each has refused to cooperate and failed to
comply with a lawfully issued subpoena. Accordingly, the
Select Committee is referring their failure to comply with
the subpoenas issued to them to the Ethics Committee for
further action. To be clear, this referral is only for
failure to comply with lawfully issued subpoenas.
The Rules of the House of Representatives make clear that
their willful noncompliance violates multiple standards of
conduct and subjects them to discipline. Willful
non-compliance with compulsory congressional committee
subpoenas by House Members violates the spirit and letter of
House rule XXIII, clause 1, which requires House Members to
conduct themselves “at all times in a manner that shall
reflect creditably on the House.” As a previous version of
the House Ethics Manual explained, this catchall provision
encompasses “‘flagrant’ violations of the law that reflect
on ‘Congress as a whole,’ and that might otherwise go
unpunished.” 681 The subpoenaed House Members’ refusal to
comply with their subpoena obligations satisfies these
criteria. A House Member’s willful failure to comply with a
congressional subpoena also reflects discredit on Congress.
If left unpunished, such behavior undermines Congress’s
longstanding power to investigate in support of its
lawmaking authority and suggests that Members of Congress
may disregard legal obligations that apply to ordinary
citizens.
For these reasons, the Select Committee refers Leader
McCarthy and Representatives Jordan, Perry, and Biggs for
sanction by the House Ethics Committee for failure to comply
with subpoenas. The Committee also believes that each of
these individuals, along with other Members who attended the
December 21st planning meeting with President Trump at the
White House,682 should be questioned in a public forum about
their advance knowledge of and role in President Trump’s
plan to prevent the peaceful transition of power.
Efforts to Avoid Testifying, Evidence of Obstruction, and
Assessments of Witness Credibility
More than 30 witnesses before the Select Committee exercised
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and refused on that basis to provide testimony. They
included individuals central to the investigation, such as
John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, Roger Stone, Michael Flynn,
Kenneth Chesebro, and others.683 The law allows a civil
litigant to rely upon an “adverse inference” when a witness
invokes the Fifth Amendment. “[T]he Fifth Amendment does not
forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions .
. ..” 684 The Committee has not chosen to rely on any such
inference in this Report or in its hearings.
We do note that certain witness assertions of the Fifth
Amendment were particularly troubling, including this:
Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe the
violence on January 6th was justified?
Counsel for the Witness: Can I get clarification, is that a
moral question or are you asking a legal question?
Vice Chair Cheney: I’m asking both.
General Flynn: The Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January
6th was justified morally?
General Flynn: Take the Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January
6th was justified legally?
General Flynn: Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe in the
peaceful transition of power in the United States of
America?
General Flynn: The Fifth.685
President Trump refused to comply with the Committee’s
subpoena, and also filed suit to block the National Archives
from supplying the Committee with White House records. The
Committee litigated the National Archives case in Federal
District Court, in the Federal Appellate Court for the
District of Columbia, and before the Supreme Court. The
Select Committee was successful in this litigation. The
opinion of the D.C. Circuit explained:
On January 6, 2021, a mob professing support for
then-President Trump violently attacked the United States
Capitol in an effort to prevent a Joint Session of Congress
from certifying the electoral college votes designating
Joseph R. Biden the 46th President of the United States. The
rampage left multiple people dead, injured more than 140
people, and inflicted millions of dollars in damage to the
Capitol. Then-Vice President Pence, Senators, and
Representatives were all forced to halt their constitutional
duties and flee the House and Senate chambers for safety.686
Benjamin Franklin said, at the founding, that we have “[a]
Republic”—“if [we] can keep it.” The events of January 6th
exposed the fragility of those democratic institutions and
traditions that we had perhaps come to take for granted. In
response, the President of the United States and Congress
have each made the judgment that access to this subset of
presidential communication records is necessary to address a
matter of great constitutional moment for the Republic.
Former President Trump has given this court no legal reason
to cast aside President Biden’s assessment of the Executive
Branch interests at stake, or to create a separation of
powers conflict that the Political Branches have avoided.687
Several other witnesses have also avoided testifying in
whole or in part by asserting Executive Privilege or
Absolute Immunity from any obligation to appear before
Congress. For example, the President’s Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows invoked both, and categorically refused to testify,
even about text messages he provided to the Committee. The
House of Representatives voted to hold him in criminal
contempt.688 Although the Justice Department has taken the
position in litigation that a former high level White House
staffer for a former President is not entitled to absolute
immunity,689 and that any interests in the confidentiality
of his communications with President Trump and others are
overcome in this case, the Justice Department declined to
prosecute Meadows for criminal contempt. The reasons for
Justice’s refusal to do so are not apparent to the
Committee.690 Commentators have speculated that Meadows may
be cooperating in the Justice Department’s January 6th
investigation.691 The same may be true for Daniel Scavino,
President Trump’s White House Deputy Chief of Staff for
Communications and Director of Social Media, whom the House
also voted to hold in contempt.692
Steve Bannon also chose not to cooperate with the Committee,
and the Justice Department prosecuted him for contempt of
Congress.693 Bannon has been sentenced and is currently
appealing his conviction. Peter Navarro, another White House
Staffer who refused to testify, is currently awaiting his
criminal trial.694
Although the Committee issued letters and subpoenas to seven
Republican members of Congress who have unique knowledge of
certain developments on or in relation to January 6th, none
agreed to participate in the investigation; none considered
themselves obligated to comply with the subpoenas. A number
of these same individuals were aware well in advance of
January 6th of the plotting by Donald Trump, John Eastman,
and others to overturn the election, and certain of them had
an active role in that activity.695 None seem to have
alerted law enforcement of this activity, or of the known
risk of violence. On January 5th, after promoting unfounded
objections to election results, Rep. Debbie Lesko appears to
have recognized the danger in a call with her colleagues:
I also ask leadership to come up with a safety plan for
Members [of Congress]. . . . We also have, quite honestly,
Trump supporters who actually believe that we are going to
overturn the election, and when that doesn’t happen—most
likely will not happen—they are going to go nuts.696
During our hearings, the Committee presented the testimony
of numerous White House witnesses who testified about
efforts by certain Republican Members of Congress to obtain
Presidential pardons for their conduct in connection with
January 6th.697 Cassidy Hutchinson provided extensive detail
in this regard:
Vice Chair Cheney: And are you aware of any members of
Congress seeking pardons?
Hutchinson: I guess Mr. Gaetz and Mr. Brooks, I know, have
both advocated for there’d be a blanket pardon for members
involved in that meeting, and a — a handful of other members
that weren’t at the December 21st meeting as the presumptive
pardons. Mr. Gaetz was personally pushing for a pardon, and
he was doing so since early December.
I’m not sure why Mr. Gaetz would reach out to me to ask if
he could have a meeting with Mr. Meadows about receiving a
presidential pardon.
Vice Chair Cheney: Did they all contact you?
Hutchinson: Not all of them, but several of them did.
Vice Chair Cheney: So, you mentioned Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Brooks.
Hutchinson: Mr. Biggs did. Mr. Jordan talked about
Congressional pardons, but he never asked me for one. It was
more for an update on whether the White House was going to
pardon members of Congress. Mr. Gohmert asked for one as
well. Mr. Perry asked for a pardon, too. I’m sorry.
Vice Chair Cheney: Mr. Perry? Did he talk to you directly?
Hutchinson: Yes, he did.
Vice Chair Cheney: Did Marjorie Taylor Greene contact you?
Hutchinson: No, she didn’t contact me about it. I heard that
she had asked White House Counsel’s Office for a pardon from
Mr. Philbin, but I didn’t frequently communicate with Ms.
Greene.698
Many of these details were also corroborated by other
sources. President Personnel Director Johnny McEntee
confirmed that he was personally asked for a pardon by
Representative Matt Gaetz (R–FL).699 Eric Herschmann
recalled that Representative Gaetz “. . . asked for a very,
very broad pardon.. . . And I said Nixon’s pardon was never
nearly that broad.” 700 When asked about reporting that
Representatives Mo Brooks and Andy Biggs also requested
pardons, Herschmann did not reject either possibility out of
hand, instead answering: “It’s possible that Representative
Brooks or Biggs, but I don’t remember.” 701 The National
Archives produced to the Select Committee an email from
Representative Mo Brooks to the President’s executive
assistant stating that “President Trump asked me to send you
this letter” and “. . . pursuant to a request from Matt
Gaetz” that recommended blanket Presidential pardons to
every Member of Congress who objected to the electoral
college votes on January 6th.702
These requests for pardons suggest that the Members
identified above were conscious of the potential legal
jeopardy arising from their conduct. As noted infra 136, the
Committee has referred a number of these individuals to the
House Ethics Committee for their failure to comply with
subpoenas, and believes that they each owe the American
people their direct and unvarnished testimony.
The Select Committee has also received a range of evidence
suggesting specific efforts to obstruct the Committee’s
investigation. Much of this evidence is already known by the
Department of Justice and by other prosecutorial
authorities. For example:
1. The Committee received testimony from a witness about her
decision to terminate a lawyer who was receiving payments
for the representation from a group allied with President
Trump. Among other concerns expressed by the witness:
The lawyer had advised the witness that the witness could,
in certain circumstances, tell the Committee that she did
not recall facts when she actually did recall them.
During a break in the Select Committee’s interview, the
witness expressed concerns to her lawyer that an aspect of
her testimony was not truthful. The lawyer did not advise
her to clarify the specific testimony that the witness
believed was not complete and accurate, and instead conveyed
that, “They don’t know what you know, [witness]. They don’t
know that you can recall some of these things. So you saying
‘I don’t recall’ is an entirely acceptable response to
this.”
The lawyer instructed the client about a particular issue
that would cast a bad light on President Trump: “No, no, no,
no, no. We don’t want to go there. We don’t want to talk
about that.”
The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share
her testimony before the Committee with other lawyers
representing other witnesses. The lawyer shared such
information over the client’s objection.
The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share
information regarding her testimony with at least one and
possibly more than one member of the press. The lawyer
shared the information with the press over her objection.
The lawyer did not disclose who was paying for the lawyers’
representation of the client, despite questions from the
client seeking that information, and told her, “we’re not
telling people where funding is coming from right now.”
The client was offered potential employment that would make
her “financially very comfortable” as the date of her
testimony approached by entities apparently linked to Donald
Trump and his associates. Such offers were withdrawn or did
not materialize as reports of the content of her testimony
circulated. The client believed this was an effort to impact
her testimony.
Further details regarding these instances will be available
to the public when transcripts are released.
2. Similarly, the witness testified that multiple persons
affiliated with President Trump contacted her in advance of
the witness’s testimony and made the following statements:
What they said to me is, as long as I continue to be a team
player, they know that I am on the right team. I am doing
the right thing. I am protecting who I need to protect. You
know, I will continue to stay in good graces in Trump World.
And they have reminded me a couple of times that Trump does
read transcripts and just keep that in mind as I proceed
through my interviews with the committee.
Here is another sample in a different context. This is a
call received by one of our witnesses:
[A person] let me know you have your deposition tomorrow. He
wants me to let you know he’s thinking about you. He knows
you’re a team player, you’re loyal, and you’re going do the
right thing when you go in for your deposition.703
3. The Select Committee is aware of multiple efforts by
President Trump to contact Select Committee witnesses. The
Department of Justice is aware of at least one of those
circumstances.
4. Rather than relying on representation by Secret Service
lawyers at no cost, a small number of Secret Service agents
engaged private counsel for their interviews before the
Committee.704 During one such witness’s transcribed
interview, a retained private counsel was observed writing
notes to the witness regarding the content of the witness’s
testimony while the questioning was underway. The witness’s
counsel admitted on the record that he had done so.705
Recently, published accounts of the Justice Department’s
Mar-a-Lago investigation suggest that the Department is
investigating the conduct of counsel for certain witnesses
whose fees are being paid by President Trump’s Save America
Political Action Committee.706 The public report implies the
Department is concerned that such individuals are seeking to
influence the testimony of the witnesses they represent.707
This Committee also has these concerns, including that
lawyers who are receiving such payments have specific
incentives to defend President Trump rather than zealously
represent their own clients. The Department of Justice and
the Fulton County District Attorney have been provided with
certain information related to this topic.
The Select Committee recognizes of course that most of the
testimony we have gathered was given more than a year after
January 6th. Recollections are not perfect, and the
Committee expects that different accounts of the same events
will naturally vary. Indeed, the lack of any inconsistencies
in witness accounts would itself be suspicious. And many
witnesses may simply recall different things than others.
Many of the witnesses before this Committee had nothing at
all to gain from their testimony, gave straightforward
responses to the questions posted, and made no effort to
downplay, deflect, or rationalize. Trump Administration
Justice Department officials such as Attorney General Barr,
Acting Attorney General Rosen, and Acting Deputy Attorney
General Donoghue are good examples. Multiple members of
President Trump’s White House staff were also suitably
forthcoming, including Sarah Matthews, Matthew Pottinger,
Greg Jacob, and Pat Philbin, as were multiple career White
House and agency personnel whose names the Committee agreed
not to disclose publicly; as were former Secretary of Labor
Eugene Scalia, Bill Stepien, and certain other members of
the Trump Campaign. The Committee very much appreciates the
earnestness and bravery of Cassidy Hutchinson, Rusty Bowers,
Shaye Moss, Ruby Freeman, Brad Raffensperger, Gabriel
Sterling, Al Schmidt, and many others who provided important
live testimony during the Committees hearings.708
The Committee, along with our nation, offers particular
thanks to Officers Caroline Edwards, Michael Fanone, Harry
Dunn, Aquilino Gonell, and Daniel Hodges, along with
hundreds of other members of law enforcement who defended
the Capitol on that fateful day, all of whom should be
commended for their bravery and sacrifice. We especially
thank the families of Officer Brian Sicknick, Howard
Liebengood and Jeffrey Smith, whose loss can never be
repaid.
The Committee very much appreciates the invaluable testimony
of General Milley and other members of our military, Judge
J. Michael Luttig, and the important contributions of
Benjamin Ginsberg and Chris Stirewalt. This, of course is
only a partial list, and the Committee is indebted to many
others, as well.
The Committee believes that White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone gave a particularly important account of the
events of January 6th, as did White House lawyer, Eric
Herschmann. For multiple months, Cipollone resisted giving
any testimony at all, asserting concerns about executive
privilege and other issues, until after the Committee’s
hearing with Hutchinson. When he did testify, Cipollone
corroborated key elements of testimony given by several
White House staff, including Hutchinson—most importantly,
regarding what happened in the White House during the
violence of January 6th—but also frankly recognized the
limits on what he could say due to privilege: “Again, I’m
not going to get into either my legal advice on matters, and
the other thing I don’t want to do is, again, other
witnesses have their own recollections of things.” Cipollone
also told the Committee that, to the extent that other
witnesses recall communications attributable to White House
counsel that he does not, the communications might have been
with his deputy Pat Philbin, or with Eric Herschmann, who
had strong feelings and was particularly animated about
certain issues.709
Of course, that is not to say that all witnesses were
entirely frank or forthcoming. Other witnesses, including
certain witnesses from the Trump White House, displayed a
lack of full recollection of certain issues, or were not
otherwise as frank or direct as Cipollone. We cite two
examples here, both relating to testimony played during the
hearings.
Kayleigh McEnany was President Trump’s Press Secretary on
January 6th. Her deposition was taken early in the
investigation. McEnany seemed to acknowledge that President
Trump: (1) should have instructed his violent supporters to
leave the Capitol earlier than he ultimately did on January
6th;710 (2) should have respected the rulings of the
courts;711 and (3) was wrong to publicly allege that
Dominion voting machines stole the election.712 But a
segment of McEnany’s testimony seemed evasive, as if she was
testifying from pre-prepared talking points. In multiple
instances, McEnany’s testimony did not seem nearly as
forthright as that of her press office staff, who testified
about what McEnany said.
For example, McEnany disputed suggestions that President
Trump was resistant to condemning the violence and urging
the crowd at the Capitol to act peacefully when they crafted
his tweet at 2:38 p.m. on January 6th.713 Yet one of her
deputies, Sarah Matthews, told the Select Committee that
McEnany informed her otherwise: that McEnany and other
advisors in the dining room with President Trump persuaded
him to send the tweet, but that “. . . she said that he did
not want to put that in and that they went through different
phrasing of that, of the mention of peace, in order to get
him to agree to include it, and that it was Ivanka Trump who
came up with ‘stay peaceful’ and that he agreed to that
phrasing to include in the tweet, but he was initially
resistant to mentioning peace of any sort.” 714 When the
Select Committee asked “Did Ms. McEnany describe in any way
how resistant the President was to including something about
being peaceful,” Matthews answered: “Just that he didn’t
want to include it, but they got him to agree on the
phrasing ‘stay peaceful.’” 715
The Committee invites the public to compare McEnany’s
testimony with the testimony of Pat Cipollone, Sarah
Matthews, Judd Deere, and others.
Ivanka Trump is another example. Among other things, Ivanka
Trump acknowledged to the Committee that: (1) she agreed
with Attorney General Barr’s statements that there was no
evidence of sufficient fraud to overturn the election; (2)
the President and others are bound by the rulings of the
courts and the rule of law; (3) President Trump pressured
Vice President Pence on the morning of January 6th regarding
his authorities at the joint session of Congress that day to
count electoral votes; and (4) President Trump watched the
violence on television as it was occurring.716 But again,
Ivanka Trump was not as forthcoming as Cipollone and others
about President Trump’s conduct.
Indeed, Ivanka Trump’s Chief of Staff Julie Radford had a
more specific recollection of Ivanka Trump’s actions and
statements. For example, Ivanka Trump had the following
exchange with the Committee about her attendance at her
father’s speech on January 6th that was at odds with what
the Committee learned from Radford:
Committee Staff: It’s been reported that you ultimately
decided to attend the rally because you hoped that you would
calm the President and keep the event on an even keel. Is
that accurate?
Ivanka Trump: No. I don’t know who said that or where that
came from.717
However, this is what Radford said about her boss’s
decision:
Committee Staff: What did she share with you about why it
was concerning that her father was upset or agitated after
that call with Vice President Pence in relation to the
Ellipse rally? Why did that matter? Why did he have to be
calmed down, I should say.
Radford: Well, she shared that he had called the Vice
President a not—an expletive word. I think that bothered
her. And I think she could tell based on the conversations
and what was going on in the office that he was angry and
upset and people were providing misinformation. And she felt
like she might be able to help calm the situation down, at
least before he went on stage.
Committee Staff: And the word that she relayed to you that
the President called the Vice President—apologize for being
impolite—but do you remember what she said her father called
him?
Radford: The “P” word.718
When the Committee asked Ivanka Trump whether there were
“[a]ny particular words that you recall your father using
during the conversation” that morning with Vice President
Pence, she answered simply: “No.” 719
In several circumstances, the Committee has found that less
senior White House aides had significantly better
recollection of events than senior staff purported to have.
The Select Committee also has concerns regarding certain
other witnesses, including those who still rely for their
income or employment on organizations linked to President
Trump, such as the America First Policy Institute. Certain
witnesses and lawyers were unnecessarily combative, answered
hundreds of questions with variants of “I do not recall” in
circumstances where that answer seemed unbelievable,
appeared to testify from lawyer-written talking points
rather than their own recollections, provided highly
questionable rationalizations or otherwise resisted telling
the truth. The public can ultimately make its own assessment
of these issues when it reviews the Committee transcripts
and can compare the accounts of different witnesses and the
conduct of counsel.
One particular concern arose from what the Committee
realized early on were a number of intentional falsehoods in
former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows’s December 7,
2021 book, The Chief’s Chief. 720 Here is one of several
examples: Meadows wrote, “When he got offstage, President
Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically
about going to the Capitol.” 721 Meadows goes on in his book
to claim that it “was clear the whole time” President Trump
didn’t intend to go to the Capitol.722 This appeared to be
an intentional effort to conceal the facts. Multiple
witnesses directly contradicted Meadows’s account about
President Trump’s desire to travel to the Capitol, including
Kayleigh McEnany, Cassidy Hutchinson, multiple Secret
Service agents, a White House employee with national
security responsibilities and other staff in the White
House, a member of the Metropolitan Police and others. This
and several other statements in the Meadows book were false,
and the Select Committee was concerned that multiple
witnesses might attempt to repeat elements of these false
accounts, as if they were the party line. Most witnesses did
not, but a few did.
President Trump’s desire to travel to the Capitol was
particularly important for the Committee to evaluate because
it bears on President Trump’s intent on January 6th. One
witness account suggests that President Trump even wished to
participate in the electoral vote count from the House
floor, standing with Republican Congressmen, perhaps in an
effort to apply further pressure to Vice President Mike
Pence and others.723
Mark Meadows’s former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Anthony Ornato gave testimony consistent with the false
account in Meadows’s book. In particular, Ornato told the
Committee that he was not aware of a genuine push by the
President to go to the Capitol, suggesting instead that “it
was one of those hypotheticals from the good idea fairy . .
. [b]ecause it’s ridiculous to think that a President of the
United States can travel especially with, you know, people
around just on the street up to the Capitol and peacefully
protest outside the Capitol . . ..” 724 He told the Select
Committee that the only conversation he had about the
possibility of the President traveling to the Capitol was in
a single meeting officials from the President’s advance
team,725 and his understanding is that this idea “wasn’t
from the President.” 726 Two witnesses before the Committee,
including a White House employee with national security
responsibilities and Hutchinson, testified that Ornato
related an account of President Trump’s “irate” behavior
when he was told in the Presidential SUV on January 6th that
he would not be driven to the Capitol.727 Both accounts
recall Ornato doing so from his office in the White House,
with another member of the Secret Service present.728
Multiple other witness accounts indicate that the President
genuinely was “irate,” “heated,” “angry,” and “insistent” in
the Presidential vehicle.729 But Ornato professed that he
did not recall either communication, and that he had no
knowledge at all about the President’s anger.730
Likewise, despite a significant and increasing volume of
intelligence information in the days before January 6th
showing that violence at the Capitol was indeed possible or
likely, and despite other intelligence and law enforcement
agencies similar conclusions,731 Ornato claimed never to
have reviewed or had any knowledge of that specific
information732 He testified that he was only aware of
warnings that opposing groups might “clash on the Washington
Monument” and that is what he “would have briefed to [Chief
of Staff] Meadows.” 733 The Committee has significant
concerns about the credibility of this testimony, including
because it was Ornato’s responsibility to be aware of this
information and convey it to decisionmakers.734 The
Committee will release Ornato’s November Transcript so the
public can review his testimony on these topics.
Summary: Creation of the Select Committee; Purposes.
In the week after January 6th, House Republican Leader Kevin
McCarthy initially supported legislation to create a
bipartisan commission to investigate the January 6th attack
on the United States Capitol, stating that “the President
bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on Congress by
mob rioters” and calling for creation of a “fact-finding
commission.” 735 Leader McCarthy repeated his support for a
bipartisan commission during a press conference on January
21st: “The only way you will be able to answer these
questions is through a bipartisan commission.” 736
On February 15th, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced in a
letter to the House Democratic Caucus her intent to
establish the type of independent commission McCarthy had
supported, to “investigate and report on the facts and
causes relating to the January 6, 2021 domestic terrorist
attack upon the United States Capitol Complex.” 737 A few
days thereafter, Leader McCarthy provided the Speaker a wish
list that mirrored “suggestions from the Co-Chairs of the
9/11 Commission” that he and House Republicans hoped would
be included in the House’s legislation to establish the
Commission.738
In particular, Leader McCarthy requested an equal ratio of
Democratic and Republican nominations, equal subpoena power
for the Democratic Chair and Republican Vice Chair of the
Commission, and the exclusion of predetermined findings or
outcomes that the Commission itself would produce. Closing
his letter, Leader McCarthy quoted the 9/11 Commission
Co-Chairs, writing that a “bipartisan independent
investigation will earn credibility with the American
public.” 739 He again repeated his confidence in achieving
that goal.740 In April 2021, Speaker Pelosi agreed to make
the number of Republican and Democratic Members of the
Commission equal, and to provide both parties with an equal
say in subpoenas, as McCarthy had requested.741
In May 2021, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman
Bennie G. Thompson began to negotiate more of the details
for the Commission with his Republican counterpart, Ranking
Member John Katko.742 On May 14th, Chairman Thompson
announced that he and Ranking Member Katko had reached an
agreement on legislation to “form a bipartisan, independent
Commission to investigate the January 6th domestic terrorism
attack on the United States Capitol and recommend changes to
further protect the Capitol, the citadel of our
democracy.” 743
On May 18th, the day before the House’s consideration of the
Thompson-Katko agreement, Leader McCarthy released a
statement in opposition to the legislation.744 Speaker
Pelosi responded to that statement, saying: “Leader McCarthy
won’t take yes for an answer.” 745 The Speaker referred to
Leader McCarthy’s February 22nd letter where “he made three
requests to be addressed in Democrats’ discussion
draft.” 746 She noted that “every single one was granted by
Democrats, yet he still says no.” 747
In the days that followed, Republican Ranking Member Katko
defended the bipartisan nature of the bill to create the
Commission:
As I have called for since the days just after the attack,
an independent, 9/11-style review is critical for removing
the politics around January 6 and focusing solely on the
facts and circumstances of the security breach at the
Capitol, as well as other instances of violence relevant to
such a review. Make no mistake about it, Mr. Thompson and I
know this is about facts. It’s not partisan politics. We
would have never gotten to this point if it was about
partisan politics.748
That evening, the House passed the legislation to establish
a National Commission to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol Complex in a bipartisan
fashion, with 35 Republicans joining 217 Democrats voting in
favor and 175 Republicans voting against.749 In the days
thereafter, however, only six Senate Republicans joined
Senate Democrats in supporting the legislation, killing the
bill in the Senate.750
On June 24th, Speaker Pelosi announced her intent to create
a House select committee to investigate the attack.751 On
June 25th, Leader McCarthy met with DC Metropolitan Police
Officer Michael Fanone, who was seriously injured on January
6th.752 Officer Fanone pressed Leader McCarthy “for a
commitment not to put obstructionists and the wrong people
in that position.” 753
On June 30th, the House voted on H. Res. 503 to establish a
13-Member Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol by a vote of 222 Yeas
and 190 Nays with just two Republicans supporting the
measure: Representative Liz Cheney and Representative Adam
Kinzinger.754 On July 1st, Speaker Pelosi named eight
initial Members to the Select Committee, including one
Republican: Representative Cheney.755
On July 17th, Leader McCarthy proposed his selection of five
members:
Representative Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of the House
Judiciary Committee;
Representative Kelly Armstrong of North Dakota; House Energy
and Commerce Committee;
Representative Troy Nehls, House Transportation &
Infrastructure and Veterans’ Affairs Committees.
Representative Jim Banks, Armed Services, Veterans’ Affairs
and Education and Labor Committees;
Representative Rodney Davis, Ranking Member of the Committee
on House Administration.756
Jordan was personally involved in the acts and circumstances
of January 6th, and would be one of the targets of the
investigation. By that point, Banks had made public
statements indicating that he had already reached his own
conclusions and had no intention of cooperating in any
objective investigation of January 6th, proclaiming, for
example, that the Select Committee was created “. . . solely
to malign conservatives and to justify the Left’s
authoritarian agenda.” 757
On July 21st, Speaker Nancy Pelosi exercised her power under
H. Res. 503 not to approve the appointments of
Representatives Jordan or Banks, expressing “concern about
statements made and actions taken by these Members” and “the
impact their appointments may have on the integrity of the
investigation.” 758 However, she also stated that she had
informed Leader McCarthy “. . . that I was prepared to
appoint Representatives Rodney Davis, Kelly Armstrong and
Troy Nehls, and requested that he recommend two other
Members.” 759
In response, Leader McCarthy elected to remove all five of
his Republican appointments, refusing to allow
Representatives Armstrong, Davis and Nehls to participate on
the Select Committee.760 On July 26, 2021, Speaker Pelosi
then appointed Republican Representative Adam Kinzinger.761
In resisting the Committee’s subpoenas, certain litigants
attempted to argue that the Select Committee’s composition
violated House Rules or H. Res. 503, but those arguments
failed in court.762
Select Committee Witnesses Were Almost Entirely Republican
In its ten hearings or business meetings, the Select
Committee called live testimony or played video for several
dozen witnesses, the vast majority of whom were Republicans.
A full list is set forth below.
Republicans:
John McEntee (served as Director of the White House
Presidential Personnel Office in the Trump Administration)
Judd Deere (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and
White House Deputy Press Secretary in the Trump
Administration)
Jared Kushner (served as a Senior Advisor to President
Donald Trump)
Pat Cipollone (served as White House Counsel for President
Donald Trump)
Eric Herschmann (served as a Senior Advisor to President
Donald Trump)
Kayleigh McEnany (served as White House Press Secretary in
Trump Administration)
Derek Lyons (served as White House Staff Secretary and
Counselor to the President in the Trump Administration)
Cassidy Hutchinson (served as Assistant to Chief of Staff
Mark Meadows in the Trump Administration)
Matt Pottinger (served as Deputy National Security Advisor
in the Trump Administration)
Ben Williamson (served as Senior Advisor to Chief of Staff
Mark Meadows)
Sarah Matthews (served as Deputy Press Secretary in the
Trump Administration)
William Barr (served as Attorney General in the Trump
Administration)
Mike Pompeo (served as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and Secretary of State in the Trump Administration)
Ivanka Trump (served as a Senior Advisor and Director of the
Office of Economic Initiatives and Entrepreneurship in the
Trump Administration)
Donald Trump Jr. (eldest child of Donald Trump)
Molly Michael (served as Deputy Assistant to the President
and Executive Assistant to the President)
Tim Murtaugh (served as Director of Communications for the
Trump 2020 Presidential campaign)
Richard Donoghue (served as Acting Deputy Attorney General
in the Trump Administration)
Jeffrey Rosen (served as Acting Attorney General in the
Trump Administration)
Steven Engel (served as Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel in the Trump Administration)
Marc Short (served as Chief of Staff to Vice President Mike
Pence)
Greg Jacob (served as Counsel to Vice President Mike Pence)
Keith Kellogg (served as National Security Advisor to Vice
President Mike Pence)
Chris Hodgson (served as Director of Legislative Affairs for
Vice President Mike Pence)
Douglas Macgregor (served as advisor to the Secretary of
Defense in the Trump Administration)
Jason Miller (served as spokesman for the Donald Trump 2016
Presidential Campaign and was a Senior Advisor to the Trump
2020 Presidential Campaign)
Alex Cannon (Counsel for the Trump 2020 Presidential
Campaign)
Bill Stepien (served as the Campaign Manager for the Trump
2020 Presidential Campaign and was the White House Director
of Political Affairs in the Trump Administration from 2017
to 2018)
Rudolph Giuliani (an attorney for Donald Trump)
John Eastman (an attorney for Donald Trump)
Michael Flynn (served as National Security Advisor in the
Trump Administration)
Eugene Scalia (served as the Secretary of Labor in the Trump
Administration)
Matthew Morgan (General Counsel for the Trump 2020
Presidential Campaign)
Sidney Powell (an attorney and advisor to Donald Trump)
Jeffrey Clark (served as Acting Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Division in the Trump Administration)
Cleta Mitchell (an attorney working with the Trump 2020
Presidential Campaign)
Ronna Romney McDaniel (Chair of the Republican National
Committee)
Justin Clark (served as Deputy Campaign Manager for the
Trump 2020 Presidential Campaign)
Robert Sinners (Georgia State Director of Election Day
Operations for the Trump 2020 Presidential Campaign)
Andrew Hitt (Wisconsin Republican Party Chair)
Laura Cox (Michigan Republican Party Chair)
Mike Shirkey (Majority Leader, Michigan State Senate)
Bryan Cutler (Speaker, Pennsylvania House of
Representatives)
Rusty Bowers (Speaker, Arizona House of Representatives)
Brad Raffensperger (Georgia Secretary of State)
Gabriel Sterling (Georgia Secretary of State, Chief
Operating Officer)
BJay Pak (served as United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Georgia in the Trump Administration)
Al Schmidt (City Commissioner of Philadelphia)
Chris Stirewalt (Fox News Political Editor)
Benjamin Ginsberg (Election Attorney)
J. Michael Luttig (Retired judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and informal advisor to Vice
President Mike Pence)
Katrina Pierson (served as a liaison for the White House and
organizers at Donald Trump’s “Save America” rally on January
6th)
Nicholas Luna (served as Personal Aide to President Trump)
Stephen Miller (served as Senior Advisor to President Trump)
Vincent Haley (served as Deputy Assistant to the President
and Advisor for Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting in the
Trump Administration)
Julie Radford (Chief of Staff to Ivanka Trump in the Trump
Administration)
Mick Mulvaney (former Acting Chief of Staff and Special
Envoy for Northern Ireland in the Trump Administration)
Elaine Chao (Secretary of Transportation in the Trump
Administration)
Roger Stone (Trump associate)
Democrats:
Jocelyn Benson (Michigan Secretary of State)
Other:
U.S. Capitol Police Officer Harry Dunn
DC Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone
U.S. Capitol Police Sgt. Aquilino Gonell
DC Metropolitan Police Officer Daniel Hodges
General Mark Milley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
U.S. Capitol Police Officer Caroline Edwards
Nick Quested (award-winning British filmmaker)
Robert Schornack (sentenced to 36 months’ probation)
Eric Barber (charged with theft and unlawful demonstration
in the Capitol)
John Wright (awaiting trial for felony civil disorder and
other charges)
George Meza (Proud Boy)
Daniel Herendeen (sentenced to 36 months’ probation for role
in Capitol attack)
Matthew Walter (Proud Boy)
Wandrea ArShaye “Shaye” Moss (Georgia election worker)
Ruby Freeman ( Georgia election worker)
Anika Collier Navaroli (former Twitter employee)
White House Security Official
Jim Watkins (Founder and owner, 8kun)
Jody Williams (former owner of TheDonald.win)
Dr. Donell Harvin (Chief of Homeland Security and
Intelligence for the government of the District of Columbia)
Kellye SoRelle (attorney for Oath Keepers)
Shealah Craighead (White House Photographer)
Jason Van Tatenhove (former Oath Keepers spokesperson)
Stephen Ayres (plead guilty to disorderly and disruptive
conduct related to Capitol attack)
Sgt. Mark Robinson (Ret.) (Metropolitan Police Department)
Janet Buhler (pleaded guilty to charges related to the
Capitol attack)
ENDNOTES
1. A few weeks later, Rhodes and his associate Kelly Meggs
were found guilty of seditious conspiracy, and other Oath
Keepers were found guilty on numerous charges for
obstructing the electoral count. Trial Transcript at
10502-508, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, “Oath
Keepers Leader Convicted of Sedition in Landmark Jan. 6
Case,” New York Times, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.
2. Trial Transcript at 5698, 5759, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022).
3. Trial Transcript at 5775, United States v. Rhodes et al.,
No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (“for me at the time,
it meant I felt it was like a Bastille type moment in
history where in the French Revolution it was that big
turning point moment where the population made their
presence felt. I thought it was going to be a similar type
of event for us”).
4. Trial Transcript at 5783, 5866, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022).
5. Sentencing Transcript at 15-17, United States v. Reimler,
No. 1:21-cr-239 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022), ECF No. 37.
6. Sentencing Transcript at 33, United States v. Pert, No.
1:21-cr-139 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2022), ECF No. 64.
7. Sentencing Memorandum by Abram Markofski, Exhibit B,
United States v. Markofski, No. 1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 2,
2021), ECF No. 44-2.
8. Sentencing Transcript at 49, United States v. Witcher,
No. 1:21-cr-235 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2022), ECF No. 53.
9. Sentencing Transcript at 19–20, United States v. Edwards,
No. 1:21-cr-366 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2022), ECF No. 33. See
also, Sentencing Memorandum by Brandon Nelson, Exhibit B,
United States v. Nelson, No. 1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 6,
2021), ECF No. 51-2; Sentencing Transcript at 65–66, United
States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2021),
ECF No. 137; Sentencing Transcript at 45, United States v.
Schornak, 1:21-cr-278 (D.D.C. May 11, 2022), ECF No. 90;
Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Wilkerson, No.
1:21-cr-302 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2021), ECF No. 31; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Barber,
(Mar. 16, 2022), pp. 50–51.
10. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Sandlin, No.
1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Ryan J.
Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter Oct. 1, 2022 3:33 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1576295667412017157;
Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter, Oct. 1, 2022 3:40 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1576296016512692225;
Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 16, United States
v. Sandlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2022), ECF No.
92.
11. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Revoke
Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order at 4, United States v.
Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No 16;
Dan Mangan, “Capitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was
Following Trump’s Orders, Apologizes to AOC for Threat,”
CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John
Douglas Wright, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 22, 63.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Lewis
Cantwell, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 54.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Stephen Ayres, (June 22, 2022), p. 8.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
16. Affidavit at 8, United States v. Ayres, No. 1:21-cr-156
(D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2021), ECF No. 5-1.
17. See infra, Chapter 6. See also Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart
Compiling Defendant Statements). The Select Committee Chart
Compiling Defendant Statements identifies hundreds of
examples of such testimony. Select Committee staff tracked
cases filed by the Department of Justice against defendants
who committed crimes related to the attack on the United
States Capitol. Through Department of Justice criminal
filings, through public reporting, through social media
research, and through court hearings, staff collected a
range of statements by these defendants about why they came
to Washington, DC, on January 6th. Almost always, it was
because President Trump had called upon them to support his
big lie. Those defendants also discussed plans for violence
at the Capitol, against law enforcement, against other
American citizens, and against elected officials in the days
leading up to January 6th. In the days immediately following
the attack, defendants also bragged about their conduct.
Some defendants later reflected on their actions at
sentencing. The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant
Statements is not meant to be comprehensive or polished; it
is a small sampling of the tremendous work the Department of
Justice has done tracking down and prosecuting criminal
activity during the attempted insurrection. Moreover, the
trial of multiple members of the Proud Boys on seditious
conspiracy and other charges is set to begin on December 19,
2022, and may provide additional information directly
relevant to this topic. See Court Calendar: December 9,
2022–December 31, 2022, United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, available at
https://media.dcd.uscourts.gov/datepicker/index.html (last
accessed Dec. 9, 2022); Alan Feuer, “Outcome in Oath Keepers
Trial Could Hold Lessons for Coming Jan. 6 Cases,” New York
Times, (Nov. 30, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/30/us/politics/oath-keepers-stewart-rhodes.html.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001890_00001 (December 28, 2020, email from Bernard
Kerik to Mark Meadows explaining that “[w]e can do all the
investigations we want later”); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000005090_0001 (January. 6, 2021, email from John
Eastman to Gregory Jacob acknowledging that President Trump
had “been so advised” that Vice President Pence “DOES NOT
have the power to decide things unilaterally”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (Russell
“Rusty” Bowers testimony recalling Rudolph Giuliani stating
that “[w]e’ve got lots of theories; we just don’t have the
evidence”); see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 128
(“Whether Rudy was at this stage of his life in the same
abilities to manage things at this level or not, I mean,
obviously, I think Bernie Kerik publicly said it, they never
proved the allegations that they were making, and they were
trying to develop.”) Note: Some documents cited in this
report show timestamps based on a time zone other than
Eastern Time—such as Greenwich Mean Time—because that is how
they were produced to the Committee.
19. The Committee notes that a number of these findings are
similar to those Federal Judge David Carter reached after
reviewing the evidence presented by the Committee. Order Re
Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 31-40,
Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM); Order Re Privilege
of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021
at 23-24, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D.
Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356; Order Re Privilege of
Remaining Documents at 13-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372.
20. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United
States Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division
communication noting left-wing groups telling members to
“stay at home” on January 6th).
21. Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the
United States Capitol Police and Preparations for and
Response to the Attack of January 6th: Part I, 117th Cong.,
1st sess., (Apr. 21, 2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-united-states-capitol-police-and-preparations-and-response;
Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the United
States Capitol Police and Preparations for and Response to
the Attack of January 6th: Part II, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,,
(May 10, 2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-police-threat;
Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January
6th Attack: Review of the Architect of the Capitol’s
Emergency Preparedness, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 12,
2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-review-architect-capitol-s-emergency;
Committee on House Administration, Reforming the Capitol
Police and Improving Accountability for the Capitol Police
Board, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 19, 2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/reforming-capitol-police-and-improving-accountability-capitol-police;
Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January
6th Attack: United States Capitol Police Containment
Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., (June 15, 2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-police-containment;
Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January
6th Capitol Attack: Ongoing Review of the United States
Capitol Police Inspector General Flash Reports, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (Feb. 17, 2022), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-capitol-attack-ongoing-review-united-states.
22. John Koblin, “At Least 20 Million Watched Jan. 6
Hearing,” New York Times, (June 10, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/business/media/jan-6-hearing-ratings.html.
Their findings were also widely noted by major media
outlets, including conservative ones. “Editorial: What the
Jan. 6 Hearings Accomplished,” Wall Street Journal, (Oct.
14, 2022), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-jan-6-inquiry-accomplished-donald-trump-liz-cheney-subpoena-congress-11665699321;
“Editorial: The Jan. 6 Hearings are Over. Time to Vote.,”
Washington Post, (Oct. 13, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/13/jan-6-hearings-are-over-time-vote/;
“Editorial: The President Who Stood Still on Jan. 6,” Wall
Street Journal, (July 22, 2022), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-president-who-stood-still-donald-trump-jan-6-committee-mike-pence-capitol-riot-11658528548;
“Editorial: ‘We All have a Duty to Ensure that What Happened
on Jan. 6 Never Happens Again’,” New York Times, (June 10,
2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/opinion/january-6-hearing-trump.html;
“Editorial: Trump’s Silence on Jan. 6 is Damning,” New York
Post, (July 22, 2022), available at
https://nypost.com/2022/07/22/trumps-jan-6-silence-renders-him-unworthy-for-2024-reelection/
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45 (“And I told him it
was going to be a process. It was going to be, you know—you
know, we’re going to have to wait and see how this turned
out. So I, just like I did in 2016, I did the same thing in
2020.”).
24. “When States Can Begin Processing and Counting
Absentee/Mail-In Ballots, 2020,” Ballotpedia (accessed on
Dec. 5, 2022), available at
https://ballotpedia.org/When_states_can_begin_processing_and_counting_absentee/mail-in_ballots,_2020.
25. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January
6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 21.
30. John J. Martin, Mail-in Ballots and Constraints on
Federal Power under the Electors Clause, 107 Va. L. Rev.
Online 84, 86 (Apr. 2021) (noting that 45 States and DC
permitted voters to request a mail-in ballot or
automatically receive one in the 2020 election); Nathanial
Rakich and Jasmine Mithani, “What Absentee Voting Looked
Like In All 50 States,” FiveThirtyEight, (Feb. 9, 2021),
available at
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-absentee-voting-looked-like-in-all-50-states/;
Lisa Danetz, “Mail Ballot Security Features: A Primer,”
Brennan Center for Justice, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/mail-ballot-security-features-primer.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope
Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), p. 24.
32. He also won in Utah, which mailed absentee ballots to
all active voters, and won one or more electoral votes in
both Maine and Nebraska, which allowed no-excuse absentee
voting and assign their electoral votes proportionally. See
“Table 1: States with No-Excuse Absentee Voting,” National
Conference of State Legislatures, (July 12, 2022), available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201004185006/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting.aspx
(archived); “Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee,
All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options,” National
Conference of State Legislatures, (Sep. 24, 2020), available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201103175057/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx
(archived); Federal Election Commission, “Federal Elections
2020 – Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S.
Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives,” (Oct. 2022),
p. 12, available at
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 66; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3,
2022), pp. 75-76.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 66.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-77.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 60-61.
37. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,”
Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.
38. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 5,
2020 9:12 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201105170250/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1324353932022480896
(archived). Note: Citations in this report that refer to an
archived tweet may list a timestamp that is several hours
earlier or later than the one shown on the suggested webpage
because tweets are archived from various time zones.
39. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10307; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
16-1010.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 77-78.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(November 3, 2020, email exchange between Tom Fitton and
Molly Michael copying proposed election day victory
statement).
43. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,” Mother Jones,
(July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory.
We note that Mr. Bannon refused to testify and has been
convicted of criminal contempt by a jury of his peers.
“Stephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two
counts of Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice,
(Oct. 21, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-two-counts-contempt-congress.
44. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment
right not to incriminate himself in response to over 70
questions, including questions regarding his direct
communications with Donald Trump and his role in January
6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone
(Dec. 17, 2021). See also Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production),
Video file 201101_1 (November 1, 2020, footage of Roger
Stone speaking to associates).
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 12-13.
46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
79VP-R000011578_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0001,
079VP-R000011579_0002 (November 3, 2020, email and
memorandum from Gregory Jacob to Marc Short regarding
electoral vote count).
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 117-18.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
50. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p.
121; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alyssa Farah Griffin, (Apr. 15, 2022), p. 62; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Sep. 14, 2022), p. 113; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kellyanne Conway, (Nov.
28, 2022), pp. 79-84.
51. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith
Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 212-21; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley,
(Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 108-10; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 44, 46,
48-51; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Douglas Macgregor, (June 7, 2022), pp. 27-41.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg,
Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 215.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 6.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex
Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 22, 33-34.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111-12.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.
57. ABC News, “Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6:
Exclusive,” YouTube, at 2:13, Nov. 14, 2022, available at
https://youtu.be/-AAyKAoPFQs?t=133.
58. “CNN Townhall: Former Vice President Mike Pence,” CNN,
(Nov. 16, 2022), available at
https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-11-16/segment/01.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 118.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
61. Michael Balsamo, “Disputing Trump, Barr Says No
Widespread Election Fraud,” Associated Press, (Dec. 1, 2020,
updated June 28, 2022), available at
https://apnews.com/article/barr-no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24-30; “Bill Barr Press
Conference Transcript: No Special Counsels Needed to
Investigate Election or Hunter Biden,” Rev, (Dec. 21, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/bill-barr-press-conference-transcript-no-special-counsels-needed-to-investigate-election-or-hunter-biden.
63. “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure
Government Coordinating Council & the Election
Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,”
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12,
2020), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election
(emphasis in original).
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 59-60.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 108-09.
67. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview
of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156, available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 18-19.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 50,
123; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 168-69, 184, 187.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 50.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (April 6, 2022), p. 128.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 172-73.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 63-70; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25,
2022), pp. 57-62; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), pp, 66-68;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex
Cannon, (Apr. 19, 2022), pp. 37-38; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh production),
XXM-0021349 (text chain with Giuliani, Ellis, Epshteyn,
Ryan, Bobb, and Herschmann).
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 173.
79. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich.
2020), also available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/King-v-Whitmer-Doc62.pdf;
Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706 (D. Ariz. 2020),
also available at
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.azd.1255923/gov.uscourts.azd.1255923.84.0_2.pdf;
Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d
899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020), also available at
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.127057/gov.uscourts.pamd.127057.202.0_1.pdf;
Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS
1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52, 54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020),
available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1
(attaching and affirming lower court decision), also
available at
https://election.conservative.org/files/2020/12/20-OC-00163-Order-Granting-Motion-to-Dismiss-Statement-of-Contest.pdf;
Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Pence, 514 F. Supp. 3d 117, 119
(D.D.C. 2021), also available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WVA-v-Pence-Doc10.pdf.
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0620 (text
message between Tim Murtaugh, Zach Parkinson, and “Matt”).
81. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506,
slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
82. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506,
slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
83. Opinion and Order at 1, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d
720 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2020) (No. 20-13134), ECF No. 172.
84. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable
Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The
Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020
Presidential Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at
https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
85. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable
Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The
Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020
Presidential Election, (July 2022), pp. 3-4, available at
https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/. We also note this:
The authors of Lost, Not Stolen also conclude that one of
the pieces of supposed evidence that President Trump and his
allies have pointed to since January 6, 2021, to try to
bolster their allegations that the 2020 election was stolen
shows nothing of the sort. Lost, Not Stolen explains that
Dinesh D’Souza’s “2000 Mules” tries to establish widespread
voter fraud in the 2020 election using phone-tracking data.
“Yet the film, heartily endorsed by Trump at its Mar-a-Lago
premiere, has subsequently been thoroughly debunked in
analysis. What the film claims to portray is simply not
supported by the evidence invoked by the film.” Id., at 6.
Likewise, former Attorney General Barr told the Select
Committee: “. . . I haven’t seen anything since the election
that changes my mind [that fraud determined the outcome]
including, the 2000 Mules movie.” Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2,
2022), p. 37. He called its cell phone tracking data
“singularly unimpressive” because “. . . in a big city like
Atlanta or wherever, just by definition you’re going to find
many hundreds of them have passed by and spent time in the
vicinity of these boxes” for submitting ballots, and to
argue that those people must be “mules” delivering
fraudulent ballots was “just indefensible.” Id., at 37-38.
86. White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann told the
Committee that when he disputed allegations of election
fraud in a December 18th Oval Office meeting, Sidney Powell
fired back that “the judges are corrupt. And I was like,
every one? Every single case that you’ve done in the country
you guys lost every one of them is corrupt, even the ones we
appointed?” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 171.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at
1:53:10-1:53:20, available at
https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-committee-hearing.
88. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 46-47, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar,
No. 4:20-cv-02078 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020), available at
https://cdn.donaldjtrump.com/public-files/press_assets/2020-11-09-complaint-as-filed.pdf.
89. Opinion at 2, 3, 16, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.
v. Boockvar, No. 20-3371 (3d Cir. Nov. 27, 2020), available
at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Donald-J.-Trump-for-President-v-Boockvar-3rd-Cir-Doc91.pdf.
90. Complaint for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief Pursuant to Article II of the United States
Constitution, Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No.
2:20-cv-01785 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-Doc1.pdf.
91. Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d
620, 21, 22 (E.D. Wis. 2020), available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-Doc134.pdf.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at
1:52:45 to 1:53:20, available at
https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-committee-hearing.
93. The authors determined that thirty cases were dismissed
by a judge after an evidentiary hearing had been held,
compared to twenty cases that were dismissed by a judge
beforehand, while the remaining fourteen were withdrawn
voluntarily by plaintiffs. See Senator John Danforth,
Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al,
Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and
Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), p. 3,
available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.
95. Letter from Timothy C. Parlatore to Chairman Bennie G.
Thompson on “Re: Subpoena to Bernard B. Kerik,” (Dec. 31,
2021).
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004125_0001
(December 28, 2020, email from Kerik to Meadows).
97. When our courts weigh evidence to determine facts, they
often infer that disputed facts do not favor a witness who
refuses to testify by invoking his Fifth Amendment right
against incriminating himself. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (the Fifth Amendment allows for
“adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when
they refuse to testify to probative evidence offered against
them”).
98. Nor was there such evidence of widespread fraud in any
of the documents produced in response to Select Committee
subpoenas issued to the proponents of the claims, including
Rudy Giuliani and his team members and investigators Bernard
Kerik and Christina Bobb, or other proponents of election
fraud claims such as Pennsylvania Senator Doug Mastriano,
Arizona legislator Mark Finchem, disbarred attorney Phill
Kline, and attorneys Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell, and John
Eastman. Not one of them provided evidence raising genuine
questions about the election outcome. In short, it was a big
scam.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 19,
2022), at 56:30 to 58:10, available at
https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/101322-select-committee-hearing.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Eugene Scalia (June 30, 2022), pp. 11-13. Then-Secretary
Scalia also sent a memorandum to President Trump on January
8, 2021. In that memorandum, he requested that the President
“convene an immediate meeting of the Cabinet.” He told the
President that he was “concerned by certain statements you
made since the election . . . of further actions you may be
considering,” and he “concluded that [his] responsibilities
as a Cabinet Secretary obligate[d] [him] to take further
steps to address those concerns.” The Select Committee will
make this memorandum available to the public. Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Labor
Production), CTRL0000087637, (January 8, 2021, Memorandum
for The President of the United States from Secretary of
Labor Eugene Scalia, regarding Request for Cabinet Meeting).
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 12.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 3, 2022), p. 62.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 3, 2022), pp. 19-20.
105. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed
Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), pp. 30-31,
available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey
Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 14-15 (in which Rosen confirms
the general accuracy of the transcription of his Senate
testimony and then is asked and agrees to the following
question: [Committee staff]: “And we are going to—the select
committee is going to essentially incorporate those
transcripts as part of our record and rely upon your
testimony there for our purposes going forward, as long as
you’re comfortable with that?” [Rosen]: “Yes.”)
106. “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results –
December 22, 2020,” Factba.se, at 9:11-9:25 (Dec. 22, 2020),
available at
https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 43.
108. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
109. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
110. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3,
2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210103135742/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1345731043861659650
(archived).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.
112. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims
Transcript December 2,” Rev, at 15:12-15:44, (Dec. 2, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64.
114. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress
Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,”
YouTube, at 1:42:58-1:43:02, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=6178.
115. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard
Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156, available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
116. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress
Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,”
YouTube, at 1:15:19-1:15:39, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=4519.
117. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
118. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, at 51:38-52:01, (Jan. 4,
2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
119. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
120. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress
Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,”
YouTube, at 1:32:25-1:32:43, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5545.
121. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
122. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress
Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,”
YouTube, at 1:33:35-1:33:44, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5615.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 290-91.
124. Search results for “dominion”, Trump Twitter Archive
v2, (accessed Sep. 20, 2022),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22&results=1.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.
126. “Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript
2020: Addresses Possibility of Conceding Election,” Rev, at
23:35-23:46, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-possibility-of-conceding-election.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.
128. “Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript
2020: Addresses Possibility of Conceding Election,” Rev, at
24:16-24:35 (Nov. 26, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-possibility-of-conceding-election.
129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 27.
130. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims
Transcript December 2,” Rev, at 10:46-11:06, (Dec. 2, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
131. William P. Barr, One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs
of an Attorney General, (New York: HarperCollins, 2022), at
p. 554.
132. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15,
2020 12:21 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1338715842931023873.jpg
(archived).
133. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed
Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), pp. 25, 31,
available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
134. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 16,
2020 1:09 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1339090279429775363.jpg
(archived).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert O’Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 164-65.
136. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19,
2020 11:30 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1340333619299147781.jpg
(archived).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
138. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
139. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
140. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress
Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,”
YouTube, at 1:39:09 to 1:39:27 and 1:40:51 to 1:41:01, Jan.
6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5949.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 15.
143. The framers specifically considered and rejected two
constitutional plans that would have given Congress the
power to select the Executive. Under both the Virginia and
New Jersey Plans, the national executive would have been
chosen by the national legislature. See Curtis A. Bradley &
Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 592, 595 (2004); see also 1
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21, 244
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) (introducing Virginia and New Jersey
Plans), available at
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-vol-1;
James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention (Sep.
4, 1787) (Gov. Morris warning of “the danger of intrigue &
faction” if Congress selected the President), available at
https://www.consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutional-convention-1787-9-4/.
144. The Federalist No. 68, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
145. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
146. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
147. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also U.S. Const. art. II, §
1, cl. 2 (“but no Senator or Representative, or Person
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector”).
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976
(Eastman Jan 6 scenario dual slates of electors memo);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman
University Production), CTRL0000923171 (Eastman Jan. 6
scenario conduct by elected officials memo).
149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228
(Eastman memo to President Trump).
150. See Eastman v. Thompson et al. at 6-8, 594 F. Supp. 3d
1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228
(Eastman memo to President Trump).
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb.
1, 2022), p. 118.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb.
1, 2022), pp. 110, 117.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb.
1, 2022), pp. 109-10; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June
16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16), available
at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
156. “Former Vice President Pence Remarks at Federalist
Society Conference,” C-SPAN (Feb. 4, 2022), available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?517647-2/vice-president-pence-remarks-federalist-society-conference.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 122.
158. Document on file with the Select Committee (National
Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (January 5, 2021, Greg
Jacob memo to Vice President); see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
127-28 (discussing memorandum).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27.
161. Judge Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:53
a.m. ET available at
https://twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee, (Chapman
University Production), Chapman005442 (Eastman emails with
Greg Jacob).
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 88.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85-86.
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86-87.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 34.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40.
174. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have
Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,” New
York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.
175. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
9:58 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb.
3, 2022), p. 174-76; Greg Jacob testified that the
President’s statement was “categorically untrue.” Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Marc
Short testified that the statement was “incorrect” and
“false.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc
Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Chris Hodgson testified that
it was not an accurate statement. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp.
184-85.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 175-77 (acknowledging that Miller
normally would have called the Vice President’s office
before issuing a public statement describing the Vice
President’s views but stating “I don’t think that
ultimately—don’t know if it ultimately would have changed
anything as the President was very adamant that this is
where they both were” and acknowledging that “the way this
[statement] came out was the way that [Trump] wanted [it]
to.”).
177. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346698217304584192
(archived).
178. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210106175200/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346808075626426371
(archived).
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p.
126.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of General Keith
Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; See also, Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald John
Trump Jr., (May 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6,
2022), p. 49; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp.
21-22. The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of
this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee (June 10, 2022), p. 20. The Select Committee
is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard
against the risk of retaliation.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of General Keith
Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19. See also Peter Baker, Maggie
Haberman, and Annie Karni, “Pence Reached His Limit with
Trump. It Wasn’t Pretty,” New York Times, (Jan. 12, 2021),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-pence-trump.html;
Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show,
(New York: Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273-74.
185. At 11:33 a.m., Stephen Miller’s assistant, Robert
Gabriel, emailed the speechwriting team with the line:
“REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES.” Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007531_0001 (January 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel email
to Trump speechwriting team at 11:33 a.m.).
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller
(Apr. 14, 2022), p. 153.
187. Document on file with the Select Committee (Ross
Worthington Production), RW_0002341-2351 (S. Miller Jan. 6
Speech Edits Native File), pp. 2-3.
188. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross
Worthington Production), CTRL0000924249, (changes in speech
between draft and as delivered), pp. 2, 5, 12, 16, 22.
189. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
190. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
191. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
0:14:11-0:14:29, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
2:07:02-2:07:07, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
2:07:02-2:07:07, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:00:46-1:01:12, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:01:13-1:01:26, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
0:14:37-0:14:46, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
0:14:47-0:14:55, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 26-27 (establishing
time as 1:21 p.m. based on time stamp of a photograph
recognized and described).
200. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346900434540240897
(archived).
201. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 32-33, United
States v. Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2022),
ECF No. 110.
202. See Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and
Arrest Warrant at 5, United States v. Black, No. 1:21-cr-127
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1354806/download.
203. Indictment at 9, United States v. Neefe, No.
1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1432686/download.
204. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 8, United States v. Evans, No. 1:21-cr-337
(D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1351946/download.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13,
2022), at 2:26:06-2:26:26, available at
https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript
at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept.
27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying for a victim impact
statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: “At approximately
1435 hours, with rapidly mounting injuries and most of the
MPD less than lethal munitions expended, the defending
officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back
towards the United States Capitol Building entrance. This is
the first fighting withdrawal in the history of the
Metropolitan Police Department”).
206. See Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
207. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at
14:16.
208. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at
14:25; see also Spencer S. Hsu, “Pence Spent Jan. 6 at
Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,”
Washington Post, (Mar. 21, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/21/couy-griffin-cowboys-trump-jan6/.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
2:11:22-2:13:55, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44.
212. Complaint, Exhibit 2 (Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol subpoena
to Chapman University, dated Jan. 21, 2022), Eastman v.
Thompson et al. et al., No. 8:22-cv-99, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20,
2022) ECF No. 1-2.
213. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 51-52, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
214. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 56-57, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
215. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 63-64, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 223.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney
McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7-8.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney
McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9-11.
220. On December 13th, Chesebro memorialized the strategy in
an email he sent Rudy Giuliani with the subject line:
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL – Brief notes on ‘President of
the Senate strategy.” Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman004708 (Dec. 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro email to Rudy
Giuliani). Chesebro argued that the Trump team could use the
fake slates of electors to complicate the joint session on
January 6th if the President of the Senate “firmly t[ook]
the position that he, and he alone, is charged with the
constitutional responsibility not just to open the votes,
but to count them—including making judgments about what to
do if there are conflicting votes.” Id. In the weeks that
followed, Chesebro and John Eastman would build upon that
framework and write two memos asserting that Joe Biden’s
certification could be derailed on January 6th if Vice
President Pence acted as the “ultimate arbiter” when opening
the real and fake Electoral College votes during the joint
session of Congress. Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, Eastman memo titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL – Dec 23 memo on Jan 6
scenario.docx”); see also Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman061863 (January 1, 2021, Chesebro email to Eastman).
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark,
(May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark,
(May 17, 2022), pp. 116.
223. The “certificate of ascertainment” is a State
executive’s official documentation announcing the official
electors appointed pursuant to State law. See 3 U.S.C. § 6.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew
Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), pp. 70-72.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin
(Apr. 13, 2022).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 75.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shawn Still,
(Feb. 25, 2022), p. 24.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt,
(Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50–51.
231. The National Archives produced copies of the seven
slates of electoral votes they received from Trump electors
in States that President Trump lost. See Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945,
CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948,
CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020, memoranda from slates of
purported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New
Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), VP-R0000323_0001 (Senate Parliamentarian office
tracking receipt and attaching copies of the seven slates);
See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083893 (Trump
campaign staffers emailing regarding submission); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bill Stepien
Production), WS 00096 – WS 00097 (Trump campaign staffers
emailing regarding submission).
232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001 000004
(December 10, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro email to David Shafer).
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037944
(December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from
Georgia); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037941
(December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from
Arizona), Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945
(December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from
Michigan).
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000080 (January 4,
2021, Hitt text message with Mark Jefferson); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum
Production), McCallum_01_001576 - McCallum_01_001577
(January 5, 2021, McCallum text messages with G. Michael
Brown); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) CTRL0000056548_00007
(January 6, 2021, Hodgson text messages with Matt Stroia);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021,
text messages from Senator Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean
Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 206–07; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production)
CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, text message from
Rep. Kelly’s Chief of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson
at 8:41 a.m.), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, text
messages from Senator Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley,
to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.); Jason Lennon, “Johnson
Says Involvement with 1/6 Fake Electors Plan Only ‘Lasted
Seconds’,” Newsweek, (Aug. 21, 2022), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-seconds-1735486.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 52–54.
237. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3,
2020 - January 20, 2021 at 6, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.
238. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3,
2020 - January 20, 2021 at 20, Eastman v. Thompson et al..,
No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.
239. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
240. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 5, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available
at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf.
241. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 35, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also
available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf.
242. After a journalist tweeted a video clip of key remarks
from Gabriel Sterling’s warning addressed to President
Trump, President Trump responded by quote-tweeting that
post, along with a comment that doubled down on demonizing
Georgia election workers in spite of Sterling’s stark and
detailed warning. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521
(archived) (“Rigged Election. Show signatures and envelopes.
Expose the massive voter fraud in Georgia. What is Secretary
of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what we’ll
find!!! [linking to]
twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633”);
Brendan Keefe (@BrendanKeefe), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 4:22
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633
(“It. Has. All. Gone. Too. Far,” says @GabrielSterling with
Georgia Sec of State after a Dominion tech’s life was
threatened with a noose. “Mr. President, you have not
condemned these actions or this language. . . .all of you
who have not said a damn word are complicit in this.” with
embedded video of Gabriel Sterling’s remarks); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
243. Stephen Fowler, “‘Someone’s Going to Get Killed’:
Election Official Blasts GOP Silence on Threats,” GPB News,
(Dec. 1, 2020, updated Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/12/01/someones-going-get-killed-election-official-blasts-gop-silence-on-threats.
244. House Governmental Affairs Committee, Georgia House of
Representatives, Public Hearing (Dec. 10, 2020), YouTube, at
1:55:10-1:59:10, available at
https://youtu.be/9EfgETUKfsI?t=6910.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
2:25:45 to 2:26:00, available at
https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.
246. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report:
Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers – and
Death Threats Followed,” Reuters (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
247. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No.
21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22,
available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ruby
Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls,
Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election
Review,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/;
Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do
Something Huge’: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizona’s
Election Results,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated
Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
53:00-53:40, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
252. Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020
11:23 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336526978640302080
(retweeting people who were posting Bowers’s personal
information); Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8,
2020 11:28 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336528029791604737.
253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russel “Rusty”
Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52; Kelly Weill, “Arizona
GOP Civil War Somehow Keeps Getting Weirder,” Daily Beast,
(Dec. 11, 2020), available at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/arizona-republican-party-civil-war-somehow-keeps-getting-weirder;
Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do
Something Huge’: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizona’s
Election Results,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated
Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-22.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee
Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.
258. “Legislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,” State
Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at
https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-president-trump/.
259. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 3, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210103170109/https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/status/1345776940196659201
(archived); Beth LeBlanc, “Trump Campaign Lists Lawmakers’
Cells, Misdirects Calls for Chatfield to Former Petoskey
Resident,” Detroit News, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/04/trump-campaign-lists-michigan-lawmakers-cell-numbers-misdirects-private-citizen/4130279001/;
Jaclyn Peiser, “Trump Shared the Wrong Number for a Michigan
Lawmaker: A 28-Year-Old Has Gotten Thousands of Angry
Calls,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/05/michigan-trump-wrong-number-chatfield/.
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian,
“Former Michigan Resident Slammed with Calls After Trump
Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on Social Media,” Fox 17
West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.
261. Nor would any State legislature have had such
authority.
262. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 16-17,
Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct.
19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742,
(December 31, 2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and
Kurt Hilbert).
264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742,
(December 31, 2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and
Kurt Hilbert).
265. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17,
Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct.
19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
266. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17,
Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-099 (C.D. Cal Oct.
19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 53.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48, 53;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.
277. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26,
2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating:
“Mark, just checking in as time continues to count down. 11
days to 1/6 and 25 days to inauguration. We gotta get
going!”), MM014100 (December 26, 2020, message from
Representative Perry to Meadows stating: “Mark, you should
call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he
explained to me why the principal deputy won’t work
especially with the FBI. They will view it as as [sic] not
having the authority to enforce what needs to be done.”),
MM014101 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from Meadows to Rep. Perry
stating: “I got it. I think I understand. Let me work on the
deputy position”), MM014102 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from Rep.
Perry to Meadows stating: “Roger. Just sent you something on
Signal”), MM014162 (December 27, 2020, message from Rep.
Perry to Meadows stating: “Can you call me when you get a
chance? I just want to talk to you for a few moments before
I return the presidents [sic] call as requested.”), MM014178
(December 28, 2020, message from Rep. Perry to Meadows
stating: “Did you call Jeff Clark?”), MM014208 (December 29,
2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating:
“Mark, I sent you a note on signal”), MM014586 (January 2,
2021, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating:
“Please call me the instant you get off the phone with
Jeff.”). President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Representative
Perry refused to testify before the Select Committee, and
Jeffrey Clark asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in
refusing to answer questions from the Select Committee.
“Thompson & Cheney Statement on Donald Trump’s Defiance of
Select Committee Subpoena,” Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nov.
14, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-statement-donald-trump-s-defiance-select-committee-subpoena;
Luke Broadwater, “Trump Sues to Block Subpoena from Jan. 6
Committee,” New York Times, (Nov. 11, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/us/politics/trump-subpoena-jan-6-committee.html;
H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of
Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued
by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf;
Letter from John P. Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G.
Thompson, re: Subpoena to Representative Scott Perry, May
24, 2022, available at
https://keystonenewsroom.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2022/05/575876667-Rep-perry-Ltr-SelectComm.pdf;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark,
(Nov. 5, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued
Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Feb. 2, 2022). See also
Jonathan Tamari and Chris Brennan, “Pa. Congressman Scott
Perry Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center
of Election Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021),
available at
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html.
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099-014103,
MM014178.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 54-55.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 55.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (Department of
Justice policy),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000685 (White House
policy).
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698, (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with Congressman Perry).
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 15-17, 64-80, 179-191;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with
draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from
Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 184-88; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice
Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with
draft letter attached to Dec. 28 email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue). As further discussed in
Chapter 4 of this report, Klukowski, a lawyer, joined DOJ’s
Civil Division with just weeks remaining in President
Trump’s term and helped Clark on issues related to the 2020
election, despite the fact that “election-related matters
are not part of the Civil portfolio.” Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p.
66-67. Although Klukowski told the Select Committee that the
Trump Campaign was his client before joining DOJ, id. at p.
190, and despite the fact that he had sent John Eastman
draft talking points titled “TRUMP RE-ELECTION” that
encouraged Republican State legislatures to “summon” new
Electoral College electors for the 2020 election less than a
week before starting at DOJ, Klukowski nevertheless helped
Clark draft the December 28th letter described in this
Report that, if sent, would have encouraged one or more
State legislatures to take actions that they believed could
have changed the outcome of the 2020 election. See Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University
Production), Chapman028219, Chapman028220 (December 9, 2020,
email from Klukowski to Eastman with attached memo). The
Select Committee has concerns about whether Klukowski’s
actions at DOJ, and his continued contacts with those
working for, or to benefit, the Trump Campaign, may have
presented a conflict of interest to the detriment of DOJ’s
mission. In addition, the Select Committee has concerns
about many of the “privilege” claims Klukowski used to
withhold information responsive to his subpoena, as well as
concerns about some of his testimony, including his
testimony about contacts with, among others, John Eastman.
The Committee has learned that their communications included
at least four known calls between December 22, 2020, and
January 2, 2021. Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Verizon Production, July 1, 2022) (showing that
Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:38 a.m. EST for 22.8
min, that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:09 p.m. EST
for 6.4 min, that Eastman called Klukowski on 12/30 at 9:11
p.m. EST for 31.9 min, and that Klukowski called Eastman on
1/02 at 6:59 p.m. EST for 6.4 min).
288. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061893 (Jan.
1, 2021, emails between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); see
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon
Production, July 1, 2022) (showing five calls between John
Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from January 1, 2021, through
January 8, 2021).
289. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (Dec. 28 email
from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue
titled “Two Urgent Action Items”) (“The concept is to send
it to the Governor, Speaker, and President pro temp of each
relevant state. . .”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 68-69, 79.
290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter
attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
291. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter
attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703.
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter
attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter
attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter
attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2,
2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled
“RE: Two Urgent Action Items”).
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2,
2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled
“RE: Two Urgent Action Items”).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2,
2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled
“RE: Two Urgent Action Items”).
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 79-82; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice
Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703
(December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey
Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action Items in
which Donoghue writes: “there is no chance that I would sign
this letter or anything remotely like this.”).
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice
Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703
(December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey
Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action Items in
which Donoghue writes: “there is no chance that I would sign
this letter or anything remotely like this.”); Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Donoghue,
(August 6, 2021), at p. 99, available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
307. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000083040
(January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119-20. (“And so
it was unanimous; everyone was going to resign if Jeff Rosen
was removed from the seat.” The only exception was John
Demers, the Assistant Attorney General for the National
Security Division. Donoghue encouraged Demers to stay on
because he didn’t want to further jeopardize national
security.)
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126-28; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 120.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven A. Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 64.
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-132.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-32.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell,
(May 7, 2022), pp. 75, 84.
319. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19,
2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340185773220515840
(archived).
320. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26,
2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020
5:51 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343328708963299338;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020
2:06 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1344359312878149634;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
12:52 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22
(archived) (retweeting @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/KylieJaneKremer/status/1340399063875895296));
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
2:53 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345095714687377418;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
3:34 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
6:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021
9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
1:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22
(archived) (retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730));
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:15 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22
(archived) (retweeting Jennifer Lynn Lawrence
(@JenLawrence21)), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22
(archived) (retweeting Ron Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2,
2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1345599512560078849
(archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 3, 2021 10:24 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22
(archived) (retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan.
2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/1345547185836978176
(archived)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:28 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22
(archived) (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2, 2021
2:58 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/1345459488107749386);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021
9:46 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346478482105069568;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
5:43 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346588064026685443.
321. See, e.g., Sentencing Memorandum of Daniel Johnson at
5, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:21-cr-407 (D.D.C. May 25,
2022), ECF No. 56 (“Mr. Johnson believed what he read on the
internet and heard from the President himself— that the
election had been stolen.”); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Zac Martin, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 20
(answering that he believed President Trump wanted “patriots
to show up in Washington, DC on January 6th” because “we
felt like our rights were being taken away from us” given
the election results).
322. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States
v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022)
(Oath Keeper Jason Dolan testified that the Oath Keepers
came to Washington, DC “to stop the certification of the
election. . . . [b]y any means necessary. That’s why we
brought our firearms.”); Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at
34, 85-86, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246
(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (“Trump called us.
Trump called us to D.C. . . . and he’s calling for help—I
thought he was calling for help. I thought he was—I thought
we were doing the right thing.”); Statement of Facts at 2,
United States v. Martin, No. 1:21-cr-394 (D.D.C. Apr. 20,
2021) (“MARTIN reported that he decided to travel to
Washington, DC after reading then-President Donald Trump’s
tweets regarding the election being stolen and a protest on
January 6, 2021, flying to DC on January 5, 2021, and
attending the rallies on January 6, 2021, and then heading
to the U.S. Capitol where he entered along with a crowd of
other individuals.”); Statement of Facts at 9-10, United
States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (“So
Trump has called this himself. For everyone to come. It’s
the day the electoral college is suppose [sic] to be
certified by congress to officially elect Biden.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6thth Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin
Thompson (Nov. 16, 2022), pp. 34, 44, 70-71 (noting that he
went to the Capitol at President Trump’s direction and that
he “figured [stopping the certification of the vote] was
[President Trump’s] plan”; see also, Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart
Compiling Defendant Statements).
323. Indictment at 6, United States v. Smith, No.
1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
324. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Sulenta, No.
1:22-mj-00129-ZMF (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.
325. Stipulated Statement of Facts at 7, United States v.
Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C. August 23, 2022), ECF No. 430.
326. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Grayson, No.
1:21-cr-224 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
327. Statement of Facts at 11, United States v. Denney, No.
1:21-mj-00686-RMM-ZMF (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
328. Gieswein denies that he was a Three Percenter as of
January 6, 2021, even though he affiliated with an apparent
Three Percenter group at previous times. See Gieswein’s
Motion for Hearing & Revocation of Detention Order at 2-3,
18-19, 25, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C.
June 8, 2021), ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein,
the criminal complaint noted that he “appears to be
affiliated with the radical militia group known as the Three
Percenters.” Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v.
Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/download.
See also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021
9:13 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315
(highlighting photos of Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter
symbol).
329. Second Superseding Indictment at 9-10, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. March 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
330. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Bertino,
No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5; Third
Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Nordean, et
al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380;
Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Donohoe, No.
1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.
331. Third Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380; Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey,
“Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to Washington, Helped Lead
Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan.17, 2021),
available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.
332. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000070865, (December
29, 2020, Telegram chat at 11:09 a.m. from Enrique Tarrio
under the name “HEIKA NOBLELEAD.”).
333. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious
Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following
2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6,
2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power;
“Leader of North Carolina Chapter of Proud Boys Pleads
Guilty to Conspiracy and Assault Charges in Jan. 6 Capitol
Breach,” Department of Justice, (Apr. 8, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-north-carolina-chapter-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-and-assault-charges-jan-6.
334. Statement of Offense at 2, United States v. Bertino,
No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.
335. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Bertino,
No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.
336. Statement of Offense at 4-5, United States v. Bertino,
No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.
337. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe,
No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336. Indeed,
Proud Boys leaders Biggs and Nordean told MOSD on January
5th about a plan they had discussed with Tarrio for January
6th. Although Biggs and Nordean did not share the plan’s
precise details, Proud Boys like Bertino and Donohoe
nonetheless understood the “objective in Washington, D.C.,
on January 6, 2021, was to obstruct, impede, or interfere
with the certification of the Electoral College vote,
including by force if necessary,” and that the Proud Boys
“would accomplish this through the use of force and
violence, which could include storming the Capitol through
police lines and barricades if necessary.” Statement of
Offense at 8, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329
(D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5; Statement of Offense at 6,
United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2022), ECF No. 336.
338. Superseding Indictment at 2-3, United States v. Rhodes
et al, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
339. Caldwell testified that he was not an Oath Keeper. See
Trial Transcript at 8778-79, United States v. Rhodes et al.,
No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2022); Hannah Rabinowitz and
Holmes Lybrand, “Capitol Riot Defendant Calls Himself a
‘Little Bit of a Goof’ Regarding Pelosi and Pence Comments,”
CNN, (Nov. 15, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/politics/thomas-caldwell-testifies-oath-keeper-trial.
Because the government tried Caldwell in a conspiracy case
with known Oath Keepers, the Select Committee has referred
to him as an Oath Keeper.
340. See Trial Transcript at 10502-08, United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022).
341. Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9328 - 9396), United States
v. Rhodes, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022).
342. Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Rhodes,
III, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No
167.
343. Superseding Indictment at 13-14, United States v.
Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF
No. 167.
344. Superseding Indictment at 15-17, United States v.
Rhodes, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No
167.
345. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Ulrich, No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2022), ECF No. 117.
346. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. James, No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF No. 60.
347. “TTPO Stance on Election Fraud,” The Three Percenters -
Original, available at
https://archive.ph/YemCC#selection-289.0-289.29 (archived).
348. Statement of Facts at 7-8, United States v. Buxton, No.
1:21-cr-739 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Post: “Oath
Keepers claim to stand for the constitution yet will not
call up its 30k membership to attend the 6th. I thought you
guys stood for the constitution? It’s your only job as an
organization. . .now or never boys,” Patriots.win, Dec. 29,
2020, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s.
349. Indictment at 1, 7, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
350. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No.
1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
351. Indictment at 8-13, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
352. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No.
1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
353. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
354. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1. When
the Select Committee asked about this post to the leader of
the Florida Guardians of Freedom, Liggett downplayed any
significance or any knowledge about other Three Percenter
groups that might “show in record numbers.” Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett, (May 17, 2022), pp.
51-52.
355. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et
al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1;
#SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021
2:11 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
356. Statement of Facts at 15-17, United States v. Cole et
al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
The “tunnel” is actually a flight of stairs leading to a
doorway from which the President emerges on Inauguration Day
to take the oath of office. When the inauguration stage is
present, the stairs leading to the doorway are converted
into a “10-foot-wide, slightly sloped, short tunnel that was
approximately 15 feet long.” Government’s Sentencing
Memorandum at 5-6, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291-3
(D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140. For other examples of
how extremist groups responded to President Trump’s call to
action, see Chapter 6.
357. Indictment at 11, United States v. Rodriguez et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65; Motion
to Suppress, Exhibit A at 70, United States v. Rodriguez,
No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
358. Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United
States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021),
ECF No. 38-1.
359. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Request
for Pretrial Release at 7, United States v. Meggs, No.
1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 98.
360. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol ( Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
361. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022).
362. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022).
363. Trial Exhibit 9221, United States v. Rhodes et al.,
No.1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2022).
364. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 125-26, United States v.
Vallejo, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022), ECF No.
102-1 (Collection of redacted text messages, labeled as
Exhibit 8, showing Rhodes adding “a CA Oath Keeper who is in
with a four man team, followed by that person announcing his
identifiable radio frequency) Ryan J. Reilly, “New Evidence
Reveals Coordination Between Oath Keepers, Three Percenters
on Jan. 6,” NBC News, (May 28, 2022), available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/new-evidence-reveals-coordination-oath-keepers-three-percenters-jan-6-rcna30355
(noting how public source investigators linked the
identifiable radio frequency to Derek Kinnison, who is one
of the California Three Percenters indicted on conspiracy
charges for their conduct on January 6th. See Indictment,
United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C.
June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1).
365. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production), CTRL 0000010471,
at 7:01 (January 6, 2021, video footage recorded by Samuel
Montoya at the U.S. Capitol).
366. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (District of Columbia Production), Axon Body 3
X6039BKH5 13.53.47 20210106-FELONYRIOT-FIRSTSTSE, at
15:28:13 (MPD body camera footage); Statement of Facts at 3,
United States v. Cale, No. 1:22-cr-139 (D.D.C. Mar. 28,
2022), ECF No. 1-1.
367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000603.
368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 143.
369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199.
370. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December
22, 2020, email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers
chats).
371. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December
22, 2020, email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers
chats).
372. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
375. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
376. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
377. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
378. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637,
(December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th
intelligence).
379. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000080
(December 28, 2020, email to John Donohue re: (LES) Armed
and Ready SITE.pdf.); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Jack Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 8; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Donohue,
(Jan. 7, 2022).
380. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420
(December 26, 2020, email to PIOC regarding possible Proud
Boys plan for January 6, 2021).
381. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420
(December 26, 2020, email to PIOC regarding possible Proud
Boys plan for January 6, 2021).
382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473
(December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT
ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C.
Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.).
383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087
(December 28, 2020, email re: 1/6 warning.).
384. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473
(December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY@USSS.DHS.GOV to
THREATS@uscp.gov titled “FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi
Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal
Building.”).
385. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001,
pp. 1, 3 (December 30, 2020, Protective Intelligence Brief
titled “Wild Protest”).
386. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email
titled “Fwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.”).
387. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email
titled “Fwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.”).
388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Parler Production) PARLER_00000013 (January 2,
2021, email from Parler to the FBI re: Another to check out,
attaching Parler posts).
389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001487 (January
2, 2021, email to Capitol Police and Department of Justice
with screenshots of Parler posts); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production),
CTRL0000000116, CTRL0000000116.0001 (January 4, 2021, email
from U.S. Capitol Police re: Comments of concern for Jan 6
rally, collecting Parler posts).
390. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001,
p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
391. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001,
p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
392. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000293417
(December 30, 2020, email to OSU-ALL titled “Discovery of
Event Website- MAGA Drag the Interstate & Occupy the
Capitol”).
393. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083,
CTRL0000000083.0001 (January 5, 2021, email re:
(U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083,
CTRL0000000083.0001 (January 5, 2021, email re:
(U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
395. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083,
CTRL0000000083.0001 (January 5, 2021, email re:
(U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000066986,
USSS0000066986.0001 (January 5, 2021, Secret Service email
noting social media user threatening to bring a firearm to
Washington, D.C. on January 6th).
397. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Production),
DOI_46000114_00000238, DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5,
2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of
Investigation. “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C.
Area in Connection with Planned ‘StopTheSteal’ Protest on 6
January 2021.”).
398. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Production),
DOI_46000114_00000238, DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5,
2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of
Investigation. “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C.
Area in Connection with Planned ‘StopTheSteal’ Protest on 6
January 2021.”).
399. Trial Exhibit 6923 (1.S.159.817, 955), United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2022) ( Rhodes
sent an encrypted message to Oath Keeper leadership on
January 5, 2021, stating: “We will have several well
equipped QRFs outside DC. And there are many, many others,
from other groups, who will be watching and waiting on the
outside in case of worst case scenarios.”).
400. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441-MM01442
(December 30, 2020, 6:05 p.m. ET text from Jason Miller to
Mark Meadows).
401. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. Miller claimed he had
no idea about the comments and would have “flag[ged]” them
for “Secret Service” had he seen them. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp.
210-12.
402. On his way to the Capitol, Proud Boy David Nicholas
Dempsey stopped on the National Mall in front of an erected
gallows, fitted with a noose, to tell the world what he
hoped would happen: “Them worthless shitholes like Jerry
Nadler, fuckin Pelosi . . . They don’t need a jail cell.
They need to hang from these motherfuckers [pointing to
gallows]. They need to get the point across that the time
for peace is over. . . . For four, or five years really,
they’ve been fucking demonizing us, belittling us, . . .
doing everything they can to stop what this is, and people
are sick of that shit . . . . Hopefully one day soon we
really have someone hanging from one of these motherfuckers
. . . .” Statement of Facts at 2-3, United States v.
Dempsey, No. 1:21-cr-566 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2021);
#SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, Mar. 11, 2021
8:12 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1370180789770588163.
403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.
404. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 92.
405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_035, SC_HH_036
(January 6, 2021, text messages with Hogan Gidley).
406. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope
Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 109-10.
407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency,
DC Production), CTRL0000926794 (Talking points put together
by Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director of HSEMA, for a
briefing with Mayor Muriel Bowers on December 30, 2020).
408. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell
Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.
409. Given the timing of receipt of much of this
intelligence immediately in advance of January 6th, it is
unclear that any comprehensive intelligence community
analytical product could have been reasonably expected. But
it is clear that the information itself was communicated.
410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000181 (January 2,
2021, email from Katrina Pierson to Caroline Wren and Taylor
Budowich re: 1/6 Speaker Schedule).
411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5449; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
412. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 83, 86.
413. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
414. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert “Bobby” Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 64.
415. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 21.
416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
417. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
418. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
419. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 16.
420. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000086772, p. 4
(November 18, 2021, document titled: United States Secret
Service - Coordinated Response to a Request for Information
from the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol).
421. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS7-GC_1935.mov; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production),
CTRL0000882478 (Summary of updates from January 6, 2021);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin
Thompson, (Nov. 16, 2022), pp. 30-31 (“I was seeing these,
like, piles of backpacks and flagpoles [outside the
magnetometers]. And some people were watching that for other
people. And I just—there were lots of piles all over the
place of stuff like that.”).
422. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu,
“Evidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd Grows as Arrests and
Trials Mount,” Washington Post, (July 8, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.
423. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (summary
of radio traffic on January 6, 2021).
424. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73-78
(District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department,
Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of
Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of
Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, audio file of
radio traffic from January 6, 2021, from 12:00 - 13:00).
425. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-CTRL0000000069.
426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
427. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77
(“The most--the thing that sticks out most was he kept
asking why we couldn’t go, why we couldn’t go, and that he
wasn’t concerned about the people that were there or
referenced them being Trump people or Trump supporters.”).
428. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
429. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 20-21.
431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24, 26.
432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26.
433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 23.
434. See “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally
Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), at 1:00:00 –
1:02:31, available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6
(timestamping the speech).
435. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:00:45-1:01:12, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Janet West Buhler, (Feb.
28, 2022), p. 40.
437. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
438. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
439. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
0:14:11-0:15:00, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing on Motion to
Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43 - 8:00,
United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20,
2021).
441. Unframe of Mind, “Unframe of Mind in DC #stopthesteal
Rally,” YouTube, at 9:40 – 9:47, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at,
at 0:14:11-0:15:00, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
442. Walter Masterson, “Live from the Trump Rally in
Washington, D.C.,” YouTube, at 17:32 – 17:50, Jan. 11, 2021,
available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at,
at 2:07:02-2:07:07, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
443. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022) at, at
2:07:13-2:07:47, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:00:45-1:01:12, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; On the Media, “Jessica
Watkins on ‘Stop the Steal J6’ Zello Channel (Unedited),”
Soundcloud, at 4:00-4:18, available at
https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.
445. For a video of the interview, see “Crown Point, Indiana
Man Charged in Jan. 6 Capitol Riot Says He Has ‘No
Regrets’,” CBS Chicago, Nov. 29, 2022, available at
https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/video/crown-point-indiana-man-charged-in-jan-6-capitol-riot-says-he-has-no-regrets/#x.
446. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27
(emphasis added).
447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.
448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 131 (“I
just didn’t think it would be, you know, a good idea for the
President to go up to the Capitol.”). While Cipollone did
not specifically recall talking with Cassidy Hutchinson
about this topic, he informed the Select Committee that he
was sure that he did express his view to some people. Id.
Hutchinson believes it was Pat Cipollone, but also testified
that it may have been a different lawyer. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 113-16.
449. For security reasons, the Select Committee is not
releasing the name of this employee. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House employee with
national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022) at p.
73. See also Chapter 7, which discusses this topic in
greater detail.
450. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Agent, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp.
22-23. The Select Committee has agreed to keep confidential
the identity of this witness due to their sensitive national
security responsibilities.
451. A book written by Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in
December 2021 made the categorical claim that the President
never intended to travel to the Capitol that day. See Mark
Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons
Press, 2021), p. 250. The Committee’s evidence demonstrates
that Meadows’s claim is categorically false. Because the
Meadows book conflicted sharply with information that was
being received by the Select Committee, the Committee became
increasingly wary that other witnesses might intentionally
conceal what happened. That appeared to be the case with
Ornato. Ornato does not recall that he conveyed the
information to Cassidy Hutchinson regarding the SUV, and
also does not recall that he conveyed similar information to
a White House employee with national security
responsibilities who testified that Ornato recalled a
similar account to him. The Committee is skeptical of
Ornato’s account.
452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45. The Select
Committee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of
this witness due to their sensitive national security
responsibilities.
453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.
454. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
455. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2-9, United
States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022),
ECF No. 140; 167 Cong. Rec. S619 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf;
Michael S. Schmidt and Luke Broadwater, “Officers’ Injuries,
Including Concussions, Show Scope of Violence at Capitol
Riot,” New York Times, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/politics/capitol-riot-police-officer-injuries.html.
456. See Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v.
Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2021), ECF No.
137; Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein, “Where Jan. 6
Prosecutions Stand, 18 Months after the Attack,” Politico,
(July 7, 2022), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/07/jan-6-prosecutions-months-later-00044354.
457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
2:36:58-2:37:30, 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right
after that come out . . . As soon as that come out,
everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely
dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:58:00, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo (“I’m here
delivering the President’s message. Donald Trump has asked
everybody to go home. . . . That’s our order.”).
458. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:50:59-1:52:19, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=6659; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation,
117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 2:15:45-2:17:12,
available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8145; CBS News,
“Former Vice President Mike Pence on ‘Face the Nation with
Margaret Brennan’ | Full Interview,” YouTube, at
16:23-19:01, Nov. 21, 2022, available at
https://youtu.be/U9GbkPhG1Lo?t=983; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr.
20, 2022), p. 173.
459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27. The Select Committee
is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard
against the risk of retaliation; See “Donald Trump Speech
‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6
(timestamping the speech).
460. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file
40a8_hi_j0087_0bea; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July
21, 2022), at 34:18, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2058.
461. Washington Post, “D.C. Police requested backup at least
17 times in 78 minutes during Capitol riot | Visual
Forensics,” YouTube, at 7:58 to 8:45, Apr. 15, 2021,
available at https://youtu.be/rsQTY9083r8?t=478; Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Public
Hearing, (Mar. 3, 2021), Written Testimony of William J.
Walker, Commanding General District of Columbia National
Guard, p. 3, available at
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Walker-2021-03-03.pdf.
462. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 42, 46.
463. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
464. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
465. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael,
(Mar. 24, 2022), p. 138.
466. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr.,
(Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-90.
467. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael,
(Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 127, 129, 131-32, 137, 141, 143-44,
148-49, 159.
468. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
469. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 163-64; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
470. Senator Lee wrote to a reporter that he received a call
from the President moments after the Senate halted its
proceedings and that the President claimed he had dialed
Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), so Lee let Tuberville talk to
the President on his phone for 5 or 10 minutes until they
were ordered to evacuate. Bryan Schott, “What Sen. Mike Lee
Told Me about Trump’s Call the Day of the Capitol Riot,”
Salt Lake Tribune, (Feb. 10, 2021, updated Feb. 11, 2021),
available at
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2021/02/11/what-sen-mike-lee-told-me/;
see also Kyle Cheney, “Tuberville Says He Informed Trump of
Pence’s Evacuation before Rioters Reached Senate,” Politico,
(Feb. 11, 2021), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/11/tuberville-pences-evacuation-trump-impeachment-468572.
471. 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
1:49 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210107235835/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346891760174329859
(archived).
472. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp.
149-50.
473. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp.
150-51.
474. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at
1:39:03-1:40:42, available at
https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5943. Two witnesses recall
writing this note: Cassidy Hutchinson and Eric Herschmann,
although Hutchinson recalls that Herschmann was responsible
for the revision made to the note. The Committee’s review of
Hutchinson’s handwriting was consistent with the script of
the note. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 167; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 67-68. Who wrote the note is
not material to the Select Committee—the important point is
that it was prepared for the President.
475. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.
476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at
1:27:52-1:28:53, available at
https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5272; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June
20, 2022), pp. 25-26.
477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:29:30 - 1:31:51, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
478. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House employee with national security responsibilities,
(July 19, 2022), pp. 12-15, 98-99; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 38:02-38:44, available
at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2283.
479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 108-09.
480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.
482. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield .
. . to break a window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and
that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol
through this broken window.”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily
ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
483. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907.
484. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.
485. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.
486. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014933.
488. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935.
489. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.
490. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.
491. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
492. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.
493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
494. U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (@SenBillCassidy),
Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:03 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/SenBillCassidy/status/1346925444189327361.
495. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014971.
496. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 149-50; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 25,
2022), p. 37.
497. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 145, 150.
498. Leader McCarthy spoke on the air to Fox News starting
at 3:05 p.m. ET and told the network that “I’ve already
talked to the President. I called him. I think we need to
make a statement, make sure that we can calm individuals
down.” Fox News (FoxNews), “LISTEN: Rep. Kevin McCarthy on
protesters storming Capitol,” Facebook, at 3:27-3:40, Jan.
6, 2021 (uploaded to Facebook at 3:35 p.m. ET), available at
https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/videos/listen-rep-kevin-mccarthy-on-protesters-storming-capitol/232725075039919/.
499. CBS News, “Live coverage: Protesters Swarm Capitol,
Abruptly Halting Electoral Vote Count,” YouTube, at
3:29:02-3:29:15, 3:29:43-3:30:03, 3:31:28-3:32:07,
3:33:52-3:34:12, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://youtu.be/3Fsf4aWudJk?t=12542.
500. Rep. Herrera Beutler Describes Efforts to Get Trump to
Intervene in Stopping Jan. 6 riot,” WTHR (Feb. 13, 2021), at
1:20 - 1:50, available at
https://www.wthr.com/video/news/nation-world/capitol-riot-herrera-beutler-trump-mccarthy-call/507-477fa84f-1277-444a-aad6-716c5ec9f66f.
501. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John
Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43. CNN’s Jamie
Gangel related that she also confirmed the account with
multiple other sources, reporting that “I’ve spoken to
multiple Republican Members of the House who have knowledge
of that call, who tell us that after Trump tried to say to
Kevin, ‘these are not my people, it’s Antifa,’ Kevin
McCarthy said to Trump, ‘no, it’s not Antifa. These are your
people’. . . . We’re also told by several other Republican
Members that Kevin McCarthy wasn’t shy about this heated
exchange with Trump, that he wanted his Members to know
about it.” CNN, “New Details Emerge in McCarthy’s Call with
Trump on January 6,” YouTube, at 0:25 - 1:50, Feb. 12, 2021,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gy1FPNluoOE.
502. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John
Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), pp. 10-12
(describing calls and text messages to Dan Scavino and Mark
Meadows).
503. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (HBO Production), Video file Reel_204I - All Clips
Compilation.mp4 at 5:32–5:55 (January 6, 2021, footage of
Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer on phone call with Jeffrey
Rosen); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906 (January 6, 2021
text message from Marjorie Taylor Greene to Mark Meadows),
MM014919 (January 6, 2021 text message from William Timmons
to Mark Meadows), MM014939 (January 6, 2021 text message
from Chip Roy to Mark Meadows).
504. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 151.
505. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.
506. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 152.
507. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
0:57:48 - 0:58:19, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3468.
508. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), pp. 81-83; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. The
Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this
witness because of national security concerns as well as to
guard against the risk of retaliation.
509. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346900434540240897.jpg
(archived).
510. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
2:11:22-2:13:55, available at
https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.
511. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
2:26:06-2:26:26, available at
https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript
at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept.
27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying for a victim impact
statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: “At approximately
1435 hours, with rapidly mounting injuries and most of the
MPD less than lethal munitions expended, the defending
officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back
towards the United States Capitol Building entrance. This is
the first fighting withdrawal in the history of the
Metropolitan Police Department.”).
512. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
513. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
514. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), p. 113.
515. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 160.
516. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_043-044 (January 6,
2021, text message from Hope Hicks to Julie Radford at 7:18
p.m.).
517. 167 Cong. Rec. S635 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf;
Spencer S. Hsu, “Pence Spent Jan. 6 at Underground Senate
Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,” Washington Post,
(Mar. 21, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/21/couy-griffin-cowboys-trump-jan6/.
518. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael,
(Mar. 24, 2022), p. 137.
519. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
520. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
521. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at
1:31:25 – 1:32:22, available at
https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5359; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June
20, 2022), pp. 27-28.
522. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 182.
523. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68-69, 71.
524. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg
(archived).
525. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
526. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg
(archived).
527. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
528. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
529. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
530. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th].
531. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004112_0001
(January 6, 2021 email at 3:05 p.m. notifying Beau Harrison
of Ashli Babbitt shooting); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of William Beau Harrison (Aug. 18,
2022), pp. 73–76 (describing writing note and passing it to
Mark Meadows or Tony Ornato); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
P-R000241 (January 6, 2021 pocket card written by Beau
Harrison with the message, “1x CIVILIAN GUNSHOT WOUND TO
CHEST @ DOOR OF HOUSE CHABER [sic]”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee,
(June 10, 2022), pp. 46–47 (“I remember seeing that [note]
in front of [President Trump], yeah.”). The Select Committee
is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard
against the risk of retaliation. See also Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (January
28, 2022), p. 115; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 87
(recalling announcing during the afternoon that a Trump
supporter had been killed).
532. “Department of Justice Closes Investigation into the
Death of Ashli Babbitt,” Department of Justice, (Apr. 14,
2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/department-justice-closes-investigation-death-ashli-babbitt.
533. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; ABC
News, “Mike Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6:
Exclusive,” YouTube, at 9:27-10:00, Nov. 14, 2022, available
at https://youtu.be/-AAyKAoPFQs?t=567; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley
(Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-81; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan.
14, 2022), pp. 124-25; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 172-73,
182-84; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 186.
534. NBC News, “Biden Condemns Chaos at the Capitol as
‘Insurrection,’“ YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBCWTqJT7M4; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
535. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to
Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
536. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
537. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
538. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
2:36:58-2:37:30, 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right
after that come out . . . As soon as that come out,
everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely
dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.”).
539. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
1:58:00, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
540. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
1:58:00, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
541. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 at 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210106232133/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346954970910707712
(archived).
542. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
543. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 175; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
544. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 194;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
545. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 192.
546. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53. The Select Committee
is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard
against the risk of retaliation.
547. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T
Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
548. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205-07; Sunlen Serfaty, Devan
Cole, and Alex Rogers, “As Riot Raged at Capitol, Trump
Tried to Call Senators to Overturn Election,” CNN, (Jan. 8,
2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/politics/mike-lee-tommy-tuberville-trump-misdialed-capitol-riot;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production,
Feb. 9, 2022).
549. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2022), p. 475.
550. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2022), p. 474.
551. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr.,
(Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue,
(Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp.
21-22.
552. ABC News, “Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6:
Exclusive,” YouTube, at 10:45-11:02, Nov. 14, 2022,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AAyKAoPFQs.
553. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr.,
(Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue,
(Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp.
21-22.
554. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 17, 268.
555. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
556. Glenn Kessler, “Trump Falsely Claims He ‘Requested’
10,000 Troops Rejected by Pelosi,” Washington Post, (Mar. 2,
2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/02/trump-falsely-claims-he-requested-10000-troops-rejected-by-pelosi/;
“Mark Meadows: Biden Administration Policies Put ‘America
Last’,” Fox News, (Feb. 7, 2021), available at
https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/mark-meadows-biden-administration-policies-put-america-last.
557. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01. On
January 4, 2021, Max Miller and Katrina Pierson exchanged
text messages discussing their planning activities for the
6th. In those messages, Max Miller stated: “Just glad we
killed the national guard and a procession” and that “. . .
chief [Mark Meadows] already had said no for days!”.
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Max
Miller Production), Miller Production 0001 (January 4, 2021,
text messages between Max Miller and Katrina Pierson).
558. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
2:22:45-2:23:22, available at
https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo?t=8565; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production),
KPierson0717-719.
559. “House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy on Asking
President Trump for his Resignation,” ed. Alex Burns and
Jonathan Martin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 8, 2021),
available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources.
560. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014456.
561. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014858 - MM014861.
562. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014467 (December 31,
2020, text message from telephone number assigned to Carrah
Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark Meadows). The Select
Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.
563. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014503 (January 1,
2021, text message from telephone number assigned to Carrah
Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark Meadows). The Select
Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.
564. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), CTRL0000925383, p. 3
(January 7, 2021, text message from Sean Hannity to Kayleigh
McEnany)
565. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM015209 (January 10,
2021, text message Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows and Jim
Jordan).
566. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906.
567. “U.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time,
232-197,” C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 - 4:15:31, Jan. 13, 2021,
available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=.
568. “Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy says Pres. Trump
Admitted He Bears Some Responsibility for the January 6
Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,” ed. Alex Burns and
Jonathan Martin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021),
available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources.
569. “Statement by Mo Brooks,” Mo Brooks for U.S. Senate,
available at https://mobrooks.com/statement-by-mo-brooks/;
Joe Walsh, “GOP Rep. Mo Brooks Claims Trump Asked Him to
Reinstate Trump Presidency,” Forbes, (Mar. 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2022/03/23/gop-rep-mo-brooks-claims-trump-asked-him-to-reinstate-trump-presidency/?sh=7264e1d91edd
(noting that Rep. Mo Brooks issued this statement on
Wednesday, March 23, 2022).
570. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, “In Their Own Words:
The 43 Republicans’ Explanations of Their Votes Not to
Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,” Just Security, (Feb.
15, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.
571. C-SPAN, “Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell Remarks
Following Senate Impeachment Vote,” YouTube, at 5:10 – 5:46,
(Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxRMoqNnfvw.
572. “Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy Says Pres. Trump
Admitted He Bears Some Responsibility for the January 6
Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,” Alex Burns and Jonathan
Martin, eds., ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021),
available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources;
Melanie Zanona, “New Audio Reveals McCarthy said Trump
Admitted Bearing Some Responsibility for Capitol Attack,”
CNN, (April 22, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/22/politics/trump-january-6-responsibility-book/index.html.
Leader McCarthy also relayed this conversation with
President Trump to his Republican colleagues: “I asked him
[Trump] personally today, does he hold responsibility for
what happened. And he needs to acknowledge that.” Id. The
Committee believes that House Republican Leader McCarthy’s
testimony would be material to any criminal investigation of
Donald Trump, not just to probe this apparent Trump
acknowledgement of culpability, but also because Leader
McCarthy spoke directly to Donald Trump and others who were
in the White House on January 6th and unsuccessfully pleaded
for the President’s immediate assistance to halt the
violence. Leader McCarthy did not comply with the Select
Committee’s subpoena.
573. “U.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time,
232-197,” C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 - 4:15:31, (Jan. 13, 2021),
available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=;
167 Cong. Rec. H172 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/01/13/CREC-2021-01-13-pt1-PgH165.pdf.
574. See supra, Executive Summary.
575. See supra, Executive Summary.
576. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National
Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021,
email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter).
577. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 –
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).
578. See supra, Executive Summary. The State legislatures
lacked authority to change the lawful outcome of the State
elections at that point. Nevertheless Eastman, Trump, and
others nevertheless pushed for such action.
579. See supra, Executive Summary.
580. See supra, Executive Summary; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET,
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340185773220515840
(archived); see also, e.g., Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020
5:51 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343328708963299338;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020
2:06 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1344359312878149634;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
12:52 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22
(retweeting @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/KylieJaneKremer/status/1340399063875895296);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
2:53 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345095714687377418;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
3:34 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
6:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021
9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
1:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021
9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:15 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22
(retweeting Jennifer Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21), Jan. 3,
2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22
(retweeting Ron Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14
p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1345599512560078849
(archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 3, 2021 10:24 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22
(retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan. 2, 2021
5:47 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/1345547185836978176
(archived)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:28 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22
(retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2, 2021 2:58 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/1345459488107749386);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021
9:46 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346478482105069568;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
5:43 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346588064026685443.
581. Donald J. Trump (@realDonldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22mike+pence+%22&results=1
(archived) (“Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what
should have been done to protect our Country and our
Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected
set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which
they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the
truth!”); USA Today Graphics (@usatgraphics), Twitter, Jan.
7, 2021 9:56 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/usatgraphics/status/1347376642956603392
(screenshotting the since-deleted tweet).
582. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to
Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
2:36:58-2:37:30 and 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right
after that come out . . . As soon as that come out,
everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely
dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.”).
583. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 3–16, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
584. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 53–53, 58, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d
1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM)
(referring to two Federal criminal statutes).
585. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3,
2020 – January 20, 2021 at 24, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No.
24.
586. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 63–64, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
587. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 64, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
588. See “23 Months Since the January 6th Attack on the
Capitol,” Department of Justice, (Dec. 8, 2022), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/23-months-january-6-attack-capitol.
589. Kyle Cheney, “Rep. Scott Perry Suing to Block DOJ
Access to His Cell Phone,” Politico, (Aug. 24, 2022),
available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/24/rep-scott-perry-suing-to-block-doj-access-to-his-cell-phone-00053486;
Betsy Woodruff Swan, Josh Gerstein, and Kyle Cheney, “DOJ
Searches Home of Former Official Who Aided Alleged Pro-Trump
‘Coup’,” Politico, (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/23/law-enforcement-trump-official-coup-00041767.
590. See, e.g., Sarah Murray, Evan Perez, and Katelyn
Polantz, “Federal Judge Orders Former Top Lawyers in Trump’s
White House to Testify in Criminal Grand Jury Probe,” CNN,
(Dec. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/01/politics/cipollone-philbin-trump-lawyers-testify.
591. Sara Murray and Jason Morris, “Fulton County Prosecutor
Investigating Trump Aims for Indictments as Soon as
December,” CNN, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/06/politics/fani-willis-georgia-prosecutor-trump-indictments-december/index.html.
592. The Special Counsel is to oversee the Department’s
ongoing investigation “into whether any person or entity
unlawfully interfered with the transfer of power following
the 2020 Presidential election or the certification of the
Electoral College vote held on or about January 6, 2021.”
“Appointment of a Special Counsel,” Department of Justice,
(Nov. 18, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel-0.
In addition, the Special Counsel is to oversee the
Department’s “ongoing investigation involving classified
documents and other Presidential records, as well as the
possible obstruction of that investigation. . . .” Id.
593. The House of Representatives held Meadows in contempt
for refusing to testify before the Committee, 167 Cong. Rec.
H7814-7815 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2021), but DOJ declined to
prosecute him. See Josh Gerstein, Kyle Cheny, and Nicholas
Wu, “DOJ Declines to Charge Meadows, Scavino with Contempt
of Congress for Defying Jan. 6 Committee,” Politico, (June
3, 2022), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/03/doj-declines-to-charge-meadows-scavino-with-contempt-of-congress-for-defying-jan-6-committee-00037230.
594. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
595. According to DOJ, “[a] conviction under Section
1512(c)(2) requires proof that”: (1) “the natural and
probable effect of the defendant’s actions were to obstruct
[influence or impede] the official proceeding;” (2) “that
[defendant] knew that his actions were likely to obstruct
[influence or impede] that proceeding;” and (3) “that he
acted with the wrongful or improper purpose of delaying or
stopping the official proceeding.” United States v. Andries,
No. 21-93 (RC), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44794 at *37 n.8
(D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting Government’s Response to
Defendant’s Second Supplemental Brief at 6); see United
States v. Aguilar; 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (describing the
“longstanding and well-accepted meaning” of “corruptly” as
denoting “an act done with an intent to give some advantage
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others”
(quoting United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir.
1979))).
596. See, e.g., United States v. Gillespie, No. 22-CR-60
(BAH), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214833, at *7-8 (D.D.C. Nov.
29, 2022); United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-cr-287 (TNM),
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196980, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Oct. 29,
2022); United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 67
(D.D.C. 2022), reconsideration denied, No. 1:21-CR-119
(CJN), 589 F. Supp. 3d 60 (D.D.C. May 27, 2022); United
States v. Puma, No. 1:21-CR-454 (PLF), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48875, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2022); United States v.
McHugh, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2022). See also T.
Kanefield, “January 6 Defendants Are Raising a Creative
Defense. It Isn’t Working,” Washington Post, (Feb. 15,
2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/15/jan-6-official-proceeding/.
597. See supra, Executive Summary.
598. See supra, Executive Summary.
599. See supra, Executive Summary.
600. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National
Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021,
email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter). One judge on the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, in the course of concluding
that section 1512(c) is not void for vagueness, interpreted
the “corruptly” element as meaning “contrary to law,
statute, or established rule.” United States v. Sandlin, 575
F. Supp. 3d. 15–16, (D.D.C. 2021). As explained above,
President Trump attempted to cause the Vice President to
violate the Electoral Count Act, and even Dr. Eastman
advised President Trump that the proposed course of action
would violate the Act. We believe this satisfies the
“corruptly” element of the offense under the Sandlin
opinion.
601. Indeed, it would not have been legally possible for a
State to have done so in the days before January 6th.
602. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 49-50, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
603. See supra, Executive Summary.
604. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 -
COR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).
605. See supra, Executive Summary.
606. See supra, Executive Summary.
607. See supra, Executive Summary. Jeffrey Clark invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
response to questions regarding this letter. As already
noted, the political appointee who assisted in drafting the
letter was hired at the Justice Department on December 15,
2020, but had worked on behalf of President Trump on
election challenges in the weeks beforehand (including,
apparently, while simultaneously serving as Special Counsel
for the White House Office of Management and Budget).
608. See supra, Executive Summary.
609. See supra, Executive Summary.
610. See supra, Executive Summary.
611. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.
612. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National
Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021,
email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter).
613. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44. Although Eastman invoked
his Fifth Amendment rights as a reason not to answer any of
this Committee’s substantive questions during his
deposition, he has recently suggested in public that he only
wished to delay the count of votes by multiple days. As the
evidence developed by this Committee demonstrates, Eastman
knew that such an effort to delay the count would also be
illegal. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January
6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
at 1:32:00-1:35:13, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (“[D]id Dr.
Eastman seem to admit that both of these theories suffered
from similar legal flaws? [T]his new theory, as I was
pointing out to him, or the procedural theory, still
violates several provisions of the Electoral Count Act, as
he acknowledged. . . . So, he acknowledged in those
conversations that the underlying legal theory was the same.
. . .”). In addition, neither Eastman nor any other
co-conspirator had information establishing that any delay
in counting votes would or could have changed the outcome of
the election in any State.
614. See supra, Executive Summary. We also note that these
Republican Members of Congress, who had more knowledge of
Trump’s planning for January 6th than any other Members of
Congress, were also likely in a far superior position than
any other Members to warn the Capitol Police of the risks of
violence at the Capitol on January 6th.
615. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at
2:29:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (“I’ve decided
that I should be on the pardon list, if that is still in the
works.”).
616. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy to defraud the
United States are: (1) at least two people entered into an
agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the government,
(2) by deceitful or dishonest means, and (3) a member of the
conspiracy engaged in at least one overt act in furtherance
of the agreement. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated
January 4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F.
Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No.
8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). Put similarly, to prove a violation
section 371’s “defraud” provision, the Government must prove
that the defendant: (1) agreed with at least one other
person to defraud the United States, (2) knowingly
participated in the conspiracy with the intent to defraud
the United States, and (3) that at least one overt act was
taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v.
Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United
States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985));
see also United States v. Mellen, 158, 393 F.3d 175, 181
(D.C. Cir. 2004). An individual “defrauds” the Government
for purposes of section 371 if he “interfere[s] with or
obstruct[s] one of its lawful governmental functions by
deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are
dishonest.” Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,
188 (1924); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31,
122 n.255 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding jury verdict on
instruction defining “defrauding the United States” as:
“depriv[ing] the Government of its right to have the
officials of its departments and agencies transact their
official business honestly and impartially, free from
corruption, fraud, improper and undue influence, dishonesty
and obstruction”).
617. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 54-55, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
618. See Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7,
2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d
1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
(“An ‘agreement’ between co-conspirators need not be express
and can be inferred from the conspirators’ conduct.”).
619. See infra, Chapter 1.
620. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 55, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
621. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
622. See infra, Chapter 2. President Trump’s call with
Secretary Raffensperger may have violated several provisions
of both Federal and Georgia law. We do not attempt to
catalogue all the possible violations here.
623. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
624. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 59, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
625. “908. ELEMENTS OF 18 U.S.C. § 1001,” Department of
Justice, (last accessed on Dec. 13, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-908-elements-18-usc-1001.
626. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy are discussed
above.
627. As explained in Chapter 3, staffers for Rep. Mike Kelly
(R-PA) and Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) reached out to Vice
President Pence’s director of legislative affairs,
apparently seeking to deliver fake certificates on January
6. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00012 (January 6, 2021,
text message from Rep. Kelly’s chief of staff, Matt Stroia,
to Chris Hodgson on January at 8:41 a.m.), 00058 (January 6,
2021, text messages from Senator Johnson’s chief of staff,
Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).
628. See infra, Chapter 3.
629. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (emphasis added).
630. See, e.g., United States v. Bowser, 964 F.3d 26, 31
(D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1390 (2021)
(“[T]he False Statements Act applies to ‘any investigation
or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any
committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the
Congress.’ 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(2) (emphasis added).”);
United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2019).
631. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13,
2022), at 1:14:59-1:15:22 available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0 (“[President
Trump] turned the call over to Mr. Eastman, who then
proceeded to talk about the importance of the RNC helping
the campaign gather these contingent electors, in case any
of the legal challenges that were ongoing changed the result
of any of the states.”).
632. 18 U.S.C. § 2383.
633. Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 115 (D.D.C.
2022), appeal pending, No. 22-5069 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18,
2022).
634. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, “In Their Own Words:
The 43 Republicans’ Explanations of Their Votes Not to
Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,” Just Security, (Feb.
15, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.
635. See supra, Executive Summary.
636. See supra, Executive Summary. The evidence suggests
that the Vice President and certain members of President
Trump’s staff urged DOD to deploy the National Guard
notwithstanding the President’s wishes.
637. A prominent U.S. professor of criminal law has opined
that President Trump can be held criminally responsible
under section 2383 for his failure to act, when he had a
duty to act given his constitutional obligation under
Article II section 3 of the Constitution to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” See Albert W. Alschuler,
“Trump and the Insurrection Act: The Legal Framework,” Just
Security, (Aug. 16, 2022), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/82696/trump-and-the-insurrection-act-the-true-legal-framework/.
Professor Albert Alschuler, the Julius Kreeger Professor
Emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School, taught
criminal law for over 50 years at many of our Nation’s
leading law schools. He has published a number of analytical
pieces applying the “assists” and “aid and comfort” clauses
of that provisions (which he analogizes to “aiding and
abetting” accomplice liability) to the evidence presented at
the Committee’s hearings. In any event, as described above,
President Trump did act, including through his 2:24 p.m.
tweet about the Vice President that inflamed the crowd
attacking the Capitol.
638. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022) p. 26.
639. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:02:53, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET,
available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox="didn’t+have+the+courage+to+do+what+should+have+been+done"
(archived).
640. See infra, Chapter 8.
641. See supra, Executive Summary.
642. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
643. See Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardons, Government
Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,” Washington Post,
(Sept. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
644. Jordan Fischer, Eric Flack, and Stephanie Wilson,
“Georgia Man Who Wanted to ‘Remove Some Craniums’ on January
6 Sentenced to More than 2 Years in Prison,” WUSA9, (Dec.
14, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/RSY2-J3RU.
645. Dan Mangan, “Capitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was
Following Trump’s Orders, Apologizes to AOC for Threat,”
CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html.
646. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
647. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 166–67.
648. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
649. 18 U.S.C. § 372.
650. See “Leader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member
Found Guilty of Seditious Conspiracy and Other Charges
Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(Nov. 29, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-keepers-member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.
651. 18 U.S.C. § 2384. To establish a violation of section
2384, the government must establish (1) a conspiracy, (2) to
overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of
the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose
by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent,
hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United
States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property
of the United States contrary to the authority thereof. See
United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 487 (4th Cir. 2006).
652. “Leader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found
Guilty of Seditious Conspiracy and Other Charges Related to
U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 29,
2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-keepers-member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.
653. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted
in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses
Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
654. See supra, Executive Summary.
655. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
656. Kristen Holmes, “Trump Calls for the Termination of the
Constitution in Truth Social Post,” CNN, (Dec. 4, 2022),
available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/politics/trump-constitution-truth-social/index.html.
657. See Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardons, Government
Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,” Washington Post,
(Sept. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
658. See infra, Chapter 7.
659. 167 Cong. Rec. H171-72 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021).
660. See supra, Executive Summary.
661. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 84–87.
662. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008962_0009
(January 2, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
663. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014864 (January 5,
2021, text message from Rep. Jim Jordan to Mark Meadows
describing the Vice President’s actions on January 6th).
664. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255-259
(January 6, 2021, Presidential Daily Diary); Felicia Somnez,
“Rep. Jim Jordan Tells House Panel He Can’t Recall How Many
Times He Spoke with Trump on Jan. 6,” Washington Post, (Oct.
20, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/jordan-trump-calls-capitol-attack/2021/10/20/1a570d0e-31c7-11ec-9241-aad8e48f01ff_story.html.
665. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
666. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205–07.
667. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 106.
668. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 72–73.
669. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 66–67.
670. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 62–64.
671. See Sarah Lynch and David Shepardson, “Watchdog to
Probe if Justice Dept. Officials Improperly Tried to Alter
2020 Election,” Reuters, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-justice/watchdog-to-probe-if-justice-dept-officials-improperly-tried-to-alter-2020-election-idUSKBN29U21E
(“Throughout the past four years, I worked with Assistant
Attorney General Clark on various legislative matters. When
President Trump asked if I would make an introduction, I
obliged,’ Perry said in a statement.”).
672. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 48.
673. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 45.
674. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 106–07.
675. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449.
676. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011506, (November 2020
text messages from Rep. Andy Biggs to Mark Meadows).
677. Josh Kelety, “Congressman Andy Biggs Coordinated
Efforts with Mark Finchem before Capitol Riot,” Phoenix New
Times, (Feb. 18, 2021), available at
https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/congressman-andy-biggs-coordinated-with-mark-finchem-before-capitol-riot-11532527.
678. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jim DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000554
(December 18, 2020, text messages between James
DeGraffenreid, a Nevada fake elector for Trump, and another
remarking that “Andy Biggs . . . has reached out to NV to
ask about our evidence”).
679. Audrey Fahlberg, “January 6 Hearings Become Fundraising
Fodder,” The Dispatch, (July 7, 2022), available at
https://thedispatch.com/p/january-6-hearings-become-fundraising;
Archive of Political Emails, Jim Jordan, “The January 6th
Committee Is After Me,” June 9, 2022 12:41 p.m., available
at https://politicalemails.org/messages/686023.
680. John Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson re:
“Subpoena to Representative Scott Perry,” (May 24, 2022),
available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22061774-scott-perry-j6-response.
681. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, House
Ethics Manual, p. 13 (2008).
682. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080
(December 21, 2020, WAVES records showing Representatives
Babin, Biggs, Brooks, Gaetz, Gohmert, Gosar, Taylor Greene,
Harris, Hice, Jordan, and Perry entering the White House).
683. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John
Eastman, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Roger Stone, (Dec. 17, 2021); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Feb. 2, 2022); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Flynn, (Mar.
10, 2022).
684. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328
(1999)). Justice Scalia not only agreed with this principle,
but he also reasoned that the Fifth Amendment does not
prevent an adverse inference in even criminal cases. This is
because the text of that Amendment does not require such a
rule and applying an adverse inference to a refusal to
testify is exactly in keeping with “normal evidentiary
inferences.” See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia. See
id. at 341-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
685. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Flynn,
(Mar. 10, 2022), p. 82.
686. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2021),
cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1350 (2022).
687. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1350 (2022).
Former President Trump also asked the United State Supreme
Court to block the Select Committee from accessing his
documents. The Supreme Court denied that request stating,
“Because the Court of Appeals concluded that President
Trump’s claims would have failed even if he were the
incumbent, his status as a former President necessarily made
no difference to the court’s decision.” Trump v. Thompson,
142 S.Ct. 680, 680 (2022) (citation omitted).
688. H. Res. 851, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-216,
Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives
Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for
Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf.
689. Statement of Interest of the United States at 9-10,
Meadows v. Pelosi et al., No. 1:21-cv-03217 (CJN) (D.D.C.
July 15, 2022), ECF No. 42.
690. “Thompson & Cheney Statement on Justice Department
Decisions on Contempt Referrals,” Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (June 3, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-statement-justice-department-decisions-contempt-referrals.
691. Dennis Aftergut, “Why the DOJ Did Not Indict Mark
Meadows (and What It Should Do Next),” NBC News, (June 7,
2022), available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-lackey-mark-meadows-escaped-january-6-prosecution-peter-navarro-rcna32319.
692. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); H. Rept. 117-284,
Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives
Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt
of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly
Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2022), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
In particular, Scavino may have further information on
President Trump’s advance knowledge from social media posts
of the rioters’ plans to invade the Capitol. See supra __.
693. H. Res. 730, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-152,
Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives
Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal
to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf.
694. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); “Peter Navarro
Indicted for Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice,
(June 3, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/peter-navarro-indicted-contempt-congress;
H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino,
Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a
Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
695. See infra 136.
696. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at
2;14:00-2:14:50, available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo.
697. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022),
pp. 129-35; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp.
176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 104-06.
698. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at
2:22:05-2:23:41, available at
https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8525.
699. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing
on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess.,
(June 23, 2022), at 2:23:41-2:24:42, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4535-VW-bY&t=8620s.
700. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35, esp. pp. 130-131;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at
2:21:26-2:22:04, available at
https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8486.
701. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 133.
702. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005854_0001
(January 11, 2021, email from Molly Michael to Rep. Mo
Brooks, confirming receipt of email from Brooks recommending
pardons, including for “Every Congressman and Senator who
voted to reject the electoral college vote submissions of
Arizona and Pennsylvania”); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing
on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess.,
(June 23, 2022), at 2:20:52-2:21:12, available at
https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8452.
703. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
704. The Committee has enormous respect for the U.S. Secret
Service and recognized that the testimony regarding their
work is sensitive for law enforcement, protectee security,
and national security reasons. See, e.g., Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee “Driver”,
(Nov. 7, 2022), p. 4 (the Select Committee is not releasing
the name of this individual); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 28,
2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of USSS Employee, (Nov. 21, 2022), p. 4; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 18,
2022), p. 4 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 4.
705. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS
Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 4, 86-87.
706. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Jacqueline Alemany, Josh
Dawsey, and Rosalind S. Heldeman, “The Justice Dept.’s Jan.
6 Investigation Is Looking at . . . Everything,” Washington
Post, (Sept. 16, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/trump-january-6-subpoenas-meadows/;
Josh Dawsey and Isaac Arnsdorf, “Prosecutors Seek Details
from Trump’s PAC in Expanding Jan. 6 Probe,” Washington
Post, (Sept. 8, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/08/trump-subpoenas-pac-jan-6/.
707. See Devlin Barrett, Josh Dawsey, and Isaac
Stanley-Becker, “Trump’s Committee Paying for Lawyers of Key
Mar-a-Lago Witnesses,” Washington Post, (Dec. 5, 2022),
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/05/trump-witnesses-legal-bills-pac/.
708. The Committee sat for dozens of hours with Hutchinson
and concluded that she is brave and earnest, and understood
the intense backlash that would inevitably result from those
who were enlisted to defend President Trump’s behavior. [See
infra, Chapter 7]. The thuggish behavior from President
Trump’s team, including efforts to intimidate described
elsewhere in this report (see e.g. Chapter 3), gave rise to
many concerns about Hutchinson’s security, both in advance
of and since her public testimony. (We note that multiple
members of the Committee were regularly receiving threats of
violence during this period.) Accordingly, the Committee
attempted to take appropriate measures to help ensure her
safety in advance of her testimony, including measures
designed to minimize the risk of leaks that might put her
safety at risk.
709. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8,
2022), pp. 71-72 (noting that another witness reference may
have been to Pat Philbin).
710. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 264-65.
711. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 52-57, 70-74, 282-88.
712. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 142-45, 288-92. See also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 12-15.
713. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 183-86.
714. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39-41.
715. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 41.
716. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 38-39, 120, 205, 210,
213-14.
717. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 27.
718. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19.
719. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 40.
720. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL:
All Seasons Press, 2021).
721. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL:
All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.
722. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL:
All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.
723. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 47-49.
724. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Anthony Ornato, (Jan.y 28, 2022), pp. 76-77.
725. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 46-47. Ornato was interviewed
at length by the Select Committee in November 2022, after
the Secret Service produced nearly a million new internal
documents in August and September of this year.
726. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 92; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29,
2022), pp. 45-46 (stating that he had not heard about
President Trump’s instruction to others to ask Ornato about
going to the Capitol).
727. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House
employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued
Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.
728. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House
employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued
Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.
729. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House employee with national security responsibilities,
(July 19, 2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022),
pp. 4-7; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of USSS Employee “Driver”, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 77-80, 92-93;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 17-18.
730. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 104-105, 131-32, 135-36. See
also Chapter 7.
731. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199
(describing another senior intelligence official worrying,
ahead of January 6th, about violence at the Capitol); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell
Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23 (former Chief of Homeland
Security and Intelligence for the District of Columbia
describing the threat scene ahead of January 6th); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police
Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI
Situational Information Report).
732. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 54-56.
733. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 55-56.
734. See supra pp. 81-83. See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29,
2022), p. 13 (Ornato confirming that one of his
responsibilities was briefing the chief of staff and,
through the chief of staff at times, the President on
security-related issues).
735. “U.S. House of Representatives Debate on Impeachment of
President Trump,” C-SPAN, at 1:03:53 - 1:13:42, Jan. 13,
2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-4/debate-impeachment-president-trump;
Tyler Moyer, “McCarthy: ‘President Bears Responsibility for
Wednesday’s Attack’,” Bakersfield Now, (Jan. 13, 2021),
available at
https://bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/mccarthy-president-bears-responsibility-for-wednesdays-attack.
736. “House Minority Leader Weekly Briefing.” C-SPAN, at
7:30 - 8:44, Jan. 21, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?508185-1/minority-leader-mccarthy-backs-gop-conference-chair-liz-cheney;
Rudy Talaka, “GOP Leader McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Members Helping
Rioters,” Mediaite, (Jan. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/gop-leader-mccarthy-calls-for-bipartisan-commission-to-investigate-allegations-of-members-helping-rioters/;
“Rep. McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan Commission to Probe
Capitol Riot,” Newsmax, (Jan. 22, 2021), available at
https://www.newsmax.com/politics/kevin-mccarthy-capitol-riot-boebert-probe/2021/01/21/id/1006648/.
737. Clare Foran, Ryan Nobles, and Annie Grayer, ‘‘Pelosi
Announces Plans for ‘9/11-Type Commission’ to Investigate
Capitol Attack,” CNN, (Feb. 15, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/15/politics/pelosi-capitol-attack-commission/index.html.
738. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available
at
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
739. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available
at
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
740. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available
at
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
741. Ryan Nobles, Annie Grayer, and Jeremy Herb, “Pelosi
Concedes to Even Partisan Split on 1/6 Commission in Effort
to Jumpstart Talks,” CNN, (Apr. 20, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/politics/nancy-pelosi-january-6-commission-talks/index.html;
Ryan Nobles and Daniella Diaz, “Pelosi Makes Concession on
Subpoenas for 9/11 Style Commission to Investigate
Insurrection,” CNN, (Apr. 22, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/22/politics/nancy-pelosi-911-style-commission-insurrection-subpoenas/index.html.
742. John Bresnahan, Anna Palmer, and Jake Sherman, “Pelosi
Taps Top Dem to Negotiate on Jan. 6 Commission,” Punchbowl
News, (May 11, 2021), available at
https://punchbowl.news/archive/punchbowl-news-am-5-11/.
743. “Chairman Thompson Announces Bipartisan Agreement with
Ranking Member Katko to Create Commission to Investigate the
January 6 Attack on the Capitol,” House Committee on
Homeland Security, (May 14, 2021), available at
https://homeland.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairman-thompson-announces-bipartisan-agreement-with-ranking-member-katko-to-create-commission-to-investigate-the-january-6-attack-on-the-capitol.
744. “McCarthy Statement on January 6 Commission
Legislation,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (May
18, 2021), available at
https://www.republicanleader.gov/mccarthy-statement-on-january-6-commission-legislation/.
745. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th
Commission,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18,
2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.
746. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th
Commission,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18,
2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821;
“Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available
at
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
747. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th
Commission,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18,
2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.
748. “U.S. House of Representatives House Session,” C-SPAN,
at 4:12:23-4:12:55, May 19, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?511820-2/houses-passes-bill-create-january-6-commission-252-175.
749. “Roll Call 154 | Bill Number: H. R. 3233,” Clerk of the
U.S. House of Representatives, (May 19, 2021), available at
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021154?Page=1&Date=05%2F19%2F2021.
750. “Roll Call Vote 117th Congress - 1st Session,”
Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture
Re: Motion to Proceed to H.R. 3233), H.R. 3233 - 117th
Congress (2021): National Commission to Investigate the
January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex Act,
H.R.3233, 117th Cong. (2021), available at
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1171/vote_117_1_00218.htm.
751. “House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Announces Select Committee
on the January 6th Insurrection,” C-SPAN, at 4:44-5:26, June
24, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=guCcy9tUfn8.
752. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, “Officer Injured in Capitol
Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP January 6 Conspiracies,”
CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.
753. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, “Officer Injured in Capitol
Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP January 6 Conspiracies,”
CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.
754. “Roll Call 197 | Bill Number: H. Res. 503,” Clerk of
the U.S. House of Representatives, (June 30, 2021),
available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021197.
755. “Pelosi Names Members to Select Committee to
Investigate January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July 1, 2021), available at
https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/7121-0.
756. “McCarthy Names House Republicans to Serve on Select
Committees,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July
19, 2021), available at
https://www.republicanleader.gov/mccarthy-names-house-republicans-to-serve-on-select-committees/.
757. “McCarthy Taps Banks to Lead Republicans on Jan 6
Committee,” Congressman Jim Banks, (Jul. 19, 2021),
available at
https://banks.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1921.
758. “Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to
Serve on the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi, (Jul. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
759. “Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to
Serve on the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi, (Jul. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
760. “McCarthy Statement about Pelosi’s Abuse of Power on
January 6th Select Committee,” Republican Leader Kevin
McCarthy, (July 21, 2021), available at
https://republicanleader.house.gov/mccarthy-statement-about-pelosis-abuse-of-power-on-january-6th-select-committee/;
“McCarthy Pulls Republicans from Jan. 6 Select Committee
after Pelosi Rejects Picks,” Axios, (July 21, 2021),
available at
https://www.axios.com/2021/07/21/pelosi-jim-jordan-banks-select-committee.
761. “Pelosi Announces Appointment of Congressman Adam
Kinzinger to Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi,
(July 25, 2021), available at
https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72521; 167 Cong. Rec. H3885
(daily ed. July 26, 2021).
762. See, e.g., Eastman v. Thompson et al., No.
8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25546, at *12-14
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022); Memorandum Opinion, Republican
National Committee v. Nancy Pelosi et al.
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.241102/gov.uscourts.dcd.241102.33.0.pdf.
Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
1
THE BIG LIE
Late on election night 2020, President Donald J. Trump
addressed the nation from the East Room of the White House.
When Trump spoke, at 2:21 a.m. on November 4th, the
President’s re-election was very much in doubt. Fox News, a
conservative media outlet, had correctly called Arizona for
former Vice President Joseph R. Biden. Every Republican
presidential candidate since 1996 had won Arizona. If the
President lost the State, and in the days ahead it became
clear that he had, then his campaign was in trouble. But as
the votes continued to be counted, President Trump’s
apparent early lead in other key States—States he needed to
win—steadily shrank. Soon, he would not be in the lead at
all—he’d be losing.
So, the President of the United States did something he had
planned to do long before election day: he lied.
“This is a fraud on the American public. This is an
embarrassment to our country,” President Trump said. “We
were getting ready to win this election,” the President
continued. “Frankly, we did win this election. We did win
this election.” Trump claimed, without offering any
evidence, that a “major fraud” was occurring “in our
nation.” 1
Neither of President Trump’s claims were true. He had no
basis for claiming victory or that fraud was taking place.
Millions of votes still had not been counted. The States
were simply tabulating the ballots cast by the American
people. Trump’s own campaign advisors told him to wait—that
it was far too early to declare victory.
As the evening progressed, President Trump called in his
campaign team to discuss the results. Trump Campaign Manager
William Stepien and other campaign experts advised him that
the results of the election would not be known for some
time, and that he could not truthfully declare victory.
Stepien was of the view that, because ballots were going to
be counted for days, “it was far too early to be making any
proclamation [about having won the election].” Stepien told
President Trump that his recommendation was to say, “votes
are still being counted. It's . . . too early to call the
race.” 2
Jason Miller, another senior Trump Campaign advisor, told
the Select Committee that he argued in conversations with
Stepien and others that night against declaring victory at
the time as well, because “it was too early to say one way
[or] the other” who had won. Miller recalled recommending
that “we should not go and declare victory until we had a
better sense of the numbers.” 3
According to testimony received by the Committee, the only
advisor present who supported President Trump’s inclination
to declare victory was Rudy Giuliani, who, according to
Miller, was “definitely intoxicated” that evening.4
President Trump’s decision to declare victory falsely on
election night and, unlawfully, to call for the vote
counting to stop, was not a spontaneous decision. It was
premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of
evidence of President Trump’s preplanning for a false
declaration of victory. This includes multiple written
communications on October 31st and November 3, 2020, to the
White House by Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.5 This
evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with
President Trump and understood that he would falsely declare
victory on election night and call for vote counting to
stop. The evidence also includes an audio recording of
President Trump’s advisor Steve Bannon, who said this on
October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates from China:
And what Trump’s going to do is just declare victory, right?
He’s gonna declare victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s the
winner. He’s just gonna say he’s a winner… The Democrats,
more of our people vote early that count. Their vote in
mail. And so they’re gonna have a natural disadvantage, and
Trump’s going to take advantage of it. That’s our strategy.
He’s gonna declare himself a winner. So when you wake up
Wednesday morning, it’s going to be a firestorm . . . Also,
if Trump, if Trump is losing, by ten or eleven o’clock at
night, it’s going to be even crazier. No, because he’s gonna
sit right there and say ‘They stole it. I’m directing the
Attorney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50
states. It’s going to be, no, he’s not going out easy. If
Trump—if Biden’s winning, Trump is going to do some crazy
shit.6
Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another
outside advisor to President Trump, made this statement:
I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When
that happens, the key thing to do is to claim victory.
Possession is 9/10s of the law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry.
Over. We won. You’re wrong. Fuck you.7
In the days after the election, the President’s own campaign
team told him he had lost and there was no evidence of
significant fraud. When his campaign staff wouldn’t tell him
what he wanted to hear, President Trump replaced them with
what Attorney General William Barr described as a “clown
car” of individuals willing to promote various conspiracy
theories.8
But Donald Trump was no passive consumer of these lies. He
actively propagated them. Time and again President Trump was
informed that his election fraud claims were not true. He
chose to spread them anyway. He did so even after they were
legally tested and rejected in dozens of lawsuits. Not even
the electoral college’s certification of former Vice
President Biden’s victory on December 14, 2020, stopped the
President from lying. Throughout, the Big Lie remained
central to President Trump’s efforts to block the peaceful
transfer of power on January 6, 2021.
1.1 The Big Lie Reflected Deliberate Exploitation of the
“Red Mirage”
President Trump’s “Big Lie” on election night was based on
simple differences in how Americans vote. In 2020, it was
well-known that Democrats were much more likely to vote via
mail-in ballots than in person in 2020. On the other hand,
Republicans generally preferred to vote in person on
election day.9 In key swing States with tight margins
between the candidates, the election day votes would favor
President Trump and disproportionately be counted first.
Mail-in ballots, which would favor former Vice President
Biden, would disproportionately be counted later. In some
States it would take days to process the remaining mail-in
ballots.
The timing of how votes are counted created the potential
for what is known as a “Red Mirage”—or an illusion of a
Republican (Red) victory in the early stages of vote
counting. President Trump would appear to be in the lead on
election night, but this was not the whole picture. Many
mail-in votes for former Vice President Biden would not be
counted on election day. Therefore, the actual winner would
likely not be known on election night.
Photo by House Creative Services
Photo by House Creative Services
The “Red Mirage” phenomenon was widely known prior to the
2020 presidential election. Chris Stirewalt was the head of
the Fox News elections desk that correctly called Arizona
for Biden. Stirewalt and his team tried to warn viewers of
the Red Mirage. He testified that over the past 40 or 50
years, “Americans have increasingly chosen to vote by mail
or early or absentee,” and that “Democrats prefer that
method of voting more than Republicans do.” 10 In nearly
“every election,” Stirewalt elaborated, “Republicans win
Election Day and Democrats win the early vote, and then you
wait and start counting.” It “[h]appens every time.” 11
President Trump’s campaign team made sure the President was
briefed on the timing of vote tallying. Stepien, his
campaign manager, told the Select Committee that President
Trump was reminded on election day that large numbers of
mail-in ballots would still remain to be counted over the
coming days.12 Stepien added that he personally reminded the
President that while early returns may be favorable, the
counting would continue: “I recounted back to 2016 when I
had a very similar conversation with him on election day . .
. I recounted back to that conversation with him in which I
said, just like I said in 2016 was going to be a long night,
I told him in 2020 that, you know, it was going to be a
process again, as, you know, the early returns are going to
be positive. Then we’re going to, you know, be watching the
returns of ballots as, you know, they rolled in
thereafter.” 13
Ordinarily, the “Red Mirage” anomaly does not create
problems in the election process because candidates wait for
the votes to be tallied before declaring victory or
conceding. As Stirewalt emphasized, prior to President
Trump, “no candidate had ever tried to avail themselves of
this quirk in the election counting system.” 14
President Trump, however, made a different choice. In an
extraordinary breach of the American democratic process, he
decided to exploit the potential for confusion about the
staggered timing of vote counting to deceive the American
public about the election results. He and his allies
foreshadowed this decision in their statements in the months
leading up to the November 2020 election.
1.2 Trump’s Pre-Election Plans to Declare Victory
On Halloween, advisor Steve Bannon, who had served four
years earlier as Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign manager, laid
out the election night plan. “What Trump’s gonna do is just
declare victory. Right? He’s gonna declare victory. But that
doesn’t mean he’s a winner,” Bannon told a private audience.
“He’s just gonna say he’s a winner.” 15
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Bannon explained that the Democrats “[would] have a natural
disadvantage” on election night, because more Democrats
would vote by mail than Republicans and it would take time
to count the mail-in ballots. This would give President
Trump the illusion of a lead. “And Trump’s going to take
advantage of it,” Bannon said. “That’s our strategy. He’s
gonna declare himself a winner.” 16
In an interview on Fox News the morning of the election,
Bannon insisted that President Trump needed to address the
nation that night, to “provide the narrative engine for how
we go forward.” 17 During an episode of his podcast later
that same day, Bannon clarified what he meant: President
Trump is “going to claim victory. Right? He’s going to claim
victory.” 18
Tom Fitton drafted a victory statement for the President to
read on election night.19 On October 31st, he emailed the
statement to President Trump’s assistant, Molly Michael, and
social media guru, Dan Scavino. Fitton wrote that election
day, November 3rd, was the “deadline by which voters in
states across the country must choose a president.” Fitton
argued that counting ballots that arrived after election day
would be part of an effort by “partisans” to “overturn” the
election results.20
Of course, that claim wasn’t true—mail-in ballots are
regularly processed after election day. Regardless, Fitton
encouraged the President to pre-emptively declare victory.
“We had an election today—and I won,” Fitton wrote for
President Trump.21 Early in the evening on election day,
Fitton emailed Michael again to say he had “[j]ust talked to
him [President Trump] about the draft [statement].” 22 Later
that evening, before President Trump made his election night
remarks, Michael replied that she was “ . . redelivering to
him [President Trump] now.” 23
Roger Stone, President Trump’s longtime political
confidante, told several associates just prior to the
election that Trump needed to declare victory—especially if
the race wasn’t called on election day. “Let’s just hope we
are celebrating” on election night, Stone said. “I really do
suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens,
the key thing to do is claim victory.” Stone elaborated with
colorful language. “Possession is nine-tenths of the law.
No, we won. Fuck you. Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.” 24
Indeed, published reports echoed these warnings about
President Trump’s election strategy. Two days before the
election, Jonathan Swan of Axios reported that President
Trump “has told confidants he'll declare victory on Tuesday
night if it looks like he's ‘ahead.’” 25 Swan added that
“Trump's team is preparing to falsely claim that mail-in
ballots counted after Nov. 3—a legitimate count expected to
favor Democrats—are evidence of election fraud.” 26 If the
vote tally swung against Trump after election night in
States such as Pennsylvania, then the Trump team would claim
the Democrats had “stolen” the election.27 Fox News election
analysis Chris Stirewalt testified that he and his team “had
gone to pains” to inform viewers that early votes would
favor Republicans but the lead would be illusory “because
the Trump campaign and the President had made it clear that
they were going to try to exploit this anomaly.” 28 Others
warned that President Trump could exploit the Red Mirage as
well.29
1.3 Trump’s Pre-Election Efforts to Delegitimize the
Election Process
President Trump also paved the way for his false
election-night declaration of victory by blanketing voters
with a blizzard of lies and statements delegitimizing
mail-in voting in the middle of a deadly pandemic and
consistently questioning the security of ballots. President
Trump used the president’s bully pulpit, including his
heavily-trafficked Twitter feed, to tell one lie after
another.
The Select Committee found dozens of instances in which
President Trump claimed that mail-in voting would produce a
“rigged” election. Trump repeatedly denounced mail-in voting
on Twitter, during interviews, and even during the
presidential debate. Here is a small sample of President
Trump’s attempts to delegitimize mail-in balloting.
On April 7, 2020, President Trump claimed:
Mail ballots are a very dangerous thing for this country,
because they’re cheaters. They go and collect them. They’re
fraudulent in many cases. …These mailed ballots come in. The
mailed ballots are corrupt, in my opinion. And they collect
them, and they get people to go in and sign them. And then
they — they’re forgeries in many cases. It’s a horrible
thing.30
The following day, April 8, President Trump tweeted:
Republicans should fight very hard when it comes to
statewide mail-in voting. Democrats are clamoring for it.
Tremendous potential for voter fraud, and for whatever
reason, doesn’t work out well for Republicans.
@foxandfriends31
On May 24, President Trump tweeted:
The United States cannot have all Mail In Ballots. It will
be the greatest Rigged Election in history. People grab them
from mailboxes, print thousands of forgeries and “force”
people to sign. Also, forge names. Some absentee OK, when
necessary. Trying to use Covid for this Scam!32
On September 17, President Trump falsely alleged that
mail-in ballots were ripe for foreign interference:
@TrueTheVote There is a group of people (largely Radical
Left Democrats) that want ELECTION MAYHEM. States must end
this CRAZY mass sending of Ballots. Also, a GIFT to foreign
interference into our election!!! Stop it now, before it is
too late.33
Before the election, as President Trump campaigned against
mail-in voting, Bill Stepien sought an intercession. Along
with House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, Stepien attempted
to convince the President that mail-in voting was “not…a bad
thing for his campaign.” 34 They argued that President
Trump’s decision to discourage mail-in voting, while “urging
[his] voters to vote only on election day leaves a lot to
chance” and would fail to take advantage of a superior
grassroots operation that could encourage Trump voters to
return their ballots.35 President Trump did not heed their
warning. He continued to demonize mail-in voting. The Red
Mirage was a key part of his “Big Lie.”
Ominously, President Trump consistently refused to commit to
accepting the outcome of the election. During an interview
on Fox News in July, Chris Wallace asked: “Can you give a
direct answer [if] you will accept the election?” President
Trump responded: “I have to see. Look, you—I have to see.
No, I’m not going to just say yes. I’m not going to say no,
and I didn’t last time either.” 36
On September 23, 2020, a reporter asked President Trump if
he would commit to a “peaceful transferal of power after the
election.” The President refused, saying, “we’re going to
have to see what happens.” 37 The President claimed, “the
ballots are disaster,” adding that if he could “get rid of
the ballots . . . we’ll have a very peaceful—there won’t be
a transfer, frankly; there’ll be a continuation.” 38 That
is, according to President Trump, there would be a
“continuation” of his presidency.
The following day, September 24, another reporter followed
up by asking if the election would be legitimate only if
President Trump won. The President again suggested there was
something suspect about mail-in ballots, adding that he was
“not sure” the election could be an honest one.39
1.4 President Trump’s Launch of the Big Lie
Consistent with the pre-election narrative planted by
President Trump, within hours of polls closing, President
Trump began pushing the claim that late-reported vote
tallies were illegitimate.40 Even though he had been
reminded by his Campaign Manager that very day that a large
number of mail-in ballots would not be counted for several
hours or days,41 President Trump claimed that Democrats were
going to “find . . . ballots at four o’clock in the morning
and add them to the list.” 42 He also suggested that
Democrats were continuing to vote after the polls had
closed.43
Indeed, this is exactly what Steve Bannon described when he
said President Trump would “take advantage” of the
Democrats’ “natural disadvantage” on election night.44
In the ensuing days and weeks, President Trump often
referred to “dumps” of votes that were injected into the
counting process.45 His supporters latched onto these false
claims.46 There were no “dumps” of votes—just tallies of
absentee ballots as they were reported by jurisdictions
throughout the country in a fully transparent process.47
These batches of ballots included votes for both Trump and
Biden. The late-reported votes favored the former Vice
President, just as President Trump’s campaign advisors said
they would, particularly in primarily Democratic cities.48
Attorney General Bill Barr recognized immediately that the
“Red Mirage” was the basis for President Trump’s erroneous
claim of fraud. “[R]ight out of the box on election night,
the President claimed that there was major fraud underway,”
Barr said. “I mean, this happened, as far as I could tell,
before there was actually any potential of looking at
evidence.” 49 President Trump’s claim “seemed to be based on
the dynamic that, at the end of the evening, a lot of
Democratic votes came in which changed the vote counts in
certain states, and that seemed to be the basis for this
broad claim that there was major fraud.” 50
President Trump knew about the Red Mirage. He chose to lie
about it repeatedly—even after being directly informed that
his claims were false. This was often the case in the
post-election period. The President consciously disregarded
facts that did not support his Big Lie.
1.5 Post-Election: President Trump Replaces His Campaign
Team
President Trump’s campaign leadership, including Bill
Stepien (the campaign’s manager) and Justin Clark (the
campaign’s deputy manager), supported President Trump, and
were willing to pursue recounts and other standard
post-election litigation, but they were not willing to
promote baseless conspiracy theories.51 Stepien and others
characterized this group as “Team Normal.” 52
Less than two weeks after the election, President Trump
pushed “Team Normal” aside because its members didn’t tell
him what he wanted to hear. In their place, Trump promoted
Rudy Giuliani and his associates, men and women who spread
baseless and extreme claims of election fraud. Giuliani, the
former mayor of New York City, recruited several
investigators and lawyers to assist him.53 Giuliani’s team
included Jenna Ellis, Bernard Kerik, Boris Epshteyn,
Katherine Friess, and Christina Bobb.54 Ellis functioned as
Giuliani’s deputy on the new Trump Campaign legal team.55
Kerik, the former commissioner of the New York Police
Department and a pardoned felon, served as Giuliani’s chief
investigator.56 Other attorneys who collaborated with
Giuliani’s legal team included Sidney Powell, Cleta
Mitchell, and John Eastman. As discussed elsewhere in this
report, Eastman became a key player in President Trump’s
efforts to overturn the election.
1.6 President Trump’s Campaign Team Told Him He Lost the
Election and There Was No Significant Fraud
President Trump’s campaign team quickly realized that none
of the significant fraud claims were real. Bill Stepien
testified that, as of November 5th, the Trump Campaign had
not found any proof of fraudulent activity. There were
“allegations and reports,” but “nothing hard [and] fast”
that drew the results of the election into question.57
The Campaign continued to investigate claims of fraud into
the second week after the election. According to Stepien, as
people shared “wild allegations” with the President, the
campaign team was forced to review the facts and then serve
as a “truth telling squad” to the President regarding why
the claims “didn’t prove to be true.” 58 For example,
Stepien recalled someone alleging that thousands of illegal
votes had been cast in Arizona. That wasn’t true. The votes
had been submitted by overseas voters (such as military
deployed or stationed abroad) who were obviously eligible to
participate in the election.59
Alex Cannon was a lawyer for the Trump Campaign and
previously worked for the Trump Organization. After the
election, Cannon was tasked with looking into allegations of
voter fraud in the 2020 election—including the claim that
thousands of ineligible votes had been cast in Arizona.60
Cannon recalled that Vice President Pence asked him what he
was finding. “And I said that I didn't believe we were
finding it, or I was not personally finding anything
sufficient to alter the results of the election,” Cannon
responded. Vice President Pence thanked him.61
Cannon reported his assessment to Mark Meadows, the White
House Chief of Staff, as well. In mid to late-November 2020,
Meadows asked Cannon what his investigation had turned up.
“And I remember sharing with him that we weren't finding
anything that would be sufficient to change the results in
any of the key states,” Cannon told Meadows. “So there is no
there, there?” Meadows replied.62
Jason Miller, a senior advisor to the Trump Campaign, pushed
claims of election fraud in public. In private, however,
Miller says that he told President Trump a different story,
informing him numerous times that there was not enough
election fraud to have changed the election:
Miller: My understanding is that I think there are still
very valid questions and concerns with the rules that were
changed under the guise of COVID, but, specific to election
day fraud and irregularities, there were not enough to
overturn the election.
Committee Staff: And did you give your opinion on that to
the President?
Miller: Yes.
Committee Staff: What was his reaction when you told him
that?
Miller: “You haven't seen or heard”—I’m paraphrasing,
but—“you haven't seen or heard all the different concerns
and questions that have been raised.”
Committee Staff: How many times did you have this
conversation with the President?
Miller: Several. I couldn't put a specific number on it,
though.
Committee Staff: But more than one?
Miller: Correct.63
Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign’s top lawyer, came to a
similar conclusion. Nearly two months after the election, on
January 2nd, Morgan met with the Vice President’s staff.
According to Morgan, the consensus in the room was that even
if all the claims of fraud and irregularities were
“aggregated and read most favorably to the campaign . . . it
was not sufficient to be outcome determinative.” 64
As far as the Trump Campaign’s professional leadership was
concerned, there was no evidence that the election had been
“stolen” from President Trump. To the contrary, they had
seen ample evidence that President Trump simply lost—and
told the President so.
On November 6th, Jared Kushner arranged for the senior
campaign staff to brief President Trump in the Oval Office
on the state of the race.65 Since election day, Matt
Oczkowski, the Campaign’s leading data expert, had tracked
voting returns in the swing States to analyze the campaign’s
odds of success.66 Miller texted such updates on data from
key States to Meadows.67 The Trump Campaign’s data did not
add up to victory. Oczkowski “delivered to the President in
pretty blunt terms that he was going to lose” the
election.68 There were not enough outstanding votes in the
battleground States for President Trump to overcome Biden’s
lead. President Trump disagreed and insisted that he would
still prevail through legal challenges.69
But the data did not lie.
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
On November 7th, the Associated Press called Pennsylvania
and the overall presidential election for former Vice
President Biden.70 At that point, a small team of the
President’s campaign advisors including Stepien met with the
President and told him that his path to victory was
virtually non-existent.71 The campaign team conveyed to the
President that his chance of success was only “5, maybe 10
percent,” which Stepien explained to the Committee was a
“very, very, very bleak” assessment.72
In retrospect, the campaign’s estimate of a 5 to 10 percent
chance of winning, as of November 7th, was far too
optimistic. In one of the most favorable possible scenarios,
for example, President Trump and his team would need to win
recounts in Arizona and Georgia, while also prevailing in
litigation challenging absentee or vote by mail ballots in
Wisconsin, or possibly Michigan or Pennsylvania.73 But the
election wasn’t even close enough to trigger automatic
recounts in Arizona or Georgia.
The narrowest margin of total votes between the two
candidates was in Arizona, where former Vice President Biden
won by more than 10,000 votes. This may seem like a small
number of votes, but it was more than enough to avoid an
automatic recount. As Benjamin Ginsberg, a longtime
Republican elections lawyer, explained to the Select
Committee, “the 2020 election was not close.” 74 Previous
campaigns had successfully challenged vote differentials in
the hundreds—not thousands—of votes.75 Ginsberg explained,
“you just don't make up those sorts of numbers in
recounts.” 76 Georgia performed a hand recount of all the
ballots anyway, confirming within weeks of the election that
Biden had won the State.77 Also, by January 6th, Arizona and
New Mexico had conducted statutory post-election audits of
voting machines or randomly-selected, representative samples
of ballots at the State- or county-level that affirmed the
accuracy of their election results.78
Chris Stirewalt, who led the elections desk at Fox News at
the time, concurred with Ginsberg’s analysis. Asked what
President Trump’s odds of victory were as of November 7th,
Stirewalt replied: “None.” 79
Meanwhile, the Trump Campaign continued to crunch the
numbers. On the morning of November 12th, Oczkowski
circulated among top campaign advisors a presentation
describing what happened in each of the battleground States
the campaign was monitoring.80 This analysis by the data
team examined the turnout and margins on a county-by-county
basis in a dozen States while also analyzing demographic
changes that impacted the results.81 Among the States were
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and
Wisconsin.82 Oczkowski’s team determined that President
Trump lost each of those six States because Biden had
performed better than President Trump in certain areas like
population centers or suburbs.83 Yet, in the weeks that
followed, President Trump and his new legal team—the “clown
car”—went to great lengths to challenge the results of the
election in these six states, spreading multiple conspiracy
theories.
The voting data told a clear story: President Trump lost.
But, regardless of the facts, the President had no intention
of conceding defeat.
On election night, President Trump and Rudy Giuliani agreed
that the President should just declare victory—even though
he had no basis for doing so. Giuliani also told the Select
Committee that President Trump asked him on November 4th to
take over his campaign’s legal operation.84 Giuliani thought
the only way that it would work would be for the President
to call the existing campaign team to announce Giuliani’s
takeover because, in Giuliani’s words, “they are going to be
extraordinarily resentful, because they don’t like me
already, and I don’t trust them.” 85 He said that the
President agreed.86
Although Giuliani wouldn’t assume leadership of the
Campaign’s legal operations until mid-November, the former
New York City mayor quickly began to butt heads with “Team
Normal.”
On November 6th, Giuliani and his team met with the Trump
Campaign’s leadership at its headquarters in Arlington,
Virginia.87
“Team Normal” was not impressed. Stepien told the Select
Committee the campaign team was concerned that Giuliani
would be a distraction to them and to President Trump.88
When Giuliani suggested traveling to Pennsylvania to assist
in the campaign’s efforts, the campaign team “didn’t
dissuade him from doing so.” 89 After just 10 to 15 minutes
in the conference room, Stepien and other staffers left the
meeting.90
That same day, President Trump discussed the Campaign’s
legal strategy in the Oval Office with Giuliani, Clark, and
Matt Morgan, the Trump Campaign’s General Counsel.91 Prior
to the election, Morgan was responsible for the Campaign’s
litigation strategy.92 Morgan and his team filed lawsuits
challenging the changes States made to voting practices
during the coronavirus pandemic.93 Morgan also studied
previous elections to determine the types of cases that were
likely to succeed.94 Clark described how the Campaign’s
original legal strategy was based on his general theory for
election cases: “to look at what do you think, what do you
know, and what can you prove” and then determine which cases
to file from there.95
Giuliani had other ideas and advocated to President Trump
that he be put in charge of the Campaign’s legal operation
so that he could pursue his preferred strategy.96 “Mr.
Giuliani didn’t seem bound by those cases or by those
precedents. He felt he could press forward on anything that
he thought was wrong with the election and bring a strategy
around that,” Morgan explained.97 “Rudy was just chasing
ghosts,” Clark said.98 Morgan and Clark excused themselves
from the meeting because it “was going nowhere.” 99
Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images
Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images
The next day, November 7th, Giuliani held a press conference
at Four Seasons Total Landscaping in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. He immediately began making outlandish claims,
arguing that the Democrats had conspired to steal the
election. “As you know from the very beginning, mail-in
ballots were a source of some degree of skepticism, if not a
lot of skepticism, as being innately prone to fraud,”
Giuliani said. “Those mail-in ballots could have been
written the day before by the Democratic Party hacks that
were all over the Convention Center.” 100 Giuliani offered
no evidence to support his shocking and baseless allegation.
Echoes of President Trump’s relentless campaign against
mail-in balloting, and his decision to exploit the Red
Mirage, were easy to hear.
On November 10th, Giuliani and Kerik met with President
Trump in the Oval Office to discuss their investigation into
voter fraud. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone and White
House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann were also in
attendance. After Giuliani’s presentation, President Trump
asked Cipollone whether he had spoken to Attorney General
Barr about the allegations of fraud.101 One day before, Barr
had issued a memorandum outlining a shift in DOJ policy that
allowed Federal prosecutors to investigate claims of voting
irregularities without waiting for the results to be
certified.102 President Trump’s question was an early
indication that he was going to pressure the DOJ to endorse
his phony fraud claims.
Days later, Giuliani and Justin Clark engaged in a screaming
match during a meeting in the Oval Office.103 Giuliani was
urging President Trump to file a lawsuit in Georgia, but
Clark pointed out that a hand recount was already being
conducted and argued it was better to wait.104 Giuliani told
President Trump that Clark was lying to him.105 A formal
changing of the guard would follow.
On November 14th, President Trump announced on Twitter that
Giuliani was now the head of his campaign’s legal team.106
“Team Normal” saw drastic changes to their roles on the
newly-structured campaign team—some self-imposed—and many
outside law firms that had signed up to support the
campaign’s legal efforts disengaged completely.107
“I didn’t think what was happening was necessarily honest or
professional at that point in time,” Stepien explained.
“This wasn’t a fight that I was comfortable with,” he
added.108
On the day the leadership change was announced, Giuliani
participated in a “surrogate” briefing to coordinate
messaging by Trump loyalists during their media
appearances.109 Giuliani announced that the messaging
strategy should be “to go hard on Dominion/Smartmatic,
bringing up Chavez and Maduro.” 110 Giuliani claimed that
additional lawsuits would soon be filed “to invalidate
upwards of 1M ballots.” 111
Consistent with the messaging advanced by the new campaign
team, President Trump in mid-November remained dug-in, still
refusing to concede defeat. President Trump continued to
insist that he was cheated out of victory, endorsing one
wild conspiracy theory after another to deny the simple fact
that he lost.
1.7 President Trump Had His Day in Court
“We’ve proven” the election was stolen, but “no judge,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, has had
the courage to allow it to be heard.” 112 That was how
President Trump described efforts to overturn the election
in court one day before the electoral college met on
December 14, 2020. That was false.
Judges across the nation did evaluate President Trump’s
claims that the election was stolen. As longtime Republican
election attorney Benjamin Ginsberg testified before the
Select Committee, the President’s camp “did have their day
in court,” it’s just that “in no instance did a court find
that the charges of fraud were real.” 113 In total, the
Trump Campaign and allies of President Trump filed 62
separate lawsuits between November 4, 2020, and January 6,
2021, calling into question or seeking to overturn the
election results.114 Out of 62 cases, only one case resulted
in a victory for the President Trump or his allies, which
affected relatively few votes, did not vindicate any
underlying claims of fraud, and would not have changed the
outcome in Pennsylvania.115 Thirty of the cases were
dismissed by a judge after a hearing on the merits.116
In every State in which claims were brought, one or more
judges specifically explained as part of their dismissal
orders that they had evaluated the plaintiffs’ allegations
or supposed proof of widespread election fraud or other
irregularities, and found the claims to be entirely
unconvincing. In Arizona, for example, the plaintiffs in
Bowyer v. Ducey alleged that the election was tainted by the
introduction of “hundreds of thousands of illegal,
ineligible, duplicate or purely fictitious ballots.” 117 A
Federal judge dismissed their suit, finding it “void of
plausible allegations” and “sorely wanting of relevant or
reliable evidence.” 118 Likewise, in Ward v. Jackson, an
Arizona State-court judge dismissed a lawsuit by the State
GOP chair following a two-day trial, finding no evidence of
misconduct, fraud, or illegal votes.119 This ruling was
unanimously upheld by the State supreme court, where all
seven justices were appointed by GOP governors.120
In Georgia, a State court dismissed Boland v. Raffensperger,
which alleged that tens of thousands of illegal ballots were
cast by out-of-State voters or with invalid signature
matches.121 The judge found that “the Complaint’s factual
allegations . . . rest on speculation rather than duly pled
facts” and “do not support . . . a conclusion that
sufficient illegal votes were cast to change or place in
doubt the result of the election.” 122 The judge who issued
this decision had been appointed by a Republican governor,
as had seven of the eight justices of the State supreme
court who upheld her ruling.123 Likewise, a Federal judge
denied relief to the plaintiff in Wood v. Raffensperger,
which alleged that new procedures for checking absentee
ballot signatures spoiled the result by making it harder to
reject illegal ballots, finding “no basis in fact or law to
grant him the relief he seeks.” 124 The judge wrote that
“[t]his argument is belied by the record” because absentee
ballots were actually rejected for signature issues at the
same rate as in 2018.125
In Michigan, a Federal judge found in King v. Whitmer that
the plaintiffs’ claims of “massive election fraud” were
based on “nothing but speculation and conjecture that votes
for President Trump were destroyed, discarded or switched to
votes for Vice President Biden. . . .” 126 Similarly, a
State-court judge rejected plaintiffs’ claims in two cases
brought against Detroit and the surrounding county that
accused them of systematic fraud in how absentee ballots
were counted; the judge found that one group of plaintiffs
“. . . offered no evidence to support their assertions,” 127
and that the other group’s “interpretation of events is
incorrect” and “decidedly contradicted” by
“highly-respected” election experts.128
In Nevada, a State-court judge rejected a litany of claims
of systematic election fraud in Law v. Whitmer, ruling that
plaintiffs “did not prove under any standard of proof that
illegal votes were cast and counted, or legal votes were not
counted at all, due to voter fraud” or “for any other
improper or illegal reason.” 129 The ruling was unanimously
upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court.130
In Pennsylvania, a Federal judge dismissed Donald Trump for
President v. Boockvar, finding that the Trump Campaign had
presented nothing but “strained legal arguments without
merit and speculative accusations unpled in the operative
complaint and unsupported by evidence.” 131 The dismissal
was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, which held: “[C]alling an election unfair
does not make it so. Charges require specific allegations
and then proof. We have neither here.” 132 That opinion was
authored by another Trump appointee.133
Lastly, in Wisconsin, another judge dismissed a lawsuit
accusing the Wisconsin Elections Commission of
“constitutional violations” that “likely tainted more than
50,000 ballots.” 134 The judge ruled: “This Court has
allowed plaintiff the chance to make his case and he has
lost on the merits,” failing to show that the outcome was
affected by Commission rules about drop boxes, ballot
addresses, or individuals who claimed “indefinitely
confined” status to vote from home.135 The ruling was upheld
by a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, all of whom were Republican
appointees, including one appointed by President Trump
himself.136
In all, the judges who heard these post-election cases
included 22 Federal judges appointed by Republican
presidents.137
President Trump and his lawyers were well-aware that courts
were consistently rejecting his claims. During a December
18th meeting in the Oval Office with President Trump, Sidney
Powell and others, White House Senior Advisor Eric
Herschmann pointed out that President Trump’s lawyers had
their opportunity to prove their case in court, and failed.
Powell fired back that “the judges are corrupt.” Herschmann
responded: “Every one? Every single case that you’ve done in
the country you guys lost, every one of them is corrupt,
even the ones we appointed?” 138
President Trump was faced with another choice after having
his day in court. He could accept that there was no real
evidence of voter fraud, or he could continue to amplify
conspiracy theories and lies. He chose the latter.
1.8 President Trump Repeatedly Promoted Conspiracy Theories
Instead of accepting his defeat, President Trump attempted
to justify his Big Lie with a series of increasingly
preposterous claims. The President was not simply led astray
by those around him. The opposite was true. He actively
promoted conspiracy theories and false election fraud claims
even after being informed they were baseless. Millions of
President Trump’s supporters believed the election was
stolen from him. Many of them still do, but President Trump
knew the truth and chose to lie about it.
The power of the President’s bully pulpit should not be
underestimated, especially in the digital age.139 President
Trump’s relentless lying sowed seeds of distrust in
America’s election system. Researchers who studied this
election-denial phenomenon have noted: “President Trump
didn’t just prime his audience to be receptive to false
narratives of election fraud—he inspired them to produce
those narratives and then echoed those false claims back to
them.” 140 Social media played a prominent role in
amplifying erroneous claims of election fraud. Shortly after
election day, the “Stop the Steal” campaign, discussed more
fully in Chapter 6, went viral. “Stop the Steal” influencers
echoed President Trump’s premature declaration of victory,
asserting that he won the election, the Democrats stole it
from him, and it was the responsibility of American
“patriots” to combat this supposed injustice.141
Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images
Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images
This resulted in what Attorney General Barr has described as
an “avalanche” of false claims, as President Trump’s
supporters attempted to justify his “Big Lie.” 142 The
post-election allegations of fraud or other malfeasance were
“completely bogus,” “silly” and “usually based on complete
misinformation,” Barr explained.143 Nonetheless, many of
President Trump’s supporters wanted to believe them. The
stolen election narrative has proven to be remarkably
durable precisely because it is a matter of belief—not
evidence, or reason. Each time a claim was debunked, more
claims emerged in its place. Barr later complained that this
dynamic forced him and others to play “whack-a-mole.” 144
The United States Department of Justice, under Barr’s
leadership and then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen,
was forced to knock down one lie after another. As discussed
in Chapter 4, Barr took unprecedented steps to investigate
the “avalanche” of lies. Claims of election fraud were
referred to United States Attorney’s offices and the FBI for
investigation. Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue
tracked dozens of investigations. None of them were found to
have merit.145 The top officials in President Trump’s
Justice Department personally told the President that the
claims he was promoting were false. But that did not matter
to the President. As Barr told the Select Committee,
President Trump never showed any “indication of interest in
what the actual facts were.” 146
For example, on December 27th, Rosen and Donoghue spent
approximately two hours on the phone with President Trump.
They debunked a litany of claims regarding the election,
explaining that each had been investigated and found to be
baseless.147 According to Donoghue, President Trump “had
this arsenal of allegations that he wanted to rely on.”
Donoghue thought it was necessary to explain to the
President “based on actual investigations, actual witness
interviews, actual reviews of documents, that these
allegations simply had no merit.” Donoghue wanted “to cut
through the noise” and be “very blunt” with the President,
making it clear “these allegations were simply not
true.” 148
During their December 27th conversation with President
Trump, Rosen and Donoghue rebutted false claims regarding:
suitcases of ballots in Georgia, Dominion’s voting machines
in Antrim County, a truckload of ballots in Pennsylvania,
ballots being scanned multiple times, people voting more
than once, dead people voting, Native Americans being paid
to vote, and more votes than voters in particular
jurisdictions.149 As the officials debunked each claim,
President Trump “would just roll on to another one.” 150
Donoghue told President Trump that Federal law enforcement
officials had conducted dozens of investigations and
hundreds of interviews, and they had concluded that the
major allegations were not supported by the evidence
developed.151 Donoghue and Rosen told President Trump “flat
out” that “much of the information he [was] getting [was]
false and/or just not supported by the evidence.” 152
President Trump responded: “You guys may not be following
the internet the way I do.” 153
The Department of Justice was not alone in trying to contain
the President’s conspiracy-mongering. President Trump’s lies
were often debunked in real-time by State authorities,
judges, experts, journalists, Federal officials, and even
members of his own legal team. As discussed above, the
President’s campaign team found that there was no
significant fraud in the election. So, the President pushed
them aside. The courts rejected nearly every claim brought
by the President’s legal team. Even though courts rejected
the claims as speculative, unsupported and meritless,
President Trump, Rudy Giuliani, and others continued to
assert them as truth to Trump’s followers in speeches,
tweets, and podcasts.154
The burden of refuting the false claims made by President
Trump and his surrogates often fell on State and local
officials. For example, in Michigan, the Secretary of
State’s office posted thorough and prompt responses to the
claims of election fraud on a “Fact Check” page on its
website.155 In Georgia, the Secretary of State’s office
issued news releases and held frequent press conferences in
the weeks following the election to respond to claims of
fraud.156 County clerks in the contested States also spoke
out publicly to refute allegations. Even as the President
undermined the public’s confidence in how votes are cast and
counted, these clerks assured voters that their elections
were secure and they could have confidence in the
results.157 Outside experts also publicly denounced and
dismantled the claims being raised and amplified by
President Trump. This was done in the context of litigation,
congressional hearings, and press releases.158 President
Trump simply ignored these authoritative sources and
continued to promote false claims that had been soundly
discredited.
Below, the Select Committee presents two case studies
demonstrating how President Trump and his surrogates lied in
the face of overwhelming evidence. The first case study
deals with Dominion Voting Systems. President Trump
repeatedly claimed that Dominion’s software “switched votes”
and “rigged” the election well after the leaders of campaign
and Justice Department officials told him that these claims
were baseless. The President’s smear of Dominion was central
to his “Big Lie.”
The second case study examines video footage recorded in
Fulton County on election night. President Trump and his
representatives concocted a fictional narrative based on a
deceptively edited version of the footage. After these two
case studies, the Select Committee examines a variety of
other claims the President repeatedly made. Once again,
these claims had no basis in truth.
Dominion Voting Systems
Between election day and January 6th, President Trump
repeatedly spread conspiracy theories about Dominion voting
machines. The President tweeted or retweeted false claims
about Dominion more than 30 times.159 He also repeatedly
lied about the company’s software during his post-election
speeches and interviews.160 President Trump’s own campaign
staff, administration officials, and State officials, all
told him the claims had no merit. Hand recounts confirmed
the fidelity of the machines. But none of this overwhelming
evidence mattered. President Trump demonstrated a conscious
disregard for the facts and continued to maliciously smear
Dominion.
President Trump’s allies began spreading false claims
regarding Dominion within days of the election. On November
8th, the day after networks called the election for Joe
Biden, Sidney Powell claimed on Fox News that Dominion
machines “were flipping votes in the computer system or
adding votes that did not exist.” 161 On November 12th, Rudy
Giuliani appeared on Fox News to claim that Dominion was
connected to Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez and its
software was created “in order to fix elections.” 162 The
same day, President Trump retweeted a “REPORT” claiming that
Dominion had “DELETED 2.7 MILLION TRUMP VOTES NATIONWIDE”
and switched hundreds of thousands of votes in key swing
states.163
By that time, the Trump Campaign team had looked into
allegations regarding Dominion and its software and
concluded that the claims were false. An internal campaign
memo, dated November 12, said that Dominion’s software “did
not lead to improper vote counts” and cited reports
concluding that, among other things, Dominion machines “Did
Not Affect The Final Vote Count.” 164 The memo also
addressed various claims of foreign influence regarding
Dominion.165 Jason Miller told the Select Committee that by
November 12th he had told President Trump the results of the
analysis of the Dominion claims by the campaign’s internal
research team, specifically telling him “that the
international allegations for Dominion were not valid.” 166
Emails and text messages show that this same analysis was
shared with Mark Meadows, President Trump’s chief of
staff.167 White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany told
the Select Committee that she found herself “waving
[President Trump] off of the Dominion theory,” encouraging
him to use more “fact-driven” arguments.168 But it was to no
avail.
Even though members of the Trump Campaign team reported that
the result of the election was not compromised by any
problems with Dominion machines, the President continued to
assail Dominion on Twitter in the days that followed, for
example retweeting a false claim that Dominion’s machines
were “engineered by China, Venezuela, [and] Cuba” and
claiming that Dominion had “[r]igged” the election.169
Officials in the Trump administration also worked to debunk
the false rumors about vote manipulation. The United States
Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a joint
statement of election security officials on November 12,
reassuring voters that the election was “the most secure in
American history.” CISA emphasized: “There is no evidence
that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes,
or was in any way compromised.” 170
This was another decision point for the President. He could
choose to endorse the findings of his administration’s own
cyber security experts, or he could continue to promote
baseless fictions about Dominion. President Trump chose the
lies. The President and his supporters never did produce any
evidence showing that Dominion’s machines affected the
results of the election. But President Trump was undeterred
by the facts. Indeed, the President and his supporters
seized upon a simple human error in a small Michigan county
as their initial pretense for these allegations as well as
to keep the Dominion conspiracy theory alive.
During the early-morning hours of November 4th, Sheryl Guy,
a clerk in Antrim County, Michigan, reported the unofficial
results of the vote count.171 Guy’s online report was odd.
It showed that former Vice President Biden had somehow won
Antrim, a county that is majority-Republican and President
Trump was expected to easily win. Trump’s supporters quickly
pointed to Biden’s improbable win as evidence that Dominion
had tampered with the votes.172 That wasn’t true. Guy had
made a mistake in updating the election counting software
after a late addition of a local candidate to the ballot in
some of the county’s precincts, which caused her unofficial
counts to be off when she tallied the votes reported by the
various precincts.173 Guy, a Republican, was informed of the
odd result and began to investigate immediately. The result
was corrected, and President Trump won Antrim just as was
expected.174
Within days, local and State officials in Michigan explained
to the public what had happened. On November 7th, the
Michigan Secretary of State’s office issued a detailed
description of Guy’s error and assured the public that the
official results were not impacted.175 The Michigan Senate’s
Committee on Oversight, led by Republican Senator Ed
McBroom, conducted its own comprehensive review of the
claims related to Antrim County and confirmed that the
initial reporting error was entirely attributable to an
honest mistake by the county clerk.176
The mix-up in Antrim County was quickly corrected. A human
erred—not the voting machines. But President Trump used it
as a pretext to continue lying about Dominion.
On November 12th, the same day CISA released its statement
on election security, President Trump asked Tim Walberg, a
Republican Congressman from Michigan, to “check with key
leadership in Michigan’s Legislature as to how supportive
they could be in regards to pushing back on election
irregularities and potential fraud.” 177 That night,
President Trump asked his Acting Secretary of Homeland
Security, Chad Wolf, to look into allegations of election
irregularities in Michigan.178 The next day, President
Trump’s assistant sent Wolf a letter from Michigan State
legislators raising claims about the election, including an
incorrect claim that flawed Dominion software had caused
votes to be counted for the wrong candidate.179
Administration officials quickly knocked down the Dominion
claim. Wolf forwarded the allegations to the leadership of
CISA, including CISA Director Christopher Krebs.180 Krebs
provided Wolf with a press release from the Michigan
Secretary of State that debunked the false claim about
Antrim County and Dominion’s software in detail.181 Wolf
shared an update about the information he received from
Krebs with White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.182
On November 17th, Krebs tweeted out a statement issued by
the nation’s leading election scientists that dismissed
claims that election systems had been manipulated as either
“unsubstantiated” or “technically incoherent.” 183 President
Trump fired Krebs that same day.184 President Trump claimed
the statement released by Krebs was “highly inaccurate, in
that there were massive improprieties and fraud.” 185 The
President had no evidence for his claim.
On November 19th, Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and Jenna
Ellis held a press conference at the Republican National
Committee (RNC) headquarters in Washington, DC. Powell
asserted that there was “massive influence of communist
money through Venezuela, Cuba, and likely China in the
interference with our elections here in the United
States.” 186 She pointed a finger at Dominion, claiming its
software was “created in Venezuela at the direction of Hugo
Chavez to make sure he never lost an election,” and Giuliani
echoed her claims.187
Hope Hicks told the Select Committee how that press
conference was received in the White House. The day after
the press conference, President Trump spoke by phone with
Sidney Powell from the Oval Office. During the call, Powell
repeated the same claims of foreign interference in the
election she had made at the press conference. While she was
speaking, the President muted his speakerphone and laughed
at Powell, telling the others in the room, “This does sound
crazy, doesn’t it?” 188
A few days later, the Trump Campaign issued a statement
claiming Powell was not part of the Trump Campaign’s legal
team.189 But Powell’s outlandish claims were no different
from those President Trump was making himself. On November
19th, the same day as Powell’s appearance at the RNC,
President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on
One America News Network (OAN) that was captioned,
“Dominion-izing the Vote.” 190 The segment claimed that
Dominion had switched votes from Trump to Biden. OAN
featured a supposed cyber expert, Ron Watkins, a key figure
in the QAnon conspiracy movement.191 On his own Twitter
account, Watkins celebrated and thanked his supporters just
minutes after President Trump tweeted the clip, and
President Trump went on to share the clip again several
times in the days that followed.192
Officials inside the Trump administration continued to
debunk the Dominion conspiracy theory, including during
in-person meetings with President Trump. Attorney General
Bill Barr met with President Trump face-to-face on three
occasions after the election.193 Barr told the Select
Committee, “every time I was with the President, I raised
the machines as sort of Exhibit A of how irresponsible this
was.” 194 During the first of these meetings, on November
23rd, Barr explained to the President that the conspiracy
theory about Dominion’s voting machines had “zero basis,”
and was “one of the most disturbing allegations.” Barr
stressed that this was “crazy stuff” and was poisoning
Americans’ confidence in the voting system for no reason.
This “complete nonsense” was “doing [a] great, great
disservice to the country,” Barr said.195
President Trump ignored Barr’s grave concerns. On November
29th, President Trump was interviewed by Fox News’ Maria
Bartiromo. It was the President’s first interview since he
lost his bid for reelection. He claimed the election was
“rigged” and rife with “theft” and “a total fraud.” 196 He
repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the claim
that Dominion’s voting machines had “glitches,” which he
alleged moved “thousands of votes from my account to Biden’s
account.” 197 He claimed that there had been “big, massive
dumps” of votes—a reference to the Red Mirage.198 He rambled
off various other, spurious allegations, including that dead
people voted in significant numbers.199 None of it was true.
On December 1st, Attorney General Barr met again with
President Trump and told him that “the stuff his people were
shoveling out to the public was bullshit.” 200 Attorney
General Barr specifically told President Trump that the
claims about Dominion voting machines were “idiotic
claims.” 201 President Trump was still not dissuaded from
continuing the lie. The day after his meeting with the
Attorney General, President Trump released a video in which
he repeated several claims of election fraud, including a
claim that “votes had been wrongly switched from Trump to
Biden” using Dominion voting machines.202
By early-December, courts had assessed and rejected claims
that Dominion machines were manipulated to affect the
outcome of the 2020 election. In Michigan, a Federal judge
found that claims, including those related to fraud due to
the use of Dominion voting machines, were based on “nothing
but speculation and conjecture that votes were destroyed,
discarded or switched. . . .” 203 In Arizona, a Federal
judge dismissed claims that Dominion machines had deleted,
switched, or changed votes.204 But President Trump and his
supporters refused to accept denunciations of the fabricated
Dominion claims.
Through December, President Trump and his legal team tried
to echo the Dominion conspiracy theory by claiming to have
found evidence that votes were switched in Antrim County.
The clerk’s unintentional error was fixed weeks earlier and
there was no evidence showing that Dominion had altered the
vote tally in Antrim, or anywhere else.205 But President
Trump’s legal team used a case challenging a local marijuana
ordinance that had passed by one vote to gain access to
Dominion’s voting machines. An Antrim County judge issued an
order granting the plaintiff’s experts access to the
county’s computer, Dominion voting machines, thumb drives
and memory cards.206 Although the purpose of the order was
to allow the plaintiff to seek evidence related to his
ordinance challenge, it soon became clear that President
Trump’s legal team was behind the effort.207
An organization named Allied Security Operations Group
(“ASOG”), led by Russell Ramsland, conducted an analysis of
Antrim County’s voting machines and related systems. On
December 13th, ASOG released a report on its findings. The
inspection yielded no evidence of vote manipulation. Still,
the report included an unsubstantiated assertion that the
Dominion voting machines used in Antrim County and
throughout Michigan were “purposefully designed with
inherent error to create systemic fraud and influence
election results” and that a malicious algorithm was used to
manipulate the results of the 2020 election.208 Documents
obtained by the Select Committee show that President Trump
and Vice President Mike Pence were briefed on ASOG’s
findings by Giuliani’s team.209 On December 14th, President
Trump widely disseminated the ASOG report and accompanying
talking points prepared by Giuliani’s team.210 He also
trumpeted the report on Twitter, writing on December 14th:
“WOW. This report shows massive fraud. Election changing
result!” 211
During a meeting with Attorney General Bill Barr that day,
President Trump claimed the ASOG report was “absolute proof
that the Dominion machines were rigged” and meant he was
“going to have a second term.” 212 Barr told the Select
Committee that he believed the ASOG report was “very
amateurish,” its authors lacked “any real qualifications,”
and it failed to provide any supporting information for its
sweeping conclusions about Dominion.213 Barr told President
Trump he would look into the report, but that the DOJ
already had a good idea of what happened in Antrim County
and it was human error, not a problem with the machines.214
In any event, Barr promised President Trump they would have
a definitive answer within a couple of days because a hand
recount was being conducted.215
In the ensuing days, as Barr predicted, the ASOG report was
swiftly and soundly criticized by experts within and outside
the Trump Administration, including the Department of
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security.216 The
initial analysis of election security experts at the
Department of Homeland Security was that the ASOG report was
“false and misleading” and “demonstrates a callous
misunderstanding of the actual current voting certification
process.” 217 Subsequent analyses of the ASOG report and the
underlying data from Antrim County were even more
critical.218 These thorough assessments of the Antrim County
data and the ASOG report demonstrate that virtually every
one of the claims that President Trump and his surrogates
made about the report was false.219 ASOG’s inspection did
not reveal any malicious software or algorithms or any other
evidence that the voting machines had been compromised.220
Most importantly, as Attorney General Barr had promised
President Trump, within days of the release of the ASOG
report, a full hand recount of every ballot cast in Antrim
County confirmed the results reported by the Dominion
machines and refuted ASOG’s assertion that an algorithm has
manipulated the vote count.221 Giuliani’s chief
investigator, Bernie Kerik, acknowledged that his team was
not able to find any proof that a Dominion voting machine
improperly switched, deleted, or injected votes during the
2020 election.222
President Trump was not swayed by these basic facts. The
President continued to promote the ASOG report, hounding DOJ
to investigate the matter further. He returned to ASOG’s
claims during a December 27th call with Acting Attorney
General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue,
citing the report’s claimed error rate of 68 percent in
Antrim County. Donoghue pointed out to the President that
the difference between the computer and hand count was only
one vote and that he “cannot and should not be relying on”
ASOG’s fraudulent claim, because it was simply “not
true.” 223
President Trump’s fixation on Dominion’s voting machines and
the baseless theory that the machines had manipulated votes
led to a concerted effort to gain access to voting machines
in States where President Trump was claiming election fraud.
On the evening of December 18th, Powell, Lt. Gen. Michael
Flynn (ret.) and Patrick Byrne met with the President at the
White House. Over several hours, they argued that President
Trump had the authority, under a 2018 executive order, to
seize voting machines. Several administration officials
joined the meeting and forcefully rejected this extreme
proposal.224 Multiple lawyers in the White House, including
Eric Herschmann, Derek Lyons, and White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone “pushed back strongly” against the idea of seizing
voting machines. Cipollone told the Select Committee it was
a “horrible idea,” which had “no legal basis,” 225 and he
emphasized that he had “seen no evidence of massive fraud in
the election.” 226 White House advisor Eric Herschmann
similarly told the Select Committee that he “never saw any
evidence whatsoever” to sustain the allegations against
Dominion.227 National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien phoned
into the December 18th meeting and was asked if he had seen
“any evidence of election fraud in the voting machines or
foreign interference in our voting machines.” O’Brien
responded that his team had “looked into that, and there’s
no evidence of it.” 228
Around the same time, President Trump, Mark Meadows, and
Rudy Giuliani were repeatedly asking the leadership of DHS
whether the agency had authority to seize voting machines,
and they were repeatedly told that DHS has no such
unilateral authority.229 Giuliani and Powell were also
engaged in efforts to access voting machines in multiple
States with the assistance of sympathetic local election
officials.230 Those efforts turned up no evidence of any
vote manipulation by any Dominion machine, but President
Trump continued to press this bogus claim.
On January 2, 2021, President Trump had a lengthy phone call
with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. The
President repeatedly brought up Dominion’s voting machines,
alleging that they were at the heart of a conspiracy against
him.231 Raffensperger was incredulous. “I don’t believe that
you’re really questioning the Dominion machines,”
Raffensperger said. “Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100
percent re-tally of all the ballots, and compared them to
what the machines said and came up with virtually the same
result. Then we did the recount, and we got virtually the
same result.” 232 In other words, the story in Georgia was
the same as the story in Antrim County, Michigan: Officials
performed a hand recount to put to rest any allegations that
Dominion’s machines had manipulated the vote. But once
again, President Trump consciously disregarded these basic
facts and persisted with his lies.
During a January 4, 2021, speech in Dalton, Georgia,
President Trump chose to ignore Secretary Raffensperger’s
straightforward observations. The President rhetorically
attacked Dominion once again, claiming that a “crime” had
been “committed in this state” and it was
“immeasurable.” 233 The President called for an “immediate
forensic audit of an appropriate sampling of Dominion’s
voting machines and related equipment.” 234 His allegations
were both false and nonsensical. Georgia had already
performed a statewide hand recount of all ballots.
President Trump and his allies have never provided any
evidence showing that Dominion’s voting software altered
votes in the 2020 presidential election. In fact, some of
the most vocal proponents of the Dominion claims harbored
their own misgivings about the claims they were making in
public. For example, Rudy Giuliani repeatedly claimed in
public that Dominion voting machines stole the election, and
that foreign countries had interfered in the election, but
the evidence uncovered by the Select Committee reveals that
he did not believe either of those things to be true.
Giuliani testified that he did not believe that voting
machines stole the election.235 He also acknowledged that he
had seen no evidence that foreign countries had interfered
in the election or manipulated votes.236
This testimony is consistent with his lead investigator
Bernie Kerik’s acknowledgment that he had not come across
proof that voting machines were used to switch, delete, or
inject votes improperly.237 Christina Bobb, an attorney who
worked with Giuliani, similarly could not point to any
evidence of wrongdoing by Dominion.238 Even Sidney Powell,
perhaps the most committed proponent of the Dominion
falsehoods, was unable to provide the Select Committee with
any evidence or expert report that demonstrated that the
2020 election outcome in any State had been altered through
manipulation of voting machines.239 And Powell defended
herself in a defamation suit brought by Dominion by claiming
that “no reasonable person would conclude that her
statements were truly statements of fact.” 240
By January 6, 2021, President Trump’s claims regarding
Dominion had been debunked time and again. The President
knew, or should have known, that he had no basis for
alleging that Dominion’s voting machines had cost him the
election.
The State Farm Arena Video
President Trump also recklessly promoted allegations that
video footage from a ballot counting center in Fulton
County, Georgia, was proof of major election fraud. He was
repeatedly informed that these allegations were false, but
he pressed them anyway.
On December 3rd, Rudy Giuliani presented State legislators
with selectively edited footage of ballots being counted on
Election Night at Fulton County’s State Farm Arena.241
Giuliani misrepresented the video as “a smoking gun” proving
election fraud.242 The President repeatedly claimed that he
would have won Georgia, if not for a supposed conspiracy
that unfolded on election night. President Trump and some of
his supporters alleged that political operatives faked a
water main rupture to expel Republican poll watchers.243
These same operatives then supposedly took illegal ballots
from suitcases hidden under tables and added those ballots
to the official count multiple times over by scanning them
more than once.244 Not one of these allegations was true.
In a speech on December 5th, President Trump made the false
claim about the State Farm Arena and claimed that “if you
just take the crime of what those Democrat workers were
doing . . . [t]hat’s 10 times more than I need to win this
state.” 245 During a December 22nd speech, he played the
same deceptive footage presented by Giuliani several weeks
earlier.246 President Trump also repeatedly scapegoated one
of these Fulton County election workers during his January
2nd phone call with Georgia’s Secretary of State, repeatedly
referencing her by name and calling her “a professional vote
scammer and hustler.” 247 It was a malicious smear.
President Trump was directly notified at least four
different times that the allegations he was making were
false. On December 15th, then-Deputy Attorney General
Jeffrey Rosen told him: “It wasn’t a suitcase. It was a bin.
That’s what they use when they’re counting ballots. It’s
benign.” 248 Rosen’s deputy, Richard Donoghue, also debunked
this claim, including on a phone call on December 27th and
in a meeting in the Oval Office on December 31st: “I told
the President myself . . . several times, in several
conversations, that these allegations about ballots being
smuggled in in a suitcase and run through the machines
several times, it was not true, that we had looked at it, we
looked at the video, we interviewed the witnesses, and it
was not true.” 249
Likewise, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger told
President Trump that his allegations about the video were
false. During his January 2nd call with the President,
Raffensperger explained that Giuliani’s team “sliced and
diced that video and took it out of context” and that “the
events that transpired are nowhere near what was projected”
once one looks at more complete footage.250 Raffensperger
also explained to the President that his team “did an audit
of that, and we proved conclusively that they were not
scanned three times.” 251 Yet, when Raffensperger said he
would send President Trump a link to the television segment,
the President refused: “I don’t care about the link. I don’t
need it.” 252
The actual evidence contradicted all of President Trump’s
claims about what the Fulton County video depicted. For
example, the chief investigator for Raffensperger’s office
explained in a December 6th court filing that “there were no
mystery ballots that were brought in from an unknown
location and hidden under tables….” 253 As the investigator
noted, the security footage showed there was nothing under
the table when it was brought into the room. Hours later,
with reporters and observers present, the “video shows
ballots that had already been opened but not counted placed
in the boxes, sealed up, [and] stored under the table.” 254
This finding was affirmed by the FBI, DOJ, and the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation, which interviewed witnesses and
reviewed the full video footage and machine data from the
site.255
The ballots in question were not double counted. This was
confirmed by a full hand recount in November, as well as a
subsequent review by investigators.256 They found that
although one of the workers was shown in the video scanning
certain batches multiple times, this was for a valid reason:
her scanner kept jamming. The investigators confirmed from
scanner logs, as well as the footage, that she only hit the
“accept” button once per batch.257 Investigators also found
that staff likely did not tell the observers to leave, let
alone forcefully eject them from the facility.258
Despite this conclusive evidence and testimony, President
Trump continued to point to the Fulton County video as
evidence of a grand conspiracy. On January 5th, for
instance, President Trump’s executive assistant emailed a
document “from POTUS” to Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), Senator
Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) that
cited “Suitcase Gate” among the “worst fraud incidents” in
Georgia.259
During his January 6th speech, President Trump told the
crowd that “in Fulton County, Republican poll watchers were
ejected, in some cases, physically from the room under the
false pretense of a pipe burst.” The President continued:
…then election officials pull boxes, Democrats, and
suitcases of ballots out from under a table. You all saw it
on television, totally fraudulent. And illegally scanned
them for nearly two hours, totally unsupervised. Tens of
thousands of votes. This act coincided with a mysterious
vote dump of up to 100,000 votes for Joe Biden, almost none
for Donald Trump.260
No part of President Trump’s story was true. He had already
been informed that it was false.
In June 2021, when Giuliani’s law license was revoked by a
New York State appellate court, the court’s ruling cited his
statements about supposed suitcases of ballots in Georgia as
one of its reasons for doing so. “If, as respondent claims,
he reviewed the entire video, he could not have reasonably
reached a conclusion that illegal votes were being counted,”
the court’s ruling reads.261
President Trump's conspiracy-mongering endangered innocent
public servants around the country, including in Fulton
County. For example, during a December 10, 2020, appearance
in Georgia, Giuliani falsely accused Ruby Freeman and Shaye
Moss, two Black public servants shown in the Fulton County
video, of “surreptitiously passing around USB ports as if
they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” 262 In fact, Moss had
been given a ginger mint by her mother, Freeman.263 As
described in Chapter 2, baseless accusations like these
forever changed the lives of election workers like Freeman
and Moss. All in service of President Trump's Big Lie.
The Fake Ballot Myth
The Trump Campaign’s distortion of the State Farm Arena
video is just one example of the “fake ballots” lie.
President Trump frequently claimed that “fake ballots” for
Biden were injected into the vote-counting process. To hear
the President tell it, there were truckloads of ballots
delivered in the middle of the night to vote-counting
centers and millions more votes were cast than there were
registered voters. Judges, Trump administration officials,
State authorities, and independent election experts found
each iteration of the “fake ballot” claim to be just that:
fake. The Trump Campaign and its surrogates brought nine
cases that raised some version of a “fake ballots” claim.
Every one of those cases was promptly dismissed.264 For
example, in Costantino v. City of Detroit, a Michigan court
ruled that the plaintiff’s claims regarding forged,
backdated and double-counted votes in Detroit were
“incorrect and not credible” and “rife with speculation and
guess-work about sinister motives.” 265
Many of the fake ballot claims were publicly raised and
repeated by President Trump, but never included in any
lawsuit. For example, a truck driver for the U.S. Postal
Service claimed that he delivered hundreds of thousands of
completed ballots from Bethpage, New York to Lancaster,
Pennsylvania.266 President Trump repeated this allegation
numerous times.267 The DOJ and FBI interviewed the relevant
witnesses, including the truck driver, and reviewed the
loading manifests. They determined that the allegation was
not true.268 Both Attorney General Barr and his successor,
Jeffrey Rosen, told President Trump this claim was false.
But that didn’t stop the President from repeating it.
Another alleged “truckload of ballots” was supposedly
delivered to the Detroit counting center at 4:30 a.m. on
election night. This truck allegedly carried 100,000 ballots
in garbage cans, wastepaper bins, cardboard boxes, and
shopping baskets.269 A widely circulated video purportedly
showed an unmarked van dropping off ballots, which were then
wheeled into the counting center on a wagon.270 In fact, the
only ballot delivery in Detroit after midnight on election
night was an official delivery of 16,000 ballots, stacked in
45 well-organized trays of approximately 350 ballots
each.271 The wagon depicted in the video contained camera
equipment being pulled by a reporter.272 The claim of
100,000 fake ballots being smuggled into the counting center
in the middle of the night is even more ridiculous in light
of the fact that only 174,384 absent voter ballots were
recorded in the City of Detroit in the 2020 election.273 The
addition of 100,000 fake ballots to approximately 74,000
legitimate ballots would certainly have been obvious to
election officials.274
President Trump also repeatedly claimed that more votes were
cast than there were registered voters in certain States,
cities, or precincts. It was easy to fact-check these
allegations and demonstrate they were false.
For example, in Pennsylvania, approximately nine million
people were registered to vote and approximately 6.8 million
votes were cast in the 2020 presidential election.275
Nevertheless, President Trump and his allies made numerous
“more votes than voters” claims in Pennsylvania. Citing 2020
mail-in voting data tweeted by Pennsylvania State Senator
Doug Mastriano, President Trump claimed that 1.1 million
ballots had been “created” and counted improperly.276 In
fact, there was no discrepancy in the actual
numbers—Mastriano erroneously compared the 2.6 million
mail-in ballots cast in the November general election to the
1.5 million ballots that were returned in the June primary
election.277
President Trump also promoted a false claim by a different
Pennsylvania legislator that Pennsylvania had 205,000 more
votes than voters.278 This claim was based on a flawed
comparison by State Representative Frank Ryan of the votes
recorded by State election authorities as having been cast
and those reflected in a separate State registry.279 In
fact, the discrepancy was a result of some counties not yet
uploading their official results to the registry.280 In
late-December 2020, Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue
told President Trump that this allegation was baseless.281
President Trump kept repeating it anyway.282
The President and his surrogates made similar false claims
concerning excess votes in Michigan. Many of those claims
originated with a grossly inaccurate affidavit submitted by
Russell Ramsland, the person behind the “very amateurish”
and “false and misleading” ASOG report regarding Dominion
voting machines in Antrim County.283 Ramsland claimed in a
similar affidavit filed in Federal court in Georgia that
3,276 precincts in Michigan had turnout of between 84% and
350%, with 19 precincts reporting turnout in excess of
100%.284 Ramsland’s affidavit was widely ridiculed, in part,
because he relied on data for dozens of precincts that are
located in Minnesota, not Michigan.285 Even after he
corrected his affidavit to remove the Minnesota townships,
his Michigan data remained wildly off-base.286
The “Multiple Counting of Ballots” Fiction
The President and his surrogates repeatedly claimed that
ballots for former Vice President Biden were counted
multiple times.287 These claims originated when some noticed
election officials re-running stacks of ballots through
counting machines. But the allegation is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the vote-counting process—it
is routine and appropriate for election officials to re-scan
ballots if they are not properly scanned and tabulated in
the initial effort. In Costantino v. City of Detroit, the
court rejected the “incorrect and not credible” affidavits
speculating that ballots were run through scanners and
counted multiple times in favor of the “more accurate and
persuasive explanation of activity” put forward by the
“highly-respected” election official with 40 years of
experience.288
As with other misguided claims of election fraud, the claim
that ballots were counted multiple times disregards the
safeguards in the voting process. In particular, as noted
above, it would certainly have been apparent in the
canvassing process if hundreds of ballots were counted
multiple times in Detroit because the total number of
ballots would greatly exceed the number of voters who voted.
But that was not the case.
The Imaginary “Dead” and “Ineligible” Voters
In addition to their false claims regarding fake ballots,
President Trump and his surrogates also relentlessly
asserted that tens of thousands of ballots were cast by dead
or otherwise ineligible voters. For example, President Trump
and Giuliani frequently alleged that more than 66,000
unregistered juveniles voted in Georgia.289 In fact, no
underage people voted in Georgia.290 Giuliani offered
several different made-up figures of the number of
non-citizens who supposedly voted in Arizona, but provided
no evidence to substantiate his claims.291 In fact, Arizona
requires every new voter to provide proof of citizenship in
order to register to vote—or to complete a Federal voter
registration form that requires the individual to sign an
attestation to citizenship status under penalty of
perjury—and no person can vote without being registered.292
By mid-November, Trump Campaign staff determined this
allegation that thousands of non-citizens voted in Arizona
was based on “highly unreliable” information, and it is one
of the false claims that led to Giuliani losing his New York
law license.293 These “ineligible” voters did not exist.
Nor were thousands of votes cast in the names of dead
Americans.
During his January 2nd, call with Georgia Secretary of State
Raffensperger, the President claimed that “close to about
5,000 [dead] voters” cast ballots in the election.
Raffensperger quickly informed the President this wasn’t
true. 294 But the “dead voter” lie wasn’t limited to
Georgia. President Trump wanted Americans to believe that
“dead voters” contributed to his defeat in several
battleground States.295
But even the Trump Campaign and its lawyers recognized early
on that the claims regarding “dead voters” were grossly
exaggerated, to say the least. By early November, Trump
lawyers discovered that many people listed by the campaign
as having died were actually alive and well.296 In early
December, Eric Herschmann advised Chief of Staff Meadows by
text message that the Trump legal team had determined that
the claim of more than 10,000 dead people voting in Georgia
was not accurate.297 The ensuing exchange makes clear that
both men knew that Giuliani’s claims were absurd:
Herschmann: Just an FYI. Alex Cannon and his team verified
that the 10k+ supposed dead people voting in GA is not
accurate
Meadows: I didn’t hear that claim. It is not accurate. I
think I found 22 if I remember correctly. Two of them died
just days before the general
Herschmann: It was alleged in Rudy's hearing today. Your
number is much closer to what we can prove. I think it's 12
Meadows: My son found 12 obituaries and 6 other possibles
depending on the Voter roll acuracy [sic]
Herschmann: That sounds more like it. Maybe he can help Rudy
find the other 10k ??
Meadows: lol298
Shortly thereafter, a Georgia court dismissed the claim that
there were tens of thousands of votes cast by ineligible
voters, noting the claims “rest on speculation rather than
duly pled facts.” 299
The Trump Campaign’s own expert on the supposed “dead
voters” admitted that the Campaign lacked the necessary data
to make any conclusions about whether any (or how many)
votes were cast in the name of a deceased person.300 State
officials did have such data, however, and were able to
conduct the type of matching analysis required. These State
authorities determined that there were only a handful of
cases in which people voted on behalf of deceased
individuals.301
Even in those cases where the person who voted actually did
die, President Trump’s lawyers knew that the vast majority
of the voters included on their list of dead voters actually
cast their votes before they passed.302 In early-January
2021, just days before January 6th, Republican Senator
Lindsey Graham asked several Trump lawyers to provide
evidence to support the Campaign’s claims regarding dead
voters.303 As Giuliani’s team investigated, they concluded
that they could not find evidence of dead voters anywhere
near the number that Giuliani and President Trump were
claiming publicly. After noting the shortcomings in their
evidence, Katherine Friess, a lawyer working with the
Giuliani legal team, warned that Senator Graham would “push
back” on their evidence.304 As predicted by Friess, Senator
Graham was not impressed by the information provided by
Giuliani’s team. In his speech on the Senate floor on
January 6th, Graham explained why he would not object to the
certification of electoral votes. Senator Graham referred to
the failure of the Trump attorneys to provide the evidence
he requested:
They said there’s 66,000 people in Georgia under 18 voted.
How many people believe that? I asked, “Give me 10.” Hadn’t
had one. They said 8,000 felons in prison in Arizona voted.
Give me 10. Hadn’t gotten one. Does that say there’s—There’s
problems in every election. I don’t buy this. Enough’s
enough. We’ve got to end it.305
Documents obtained by the Select Committee reveal that
President Trump and his lawyers knew that the claims being
made in court about dead or ineligible voters in Georgia
were inaccurate, and the lawyers were concerned that if the
President vouched for those claims in another court pleading
he might be criminally prosecuted. On December 31st, as the
lawyers rushed to file a Federal lawsuit in Georgia, some of
the lawyers raised concerns about the President signing a
“verification” under oath that the allegations regarding
voter fraud in Georgia, including claims regarding dead
people voting, were true. As Dr. Eastman noted in an email
to his colleagues on December 31st:
Although the President signed a verification [regarding the
Georgia claims] back on Dec. 1, he has since been made aware
that some of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the
experts) has been inaccurate. For him to sign a new
verification with that knowledge . . . would not be
accurate. And I have no doubt that an aggressive DA or US
Atty someplace will go after both the President and his
lawyers once all the dust settles on this.306
Despite these concerns, President Trump and his attorneys
filed a complaint that incorporated the same inaccurate
numbers, and President Trump signed a verification swearing
under oath that the inaccurate numbers were “true and
correct” or “believed to be true and correct” to the best of
his knowledge and belief.307 A Federal judge reviewing the
relevant emails and pleadings recently concluded:
The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific
numbers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout
those numbers, both in court and to the public. The Court
finds that these emails are sufficiently related to and in
furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the United States.308
1.9 President Trump’s January 6th Speech
At noon on January 6, 2021, President Trump addressed
thousands of his supporters at a rally just south of the
White House. The election had been decided two months
earlier. The courts found there was no evidence of
significant fraud. The States certified their votes by
mid-December. It was over—President Trump lost. But that’s
not what the President told those in attendance. He
delivered an incendiary speech from beginning to end,
arguing that nothing less than the fate of America was at
stake.
“Our country has had enough,” President Trump said. “We will
not take it anymore and that's what this is all about.” 309
He claimed that his followers had descended on Washington to
“save our democracy” and “stop the steal.” 310 He refused,
once again, to concede. And he proclaimed that “[t]oday I
will lay out just some of the evidence proving that we won
this election and we won it by a landslide.” 311
Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images
Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images
For months, President Trump had relentlessly promoted his
Big Lie.312 He and his associates manufactured one tale
after another to justify it. For more than an hour on
January 6th, the President wove these conspiracy theories
and lies together.313
By the Select Committee’s assessment, there were more than
100 times during his speech in which President Trump falsely
claimed that either the election had been stolen from him,
or falsely claimed that votes had been compromised by some
specific act of fraud or major procedural violations. That
day, President Trump repeated many of the same lies he had
told for months—even after being informed that many of these
claims were false. He lied about Dominion voting machines in
Michigan, suitcases of ballots in Georgia, more votes than
voters in Pennsylvania, votes cast by non-citizens in
Arizona, and dozens of other false claims of election
fraud.314 None of those claims were true.
As explained in the chapters that follow, the Big Lie was
central to President Trump’s plan to stay in power. He used
the Big Lie to pressure State and local officials to undo
the will of the people. His campaign convened fake electors
on the baseless pretense that former Vice President Biden
won several States due to fraud or other malfeasance. The
President tried to subvert the Department of Justice by
browbeating its leadership to endorse his election lies. And
when the DOJ’s senior personnel did not acquiesce, President
Trump sought to install a loyalist who would.
When all those efforts failed, President Trump betrayed his
own Vice President. He pressured Vice President Pence to
obstruct the joint session of Congress on January 6th,
falsely claiming that he had the power to refuse to count
certain electoral votes. President Trump knew this was
illegal but attempted to justify it with lies about the
election.
On December 19, 2020, President Trump summoned a mob to
Washington, DC on the same day that Congress was set to
certify former Vice President Biden’s victory by claiming
the election was stolen and promising a “wild” protest.315
And the bogus stolen election claim was the focus of
President Trump’s speech on January 6th. The litany of lies
he told riled up a mob that would march to the U.S. Capitol
to intimidate Vice President Pence and Members of Congress.
“And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don't fight
like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore,”
President Trump told the crowd.316 He incited them with
these words just after praising his own election night
lie—the Big Lie.
President Trump told his followers to “fight” to “save”
their country from a bogus specter of supposed election
fraud.317 And many of them did.
ENDNOTES
1. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,”
Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 60.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb.
3, 2022), pp. 74-75.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb.
3, 2022), pp. 75, 78.
5. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting
on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020,
discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
6. We note that Bannon refused to testify and has been
convicted of criminal contempt by a jury of his peers. See
“Stephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two
Counts of Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice,
(Oct. 21, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-two-counts-contempt-congress;
Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,” Mother Jones,
(July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
7. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment Right
not to incriminate himself, including to questions regarding
his direct communications with Donald Trump and his role in
January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13,
2022), at 39:15 - 39:33 available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 27.
9. Jennifer Agiesta and Marshall Cohen, “CNN Poll: Questions
about Accuracy of Vote Counting Rise as Most Want to Vote
before Election Day,” CNN, (Aug. 18, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/18/politics/cnn-poll-trump-biden-election-security-mail-in-voting/index.html;
Mark Murray, “Biden Leads Trump by 10 points in Final
Pre-Election NBC News/WSJ poll,” NBC News, (Nov. 1, 2020,
updated Nov. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/biden-leads-trump-10-points-final-pre-election-nbc-news-n1245667.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 44.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
15. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,” Mother Jones,
(July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
During our October 13 hearing, Robert Costa tweeted: “CBS
News has confirmed that Oct. 31, 2020, was a key date in the
pre-election maneuvers by Trump. Set off alarm with WH
counsel and Herschmann, among others. I’ve seen texts from
that night from some aides and they knew it was no joke;
declaring victory was Trump’s plan. Period.” Maggie Haberman
retweeted Costa, writing: “Trump told a conference call of a
bunch of lawyers and informal advisers working for him
earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he
won, first reported by @jonathanvswan.” Robert Costa
(@costareports), Twitter, Oct. 13, 2022 1:29 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/costareports/status/1580611586674151424?lang=en;
see also Maggie Haberman (@maggieNYT), Twitter, Oct. 13,
2022 1:35 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/maggienyt/status/1580613143637635072
(“Trump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and
informal advisers working for him earlier that month that he
was going to go up and say he won, first reported by
@jonathanvswan”).
16. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,” Mother Jones,
(July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
17. Fox Business, “Steve Bannon: Trump Won’t Allow the
Election to Be Stolen,” YouTube, at 3:24, Nov. 3, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDdxoyAUqoo.
18. “Steve Bannon: Donald Trump Will Claim Victory ‘Right
Before the 11 O’clock News’,” Media Matters, (Nov. 3, 2020),
available at
https://www.mediamatters.org/steve-bannon/steve-bannon-donald-trump-will-claim-victory-right-11-oclock-news-0.
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting
on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020,
discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting
on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020,
discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting
on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020,
discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting
on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020,
discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001
(Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting
on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020,
discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13,
2022), at 38:18 - 39:32, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0.
25. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory
If He Appears on Election Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020),
available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots.
26. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory
If He Appears on Election Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020),
available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots.
27. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory
If He Appears on Election Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020),
available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
29. Months prior to the election, Josh Mendelsohn, the CEO
of Hawkfish, a Democratic data and analytics firm, warned
that President Trump would try to take advantage of the Red
Mirage. See Margaret Talev, “Exclusive: Dem Group Warns of
Apparent Trump Election Day Landslide,” Axios, (Sept. 1,
2020), available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios.
For other accounts warning that election night would see a
Red Mirage, see Marshall Cohen, “Deciphering the ‘Red
Mirage,’ the ‘Blue Shift,’ and the Uncertainty Surrounding
Election Results This November,” CNN, (Sept. 1, 2020),
available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/01/politics/2020-election-count-red-mirage-blue-shift/index.html;
Darragh Roche, “Trump Is Heading for a ‘Red Mirage’ Win on
Election Night, Bloomberg-Funded Data Firm Says,” Newsweek,
(Sept. 1, 2020), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-phantom-win-election-1528948;
Tom McCarthy, “‘Red Mirage’: The ‘Insidious’ Scenario If
Trump Declares Victory,” The Guardian, (Oct. 31, 2020),
available at
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory.
30. “Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and
Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing,”
White House, April 7, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-april-7-2020/.
31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Apr. 8,
2020 8:20 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201201162757/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1247861952736526336
(archived).
32. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, May 24,
2020 10:08 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20200701075716/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1264558926021959680
(archived).
33. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Sept. 17,
2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201115164217/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1306562791894122504
(archived).
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000010941_0001-2, ,
076P-R000010940_0001-6 (July 23, 2020, emails regarding
scheduling a meeting for the President with McCarthy,
Stepien, and others).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.
36. Fox News, “President Trump Goes One-on-One with Chris
Wallace,” YouTube, July 19, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6XdpDOH1JA; Pat Ward
(@WardDPatrick), Twitter, July 19, 2020 10:15 a.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/WardDPatrick/status/1284854318575878144.
37. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White
House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-092420/.
38. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White
House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-092420/.
39. Barbara Sprunt, “Trump Questions Election Again after
White House Walked Back His Earlier Remarks,” NPR, (Sept.
24, 2020), available at
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/916440816/republican-leaders-reject-trump-hedging-on-transfer-of-power-amid-war-over-confi.
40. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4,
2020 12:49 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201105044240/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1323864823680126977
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Nov. 4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201104153504/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1324004491612618752
(archived).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.
42. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,”
Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.
43. See “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech
Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020
12:49 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201104060648/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1323864823680126977
(archived).
44. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,” Mother Jones,
(July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
45. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, at esp. 1:42-3:35, available at
https://vimeo.com/485180163; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:17 a.m. ET,
available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324007806694023169.jpg
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Nov. 4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324004491612618752.jpg
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Nov. 18, 2020 8:22 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329233502139715586.jpg
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Nov. 19, 2020 8:49 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329602736053252107.jpg
(archived).
46. For example, one widely shared post claimed that, in the
early-morning hours of November 4, hundreds of thousands of
mail in ballots were “found” in Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania, and all of the ballots were for Biden. Nick
Adams (@NickAdamsinUSA), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 4:48 p.m.,
available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201110150437/https://twitter.com/NickAdamsinUSA/status/1324151663641448448
(archived).
47. In many metropolitan areas, absentee ballots are counted
in centralized locations and reported in batches. For
example, the ballots that were supposedly “found” in
Wisconsin were absentee ballots reported by Milwaukee County
when that county completed its tally. Of the approximately
181,000 votes reported between 3:26 and 3:44 a.m., Biden
received approximately 83% of the votes and Trump received
approximately 17%. See Eric Litke and Madeline Heim, “Fact
check: Wisconsin Did Not ‘Find’ 100K Ballots around 4 a.m.
the Morning after the Election, or Take Break from Counting
Votes,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Nov. 4, 2020),
available at
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/04/wisconsin-didnt-find-ballots-stop-count-voter-fraud-claims-untrue-politifact/6165435002/.
In Michigan, no ballots were “found” between 3:30-5:00 a.m.
Rather, approximately 200,000 votes were reported by Wayne
County shortly after 6:00 a.m., the vast majority of which
were for Biden. See Geoffrey Skelley, “Live Bog: 2020
Election Results Coverage: Michigan’s Morning Update,”
FiveThirtyEight, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://fivethirtyeight.com/live-blog/2020-election-results-coverage/#294294.
Overall, Biden won 68% of the vote in Wayne County, to 30%
for Trump. However, among absentee voters, Biden won 75% to
Trump’s 23%. See “November 3, 2020 - General Election
Results,” Charter County of Wayne, Michigan, available at
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/november-3-2020-general-election-results.aspx.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; See also John
Curiel, Charles Stewart III, and Jack Williams, One Shift,
Two Shifts, Red Shift, Blue Shifts: Reported Election
Returns in the 2020 Election, MIT Election Data and Science
Lab, (July 9, 2021), p. 40, available at
https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2021-07/curiel_stewart_williams_blue_shift_esra_final.pdf,
(detailed analysis of timed reporting data shows that
“smaller and more rural counties, which favored Trump, could
report their ballots before the counties with hundreds of
precincts and hundreds of thousands of voters”).
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119, 124-26, 174.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudy Giuliani,
(May 20, 2022), pp. 22–23.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudy Giuliani,
(May 20, 2022), pp. 23, 26.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudy Giuliani,
(May 20, 2022), p. 35 (describing Ellis as “a co-counsel”
and “my number two person” so “generally, if you got an
opinion from Jenna, it would be just like getting an opinion
from me”).
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 10, 15–18.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 92.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111–112.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows
Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email from Bill
Stepien to Mark Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller
titled “Fwd: AZ Federal ID Voters”).
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex
Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 19–23.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex
Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 38–39.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex
Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 33-34.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117–18.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 112–13.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 88–91.
67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010951-52 (November 3,
2020, Jason Miller text message to Mark Meadows at 10:27
pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010972 (November 3,
2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Meadows and
David Bossie at 11:53 pm); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011343
(November 6, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark
Meadows, Ivanka Trump, Bill Stepien, Hope Hicks, Dan
Scavino, and Jared Kushner at 11:10 am).
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115– 17; Brian
Slodysko, “Explainer: Why AP Called Pennsylvania for Biden,”
Associated Press (Nov. 7, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/ap-called-pennsylvania-joe-biden-why-f7dba7b31bd21ec2819a7ac9d2b028d3.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115– 20.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 118.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.; Federal
Election Commission, “Federal Elections 2020 – Election
Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S.
House of Representatives,” Oct. 2022, p. 12, available at
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
77. “Risk-Limiting Audit Report – Georgia Presidential
Contest, November 2020,” Georgia Secretary of State, (Nov.
19, 2020), available at
https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/11.19_.20_risk_limiting_audit_report_memo_1.pdf.
78. See “Summary of Hand Count Audits – 2020 General
Election,” Arizona Secretary of State, (Nov. 17, 2020),
available at
https://azsos.gov/2020-general-election-hand-count-results ;
“Agreed Upon Procedures Report – Evaluation of the Accuracy
of Voting Machine Tabulators Used for the 2020 General
Elections Held on November 3, 2020 (Voting System Check),”
New Mexico Secretary of State, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at
https://api.realfile.rtsclients.com/PublicFiles/ee3072ab0d43456cb15a51f7d82c77a2/f740346c-7b6b-4479-acd6-068829382307/2020%20Post%20Election%20Voting%20System%20Check%20Audit%20Results.pdf.
Similar audits conducted by Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin also affirmed the results in those states, but
their results are excluded from this list because in those
instances their audit results were not available until after
January 6th. Shortly after the election, Nevada also
conducted some post-election checks that supported the
validity of the results there too, including testing a
sample of the voting machines to make sure votes were
accurately recorded. Deposition of Joseph Gloria at 33, Law
v. Whitmer, No. A-22-858609-W (Nev. Ct., Clark Cty. Dec. 1,
2020), p. 33, available at
https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2022.10.31-NV-Poll-Worker-Response-to-Application-for-Mandamus-STAMPED.pdf;
Rex Briggs, “Trump Supporters Asked me to Look into Voter
Fraud in Nevada; What I found Debunked What They were
Alleging,” Nevada Independent, (Dec. 22, 2020), available at
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/trump-supporters-asked-me-to-look-into-voter-fraud-in-nevada-what-i-found-debunked-what-they-were-alleging.
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115,
JK00117-132(November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski,
and attached analysis of battleground states).
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132
(November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached
analysis of battleground states).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132
(November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached
analysis of battleground states).
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132
(November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached
analysis of battleground states).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani
(May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani
(May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani
(May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 106-107. Sidney Powell
and Jenna Ellis accompanied Giuliani. The campaign was
represented by Jared Kushner, Bill Stepien, David Bossie (a
former senior official on President Trump’s 2016 campaign),
Derek Lyons, and Justin Clark. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31,
2022), pp. 50-51; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 64-65. Eric
Herschmann also arrived at the campaign headquarters as the
meeting was underway. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Mar. 17, 2022),
pp. 160-61.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 107.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25,
2022), pp. 34-35.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 14-16.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 14-16.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35, 41-42.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
100. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Philadelphia Press
Conference at Four Seasons Total Landscaping,” Rev, (Nov. 7,
2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-philadelphia-press-conference-november-7.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 30-32.
102. “Memorandum from Attorney General William Barr on
Post-Voting Election Irregularity Inquiries to the United
States Attorneys, to the Assistant Attorneys General for the
Criminal Division, Civil Rights Division, and National
Security Division, and to the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 9, 2020),
available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20403358-william-barr-election-memo-november-9.
Longstanding DOJ policy had been not to conduct such
investigations prior to certification to avoid impacting
election results. See Federal Prosecution of Election
Offenses, 8th ed. Department of Justice, December 2017, at
84, available at
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67; Mike Pence, So Help
Me God, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431-432.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 67; Mike Pence, So Help Me
God, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431.
106. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov.
15, 2020 7:11 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201117115935/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1327811527123103746
(archived).
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 37-38.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 174-175.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020
email from Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David
Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner describing Rudy
Giuliani’s surrogate briefing).
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020
email from Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David
Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner describing Rudy
Giuliani’s surrogate briefing).
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020
email from Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David
Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner describing Rudy
Giuliani’s surrogate briefing).
112. Factba.se, “Interview: Brian Kilmeade of Fox News
Interviews Donald Trump - December 13, 2020,” Vimeo, at
7:47, Dec. 13, 2020, available at
https://vimeo.com/490517184.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
114. Select Committee staff analyzed the lawsuits. See also,
Brendan Williams, Did President Trump’s 2020 Election
Litigation Kill Rule11?, 30 Pub. Interest L. J. 181, 189
(2021), available at
https://www.bu.edu/pilj/files/2021/06/Williams.pdf.
115. The only case that involved a victory for the campaign
was the Pennsylvania case of Trump v. Boockvar. In that
case, the court found that the Pennsylvania Secretary of
State could not extend the deadline for voters to cure their
failure to provide proper identification for absentee
ballots. This decision affected just a few thousand votes,
which were not included in any tallies. Trump v. Boockvar,
No. 602 MD 2020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 12, 2020), available at
https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/602-MD-20-1.pdf.
116. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B.
Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case
that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential
Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at
https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
117. Complaint at 2, Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699
(D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-02321), ECF No. 1.
118. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706, 723 (D.
Ariz. 2020).
119. Minute Entry and Order at 6-9, Ward v. Jackson, No.
CV2020-015285 (Az. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020).
120. See Ward v. Jackson, No. CV-20-0343-AP, 2020 Ariz.
LEXIS 313, at *6 (Ariz. 2020), also available at
https://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/1984/637437053596970000;
Howard Fischer, “State Supreme Court rejects GOP bid to void
election,” Arizona Capitol Times, (Dec. 8, 2020), available
at
https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2020/12/08/federal-judge-hears-arguments-in-election-challenge/;
“Meet the Justices,” Arizona Judicial Branch, (Dec. 8,
2020), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201208032900/https://www.azcourts.gov/meetthejustices/
(archived); “Brutinel Elected as Next Arizona Supreme Court
Chief Justice,” Associated Press, (Nov. 20, 2018), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/27b725d44d384e2cb7a0e491ac82fe7f;
Bob Christie, “Ducey Names 2 to New Arizona Supreme Court
Seats,” Associated Press, (Nov. 28, 2016), available at
https://apnews.com/article/26fc7f154b0e4b4fb358987941ded8d0;
“Arizona Governor Appoints New Supreme Court Justice,”
Associated Press, (Apr. 26, 2019), available at
https://apnews.com/article/4ce4bf1d79724c03b1d4cf36f4b97cf1;
Jonathan J. Cooper, “Ducey Appoints Montgomery to Arizona
Supreme Court,” Associated Press, (Sep. 4, 2019), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/bac43d42185c4b8bb9e8c465a59792c8.
121. Complaint at 1-2, Boland v. Raffensperger, No.
2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2020), available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-Complaint.pdf.
122. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. No.
2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2020), available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.
123. Order Denying Appeal, Boland v. Raffensperger, No.
S21M0565 (Ga. Dec. 14, 2020), available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-GA-SC-Order-Denying-Appeal.pdf;
Jonathan Ringel, “Deal Picks Krause, Richardson for Fulton
Superior,” Law.com, (Dec. 28, 2018), available at
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2018/12/28/deal-picks-krause-richardson-for-fulton-superior/;
“Chief Justice Harold D. Melton,” Supreme Court of Georgia,
(Oct. 16, 2020), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201016174745/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-harold-d-melton/
(archived); “Presiding Justice David E. Nahmias,” Supreme
Court of Georgia, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201120204518/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-david-e-nahmias/
(archived); “Chief Justice Michael P. Boggs,” Supreme Court
of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-michael-p-boggs/;
“Presiding Justice Nels S.D. Peterson,” Supreme Court of
Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-nels-s-d-peterson/;
“Justice Sarah Hawkins Warren,” Supreme Court of Georgia,
(last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-sarah-hawkins-warren/;
“Justice Charles J. Bethel,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last
accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-charles-j-bethel/;
“Justice Carla Wong McMillian,” Supreme Court of Georgia,
(last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-carla-wong-mcmillian/.
124. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317,
1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
125. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (N.D.
Ga. 2020).
126. Complaint for Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent
Injunctive Relief, King v. Whitmer, Case No.
2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW,(E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1;
King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
In a subsequent decision, the judge called the case “a
historic and profound abuse of the judicial process” and
sanctioned the attorneys who filed the lawsuit King v.
Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688-89 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
127. Opinion and Order at 1, 4, Stoddard v. City Election
Commission, No. 20-014604-CZ, (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6,
2020), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/AG/releases/2020/november/Stoddard_et_al_v_City_Election_Commission_et_al_-_11-06-2020.pdf?rev=2fa32f93caa94365a1ee8c1c492a4e75.
128. Opinion and Order at 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No.
20-014780-AW, (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 2020), available
at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.
129. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub.
LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52, 54 (Nev. Dec. 8,
2020), available at
https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and
affirming lower court decision).
130. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub.
LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at
https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and
affirming lower court decision).
131. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp.
3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
132. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 803 Fed.
App'x. 377, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
133. “Eleven Nominations Sent to the Senate Today,” Trump
White House Archives, (June 19, 2017), available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/eleven-nominations-sent-senate-today-3/.
134. Complaint at 72, Trump v. Wisconsin Election
Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Wis. 2020) (No.
2:20-cv-01785), ECF No. 1; Trump v. Wisconsin Election
Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 625 (E.D. Wis. 2020)
(dismissing case with prejudice).
135. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d
620, 637-39 (E.D. Wis. 2020).
136. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 983 F.3d 919,
922 (7th Cir. 2020); Bill Glauber, “Federal Appeals Court
Turns Down Donald Trump Push to Overturn Election Results in
Wisconsin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Dec. 24, 2020),
available at
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/24/federal-appeals-court-rejects-trump-bid-overturn-wisconsin-results/4043650001/.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 170-71.
139. For example, Select Committee data analysts found that
certain legacy media networks played a role in promoting
false claims of voter fraud and other election conspiracies.
See Staff Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol Data
Analysts, “Legacy Media Analysis,” (Dec. 3, 2022).
140. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic
Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet Observatory, The
Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15,
2021), p. 173, available at
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.
141. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic
Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet Observatory, The
Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15,
2021), p. 82, available at
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 10.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue,
(Oct. 1, 2021), p. 67.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021) pp. 59-60.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 36-37.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey
Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2022), p. 60.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61, 63-64.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 53, 67.
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 59-60.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 61-62.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54-55.
154. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally
Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27;
Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS
1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at
https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and
affirming lower court decision); Donald J. Trump for
President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa.
2020); Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317,
1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 6:23 a.m. ET,
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201228020228/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342974373632876545
(archived); Rudy Giuliani’s Common Sense, “WATCH this BEFORE
January 6th | Rudy Giuliani’s Common Sense | Ep. 100,”
Rumble, at 29:30, available at
https://rumble.com/embed/vcrv8j/?pub=4.
155. “Fact Checks,” Michigan Department of State, (last
accessed on Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/sos/faqs/elections-and-campaign-finance/fact-checks.
156. See, e.g., “Secretary of State’s Office Debunks Ware
County Voting Machine Story,” Georgia Secretary of State,
(Dec. 7, 2020), available at
https://sos.ga.gov/news/secretary-states-office-debunks-ware-county-voting-machine-story;
“News Conference on Georgia Vote Count,” C-SPAN, Nov. 9,
2020, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?477943-1/news-conference-georgia-vote-count;
“Georgia Election Security,” C-SPAN, Jan. 4, 2021, available
at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507710-1/georgia-election-official-refutes-president-trumps-voter-fraud-allegations.
157. See, e.g., PBS NewsHour, “WATCH: Wisconsin Elections
Commission Gives Vote Counting Update,” YouTube, Nov. 4,
2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yg5liyyrObc.
158. See, e.g., Declaration of Charles Stewart III, Trump v.
Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec.
14, 2020) (expert declaration of political scientist at
MIT); Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of Chris Krebs,
former Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency); “Scientists Say No Credible Evidence of
Computer Fraud in the 2020 Election Outcome, But
Policymakers Must Work with Experts to Improve Confidence,”
Matt Blaze’s Exhaustive Search, (Nov. 16, 2020), available
at https://www.mattblaze.org/blog/election-letter/.
159. Search results for “Dominion,” Trump Twitter Archive
V2, (last accessed Dec. 12, 2022), available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22.
160. See, e.g., “Remarks by President Trump During
Thanksgiving Video Teleconference with Members of the
Military,” Trump White House archives, (Nov. 27, 2020),
available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-thanksgiving-video-teleconference-members-military/;
Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News – November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at
https://factba.se/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-fox-news-sunday-morning-futures-maria-bartiromo-november-29-2020;
“Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript
December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2;
Factba.se, “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results –
December 22, 2020,” (Dec. 22, 2020), available at
https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-contesting-election-results-december-22-2020;
“Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election;
“Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol
Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
161. J.M. Rieger, “The False Claims from Fox News and Trump
Allies Cited in Dominion’s $1.6 Billion Lawsuit,” Washington
Post, (Mar. 26, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/26/fox-trump-election-dominion/.
162. Elahe Izadi and Sarah Ellison, “Fox News Has Dropped
‘Lou Dobbs Tonight,’ Promoter of Trump’s False Election
Fraud Claims,” Washington Post, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/2021/02/05/lou-dobbs-canceled-fox/;
60 Minutes, “Dominion Voting Systems and the Baseless
Conspiracy Theories about the 2020 Election | 60 Minutes,”
YouTube, at 2:12–3:20, (Oct. 23, 2022), at 2:12-2:51,
available at https://youtu.be/492jILlPtlA?t=132.
163. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 12,
2020 11:34 a.m. ET, available at
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(archived).
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407
(Internal Trump Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Zachary
“Zach” Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 46-47.
165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407
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166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.
167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM007666, MM007669
(November 12, 2020, email and attachment from Jason Miller
to Mark Meadows transmitting abridged and full internal
Trump Campaign memo); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011902,
MM011974 (Nov. 12 and 13, 2020 text messages from Jason
Miller to Mark Meadows discussing the investigation into
Dominion and the lack of evidence of foreign interference).
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 291.
169. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16,
2020 8:22 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22engineered+by+china%22
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
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170. “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure
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Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,”
Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity &
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at
https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election.
171. Mark Bowden and Matthew Teague, “How a County Clerk in
Michigan Found Herself at the Center of Trump’s Attempt to
Overthrow the Election,” Time, (Dec. 15, 2021), available at
https://time.com/6128812/the-steal-antrim-county-michigan/;
Emma Brown, Aaron C. Davis, Jon Swaine, and Josh Dawsey,
“The Making of a Myth,” Washington Post, (May 9, 2021),
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/trump-election-fraud-texas-businessman-ramsland-asog/.
172. Steven Nelson, “Michigan Republicans Claim Software
Issue Undercounted Trump Votes,” New York Post, (Nov. 6,
2020), available at
https://nypost.com/2020/11/06/michigan-gop-claims-software-issue-undercounted-trump-votes/.
173. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect
Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or
States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020),
available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf;
“Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim
County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting
Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec.
17, 2020), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result;
J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan
November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 17-27,
available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9;
Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November
2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19,
36-55, available at
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174. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the
November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp.
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175. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect
Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or
States,” Michigan Secretary of State website, (Nov. 7,
2020), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
176. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the
November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp.
14-19, available at
https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001
(November 12, 2020, email from Tim Walberg to Molly Michel
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178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 70-74; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, (Department of Homeland Security
Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from
Molly Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”).
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 72-74; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, (Department of Homeland Security
Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from
Molly Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
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2020 letter to Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson
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180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77 Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf (Jan. 21, 2022),
Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from
Christopher Krebs responding to Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis,
and Brandon Wales entitled “RE: Allegations”).
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf (Jan. 21, 2022),
Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from
Christopher Krebs to Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon
Wales entitled “RE: Allegations”); “Isolated User Error in
Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No
Impact on Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of
State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 78-80. Even as the acting
Secretary of DHS was providing Meadows information he
received from his Director of CISA debunking the Dominion
claims, the acting Assistant Secretary of DHS, Ken
Cuccinelli, was providing back channel information to
Meadows in a possible effort to promote the false Dominion
claims. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), TEXT0000072,
TEXT0000073, (Nov. 12, 2020 text messages from Ken
Cuccinelli to Mark Meadows) (Cuccinelli: “I have the
dominion list of everywhere the machines are deployed that
we know of. [I]t is pretty extensive. It is in my DHS email
account. Where do you want me to send it?” Meadows then
provided Cuccinelli with his personal email address.).
183. Chris Krebs #Protect2020 (@CISAKrebs), Twitter, Nov.
17, 2020 11:45 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/CISAKrebs/status/1328741106624901120.
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000010360_0001, 076P-R000010361_0001, (November 17,
2020 email and attached letter to Christopher Krebs from
White House Office of Presidential Personnel, stating
respectively that “the President has terminated your
appointment” and that “Pursuant to the direction of the
President, your appointment… is hereby terminated, effective
immediately”).
185. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17,
2020 7:07 p.m ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040513/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1328852352787484677
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Nov. 17, 2020 7:07 p.m ET, available at
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(archived).
186. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference
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187. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference
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19, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope
Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 88-91. See also Tucker Carlson:
“Time for Sidney Powell to Show Us Her Evidence: We Asked
the Trump Campaign Attorney for Proof of her Bombshell
Claims. She Gave Us Nothing,” Fox News, (Nov. 19, 2020),
available at
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-rudy-giuliani-sidney-powell-election-fraud.
189. Jenna Ellis (@JennaEllisEsq), Twitter, Nov. 22, 2020,
5:23 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/JennaEllisEsq/status/1330638034619035655.
190. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19,
2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-izing%22
(archived).
191. One America News Network, “Cyber Analyst on Dominion
Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,” YouTube, at 0:41-1:14,
1:37-2:23, 2:42-3:36, Nov. 15, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKcPoCNW8AA.
192. Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020
12:45 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201121092200/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1329299640848584710
(archived); Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19,
2020 12:46 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201201175413/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1329300069623820289
(archived); Donald J. Trump, Twitter, Nov. 21, 2020 11:30
p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:31 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:32
p.m. ET, Nov. 22, 2020, 3:35 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-izing%22&dates=%5B%222020-11-20%22%2C%222020-11-24%22%5D
(archived).
193. Barr met with President Trump between election day and
January 6th on November 23, December 1, and December 14. See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 16, 22, 28.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 25, 27, 50; William Barr,
One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney
General, (New York: HarperCollins, 2022), at pp. 539, 554.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.
196. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews
Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov.
29, 2020, at. 1:00-1:43, 3:23-4:36, available at
https://vimeo.com/485180163.
197. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews
Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, at
1:00-1:43, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://vimeo.com/485180163.
198. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews
Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, at
1:50-2:40, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://vimeo.com/485180163.
199. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews
Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, at
3:50-4:24, 22:40-23:52, 24:26-24:50, Nov. 29, 2020,
available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.
202. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims
Transcript December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
203. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich.
2020).
204. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 723 (D. Ariz.
2020) (finding the complaint “void of plausible allegations
that Dominion voting machines were hacked or compromised in
Arizona during the 2020 General Election”).
205. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect
Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or
States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020),
available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
206. Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for an
Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, Show Cause Order and
Preliminary Injunction, No. 2020009238CZ (Mich. Cty. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 4, 2020).
207. Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020
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Ronn Blitzer, “Trump Legal Team Celebrates after Michigan
Judge Allows Probe of Dominion Voting Machines,” Fox News,
(Dec. 6, 2020), available at
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-legal-team-michigan-antrim-county-judge-order-dominion-machines;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard
Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 19, 147.
208. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001368_00001, pp. 1, 6 (Allied Security Operations
Group Antrim Michigan Forensics Report, dated Dec. 13,
2020).
209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R00001254_00001
(December 14, 2020, email from Joanna Miller to Peter
Navarro attaching the ASOG Report and noting that “POTUS and
VPOTUS are briefed”).
210. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000798(December 14, 2020,
email from Molly Michael re: From POTUS asking the AG to
look at ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001337_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen re: From
POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001367_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Michigan Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey re:
From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production)
076P-R000001361_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Senator Kelly Loeffler re: From POTUS attaching
ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001358_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Arizona Governor Doug Ducey re: From POTUS
attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001370_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Republican Party Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel re:
From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001378_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano re:
From POTUS attaching ASOG report).
211. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 14,
2020 2:59 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201214214435/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1338574268154646528
(archived).
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 28-29.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
216. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
217. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Homeland Security Production)
CTRL0000915111, CTRL0000915117- CTRL0000915118 (draft
analyses of ASOG report). Notably, the final version of this
review, which had been requested by the Attorney General,
was edited by senior DHS officials to remove the language
most critical of ASOG before being sent to the Department of
Justice by Acting Assistant Secretary Ken Cuccinelli. See
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915120
(emails circulating draft analyses), CTRL0000926941 (noting
report was “currently in the Secretary’s office”); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production)
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000687-
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000688 (email and
report provided to Donoghue by Cuccinelli); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue,
(Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 29-31.
218. See Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the
November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), p. 16,
available at
https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf;
J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan
November 2020 Election Incident,” (Mar. 26, 2021), available
at
https://www.michigan.gov//media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
219. For example, President Trump and others frequently
cited ASOG’s finding that the Dominion machines had a “68%
error rate,” but that conclusion was based on a complete
misunderstanding of the scanner log files reviewed by ASOG.
Their report also claimed that, due to these perceived
“errors,” a “staggering number of votes” were determined
through an adjudication process that allowed for
manipulation of votes, but no adjudication software was
installed on the Dominion machines. J. Alex Halderman,
Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020
Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 40-41, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
220. Halderman concluded that “I am not aware of any
credible evidence that any security problem was ever
exploited against Antrim County’s election system. As my
analysis shows, the anomalies that occurred in the November
2020 results are fully explained by human error.” J. Alex
Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November
2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), p. 46, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
221. “Audits of the November 3, 2020 General Election,”
Michigan Secretary of State, (April 21, 2021), p. 32,
available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.;
“Hand Count Calculation Sheet (Office: President of the
United States, County: Antrim),” Michigan Secretary of
State, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/AntrimCounty_Presidential_Race_Full_Hand_Count_November2020.pdf?rev=0bf12f08c33444c59bd145fbcfbb3e40.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Derek
Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 21-22, 99; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat”
Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 44-50.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 42-43.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 50.
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 129.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert O’Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 163-65.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 97-98, 102-103; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ken Cuccinelli, (Dec. 7,
2021), pp. 49-54.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani
(May 20, 2022), pp. 157-59; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 102-03;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jenna
Ellis Production), J.007465Ellis, J.007467Ellis (December
28-29, 2020, emails with Katherine Freiss, Doug Mastriano,
Christina Bobb, Giuliani, and others about accessing voting
machines); Emma Brown and Jon Swaine, “Inside the Secretive
Effort by Trump Allies to Access Voting Machines,”
Washington Post, (Oct. 28, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/28/coffee-county-georgia-voting-trump/.
231. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
232. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
233. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
234. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 166.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Bernard Kerik (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182. Kerik also emailed
President Trump’s chief of staff, Mark Meadows, on December
28, 2020, writing: “We can do all the investigations we want
later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the
legislators that have to be moved, and this will do just
that.” Document on file with the Select Committee (National
Archives Production) 076P-R000004125_0001.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 46.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell,
(May 7, 2022), pp. 89-96.
240. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 27-28, U.S. Dominion,
Inc. v. Powell, No. 1:21-cv-00040 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 22,
2021), ECF No. 22-2.
241. Justin Gray, “Georgia Election Officials Show
Frame-by-Frame What Happened in Fulton Surveillance Video,”
WSB-TV, (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/georgia-election-officials-show-frame-by-frame-what-really-happened-fulton-surveillance-video/T5M3PYIBYFHFFOD3CIB2ULDVDE/.
242. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate election hearing,”
YouTube, at 5:31:50-5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
243. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldtrump),
Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 8:57 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201217181730/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1338483200046354434;
Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
244. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
245. Ryan Taylor, “Donald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript
Before Senate Runoff Elections December 5,” Rev, (Dec. 5,
2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5.
246. “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results –
December 22, 2020,” Factba.se, (Dec. 22, 2020), at
9:11–9:31, available at
https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.
247. Ryan Taylor, “Donald Trump Georgia Phone Call
Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger: Says He
Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.
248. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed
Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), pp. 30-31,
available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 42-43.
250. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
251. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
253. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp,
831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-04809), ECF
No. 72-1.
254. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp,
831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-04809), ECF
No. 72-1.
255. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview
of Byung J. “BJay” Pak, (Aug. 11, 2021), pp. 14-25,
available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pak%20Transcript.pdf;
Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court’s
Order of September 20, 2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No.
2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021).
256. “Georgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript
December 7: Will Recertify Election Results Today,” Rev,
(December 7, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-today;
Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court’s
Order of September 20, 2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No.
2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021).
257. “Georgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript
December 7: Will Recertify Election Results Today,” Rev,
(December 7, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-today;
Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court’s
Order of September 20, 2021, at 4-6 and Exhibit A:
Videotaped Deposition of James P. Callaway (Deputy Chief
Investigator of the Office of the Secretary of State) at
29-35, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct.
filed Oct. 12, 2021) available at,
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21084096/favorito-sos-brief-in-response-to-order-of-92021-with-exs-a-and-b.pdf.
258. Declaration of Frances Watson at 2-3, Pearson v. Kemp,
831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-04809), ECF
No. 72-1; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed
Interview of Byung J. “BJay” Pak, (August 11, 2021), pp.
14-25, available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pak%20Transcript.pdf.
259. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000004670_0001-0013, 076P-R000004888_0001-0013,
076P-R000004948_0001-0013 (January 5, 2021, emails from
Molly Michael re: “from POTUS” to Senators Josh Hawley and
Ted Cruz and to Representative Jim Jordan attaching
Background Briefing on 2020 Fraud).
260. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available
at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
261. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506,
slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
262. GA House Mobile Streaming, Governmental Affairs
12.10.20, Vimeo – Livestream, at 2:09:03 to - 2:13:10,
available at
https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
264. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B.
Griffith, et al., “Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case
that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential
Election,” (July 2022), p. 3, available at
https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
265. Opinion and Order at *6, 13, Costantino v. Detroit, No.
20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020),
available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.
266. Complaint, Exhibit 2: Affidavit of Jesse Richard Morgan
at 2, 10, Mecalfe v. Wolf, 2020 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 794 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2020) (No. 636 MD 2020), available at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210603/212420-file-10836.pdf.
267. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter,
Dec. 1, 2020 2:31 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201202014959/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1333856259662077954
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter,
Dec. 1, 2020 3:49 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201201221335/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333875814585282567
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec
2, 2020 6:42 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201203024425/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1334327204847775744
(archived).
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 45-46.
269. FOX News, “Sean Hannity,” Nov. 19, 2020, available at
https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20201120_060000_Hannity?start/1983.1.end/2077.5.
270. Brandon Waltens, “VIDEO: Wagons, Suitcases, and Coolers
Roll into Detroit Voting Center at 4 AM [UPDATED],” Texas
Scorecard, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://texasscorecard.com/federal/video-wagons-suitcases-and-coolers-roll-into-detroit-voting-center-at-4-am/;
“Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript
November 19: Election Fraud Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020),
at 22:29-26:53, available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.
271. Affidavit of Christopher Thomas ¶ 18, Texas v.
Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describing ballot
delivery), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf;
see also Opinion and Order at *6, 13, Costantino v. Detroit,
No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020),
available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf
(relying on Christopher Thomas’ affidavit to deny a petition
for various relief related to allegations that the November
3, 2020 election in Michigan was fraudulent).
272. “How a WXYZ Wagon Sparked False Election Fraud Claims
in Detroit,” WXYZ, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at
https://www.wxyz.com/news/how-a-wxyz-wagon-sparked-false-election-fraud-claims-in-detroit.
273. “Election Summary Report,” City of Detroit, (Nov. 19,
2020), available at
https://detroitmi.gov/document/november-3-2020-general-election-official-results.
274. A canvassing process in every State verifies that the
number of voters indicated as having voted matches the
number of ballots cast. If, as claimed, tens of thousands of
illegitimate ballots were counted at the TCF Center in
Detroit, the total number of ballots counted would be
substantially higher than the total number of voters who
voted, but in Detroit slightly fewer ballots were counted
than voters who were listed as having voted. The net number
of ballots for the City of Detroit counting boards was 21
more names than ballots, out of approximately 174,000
absentee votes cast. Michigan Secretary of State, “Audits of
the November 3, 2020 General Election,” (Apr. 21, 2021), p.
20, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.
275. Approximately 4.2 million ballots were cast in-person
on election day and 2.6 million mail and absentee ballots
were cast. See “Pennsylvania’s Election Stats,” Pennsylvania
Department of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at
https://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/BEST/Pages/BEST-Election-Stats.aspx;“Official
Returns – 2020 Presidential Election,” Pennsylvania
Department of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at
https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/SummaryResults?ElectionID=83&ElectionType=G&IsActive=0.
276. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 28,
2020 12:09 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201128080915/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1332552283553476608
(archived), retweeting Senator Doug Mastriano
(@SenMastriano), Twitter, Nov. 27, 2020, 1:59 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/SenMastriano/status/1332398733401591808.
277. Jessica Calefati, “Fact-Checking False Claims about
Pennsylvania’s Presidential Election by Trump and His
Allies,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-election-results-trump-fraud-fact-check-20201206.html.
278. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 28,
2020, 4:00 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201228211304/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1343663159085834248
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Dec. 29, 2020, 8:59 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201229205204/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343919651336712199
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Dec. 29, 2020, 5:55 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201229225512/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1344054358418345985.
Note that timestamps in archived tweets may reflect a time
zone different from that where the tweet originated.
279. See Pennsylvania House Republican Caucus, “PA
Lawmakers: Numbers Don’t Add Up, Certification of
Presidential Results Premature and In Error,” (Dec. 28,
2020), available at
https://www.pahousegop.com/News/18754/Latest-News/PA-Lawmakers-Numbers-Don%E2%80%99t-Add-Up,-Certification-of-Presidential-Results-Premature-and-In-Error.
Representative Ryan also promoted the groundless claim of an
unexplained discrepancy of 400,000 mail-in ballots in the
state’s database, which was based entirely on his ignorance
of the fact that the database in question accounts for
mail-in ballots and absentee ballots separately. Senate
Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs,
Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16,
2020), Written Testimony of Pennsylvania State
Representative Frank Ryan, available at
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Ryan-2020-12-16.pdf;
Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election,
(Dec. 16, 2020), Letter Submitted by Pennsylvania Secretary
of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar, available at
https://www.dos.pa.gov/about-us/Documents/statements/2020-12-16-Senator-Johnson-and-Peters.pdf.
280. “Dept. of State: Republicans’ Election Claims Are
‘Repeatedly Debunked Conspiracy Theories’,” WJAC-TV, (Dec.
29, 2020), available at
https://wjactv.com/news/local/dept-of-state-republicans-election-claims-are-repeatedly-debunked-conspiracy-theories.
281. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed
Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156,
available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
282. See “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton,
Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), at
58:09, available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election;
“Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol
Riot,” Associated Press (January 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29; Affidavit of Russell
James Ramsland, Jr., 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724 (E.D. Mich.
2021), ECF 6-24, available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/6/24/king-v-whitmer/.
Ramsland submitted a similar affidavit in a case in Georgia.
See Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffensperger,
501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No. 7-1.
284. Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffensperger,
501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No. 7-1.
285. Aaron Blake, “The Trump Campaign’s Much-Hyped Affidavit
Features a Big, Glaring Error,” Washington Post, (Nov. 20,
2020), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/20/trump-campaigns-much-hyped-affidavit-features-big-glaring-error/.
286. For example, Ramsland claimed 781.91% turnout in North
Muskegon (actual turnout: 77.78%); 460.51% turnout in
Zeeland Charter Township (actual turnout: 80.11%); and
139.29% turnout in Detroit (actual turnout: 50.88%). See
King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724 (E.D. Mich.
2021); Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the
November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021),
available at
https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
287. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally
Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27;
“Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript
December 2” Rev (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 3, 2020,
4:11 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201203211154/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1334606278388277253
(archived); “Trump Lawyers Rudy Giuliani & Jenna Ellis
Testify Before Michigan House Oversight Committee: Full
Transcript,” Rev, (Dec. 3, 2020), at 26:13, available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-lawyers-rudy-giuliani-jenna-ellis-testify-before-michigan-house-oversight-committee-transcript;
Affidavit of Mellissa A. Carone, King v. Whitmer, 505 F.
Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2020), ECF No. 1-5, available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/1/5/king-v-whitmer/.
288. See, e.g., Opinion and Order at *3, 12-13, Costantino
v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov.
13, 2020), available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf;
Affidavit of Christopher Thomas ¶¶ 2-18, Texas v.
Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describing his
experience and the process for tabulating votes), available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf.
289. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally
Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press (January 13,
2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27;
Rudy Giuliani’s Common Sense, “I CAN’T SAY THIS On National
Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,” Rumble, at
13:10–13:25, Dec. 30, 2020, available at
https://rumble.com/vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html.
290. Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Georgia House
Hearing on Election Fraud, Brad Raffensperger to Participate
12/23/20,” YouTube, at 27:28, 43:02-43:28, Dec. 23, 2020,
available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4cuakECmuA&t=2582s
(Testimony of Ryan Germany, counsel to Georgia Secretary of
State, before Georgia legislature stating: “The total number
of underage people who voted is zero. We were able to look
at everyone who voted and look at their birthdate in the
voter registration system, and I think there was four people
who requested a ballot before they turned 18, and they all
turned 18 prior to November 3rd, which means they’re allowed
to vote.”).
291. See, e.g. Bannon’s War Room, “Episode 980 – The Border
Tipping Point … Peter Navarro on the Stolen Election and
Desperation in Del Rio,” Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vhpam3-episode-980the-border-tipping-pointpeter-navarro-on-the-stolen-election-and.html;
Bannon’s War Room, “Episode 979 – The HQ of the Runaway
Train … Rachel Maddow’s Anna Karenina Moment,” Rumble, May
27, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vhp8yn-episode-979-the-hq-of-the-runaway-train-rachel-maddows-anna-karenina-moment.html;
Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Arizona State
Legislature Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,” YouTube,
at 2:06:33-2:07:02, Nov. 30, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww.
292. “Proof of Citizenship Requirements,” Arizona Secretary
of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at
https://azsos.gov/elections/voting-election/proof-citizenship-requirements.
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Arizona’s
“evidence-of-citizenship” requirement as applied to federal
elections. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,
Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 4, 19 (2013). Arizona law allows voters to
register as “federal only” voters without proof of
citizenship, but those voters must provide a driver’s
license or Social Security Number, which is then checked by
election officials against immigration records before the
person is added to voter registration rolls. Daniel
González, “Are Undocumented Immigrants Voting Illegally in
Arizona?,” Arizona Republic, (Oct. 27, 2016), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/10/27/voter-fraud-undocumented-immigrants-voting-illegally-arizona-donald-trump/91703916/.
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13,
2020, email from Bill Stepien to Mark Meadows, Justin Clark,
and Jason Miller re: AZ Federal ID Voters); In the Matter of
Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *23-25 (N.Y.
App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
294. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
295. For example, the President alleged in his January 6th
speech that large numbers of ballots were cast on behalf of
dead people not just in Georgia but also in Michigan,
Nevada, and Pennsylvania. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at
Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press (January 13,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27;
See also Rudy Giuliani’s Common Sense, “I CAN’T SAY THIS On
National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,” Rumble, at
15:10-15:46, (Dec. 30, 2020, reposted Mar. 22, 2021),
available at
https://rumble.com/vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html
(making similar claims).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Alex Cannon Production) AC-0013946, (November 12,
2020, email from Alex Cannon to Matt Wolking, Zach
Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, Ali Pardo, Matthew Morgan, and
Andrew Clark titled “Re: dead voters”); Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh
Production) XXM-0009451 (November 8, 2020, email from Jason
Miller to Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re:
PA Death Data stating that quality control checks will
“significantly decrease[]” the number of “possible dead
voters”), XXM-0009467 (November 8, 2020, email from Jason
Miller to Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re:
GA Dead Voters), XXM-0009566 (November 9, 2020 email from
Zach Parkinson to Jason Miller, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt
Wolking re PA Death Data noting there “may be errors” with
their data about people who were dead voters); Mark Niesse,
“Alleged ‘Dead’ Georgia Voters Found Alive and Well after
2020 Election,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27,
2021), available at
https://www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-well-after-2020-election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/.
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198,
(December 3, 2020, text message from Eric Herschmann to Mark
Meadows).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198-203,
(December 3, 2020, text messages between Eric Herschmann and
Mark Meadows).
299. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger,
No.2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14 2020),
available at
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.
300. The expert, Bryan Geels, based his claims on a
comparison of public voter information to public death
records. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol
(Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000683-84, 692-93,
706-07 (Affidavit of Bryan Geels dated Dec. 1, 2020, in
Trump v. Barron, a case filed by the Trump Campaign in a
Georgia Superior Court in Fulton County). However, the
records reviewed included only name and year of birth for
each individual listed. Id. at ¶ 28. Based on this limited
information, it was impossible for Geels (or anyone else) to
conclude that the person with a particular name and birth
year was the same person listed in public death records with
that name and birth year. See id., at ¶ 50 (only the
Secretary of State has the information to conduct a full
analysis of this issue); see also Declaration of Charles
Stewart III at 22, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255
(Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2020).
301. In Georgia, the Secretary of State found four cases
where people voted in the names of deceased individuals.
Mark Niesse, “Alleged ‘Dead’ Georgia Voters Found Alive and
Well after 2020 Election,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
(Dec. 27, 2021), available at
https://www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-well-after-2020-election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/;
In Arizona, the Attorney General recently concluded its
investigation into claims of supposed dead voters in the
2020 election and found only one instance in which a vote
was cast on behalf of a person who died prior to the
election. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General to The
Honorable Karen Fann, Arizona Senate President, (Aug. 1,
2022), available at
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/Letter%20to%20Fann%20-%20EIU%20Update%20080122.pdf.
In Michigan, the Senate Oversight Committee found only two
instances in which votes were cast in the names of dead
people: one was a clerical error (poll worker attributed
vote to deceased father of person with same name residing at
same address) and the other was a woman who died four days
before the election but had sent in her absentee ballot
before her death. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee,
Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23,
2021), available at
https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
302. In an email obtained by the Select Committee, Katherine
Friess, a lawyer who worked closely with Giuliani, shared
this information with Giuliani and noted, “I don’t think
this makes a particularly strong case.” Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production),
BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine
Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your
consideration).
303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol
(Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00026036 (January 5, 2021
email from Cleta Mitchell to Richard Perry re: GA Data
request by Senator Graham); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production),
BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine
Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your
consideration); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 141-42.
304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol
(Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4,
2021, email from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead
votes memo for your consideration).
305. ABC News, “Lindsey Graham Delivers Remarks on Capitol
Breach,” YouTube, at 3:05-3:30, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKHkYlRm_XM.
306. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742,
(Dec. 31, 2020 email from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and
Kurth Hibert); see also Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000008384_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Eric
Herschmann to Cleta Mitchell and cc’ed to Mark Meadows and
Molly Michael in which Herschmann wrote: “I was concerned
about the President signing a verification about facts that
may not be sustainable upon detailed scrutiny.”).
307. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17,
Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19,
2022), ECF no. 372, available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.
308. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17,
Eastman v. Thompson, Case 8:22-cv-00099-DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19,
2022), ECF no. 372, available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.
309. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
310. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
311. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
312. See “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech
Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.
313. See “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally
Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6.
314. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
315. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19,
2020, 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22wild+protest%22
(archived).
316. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
317. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US
Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
2
“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES”
In a now infamous telephone call on January 2, 2021,
President Trump pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger for more than an hour. The President
confronted him with multiple conspiracy theories about the
election—none of which were true. Raffensperger and other
Georgia officials debunked these allegations, one after
another, during their call. Under Raffensperger’s
leadership, Georgia had, by that time, already conducted a
statewide hand recount of all ballots. That recount and
other post-election reviews proved that there was no
widespread fraud, and that voting machines didn’t alter the
outcome of the election.1 This should have put President
Trump’s allegations to rest. But, undeterred by the facts,
the President badgered Raffensperger to overturn the Georgia
results.
President Trump insisted that “the ballots are corrupt” and
someone was “shredding” them.2 He issued a thinly veiled
threat, telling Raffensperger, “it is more illegal for you
than it is for them because you know what they did and
you’re not reporting it.” 3 Of course, the Georgia officials
weren’t doing anything “illegal,” and there was nothing to
“report.” Even so, President Trump suggested that both
Raffensperger and his general counsel, Ryan Germany, could
face criminal jeopardy.4 “That’s a criminal, that’s a
criminal offense. And you can’t let that happen,” the
President said.5 “That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan, your
lawyer . . . I’m notifying you that you’re letting it
happen.” 6
And then the President made his demand. “So look. All I want
to do is this. I just want to find 11,780 votes, which is
one more than we have,” President Trump told Raffensperger.7
It was a stunning moment. The President of the United States
was asking a State’s chief election officer to “find” enough
votes to declare him the winner of an election he lost.
Raffensperger saw the President’s warning to him on January
2nd as a threat. “I felt then—and I still believe today—that
this was a threat,” Raffensperger wrote in his book.8 And
this threat was multifaceted: first, the President
“notifying” Raffensperger and his team of criminal activity
could be understood as directing the law-enforcement power
of the Federal Government against them. While Raffensperger
did not know for certain whether President Trump was
threatening such an investigation, he knew Trump had
“positional power” as President and appeared to be promising
to “make [my] life miserable.” 9
But the threat was also of a more insidious kind. As
Raffensperger wrote in his book: “Others obviously thought
[it was a threat], too, because some of Trump’s more radical
followers have responded as if it was their duty to carry
out this threat.” 10 Raffensperger’s deputy held a press
conference and publicly warned all Americans, including
President Trump, that President Trump’s rhetoric endangered
innocent officials and private citizens, and fueled death
threats against Georgia election workers, sexualized threats
directed towards Raffensperger’s wife, and harassment at the
homes of Georgia election officials.11 The January 2nd call
promised more of the same. The upshot of President Trump’s
message to Raffensperger was: do what I ask, or you will
pay.
President Trump’s phone call with Secretary Raffensperger
received widespread coverage after it was leaked. But
Georgia was not the only State targeted by President Trump
and his allies. The call was one element of a larger and
more comprehensive effort—much of it unseen by and unknown
to the general public—to overturn the votes cast by millions
of American citizens across several States.
As Chapter 1 explained, the root of this effort was the “Big
Lie”: President Trump and his allies publicly claiming that
the election was rife with fraud that could have changed the
result, even though the President’s own advisors, and the
Department of Justice, told the President time and time
again that this was not the case.12 But in parallel with
this strategy, President Trump and his allies zeroed in on
key battleground States the President had lost, leaning on
Republican State officials to overrule voters, disregard
valid vote counts, and deliver the States’ electoral votes
to the losing candidate. Had this scheme worked, President
Trump could have, for the first time in American history,
subverted the results of a lawful election to stay in power.
His was a deeply anti-democratic plan: to co-opt State
legislatures—through appeals to debunked theories of
election fraud, or pure partisan politics—to replace Biden
electors with Trump electors, so President Trump would win
the electoral vote count in the joint session of Congress on
January 6th.
Had enough State officials gone along with President Trump’s
plot, his attempt to stay in power might have worked. It is
fortunate that a critical mass of honorable officials
withstood President Trump’s pressure to participate in this
scheme. They and others who stood up to him closed off
avenues for thwarting the election so that, by noon on
January 6th, President Trump was left with one desperate,
final gambit for holding on to power: sending his armed,
angry supporters to the U.S. Capitol.
2.1 The Electoral College, and President Trump’s Attempt to
Subvert It
When Americans vote for a presidential candidate on election
day, they are actually casting votes for that candidate’s
proposed presidential electors to participate in the
electoral college. After a State certifies its election
results and announces a winner, it also issues a
“certificate of ascertainment,” which contains the names of
the duly chosen electoral college electors. The electors
whose names appear as having received the most votes on the
certificate of ascertainment will go on to participate in
the electoral college, while a losing candidate’s proposed
electors have no role to play and no standing to participate
in the electoral college. This happens after every
Presidential election, in each of the fifty States and the
District of Columbia.
This process comes from a clause in the U.S. Constitution
that gives States the power to choose electoral college
electors according to State law.13 That clause says that
each State “shall appoint” electoral college electors “in
such [m]anner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” All 50
States have decreed that electors will be selected by
popular vote.
Tuesday, November 3rd, was the day established by Federal
law as election day in 2020. Each State’s rules had been
set—and courts had weighed in when certain rules were
challenged. Polls opened around the country and votes came
in, whether in person or via the mail, according to each
State’s laws.
Over 154 million voters cast votes according to the rules in
place on election day.14 President Trump lost. He and his
supporters went to court, filing long-shot legal challenges
to the election, but they failed in courts around the
country, before judges appointed by executives of both
parties (including President Trump himself), and, for those
judges who were elected, that are members of both parties.
Rather than abiding by the rule of law and accepting the
courts’ rulings, President Trump and his advisors tried
every which way to reverse the outcome at the State level.
They pressured local and State elections officials to stop
counting votes once it became clear that former Vice
President Joseph Biden would prevail in the final count.
They pressured Governors, secretaries of State, and local
officials not to certify the popular vote in several swing
States that former Vice-President Biden had won. And, when
that did not work, they pressured State legislators to
disregard the vote counts and instead appoint Trump electors
to vote in the electoral college.
This fundamentally anti-democratic effort was premised on
the incorrect theory that, because the Constitution assigns
to State legislatures the role of directing how electoral
college electors are chosen (which every State legislature
had done before the election, giving that power to the
people at the ballot boxes) then the State legislatures
could simply choose Trump/Pence electors after seeing the
election results. In effect, President Trump and his
advisors pushed for the rules to be changed after the
election—even if it meant disenfranchising millions of
Americans.
2.2 The Plan Emerges
More than a month before the Presidential election, the
media reported that the Trump Campaign was already
developing a fallback plan that would focus on overturning
certain election results at the State level. An article
published on September 23, 2020, in The Atlantic explained,
“[a]ccording to sources in the Republican Party at the State
and national levels, the Trump Campaign is discussing
contingency plans to bypass election results and appoint
loyal electors in battleground States where Republicans hold
the legislative majority.” 15 Ominously, the same reporting
predicted, almost exactly, what would later come to pass:
“With a justification based on claims of rampant fraud,
Trump would ask State legislators to set aside the popular
vote and exercise their power to choose a slate of electors
directly.” 16
Numerous senior Trump Campaign advisors—including Campaign
Manager William Stepien, Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior
Counsel Justin Clark, and President Trump’s lead attorney
Rudolph Giuliani—all told the Select Committee that there
was, indeed, a State-focused “strategy” or “track” to
challenge the outcome of the election, which included
pressing State legislators to challenge results in key
States and to appoint new electoral college electors.17
“You know, in the days after election day, later in that
first week, bleeding into the second, as our numbers and
data looked bleaker, internally we knew that,” Stepien told
the Select Committee.18 “As the AP [Associated Press] called
the race, I think some surrounding the President were
looking for different avenues to pursue.” That’s when
Stepien remembered the concept first coming up.19
Those around President Trump were pushing this idea, and
pushing it hard.
Just two days after the election, President Trump’s son,
Donald Trump, Jr., forwarded to White House Chief of Staff
Mark Meadows a suggestion that “State Assemblies can step in
and vote to put forward the electoral slate[,] Republicans
control Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina,
etc. we get Trump electors” and so “we either have a vote WE
control and WE win OR it gets kicked to Congress 6 January .
. .” 20 Chief of Staff Meadows responded: “Working on this
for pa, ga and nc already.” 21
Within one week after the election, Meadows had also sent or
received several other similar messages:
“The state legislature can take over the electoral
process”—Mark Meadows’s text to Georgia State Senator Marty
Harbin.22
“Agreed”—Mark Meadows’s text to a different sender, who
suggested that the Trump Administration “should get that out
there” if they were “seriously considering the state
legislature strategy.” 23
“I will tell him”—Mark Meadows’s text to a sender who
suggested President Trump “[s]tart building momentum for the
state legislatures.” 24
“I love it”—Mark Meadows’s text to Representative Andy
Biggs, who relayed what he acknowledged as a “highly
controversial” idea to have “Republican legislature’s (sic)”
“appoint a look doors (sic) [electors].” 25
“. . . Why can’t the states of GA NC PENN and other R
controlled state houses declare this is BS (where conflicts
and election not called that night) and just send their own
electors… I wonder if POTUS knows this . . .”—former
Secretary of Energy Rick Perry to Mark Meadows.26
Another White House official exploring such a plan less than
a week after the election was Vince Haley, Deputy Assistant
to the President for Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting. He
suggested:
“. . . Imagine if every red state legislature slated zero
electors. It would reveal that we are a red country. To do
this we would have to jack this to the nth degree as a
battle of tribes . . . .” 27
Haley pushed this strategy in several texts and emails,
including to Assistant to the President and Director of
Presidential Personnel Johnny McEntee,28 an individual Haley
characterized as “a very trusted lieutenant” for President
Trump, “a direct conveyor to Boss with ideas,” and “[a]t his
side almost all the time.” 29
For Haley, however, purported election fraud was a way to
justify President Trump-friendly legislatures changing the
outcome of the election, but there were other reasons for
doing so, too. Election fraud was “only one rationale for
slating Trump electors,” Haley told McEntee, and “[w]e
should baldly assert” that State legislators “have the
constitutional right to substitute their judgment for a
certified majority of their constituents” if that prevents
socialism.30 Haley added, “[i]ndependent of the fraud—or
really along with that argument—Harrisburg [Pennsylvania],
Madison [Wisconsin], and Lansing [Michigan] do not have to
sit idly by and submit themselves to rule by Beijing and
Paris,” proposing that radio hosts “rally the grassroots to
apply pressure to the weak kneed legislators in those states
. . .” 31
McEntee replied “Yes!” and then: “Let’s find the contact
info for all these people now.” 32 Hours later, Haley sent
him names and—in most cases—cell phone numbers for top GOP
legislators in six States, suggesting “. . . for POTUS to
invite them down for a WH meeting . . .” 33 The President
would later call several named in that message, including
Rusty Bowers and Karen Fann in Arizona; Lee Chatfield and
Mike Shirkey in Michigan; and Jake Corman in Pennsylvania.34
Others weighed in with the President about a State-focused
plan, too. Some were already looking ahead to January 6th.
On November 8th, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich
met President Trump at the White House.35 Two days later, he
sent a follow-up note to the President’s executive assistant
titled “please give to POTUS[,] newt.” 36 It suggested that
“[t]he only way Trump loses is rigged system” and added that
President Trump could encourage “GOP legislatures elect not
to send in electors,” forcing a House vote by State
delegations on January 6th that Gingrich expected President
Trump would win.37 Meadows replied: “Thanks Speaker.” 38
Newsmax CEO Christopher Ruddy had President Trump’s ear and
reportedly spoke with him by phone at least four times
before December.39 He forwarded a memo to other close
advisors of the President recommending that the Trump team
persuade one or more Republican-led chambers in Arizona,
Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and even
Minnesota to “pick a separate competitive State slate of
Electors,” which the memo predicted might turn January 6th
into “a cat-fight in Congress wherein VP Pence is
Presiding.” 40
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Attorney and conservative activist Cleta Mitchell was
recruited by Mark Meadows immediately after the election to
assist the Trump Campaign’s legal work.41 By November 5th,
she emailed Dr. John Eastman of Chapman University,42 who
would later play an outsized role pushing a theory about
what Vice President Pence could or couldn’t do during the
January 6th joint session of Congress that is detailed in
Chapter 5 of this Report. In her email, Mitchell asked
Eastman to write a memo justifying an idea that State
legislators “reclaim” the power to pick electors and asked,
rhetorically, “Am I crazy?” 43 Dr. Eastman wrote the memo,
entitled “The Constitutional Authority of State Legislatures
to Choose Electors,” and sent it along for sharing
“widely.” 44
According to the Office of Presidential Scheduling,
President Trump was scheduled to meet in the Oval Office on
November 10th with Morgan Warstler and John Robison, Texas
entrepreneurs close to former Governor Rick Perry.45 The
next day, Warstler tweeted that he “[w]as in Oval
yesterday,” 46 and months later wrote that “I told whole
Trump team in Oval” that “State legislatures can choose the
electors-no matter what current state law OR state courts
say.” 47
After this apparent meeting, John Robison sent the White
House an email entitled “URGENT follow up to our Tuesday
Meeting with POTUS,” that he asked be printed out for the
President to “explain the move forward plan for what was
discussed.” 48 The email stated that “[President Trump]
liked the plan we presented to use a parallel path of state
legislators,” and the attached memo proposed hundreds of
briefings for State lawmakers by President Trump’s
surrogates and members of the Freedom Caucus.49 The email
envisioned President Trump hosting “4+ MONSTER RALLY-TRIALS”
with “[t]ens of thousands of Trump voters staring up at the
GOP state legislators from their districts who ALONE control
which slate of electors their state will submit,” a proposal
that seemed to foreshadow the State hearings that Rudolph
Giuliani and President Trump championed less than a month
later.50
Deputy White House Chief of Staff Dan Scavino called
Robison’s message “Bat. Shit. Crazy,” but the President’s
executive assistant, who was asked to print it for the
President, wrote “Printed,” and may have shared it with the
President anyway.51
By then, President Trump was engaged. According to Stepien,
his Campaign Manager, the State-focused strategy came up in
a November 11th meeting among close advisors as “something
to consider.” 52 At that point, the election had been
called, but the President “was very interested in keeping
pathways to victory open, so [Stepien] believe[d] [the
President] found the concept intriguing.” 53 Then, the plan
“just started happening” even though it was something
Stepien, “honestly, kind of dismissed at hand,”
characterizing it as one “of the crazy, crazier ideas that
w[as] thrown out, in and around that time.” 54
But not everyone was convinced. On November 19th, the prior
Republican Presidential nominee, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT),
issued a harsh public condemnation of President Trump’s open
and notorious efforts to overturn the election:
Having failed to make even a plausible case of widespread
fraud or conspiracy before a court of law, the President has
now resorted to overt pressure on state and local officials
to subvert the will of the people and overturn the election.
It is difficult to imagine a worse, more undemocratic action
by a sitting American President.55
Senator Romney was right to identify and decry President
Trump’s actions. And yet, in hindsight, it is clear that the
effort to pressure State and local officials by the Trump
team was only just getting started.
2.3 Outreach and Implementation of the Plan
Just one day after the State-focused plan came up in the
Oval Office with the President and his top lieutenants,
President Trump started taking concrete steps aimed at State
legislators. And in the weeks that followed, the President
spearheaded outreach aimed at numerous officials in States
he lost but that had GOP-led legislatures, including in
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Arizona.
The Select Committee estimates that in the two months
between the November election and the January 6th
insurrection, President Trump or his inner circle engaged in
at least 200 apparent acts of public or private outreach,
pressure, or condemnation, targeting either State
legislators or State or local election administrators, to
overturn State election results. This included at least:
68 meetings, attempted or connected phone calls, or text
messages, each aimed at one or more State or local
officials;
18 instances of prominent public remarks, with language
targeting one or more such officials;56 and
125 social media posts by President Trump or senior aides
targeting one or more such officials, either explicitly or
implicitly, and mostly from his own account.57
Furthermore, these efforts by President Trump’s team also
involved two other initiatives that tried to enlist support
from large numbers of State legislators all at once:
The Trump Campaign contacted, or attempted to contact,
nearly 200 State legislators from battleground States
between November 30, 2020 and December 3, 2020, to solicit
backing for possible Statehouse resolutions to overturn the
election. At least some messages said they were “on behalf
of the president.” 58
Nearly 300 State legislators from battleground States
reportedly participated in a private briefing with President
Trump, Rudolph Giuliani, John Eastman, and others on January
2nd. The President reportedly urged them to exercise what he
called “the real power” to choose electoral votes before
January 6th, because, as President Trump said on the call,
“I don’t think the country is going to take it.” 59
It may be impossible to document each and every meeting,
phone call, text message, or other contact that President
Trump and his allies had with State and local officials in
various battleground States. What follows is a summary that
focuses on four States and that demonstrates the lengths to
which President Trump would go in order to stay in power
based on lies—the Big Lie—about the election.
President Trump’s Early Pressure On Public Servants
To carry out his plan, President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani,
and other surrogates of President Trump publicly and
privately sought assistance from State and local officials
whom they assumed would help as Republicans on the same team
with the “same goal.” 60 Some helped. Others didn’t.
On November 12th, U.S. Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI)
sent an email to President Trump’s Executive Assistant Molly
Michael, describing a request he had received earlier that
day:
During my conversation with the President this morning he
asked me to check with key leadership in Michigan’s
Legislature as to how supportive they could be in regards to
pushing back on election irregularities and potential fraud.
He wanted me to gauge their willingness to talk with him
about efforts to bring about transparency and integrity in
Michigan’s election and report back to him.61
Representative Walberg added that he had already acted on
this request: “I’ve had conversations with [Michigan]
Speaker Lee Chatfield, Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey,
and Senate President Pro Tempore Aric Nesbitt. They all
assured me they would look forward to speaking with the
President to report on their continuing efforts” related to
overseeing the election “and receiving any suggestions from
President Trump.” 62 The President would soon host
Chatfield, Shirkey, Nesbitt, and four other Michigan State
lawmakers at the White House.63
In Arizona, on November 13, 2020, the day after officials
finished counting ballots cast in Maricopa County,
Chairwoman Kelli Ward, of the Arizona Republican Party,
texted Mark Meadows that she had “[j]ust talked to POTUS”
and that “[h]e may call the Chairman of the Maricopa Board
of Supervisors,” Clint Hickman.64 Ward also left a message
for Hickman that said, “I just talked to President Trump,
and he would like me to talk to you and also see if he needs
to give you a call to discuss what’s happening on the ground
in Maricopa. Give me a call back when you can.” 65 According
to Hickman, Ward was unusually active after the election,
even for a party chair, and was the first person to pressure
him. One of her first messages to Hickman before trying to
connect him with President Trump was: “We need you to stop
the counting.” 66
In Georgia, the President initially took a more public
approach. After the Associated Press called the race there
on November 12th, President Trump tweeted harsh criticisms
of Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger.67 Often these tweets called for them to take
specific actions that would have shifted the election
results in his favor, such as rejecting a court settlement
(which he referred to as a consent decree) that dictated the
procedures for verifying signatures on absentee ballots. And
he was relentless.
In November alone, President Trump tweeted that
Raffensperger was “a so-called Republican (RINO)” and asked
“Where is @BrianKempGA,” 68 before suggesting that “They
knew they were going to cheat.” 69 He called to “Break the
unconstitutional Consent Decree!” 70 and urged stricter
signature matches with a demand to “Get it done!
@BrianKempGA.” 71 He called Kemp “hapless” and asked why he
wouldn’t use emergency powers to overrule Raffensperger on
the signature-verification procedures, declaring that
“Georgia Republicans are angry.” 72 President Trump also
retweeted posts asking, “Who needs Democrats when you have
Republicans like Brian Kemp,” and “why bother voting for
Republicans if what you get is Ducey and Kemp?” 73
Pennsylvania was an early, but not unique, example of how
President Trump’s State-pressure campaign affected the lives
of the public servants running this country’s elections.
On November 7th, Rudy Giuliani headlined a Philadelphia
press conference in front of a landscaping business called
Four Seasons Total Landscaping, near a crematorium and down
the street from a sex shop.74
Standing in front of former New York Police Commissioner and
recently-pardoned convicted felon, Bernard Kerik, Giuliani
gave opening remarks and handed the podium over to his first
supposed eyewitness to election fraud, who turned out to be
a convicted sex offender.75 Giuliani claimed “at least
600,000 ballots are in question” in Pennsylvania and falsely
suggested that large numbers of ballots in the State had
been cast for dead people, including boxer Joe Frazier and
actor Will Smith’s father.76
Within days, Republican Philadelphia City Commissioner Al
Schmidt and others publicly debunked Giuliani’s specific
allegations of election fraud, including the claims about
dead people voting in Pennsylvania elections.77 In reaction,
President Trump tweeted on the morning of November 11th that
“[a] guy named Al Schmidt, a Philadelphia Commissioner and
so-called Republican (RINO), is being used big time by the
Fake News Media to explain how honest things were with
respect to the Election in Philadelphia. He refuses to look
at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty. We win!” 78
That statement targeting Schmidt led to a deluge of
threatening and harassing phone calls and emails by people
who heard President Trump and falsely held out hope that
Schmidt or someone else could overturn the results of
Pennsylvania’s election.79
As a public official, Schmidt was no stranger to threats.
But being targeted by the President of the United States was
different. In Schmidt’s public testimony to the Select
Committee, he described why. “[P]rior to that the threats
were pretty general in nature. ‘Corrupt election officials
in Philadelphia are going to get what’s coming to them’” and
other similar threats.80 “After the President tweeted at me
by name, calling me out the way that he did,” Schmidt
explained, “the threats became much more specific, much more
graphic, and included not just me by name but included
members of my family by name, their ages, our address,
pictures of our home. Just every bit of detail that you
could imagine.” 81
As the President continued to push the Big Lie and vilify
public officials, such threats multiplied.
Efforts to Prevent State and Local Officials From Certifying
the Election
Some of President Trump’s early outreach was part of an
effort to prevent State and local officials from certifying
his loss. One example comes from Michigan, and the other
from Arizona.
Wayne County, Michigan, includes Detroit and its surrounding
areas. On November 17th, the county’s Board of Canvassers
met to certify election results, a process the Michigan
Supreme Court described over a century ago as ministerial
and clerical.82
The meeting started at 6:00 p.m. and lasted over three
hours.83 Its two Republican members, Board Chair Monica
Palmer and Board Member William Hartmann, first voted to
block the certification of the election.84 After a brief
break, Palmer and Hartmann returned, changed their votes,
and certified the election results.85 Just over twenty
minutes later, Palmer and Hartmann received a call from
President Trump and RNC Chair Ronna McDaniel.86
Palmer claimed that the call “was not pressure.” Rather, she
said, “[i]t was genuine concern for my safety” and “there
were general comments about different States, but we really
didn’t discuss the details of the certification.” 87
The Select Committee doesn’t know exactly what President
Trump privately said on that phone call.88 By the next
evening, however, Palmer and Hartmann had each issued signed
affidavits reassuming their earlier position that Wayne
County’s results should not be certified.89 Palmer’s
affidavit even declared that “I rescind my prior vote,”
though rescinding wasn’t possible and her statement had no
legal effect.90 And, President Trump apparently knew before
it was public that Hartmann and Palmer would try to change
their votes; almost eight hours before either of these
affidavits were publicly released, President Trump tweeted
that these “two harassed patriot Canvassers refuse to sign
the papers!” 91
Republicans in Arizona experienced similar treatment. In the
most populous and electorally significant county in Arizona,
Maricopa County’s Board of Supervisors met on November 20th
to certify the county’s election results. Their Board, made
up of four Republicans and one Democrat, carefully reviewed
the official canvass, asked questions for approximately two
hours, then unanimously voted to certify the results.92
Earlier that day, Kelli Ward contacted two of the board’s
members, Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, and asked them to
delay the certification on the basis of supposed
improprieties.93 According to Sellers and Gates, however,
Arizona law required certification that day and they had no
information (neither then, nor ever) to doubt the county’s
election results.94
When Arizona certified its 2020 statewide election results
on November 30th, it fell to Governor Doug Ducey, a
Republican, to sign the certification. While on camera
during the signing ceremony, Governor Ducey’s phone played a
ringtone for the song “Hail to the Chief,” which he
immediately silenced.95
The Governor later confirmed it had been President Trump
calling and that he returned the President’s call shortly
afterwards, but declined to say what the two discussed other
than saying that President Trump did not ask him to withhold
certification.96 The Select Committee does not know whether
that is true, but that evening President Trump blasted Ducey
on Twitter, accusing him of “rushing to put a Democrat in
office,” and warning that “Republicans will long
remember!” 97 The President also retweeted posts bashing
Ducey and his Georgia counterpart Brian Kemp, which asked
“Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans like Brian
Kemp and Doug Ducey?”, “why bother voting for Republicans if
what you get is Ducey and Kemp?”, and “Brian Kemp: ‘My state
ran the most corrupt election in American history.’ Doug
Ducey: ‘Hold my beer.’” 98 President Trump even commented
“TRUE!” when retweeting a post that “Gov Ducey has betrayed
the people of Arizona.” 99
Governor Ducey pushed back, writing on Twitter that, “I’ve
been pretty outspoken about Arizona’s election system, and
bragged about it quite a bit, including in the Oval Office .
. . In Arizona, we have some of the strongest election laws
in the country . . . The problems that exist in other states
simply don’t apply here.” 100 Governor Ducey explained the
law for certifying elections in Arizona and pointed out that
the certification now triggered a “5-day window for any
elector to bring a credible challenge to the election
results in court. If you want to contest the results, now is
the time. Bring your challenges.” 101 And, Governor Ducey
referenced his oath of office: “That’s the law. I’ve sworn
an oath to uphold it, and I take my responsibility
seriously.” 102 President Trump and his allies never brought
a credible challenge and, instead, lost every case they
brought challenging the results in Arizona.
Efforts to Replace Electoral College Electors and Overturn
The Election
Once counties and States certified the election, or when it
was nearly certain that they would, President Trump and his
team’s focus largely shifted. President Trump and his team
encouraged State legislators to meet in special sessions, if
necessary, and choose electoral college electors who would
vote for the Trump/Pence ticket. Ultimately, no State
legislature took that step, but it was the basis for
pressuring State officials from November through January 6,
2021.
Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images
Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images
Meetings With State Legislators—The “Hearings”
The concept of State legislators appointing their own
electors featured prominently in a series of hastily
arranged official and unofficial “hearings” with State
legislators that the Trump team announced on November 24,
2020.103
On November 25th, President Trump called in to an unofficial
meeting with legislators in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.104 The
meeting was set up to appear like an official hearing, but
it was not. It took place in a hotel ballroom, and those
presenting arguments or purported evidence, like Giuliani,
Jenna Ellis, and others, were not placed under oath.105
According to President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania
Senate Jake Corman, he had initially been asked by State
Senator Doug Mastriano to hold a hearing about the election.
Corman responded that any formal hearing should be official,
with sworn testimony, and open to both parties.106 That was
not what Senator Mastriano ultimately convened.
President Trump had originally made plans to attend the
Pennsylvania gathering in person, but he cancelled after
several advisors tested positive for COVID–19.107 When
President Trump called in and spoke to those gathered in the
hotel ballroom, his false claims were met with cheers, and
he made his purpose clear: “this election has to be turned
around . . . Why wouldn’t they overturn an election?
Certainly overturn it in your State . . . We have to turn
the election over.” 108
President Trump made the ask and Giuliani told the
legislators how to carry it out. Giuliani told the assembled
legislators that it was their “power” and “responsibility”
to pick Pennsylvania’s presidential electors and that
“[they] have to convince the rest of [their] members,
Republican and Democrat, they owe that to the people of”
Pennsylvania.109 Jenna Ellis told them that although
Pennsylvania law dictates that electors are chosen by
popular vote, “[y]ou can take that power back at any time.
You don’t need a court to tell you that.” 110
President Trump invited some of the lawmakers to come meet
him at the White House that evening and, according to
Giuliani, it was “a large group” that went.111 Special
Assistant to the President Cassidy Hutchinson’s text
messages with Kerik included the guest list and descriptions
of the vehicles that would need access to the White House
grounds.112 Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano drove
one car, a hired driver drove a van with most of the State
legislators, and Kerik drove an SUV with attorney Katherine
Friess and election-conspiracy proponent Phil Waldron.113
Hutchinson estimated that at least 29 visitors traveled from
Pennsylvania to the White House that day, and she explained
that their conversation with the President touched on
holding a special session of the State legislature to
appoint Trump electors.114
Just a few days later, on November 30, 2020, President Trump
also called into another one of Giuliani and Jenna Ellis’s
hotel “hearings,” this time in Arizona. Several Arizona
State lawmakers hosted the meeting at a Hyatt Regency in
Phoenix after they did not receive permission to organize an
official hearing at the State Capitol.115 Before the hearing
started, State GOP Representative Mark Finchem “promised
information to show that the state’s 11 electoral votes
should not go to Democrat Joe Biden,” and argued that “the
U.S. Constitution empowers lawmakers to decide, on their
own, whether the election was valid and, if not, to select
the electors of their choice.” 116
Giuliani told the assembled legislators that the officials
certifying Arizona’s election results “have made no effort
to find out” if the results of the election were accurate,
“which seems to me gives the state legislature a perfect
reason to take over the conduct of this election because
it’s being conducted irresponsibly and unfairly.” 117
Likewise, Jenna Ellis said that it was “not just the choice,
but the actual duty and obligation of the legislature to
step in and to make sure that you don’t certify false
results.” 118 During a recess, she also took to Twitter,
writing, “[t]he certification of Arizona’s FALSE results is
unethical and knowingly participating in the corruption that
has disenfranchised AZ voters. BUT, this in no way impacts
the state legislature’s ability to take back the proper
selection of delegates.” 119
When it was President Trump’s turn to address this handful
of lawmakers over the phone, he called them “legends for
taking this on,” and used the opportunity to criticize
Governor Ducey: “you’ll have to figure out what’s that all
about with Ducey. He couldn’t [certify] fast enough” and
“Arizona will not forget what Ducey just did. We’re not
gonna forget.” 120 That night Giuliani joined President
Trump in criticizing Governor Ducey, while at the same time
making baseless allegations about voting machines in Arizona
and calling for a special legislative session to change the
outcome of the election: “Governor Ducey of Arizona refuses
to meet with me. He doesn’t want to explain that he selected
a foreign corrupt Voting Machine company to count the vote.
I understand his reluctance, but [sic] just call a special
session. Let’s find out how crooked your election really
was?” 121
Michigan was next. Giuliani’s team announced that the
Michigan legislature would hold a hearing on December 1st,
but the relevant committee chair excluded Giuliani because
it was only open to witnesses “with first hand
knowledge.” 122 That chairman, Michigan State Senator Edward
McBroom (R-Vulcan), had already held Senate Oversight
hearings by then in an actual effort to evaluate claims of
fraud in the 2020 election, which ultimately resulted in a
comprehensive report that concluded that the Republican-led
committee “found no evidence of widespread or systematic
fraud” in Michigan’s election.123
Michigan’s House Oversight Committee, however, did allow
Giuliani to testify in a hearing on December 2nd. Before the
hearing, Giuliani joined the State’s GOP chairwoman to give
what was billed as a legal briefing. In the online
presentation, Giuliani told the audience there’s “nothing
wrong with putting pressure on your state legislators” 124
to pick new electors and that “you have got to get them to
remember that their oath to the Constitution sometimes
requires being criticized. Sometimes it even requires being
threatened.” 125
When Giuliani appeared for the hearing in Michigan, he was
not placed under oath, used his time to refer to Michigan’s
election as a “con job,” and urged legislators to “have the
courage to say that certification that was done by your
state is a complete phony.” 126 The information presented
was baseless—and sometimes racist—conspiracy theories. One
witness brought to criticize Michigan’s voter verification
even said: “I think Chinese all look alike. So how would you
tell? If some Chow shows up, you can be anybody and you can
vote.” 127 And, as he had promised in the legal briefing the
day before, Giuliani then called on the legislators to do
what the Trump Campaign had reportedly been discussing since
before election day. He said that the State legislature
could still singlehandedly decide the election result
“anytime you want to. Anytime. You can take it back tonight.
You can take it back the day before the electors go down to
Washington.” 128 Jenna Ellis also participated, insisting
“no honest person can hear these citizens of your own state
today . . . and can let this proceed. What the Constitution
obligates you to do is to take back your plenary power.” 129
Finally, Georgia. There, Giuliani and others appeared in
multiple hearings, the first of which was held on December
3, 2020. In that hearing, Giuliani was direct and called on
Georgia legislators to overturn the election results—“you
are the final arbiter of who the electors should be”—based
on the false premise that “there is more than ample evidence
to conclude that this election was a sham.” 130 Then, at a
separate hearing on December 10th, he told State legislators
that Georgia’s Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and secretary
of State were engaged in a “cover up” of “a crime in plain
sight,” and that it fell to “the state legislature [ ] to
vindicate the honor of the state.” 131 And, Giuliani used
yet another appearance, on December 30th, to call the 2020
election “the most crooked election, the most manipulated
election in American history,” and implore the Republican
legislators to hold a special session to vote on appointing
new electors, something he said that they could do “right up
until the last moment” before January 6th.132
More perniciously, Giuliani also used these hearings to
advance conspiracy theories that falsely accused Fulton
County election workers of rigging Georgia’s election
results. His delegation to the December 3rd hearing played
clips of election-night surveillance footage from the State
Farm Arena that showed election workers scanning ballots,
sometimes after partisan poll watchers had gone home.133
Although the poll watchers should have been there the entire
time while election workers counted the votes, there was
nothing nefarious about the circumstances and no question
about the end result. In fact, the FBI, Department of
Justice, and Georgia Bureau of Investigation would determine
that these ballots were legitimate ballots, that observers
were not illegally ejected, and that the ballots were
scanned and counted properly, contrary to claims by
President Trump and his attorneys.134 And yet Giuliani
baselessly declared at the December 3rd hearing that, to
him, the video was a “powerful smoking gun” proving that
“those votes are not legitimate votes.” 135
But Giuliani’s claims took a more ominous turn during the
December 10th hearing. There, he publicly named two of the
election workers shown in the video, Ruby Freeman and her
daughter, Wandrea ArShaye “Shaye” Moss, and accused them of
vote-tampering and engaging in criminal conduct.136 He
seized on a clip of Freeman passing Moss a ginger mint,
claiming that the two women, both Black, were smuggling USB
drives “as if they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” He also
suggested that Freeman and Moss should be jailed and that
they deserved to have their homes searched.137 Not only were
Giuliani’s claims about Freeman and Moss reckless, racist,
and false, they had real-world consequences that turned both
women’s lives upside down. And further heightening the
personal impact of these baseless attacks, President Trump
supported, and even repeated, them, as described later.
In the end, the hearings were widely panned. In Michigan
alone, current and former Republican lawmakers publicly
questioned the hearings and implored President Trump and his
team to stop. U.S. Representative Paul Mitchell (R-Mich.)
implored on Twitter “Please JUST STOP!” and “wondered why
Republican leaders allowed testimony he said was ‘driving
the party into this ditch.’” 138 Similarly, former Michigan
lawmaker Martin Howrylak (R-Oakland) said that he was
“embarrassed” by the hearing, and former Michigan Senator
Ken Sikkema (R-Grand Rapids) said that “the way the
committee was run was atrocious.” 139 Later, the President
promoted a tweet calling a Democratic lawmaker a “#pos” for
speaking out at the Michigan hearing.140 Months later,
Giuliani’s license to practice law in New York was suspended
for, among other reasons, the “false claims” he made on
various dates, including during the hearings in Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Georgia.141
The Trump Campaign’s Barrage of Phone Calls to State
Legislators
Not only was replacing electors a theme during the official
and unofficial State hearings, it was also a critical
component of President Trump’s plan both before and after
the hearings took place.
In fact, while the hearings were happening, the Trump
Campaign set up an operation to contact hundreds of State
legislators and ask them to support an effort to appoint
electoral college electors for the Trump/Pence ticket in
States that President Trump had lost.
On the same day as Giuliani’s hearing in Michigan, Trump
Campaign staff contacted dozens of Republicans in Michigan’s
State legislature. A Trump Campaign supervisor sent text
messages to his team, directing them to reach out to
lawmakers “to explain the process for legislative redress
and tell them how to send representative[s] to th[e]
electoral college.” 142 He added: “We’re gonna be lobbyists.
Woot.” 143
According to a Campaign staffer’s spreadsheet produced to
the Select Committee, the Trump Campaign apparently tried
contacting over 190 Republican State legislators in Arizona,
Georgia, and Michigan, alone.144
One voicemail left as part of this initiative was leaked to
the press on December 1, 2020. In it, a Trump Campaign
staffer said, “I did want to personally reach out to you on
behalf of the President.” 145 Her main point came later in
the message: “we want to know when there is a resolution in
the House to appoint electors for Trump if the President can
count on you to join in support.” 146 Another message from
this effort that reached reporters made the same ask and
claimed that, “[a]fter a roundtable with the President, he
asked us to reach out to you individually” to whip support
for a “joint resolution from the State House and Senate”
that would “allow Michigan to send electors for Donald J.
Trump to the Electoral College and save our country.” 147
Soon after the voicemail leaked, the Campaign staffer who
left this voicemail got a text message from one of her
supervisors, who wrote: “Honest to god I’m so proud of this”
because “[t]hey unwittingly just got your message out
there.” 148 He elaborated: “you used the awesome power of
the presidency to scare a state rep into getting a statewide
newspaper to deliver your talking points.” 149
Outreach by President Trump and Senior Aides
While Campaign aides blanketed State officials with these
calls, some State officials received more personalized
outreach directly from President Trump, Giuliani, and their
allies throughout the post-election period about this issue.
Michigan
As discussed earlier, Rep. Walberg reached out to State
legislators in Michigan at the President’s request in
mid-November, including Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey
and House Speaker Lee Chatfield. By November 18th, President
Trump called Chatfield and Shirkey to invite them to what
would become a meeting for a group of Michigan lawmakers in
the Oval Office.150 Although President Trump didn’t tell
Shirkey what the meeting would be about, the President was
focused on the election and asked Shirkey what he and others
were doing to investigate election fraud.151 The meeting
happened on November 20th.152
In Shirkey’s words, there “wasn’t a mystery” about why the
group was at the White House once the meeting started.153
When the President mentioned several baseless claims of
election fraud in Wayne County, Shirkey told the President
that he had lost the election and that it had nothing to do
with Wayne County, where he had actually performed better
than he had in 2016.154
From the President’s body language, Shirkey concluded that
wasn’t what he wanted to hear. But the meeting continued,
and the President dialed in Giuliani, who delivered a “long
monologue,” reciting a “litany” of allegations about
supposed fraud that was short on substance.155 Shirkey
challenged Giuliani, asking “when are you going to . . .
file a lawsuit in Michigan,” which he said Giuliani did not
answer.156 Although Shirkey says he did not recall the
President making any precise “ask,” Chatfield recalled
President Trump’s more generic directive for the group to
“have some backbone and do the right thing.” 157 Chatfield
understood that to mean they should investigate claims of
fraud and overturn the election by naming electors for
President Trump.158 Shirkey told the President that he was
not going to do anything that would violate Michigan law.159
Photo by Rey Del Rio/Getty Images
Photo by Rey Del Rio/Getty Images
After the meeting ended, Shirkey and Chatfield issued a
joint statement: “We have not yet been made aware of any
information that would change the outcome of the election in
Michigan and as legislative leaders, we will follow the law
and follow the normal process regarding Michigan’s electors,
just as we have said throughout this election.” 160
That was not the end, however. Chatfield and Shirkey
received numerous calls from the President in the weeks
following the election. Chatfield told the Select Committee
that he received approximately five to ten phone calls from
President Trump after the election, during which the
President would usually ask him about various allegations of
voter fraud.161 Chatfield said that he repeatedly looked
into the President’s claims, but never found anything
persuasive that could have changed the outcome of the
election.162
President Trump’s calls were not enough, so he turned to the
public. On January 3, 2021, the Trump Campaign posted a
tweet that urged supporters to “Contact Speaker Lee
Chatfield & Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey” to “Demand
[a] vote on decertification.” 163 Why President Trump
thought the Michigan legislature would convene to decertify
the election in a matter of hours when it had refused to do
so since early November is not clear. But that didn’t stop
the President from making things personal. The President’s
January 3rd tweet included Shirkey’s personal cellphone
number as well as a number for Chatfield that turned out to
be wrong. As a result, Shirkey said he received nearly 4,000
text messages, and another private citizen reported being
inundated with calls and texts intended for Chatfield.164
Pennsylvania
On November 21st, Mark Meadows texted a number apparently
belonging to Representative Scott Perry (R–PA) and asked:
“Can you send me the number for the speaker and the leader
of the PA Legislature. POTUS wants to chat with them.” 165
Hours later, Meadows received a response of “Yes sir.” 166
At the time, the leader of the Pennsylvania Senate was Jake
Corman and the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House was Bryan
Cutler.
Corman told the Select Committee that he received a call on
Thanksgiving Day 2020 from Giuliani, urging him to call the
legislature into a special session to replace Biden electors
with Trump electors.167 This idea wasn’t new to Corman.
President Trump and his allies had gone public about their
intentions before then, including during the Pennsylvania
hotel hearing, but Corman had braced himself for this even
before the election. Before election day in 2020, a reporter
from The Atlantic interviewed Corman and other prominent
Republicans in Pennsylvania about the possibility that
President Trump would try to circumvent the popular vote in
swing States by asking the legislatures to appoint
Trump/Pence electors. After the article, Corman drafted an
op-ed, making it clear that the Pennsylvania legislature did
not have the legal authority to appoint Trump/Pence electors
in contravention of the popular vote, a position that he
would generally maintain through the 2020 Presidential
election cycle.168
During that call, Giuliani first tried “pumping [Corman] up
as a patriot” before asking the Senator to call the
Pennsylvania legislature into a special session. Corman told
Giuliani that he did not have the authority to do that, a
position with which his own lawyers agreed.169 Giuliani’s
reply was that Corman must have bad lawyers. Corman said he
offered to connect Giuliani with his legal team. His legal
team spoke with Giuliani and a lawyer working with him,
Jenna Ellis, the following day, reiterating their view that
such a move by the legislature would be illegal.170 That
same day, or possibly the next, Giuliani and Ellis called
him back to renew their request for a special legislative
session and to demean Corman’s attorneys, calling them
“terrible,” “bad,” and “wrong.” 171 Corman, however, held
his ground and ended the call.172
While packing to return to Pennsylvania from his
Thanksgiving visit to Florida, Corman says he received a
call from an unknown number with a Washington, DC area code,
which he let go to voicemail.173 It turned out to be a White
House operator calling on behalf of President Trump.174
Corman called back and spoke to President Trump, who
insisted that he had won the election in Pennsylvania and
said something to the effect of, “Jake, this is a big issue.
We need your help.” 175 Corman told the President that he
couldn’t do what the Trump team was asking; President Trump
replied, “I’m not sure your attorneys are very good.” 176
Corman wanted to end the call and offered to have his
lawyers speak again with President Trump’s, but they never
had another call with the President’s lawyers.177
Pennsylvania House Speaker Bryan Cutler was another main
target for the President’s team. He received voicemails in
late November for four days in a row from Giuliani and/or
Jenna Ellis, which he provided to the Select Committee.178
Cutler explained that he did not feel comfortable talking
with the President’s team in case he ended up having to
preside over a legislative session about the election, and
he had his attorneys relay that to the President’s team.179
Giuliani received the message but continued to call Speaker
Cutler nonetheless.180
In the first of these voicemails, on November 26th, Giuliani
asked to “get together, quietly” to discuss “the amount of
fraud that went on in your State,” and said that Giuliani
and Ellis had also just spoken to Pennsylvania House
Majority Leader Kerry Benninghoff.181 On November 27th,
Ellis called and said in a second voicemail that they had
just talked to Pennsylvania House Member Russ Diamond and
were “very grateful” to the State’s legislature “for doing
your Article II duty.” 182 On November 28th, Giuliani left a
third voicemail and claimed to have “something important”
that “really changes things,” and said that “the president
wanted me to make sure I got it to you.” 183 And then on
November 29th, Giuliani left a fourth message and said, “I
understand that you don’t want to talk to me now” but still
sought “the courtesy of being able to talk to you as the
president’s lawyer” and a “fellow Republican” because
“you’re certifying what is a blatantly false statement . . .
I can’t imagine how that’s in your interests or in the
interests of our party.” 184
Giuliani and Ellis didn’t get through, but the President
did. “[I]f we wanted to do something, what were the
options[?]” the President asked Cutler.185 Cutler explained
to President Trump that he could file a legal challenge
contesting the election, and asked the President why his
team had never requested a statewide recount.186 Cutler was
also clear about the “constitutional peculiarities” of
Pennsylvania, where the State constitution specifically
prohibits retroactive changes to how electors are chosen.187
Practically, President Trump’s call achieved nothing. The
President wasn’t getting what he wanted in his calls to
leaders in Pennsylvania: a special session of the
legislature to appoint Trump/Pence electors.
Seemingly undeterred, President Trump invited several
leaders of the Pennsylvania legislature to the White House
for Christmas gatherings.188 Senator Corman decided not to
go, although Speaker Cutler did. President Trump spoke with
Cutler on December 3rd, while Cutler, his chief of staff,
and their wives were at that White House Christmas tour.189
The issue of overturning the results of Pennsylvania’s
election came up again, as did the possibility of a special
session of the State legislature to appoint Trump
electors.190 Cutler told the President that the State
legislature could not reconvene without an order from the
Governor and a petition from a supermajority of legislators,
neither of which was likely to happen.191 Cutler also told
the President that they could not appoint new electors
without a court order. In Cutler’s opinion, President Trump
“seemed to understand. And that was—that was clear.” 192 The
President’s apparent understanding, however, did not result
in any meaningful changes to his public rhetoric.
On December 3rd, the same day that Cutler met with President
Trump, Cutler, Corman, House Majority Leader Benninghoff,
and Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward issued a three-page
single-spaced joint statement asserting, in no uncertain
terms, that Pennsylvania’s General Assembly “lacks the
authority . . . to overturn the popular vote and appoint our
own slate of electors,” since “[d]oing so would violate our
Election Code and Constitution, particularly a provision
that prohibits us from changing the rules for election
contests of the President after the election.” 193 In
response, President Trump retweeted a December 4th post by
Bernard Kerik, which tagged all four of these State
legislators with the hashtag “Traitors,” and declared that
“These are the four cowardice[sic] Pennsylvania legislators
that intend to allow the Democrat machine to #StealtheVote!
#Cowards #Liars #Traitors.” 194
But five days later, President Trump publicly thanked Cutler
for signing onto a December 4th letter that encouraged
Members of Congress from Pennsylvania to object to their
State’s electoral votes on January 6th. The President
tweeted: “Thank you to Speaker Cutler and all others in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere who fully understand what went on
in the 2020 election. It’s called total corruption!” 195
When the Select Committee asked Cutler about this apparent
change in his position, he said that he signed on to this
letter not because of concerns that fraud or corruption
meant the results of the election Pennsylvania were wrong,
but rather because of concerns about “programmatic changes
or areas for improvement” related to the election.196 In
fact, Cutler reiterated to the Committee that he “was not
personally aware of” any widespread election fraud that
would have changed the result of the election.197
The pressure facing State legislators during this period was
significant. On December 9th, the New York Times quoted
Pennsylvania’s Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward, revealing
that she too had received a call from President Trump in
which he pushed his election fraud narrative.198 Ward told
the Times that she hadn’t been given enough time to sign the
same December 4th letter that Cutler did, but commented that
if she had taken a stand against it, “I’d get my house
bombed tonight.” 199
Arizona
In late November, Arizona House Speaker Russell “Rusty”
Bowers, a longtime Republican who served 17 years in the
State legislature, received a call from President Trump and
Giuliani.200 Giuliani alleged that Arizona’s election
results were skewed by illicit ballots, cast by non-citizens
or on behalf of dead people.201 Bowers demanded proof for
these audacious claims on the call and President Trump told
Giuliani to comply, but the evidence never came.202 The
point of the call, however, was different. Like in Michigan
and Pennsylvania, President Trump and his allies were
working the phones to get something. They wanted Bowers to
hold a public hearing with the ultimate aim of replacing
Presidential electors for former Vice President Joe Biden
with electors for President Trump.203
Bowers had never heard of anything like that before, and
Giuliani acknowledged that it had never been done. Where
President Trump and Giuliani saw a potential opportunity,
however, Bowers saw a fundamental problem.
Photo by House Creative Services
Photo by House Creative Services
As Bowers explained it, what they wanted him to do was
“counter to my oath when I swore to the Constitution to
uphold it.” 204 And he said that to the President and
Giuliani: “you are asking me to do something against my
oath, and I will not break my oath.” 205 Giuliani replied:
“aren’t we all Republicans here? I mean, I would think you
would listen a little more open to my suggestions, that
we’re all Republicans.” 206
The pressure didn’t stop with that call. On December 1st,
Giuliani and Ellis got an audience with some of the most
powerful Republican lawmakers in Arizona, including Bowers,
Senate President Karen Fann, Senate President Pro Tempore
Vince Leach, House Majority Leader and Senator-Elect Warren
Petersen, Senate Majority Whip Sonny Borrelli, Senator
Michelle Ugenti-Rita, and others.207 The Select Committee
was unable to get Giuliani and Ellis’ perspective on this
outreach because Giuliani claimed that his communications
with Bowers—who was not his client nor part of his legal
team—were “privileged,” while Ellis invoked her Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination.208
Bowers, on the other hand, told the Select Committee that
Giuliani and Ellis asked the lawmakers to deliver Arizona’s
electors for President Trump, despite the certified popular
vote count.209 To bolster their request, Giuliani and Ellis
raised numerous allegations of election fraud at the
meeting, though they never produced evidence in support of
their claims. In live testimony before the Committee, Bowers
recalled Giuliani saying in this meeting that “we’ve got
lots of theories, we just don’t have the evidence.” 210 At
the time, Bowers didn’t know whether it was a gaffe or an
example of Giuliani not thinking through what he had just
said.211 In any event, Bowers said he and others in his
group made particular note of that comment.212 And it was
borne out; Bowers testified that “No one provided me, ever,
such evidence.” 213
In late December, in another phone call with President
Trump, Bowers reiterated that he would not do anything
illegal for him.214 Afterward, John Eastman joined the
chorus of Trump allies attempting to change his mind. In a
call on January 4th that included the Speaker’s chief
counsel as well as Arizona House Majority Leader-Elect Ben
Toma, Eastman urged Bowers to hold a vote to decertify
Arizona’s Presidential electors.215 When Bowers told Eastman
he couldn’t unilaterally reconvene the legislature, Eastman
urged him to “just do it and let the court sort it out.” 216
Bowers refused and the Arizona legislature took no such
action.
Many of President Trump’s efforts in Arizona focused on
State officials, but his team also continued to reach out to
the Board of Supervisors for Maricopa County even after it
certified the election. One focus was voting machines.
According to the Arizona Republic, Giuliani left a voicemail
in mid- to late-December for Board Member Steve Chucri that
“I see we’re gonna get a chance to take a good look at those
machines . . . give me a call as soon as you get a chance.
The president also wanted me to pass on a few things to you,
too.” 217 On December 4th, Giuliani also left a message for
the Board’s Chairman Clint Hickman: “I was very happy to see
that there’s gonna be a forensic audit of the machines. And
I really wanted to talk to you about it a bit. The President
wanted me to give you a call. All right? Thank you. Give me
a call back.” 218 Hickman chose not to call back.219
Then, on Christmas Eve, Giuliani left voicemails for Board
Members Bill Gates and Jack Sellers, asking them to call him
back. In his message for Gates, Giuliani said:
It’s Giuliani, President Trump’s lawyer. If you get a
chance, would you please give me a call? I have a few things
I’d like to talk over with you. Maybe we can get this thing
fixed up. You know, I really think it’s a shame that
Republicans sort of are both in this, kind of, situation.
And I think there may be a nice way to resolve this for
everybody.220
In his message for Sellers, Giuliani said “I’d like to see
if there is a way that we can resolve this so that it comes
out well for everyone. We’re all Republicans, I think we all
have the same goal. Let’s see if . . . we can get this done
outside of the court.” 221 Like Hickman, neither Gates nor
Sellers returned Giuliani’s calls.222
So President Trump made the call himself. On December 31st,
Board Chair Clint Hickman received a voicemail from the
White House switchboard, asking him to call back for
President Trump. Hickman said that he did not return the
call, in part because the county was still facing litigation
over the election.223 Another call from the White House came
through on January 3rd with a request that Hickman call back
for the President. But, by then, the President’s call with
Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, described
below, had leaked, and Hickman “didn’t want to walk into
that space.” 224
Georgia
On December 5th, President Trump traveled to Georgia to
headline a rally and mobilize voters in advance of a January
Senate runoff. But the President’s day started with a
morning call to Governor Brian Kemp during which they
discussed reconvening the legislature in a special
session.225 After the call, Kemp took to Twitter. He
acknowledged that he had spoken to the President and that he
told the President that he supported the idea of, and had
already called for, a signature audit in Georgia.226
President Trump responded later that night by complaining
that Georgia had not yet done a signature-verification audit
and instead insisted that the Governor should “[a]t least
immediately ask for a Special Session of the
Legislature.” 227 The following day, Governor Kemp and
Lieutenant Governor Geoff Duncan issued a definitive
statement rejecting President Trump and his allies’ calls to
overturn the results in Georgia:
While we understand four members of the Georgia Senate are
requesting the convening of a special session of the General
Assembly, doing this in order to select a separate slate of
presidential electors is not an option that is allowed under
state or federal law.
State law is clear: the legislature could only direct an
alternative method for choosing presidential electors if the
election was not able to be held on the date set by federal
law. In the 1960s, the General Assembly decided that
Georgia’s presidential electors will be determined by the
winner of the State’s popular vote. Any attempt by the
legislature to retroactively change that process for the
November 3rd election would be unconstitutional and
immediately enjoined by the courts, resulting in a long
legal dispute and no short-term resolution.228
President Trump responded by directing his ire at Georgia
officials and, throughout the month of December, President
Trump grew even more relentless in his social media attacks
against Kemp than he had been the previous month. He
retweeted attorney Lin Wood calling on Georgians to call and
urge the FBI to focus more on election fraud and “[t]ell
them to also investigate @BrianKempGA @GeoffDuncanGA &
@GaSecofState.” 229 And he retweeted another post by Lin
Wood that depicted Governor Kemp and Secretary Raffensperger
wearing masks digitally altered to show the Chinese flag,
and warned that they “will soon be going to jail.” 230 Even
without his many retweets, President Trump posted an average
of about one tweet per day in December 2020 either
criticizing Governor Kemp or pressuring him explicitly or
implicitly to take actions to help overturn the election.231
President Trump seemed consumed with his plans to overturn
the election and, based on documents obtained by the Select
Committee, it appears that the President received input from
many outside donors or advisors who had access to his
staff’s email addresses. On December 7th, a Trump donor
named Bill White emailed senior Trump advisors, including
Dan Scavino and Rudolph Giuliani, to say that he “[j]ust
spoke to [Georgia State] Senator [William Burton] Jones
[who] asked if Potus can R[e]T[weet] this now pls,” along
with a tweet by Senator Jones that read: “Georgia Patriot
Call to Action…call your state Senate & House Reps & ask
them to sign the petition for a special session.” 232
President Trump and Giuliani each retweeted Senator Jones’s
tweet an hour later.233
Bill White also emailed Molly Michael, Dan Scavino, and
Giuliani, on December 8th with information that he said
“POTUS asked me last night” to send right away.234 He
recommended a Presidential tweet criticizing Georgia’s Lt.
Gov. Duncan as well as tweets to put pressure on Senate
Majority Leader Mike Dugan and Senate President Pro Tempore
Butch Miller.235 He wrote that President Trump would be
calling Dugan and Miller “to ask them to call special
session and strategize with them why they are keeping this
from happening.” 236 Dugan later confirmed that he had
received a call from President Trump’s office but that the
two of them were not able to connect.237 And the following
day, Steve Bannon revealed on his podcast that President
Trump spoke to Georgia House Speaker Ralston and Speaker Pro
Tempore Jan Jones.238 Speaker Ralston confirmed that he
spoke to President Trump on December 7th about the election,
during which he told the President that Georgia law made a
special legislative session “very much an uphill
battle.” 239
2.4 An Outright Request for Victory
Beyond asking State officials to not certify, to decertify,
or to appoint Trump electors for consideration during the
joint session, President Trump and some of his closest
advisors inserted themselves directly into the counting of
ballots and asked, outright, for enough votes to win.
White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows did this. Not only
did he place calls on behalf of the President to election
officials in Georgia, Meadows traveled there to personally
visit election officials and volunteers, coordinated with
Members of Congress, and even suggested that the President
send election workers Trump memorabilia like presidential
challenge coins and autographed MAGA hats, a suggestion that
his assistant Cassidy Hutchinson thought could be
problematic and, ultimately, did not act on.240
When Meadows made a visit on short notice to examine the
audit of absentee ballots in Cobb County, Georgia, he spoke
to Deputy Secretary of State Jordan Fuchs and Frances
Watson, the Secretary of State’s chief investigator.
Ultimately, Meadows connected Watson with the President, who
claimed that he had won the election and pressed her to say
that he had won. The Select Committee obtained a copy of
their recorded call, which is detailed below.
The President told Watson that he had “won Georgia . . . by
a lot,” told her, “you have the most important job in the
country right now,” and suggested, “when the right answer
comes out you’ll be praised.” 241 Four days later, Meadows
texted Deputy Secretary of State Fuchs, in which he asked,
“[i]s there a way to speed up Fulton county signature
verification in order to have results before Jan 6 if the
trump campaign assist[s] financially.” 242 Fuchs wrote in
response that she “Will answer ASAP.” 243
Meadows also played a central role in the lead up to the
President’s January 2, 2021, call with Georgia Secretary of
State Brad Raffensperger. In fact, it was Meadows who
originally sent text messages to Raffensperger and requested
to speak: On November 19th, he texted “Mr Secretary. Mark
Meadows here. If you could give me a brief call at your
convenience. Thank you”.244 And on December 5th, Meadows
texted, “mr Secretary. Can you call the White House
switchboard at [phone number]. For a call. Your voicemail is
full.” 245 Then, on December 11th, Meadows texted, “Thanks
so much” to a number that apparently belongs to United
States Representative Jody Hice (R-GA) after Rep. Hice told
him that he had just made a statement “regarding a recall on
Raffensperger. If this is something Potus wants to know and
help push . . . .” 246
Photo by House Creative Services
Photo by House Creative Services
All of that led to the remarkable January 2nd call between
President Trump and his advisors on one side, and Secretary
of State Brad Raffensperger and his advisors on the other.
By January 2nd, the President had tried to speak by phone
with Raffensperger at least 18 times.247 Raffensperger, for
his part, had avoided talking to the President because of
ongoing litigation with the President’s Campaign.248 Despite
Raffensperger’s reluctance, the two spoke, with their
respective lawyers on the line. During the call, President
Trump went through his litany of false election-fraud claims
and then asked Raffensperger to deliver him a second term by
“finding” just enough votes to ensure victory. The President
said, “I just want to find 11,780 votes, which is one more
than we have because we won the State.” 249 He reiterated it
several different ways: “fellas, I need 11,000 votes. Give
me a break. You know, we have that in spades already. Or we
can keep going, but that’s not fair to the voters of Georgia
because they’re going to see what happened.” 250
When it was clear that Raffensperger and his advisors would
not agree to the President’s request, the President ramped
up the pressure by accusing them of committing crimes: “the
ballots are corrupt. And you are going to find that they
are—which is totally illegal—it is more illegal for you than
it is for them because, you know, what they did and you’re
not reporting it. That’s a criminal, that’s a criminal
offense. And you can’t let that happen. That’s a big risk to
you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . I’m notifying you that
you’re letting it happen.” 251
The President would stop at nothing to win Georgia. Separate
from asking Raffensperger to alter, without justification,
the election results in Georgia, he also attacked election
workers. In that call, President Trump mentioned Ruby
Freeman’s name 18 times, referred to her daughter Shaye Moss
several of those times, and accused them of crimes.252
Raffensperger and his aides rebutted President Trump’s false
claims of fraud on the call and explained why they were
wrong, but they did not deliver the one thing President
Trump wanted most: the 11,780 votes he asked for.253
The next day, President Trump tweeted about his phone call
with Raffensperger, falsely claiming that “[Secretary
Raffensperger] was unwilling, or unable, to answer questions
such as the ‘ballots under table’ scam . . . . He has no
clue!” 254 He added that Raffensperger, Governor Kemp, and
Lt. Governor Duncan “are a disgrace” and “have done less
than nothing” about rampant political corruption.255
Even though Raffensperger and his team repeatedly told the
President why his specific allegations of election fraud in
Georgia were wrong,256 President Trump met the next day with
the top leadership of the Justice Department in an effort to
convince them to send a letter falsely claiming that the
Department had “identified significant concerns” affecting
the election results in Georgia and calling on Governor
Kemp, Speaker Ralston, and Senate President Pro Tempore
Miller to convene a special session.257 It was only after a
showdown in the Oval Office, described in Chapter 4 during
which the White House Counsel and others threatened to
resign that President Trump decided against replacing
Department of Justice leadership and issuing that letter.
2.5 Some Officials Eagerly Assisted President Trump With His
Plans
While many State officials resisted President Trump’s
demands, some eagerly joined the President’s efforts.
President Trump routinely coordinated with Pennsylvania
State Senator Doug Mastriano, whose request led to the
November 25, 2020, hotel “hearing” in Gettysburg, and who
traveled to Washington to meet with the President
afterward.258 Senator Mastriano, who would later charter and
pay for buses to Washington for the President’s “Stop the
Steal” rally on January 6th and was near the Capitol during
the attack, quickly rose to favor with the President.259
Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images
Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images
On November 30th, President Trump called Mastriano,
interrupting him during a radio interview and telling
listeners that “Doug is the absolute hero” and people are
“really angry in Pennsylvania.” 260
On December 5th, Senator Mastriano sent an email to
President Trump’s executive assistant, Molly Michael, with a
Supreme Court Amicus Brief for the President that the pair
“discussed yesterday,” related to a case brought by
Representative Mike Kelly (R–PA) against his own State,
which the Supreme Court rejected just a few days later.261
On December 14th, President Trump’s executive assistant sent
Mastriano an email “From POTUS” with talking points
promoting a conspiracy theory about election machines.262
And on December 21st, Mastriano sent another email for
President Trump, in which he wrote: “Dear Mr.
President—attached please find the ‘killer letter’ on the
Pennsylvania election that we discussed last night” that “I
only just completed.” 263 This letter recapped the
Gettysburg hotel hearing on November 25th, and claimed that
“there is rampant election fraud in Pennsylvania that must
be investigated, remedied and rectified.” 264 President
Trump sent that letter to John Eastman, Acting Attorney
General Jeffrey Rosen, Acting Deputy Attorney General
Richard Donoghue, Rush Limbaugh, former Florida Attorney
General Pam Bondi, Lou Dobbs, and others.265
As January 6th approached, Senator Mastriano’s involvement
in attempts to overturn the election only grew. On December
23rd, he led a second group of Pennsylvania State senators
for a meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office, which
Giuliani claimed “swayed about 20” of them.266 Neither
Speaker Cutler nor Senate President Corman participated.
Mastriano also sent emails indicating that he spoke with
President Trump on December 27th, 28th, and 30th, along with
files that President Trump had requested or that he had
promised to him.267 One of these was a pair of letters from
State senators asking U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell and House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy to reject
Pennsylvania’s electoral votes on January 6th.268 President
Trump’s executive assistant notified the White House’s
Director of Legislative Affairs that “[t]he President would
like the below attached letters to be sent to Mitch and
Kevin and all GOP house and senate members,” but was told in
reply, “[g]iven the political nature of the letters, would
you mind sending them?” 269
On January 5th, President Trump spoke again with Mastriano
and then notified the White House operator that Mastriano
“will be calling in for the Vice President” soon.270 That
evening Senator Mastriano sent two more emails for the
President. One was a letter addressed to Vice President
Pence on behalf of nearly 100 legislators from various
States; the other was a letter directed to McConnell and
McCarthy from Pennsylvania lawmakers, this time asking
Congress to postpone acting on the 6th.271 President Trump
tweeted the letter that night, captioning it “BIG NEWS IN
PENNSYLVANIA!” and, after midnight, he retweeted that
“Pennsylvania is going to Trump. The legislators have
spoken.” 272 As described elsewhere in this report, that
letter, and letters like it, were used in the effort to
convince Vice President Pence that he could and should
affect the outcome of the joint session of Congress on
January 6th.
The Select Committee subpoenaed Senator Mastriano to testify
about these interactions with President Trump and his
advisors, among other matters. Unlike numerous other
witnesses who complied with subpoenas and provided
deposition testimony to the Select Committee, Mastriano did
not; he logged in to a virtual deposition at the appointed
time but logged out before answering any substantive
questions or even taking the oath to the tell the truth.273
The President apparently got what he wanted in State
officials like Senator Mastriano, but not those who dared
question or outright reject his anti-democratic efforts to
overturn the election. In some cases, those who questioned
him made the President and his advisors dig in and push
harder. On January 1st, Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller
asked for a “blast text and Twitter blast out” that would
urge President Trump’s supporters to “Contact House Speaker
Bryan Cutler & Senate President Pro Tem Jake Corman!” to
“Demand a vote on certification.” 274 Senior Campaign
attorneys, however, replied that this might violate
Pennsylvania’s “very stringent” lobbying laws and get them
prosecuted or fined.275 Instead, they agreed on a similar
call to action aimed at Arizona Governor Doug Ducey and
Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers rather than Speaker
Cutler and President Pro Tempore Corman in Pennsylvania.276
2.6 The Final Outreach to State Legislators
The efforts to overturn the election through State
legislatures continued throughout the final two weeks before
the joint session of Congress on January 6th. Based on
actual events and documents obtained by the Select
Committee, President Trump’s Campaign team, outside
advisors, and motivated volunteers generally acted in accord
with what was written down in a “Strategic Communications
Plan” when engaging with, and sometimes demonizing, State
officials. Activities that occurred thereafter were in
accord with the plan.
The “Plan” was explained in a document that was presented to
the White House.277 The plan contemplated pressuring
Republican legislators both in Congress and in six key swing
States. The document itself purports to be the product of
the “GIULIANI PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL DEFENSE TEAM” and declared
that “We Have 10 Days to Execute This Plan & Certify
President Trump!” 278
Kerik told the Select Committee that pieces of the plan had
been in place for some period of time before the document
was actually created, and that he thought that the
“catalyst” for actually memorializing the plan was the
approaching deadline of January 6th.279 In fact, the 10-day
plan to help “certify president Trump” had been the subject
of “continual discussions” for “6 weeks” and was “being
discussed every day at some point prior to the 10 days that
we’re talking about. So it was a continuous thing that went
on.” 280
Ultimately, the Giuliani team shared the Strategic
Communications Plan and urged its implementation. Kerik sent
the plan to Mark Meadows via email on December 28th with
this note, in part:
There is only one thing that’s going to move the needle and
force the legislators to do what their [sic]
constitutionally obligated to do, and that is apply pressure
. . . . We can do all the investigations we want later, but
if the president plans on winning, it’s the legislators that
have to be moved, and this will do just that. We’re just
running out of time.281
Neither Giuliani nor Kerik told the Select Committee that
they recalled officially implementing the plan, and Giuliani
said that he thought Meadows even rejected it, but there is
no doubt that President Trump’s team took certain actions
consistent with it.282
The document described its goal as a “[n]ationwide
communications outreach campaign to educate the public on
the fraud numbers, and inspire citizens to call upon
legislators and Members of Congress to disregard the
fraudulent vote count and certify the duly-elected President
Trump.” 283 The “FOCUS of CAMPAIGN” was “SWING STATE
REPUBLICAN SENATORS” in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, “REPULBICAN [sic] MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE” and “REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.” 284 Among
the steps that it recommended were “RALLIES AND PROTESTS” in
six key swing States, including protests at “Governor’s
Mansions,” “Lt. Governor’s home[s],” “Secretary of State’s
homes,” and “weak Members’ homes.” 285
Although the plan did not mention specific individuals by
name, an apparently related document produced to the Select
Committee by Giuliani did, naming State legislative leaders
as “TARGETS” under a header of “KEY TARGET STATE POINTS,”
including Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, Arizona Senate
President Karen Fann (incorrectly described as the State
Senate’s majority leader), Georgia House Speaker David
Ralston, Georgia Senate Majority Leader Mike Dugan, Georgia
Senate President Pro Tempore Butch Miller as a possible back
up, Michigan House Speaker Lee Chatfield, Michigan Senate
Majority leader Mike Shirkey, Pennsylvania House Speaker
Brian Cutler, Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Kerry
Benninghoff, Pennsylvania Senate President Pro Tempore Jake
Corman, Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward,
Wisconsin State Assembly Speaker Robin Vos, and Wisconsin
Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald.286
Consistent with these proposals, Giuliani appeared as a
guest on Steve Bannon’s podcast on New Year’s Eve and told
him that “we have a weak element to our party . . . a
cowardly element” 287 and, “[n]ow I think every Republican
knows—maybe this is worse—this election was stolen. Now the
question is: can they live up to their oath of office? . . .
We gotta start working on the leadership.” 288 Giuliani also
described President Trump’s objective in this effort: “For
the president, the way forward is really it’s in the hands
of the leaders of those legislatures and the Members of
Congress, and what our people can do is let them know what
they think, and that they’re not gonna get away with pushing
this aside. That the consequences of turning your back on a
massive voter fraud are gonna be dire for them, and
historically these people are gonna become enemies of the
country.” 289
A key component of this plan was to call out Republican
officials who rejected President Trump and his team’s
efforts or claims of fraud. Kerik and numerous other members
of the Campaign’s legal team did just that. On December
27th, Kerik suggested that Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) was
“corrupt” and said that “for any Pennsylvania official to
certify their vote, it’s malfeasance and criminal.” 290 That
was entirely consistent with Kerik’s past tweets about the
election, one of which apparently called public officials
“who betrayed” President Trump “spineless disloyal
maggots.” 291 It wasn’t just rhetoric, however, because, as
described below, people showed up outside certain officials’
home—sometimes menacingly—and, of course, showed up at the
Capitol on January 6th.
The pressure in those final days did not stop with the types
of activities outlined in the Strategic Communications Plan.
January 2, 2021, was a busy day for a Saturday at the Trump
White House. That was the day President Trump called on
Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger to find enough
votes for victory in Georgia and participated in a call with
Lindsay Graham and Members of the Freedom Caucus to plan for
the joint session on January 6th.292
It was also the day that the President joined in a virtual
briefing for nearly 300 Republican legislators from swing
States.293 The event was hosted by a short-lived
organization called “Got Freedom?” that listed Jenna Ellis
among its leadership team,294 and included Giuliani, John
Eastman, and Peter Navarro as the program’s “featured
speakers.” 295 A press release by Got Freedom? said that the
meeting was hosted by Phillip Kline, a former attorney
general of Kansas, who was disbarred in 2013.296 It
indicated that purported proof of voter fraud “should serve
as an important resource for state legislators as they make
calls for state legislatures to meet to investigate the
election and consider decertifying their state election
results.” 297
According to the Washington Examiner, when President Trump
joined the call he told the participants: “You know that we
won the election, and you were also given false numbers to
certify.” It quoted him saying “[y]ou are the real power”
because “[y]ou’re more important than the courts. You’re
more important than anything because the courts keep
referring to you, and you’re the ones that are going to make
the decision.” When asked about that quote, specifically,
Giuliani, who was on the call, said he didn’t recall the
exact words that the President used but told the Select
Committee “that would be the sum or substance of what he had
been saying and what he believed.” 298 During the call, the
President reportedly “referenced the planned protests in
Washington” just days later on January 6th, and told the
group “I don’t think the country is going to take it.” 299
When reporting on the call, the Washington Examiner also
provided details about what Giuliani told the assembled
State legislators. Consistent with his team’s “Strategic
Communications Plan,” Giuliani said, “[w]e need you to put
excessive pressure on your leadership where the real
weakness and cowardice is mostly located,” and the report
quoted Navarro telling them that “Your job, I believe, is to
take action, action, action.” 300 That evening, Navarro
stated on Fox News that “these legislators—they are hot,
they’re angry, they want action,” and “we explained exactly
how the Democrat Party as a matter of strategy stole this
election from Donald J. Trump.” 301
Organizers from Got Freedom? sent a follow-up email that
evening to participants on behalf of Phill Kline, in which
they described the event as “an important briefing for
legislators who hold the power to decertify the results of
their state elections.” 302 It emphasized the following:
As elected officials in the House and Senate of your
respective States, Professor Eastman laid out the
Constitutional imperatives for you:
Assert your plenary power
Demand that your laws be followed as written
Decertify tainted results unless and until your laws are
followed
Insist on enough time to properly meet, investigate, and
properly certify results to ensure that all lawful votes
(but only lawful votes) are counted.303
The email also recommended that they “. . . sign on to a
joint letter from state legislators to Vice President Mike
Pence to demand that he call for a 12-day delay on ratifying
the election . . .” on January 6th.304 The letter ultimately
garnered more than 100 signatures by State legislators from
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.305
Doug Mastriano forwarded a copy of the letter via email to
President Trump’s executive assistant, and the National
Archives produced to the Select Committee a printed version
with a stamp at the top indicating, “THE PRESIDENT HAS
SEEN.” 306
But this plan would fail to sway its intended audience. As
discussed in Chapter 5, the Vice President rejected this and
numerous other attempts to convince him to act unlawfully on
January 6th. The election had been decided and certified by
the States. It was the Vice President and Congress’s job to
open and count the legitimate electoral college votes.
And in the early morning hours of January 7th, after a day
unlike any seen in American history, when a mob of angry
insurrectionists attempted to violently upend a Presidential
election, the Vice President and Members of Congress, shaken
but steady, delayed but resolute, regrouped and reconvened
and did their Constitutional duty to certify Joseph R. Biden
as the next President of the United States.
President Trump’s plot to pressure State legislators to
overturn the vote of the electoral college failed—but only
barely. Even so, the consequences of President Trump’s
efforts to overturn State election results were significant.
2.7 The Harm Caused by Demonizing Public Servants
Many of the people who refused to be pushed into
manipulating election results—governors, secretaries of
State, State legislators, State and local election
officials, and frontline election workers just doing their
jobs—found themselves subjected to public demonization and
subsequent spamming, doxing, harassment, intimidation, and
violent threats. Some of the threats were sexualized or
racist in nature and targeted family members. President
Trump never discouraged or condemned these tactics, and in
fact he was an active participant in directing his
supporters, through tweets and speeches, to apply pressure
to public servants who would not comply.
President Trump and his team were not above using incendiary
rhetoric or threats to achieve their goal of overturning the
election. Giuliani said so before the purported hearing in
Michigan in December. Recall that he told an online
audience, there’s “nothin’ wrong with putting pressure on
your state legislators” 307 and “you have got to get them to
remember that their oath to the Constitution sometimes
requires being criticized. Sometimes it even requires being
threatened.” 308
That pressure came privately and publicly in the
post-election period.
Privately, for example, President Trump called Michigan
Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey three times after their
White House meeting: November 21st, November 25th, and
December 14th.309 Shirkey did not recall many specifics of
those calls and claimed he did not remember the President
applying any specific pressure.310 The day after one of
those calls, however, Shirkey tweeted that “our election
process MUST be free of intimidation and threats,” and “it’s
inappropriate for anyone to exert pressure on them.” 311
From this and other public statements, it is clear that
Shirkey was sensitive to outside forces pressuring people
with roles in the election. In fact, the same day that the
electoral college met and voted former Vice President Joe
Biden as the winner of the 2020 Presidential election,
Shirkey received another call from President Trump and
issued another public statement. Shirkey’s statement that
day, December 14, 2020, read: “Michigan’s Democratic slate
of electors should be able to proceed with their duty, free
from threats of violence and intimidation” and “[i]t is our
responsibility as leaders to follow the law . . . .” 312
Publicly, President Trump used both Twitter posts and paid
social media and cable television ads to advance his
pressure campaign.
In Arizona, for example, President Trump used social media
to both praise and criticize legislators. When Speaker
Bowers and Senate President Karen Fann requested an audit of
Maricopa County’s election software and equipment, President
Trump publicly commended them, retweeting a press release
about their announcement and commenting: “Thank you to
Senate President Karen Fann and House Speaker Russell
Bowers—and all, for what you are doing in Arizona. A fast
check of signatures will easily give us the state.” 313 But
just days later, President Trump assailed Bowers for
opposing a special session to appoint new electors. He
retweeted a post by Campaign lawyer Christina Bobb that
accused Bowers of “intentionally misleading the people of
Arizona” and that included a demand by Stop-the-Steal
organizer Ali Alexander for 50,000 phone calls to Rusty
Bowers “[r]ight the heck now” to threaten him with a primary
challenge.314
And, as his efforts to change the outcome of the election
continued to meet resistance, President Trump personally
approved a series of advertisements that the Campaign ran on
cable television and social media in several important
States. One advertisement in Arizona called for pressure on
Governor Ducey in particular, alleging, “The evidence is
overwhelming. Call Governor Ducey and your legislators.
Demand they inspect the machines and hear the evidence.” 315
Another claimed that “illegal aliens voted, and here in
Arizona Trump votes were discarded. It’s an outrage. Call
Governor Ducey and your legislators at 602–542–4331. Demand
they inspect the machines and hear the evidence. Call
Governor Ducey, at 602–542–4331. Stand up for President
Trump. Call today. Paid for by Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc.” 316
Several days earlier, Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason
Miller had explained the intention for this round of
advertisements in an email. He wrote that, “the President
and Mayor Giuliani want to get back up on TV ASAP, and Jared
[Kushner] has approved in budgetary concept, so here’s the
gameplan” in order to “motivate the GOP base to put pressure
on the Republican Governors of Georgia and Arizona and the
Republican-controlled State legislatures in Wisconsin and
Michigan to hear evidence of voter fraud before January
6th.” 317 Miller anticipated a budget of $5 million and
asked for the messaging to follow an earlier round of
advertisements, “but the endings need to be changed to
include phone numbers and directions to call the local
Governor or state legislature.” 318 On December 22nd, Jason
Miller texted Jared Kushner that “POTUS has approved the
buy.” 319
References to anger and fighting were featured in some of
the President’s remarks during that period. After the
Georgia Secretary of State’s Chief Operating Officer,
Gabriel Sterling, made an impassioned public plea and
accurately warned that someone would die as a result of the
threatening election-related rhetoric that President Trump
failed to condemn, President Trump dismissively tweeted in
response: “Rigged Election. Show signatures and envelopes.
Expose the massive voter fraud in Georgia. What is Secretary
of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what we’ll
find!!!” 320 The President also tweeted that, between
Governor Ducey in Arizona and Governor Kemp in Georgia, “the
Democrat Party could not be happier” because these
Republicans “fight harder against us than do the Radical
Left” and were singlehandedly responsible for losing him
both States, something that “Republicans will NEVER
forget[.]” 321 Regarding Kemp, he asked “What’s wrong with
this guy? What is he hiding?” 322 and he alleged that
“RINOs” Governor Kemp, Lieutenant Governor Geoff Duncan, and
Secretary Raffensperger “will be solely responsible” for
Senators Loeffler and Perdue losing their senate runoff
because they “[w]on’t call a Special Session or check for
Signature Verification! People are ANGRY!” 323
President Trump’s spoken remarks were not much different.
After the President wrapped up a November 26th public phone
call to wish U.S. service members a happy Thanksgiving, he
answered a reporter’s question about election integrity in
Georgia by lashing out at Secretary Raffensperger in
particular. President Trump made several baseless claims of
election fraud in Georgia, declared that Raffensperger
himself appeared to be complicit, and labeled the Georgia
Secretary of State “an enemy of the people.” 324
President Trump and his team’s practice of naming and
viciously criticizing people had real consequences.
Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt’s story, recounted
earlier, is just one of many examples. And the consequences
weren’t just limited to high-profile public figures.
Schmidt’s deputy, for example, Seth Bluestein faced threats
after being demonized by a surrogate for President Trump,
and many of the threats he received were anti-Semitic in
nature. He received a Facebook message telling him that
“EVERYONE WITH A GUN IS GOING TO BE AT YOUR HOUSE- AMERICANS
LOOK AT THE NAME- ANOTHER JEW CAUGHT UP IN UNITED STATES
VOTER FRAUD.” 325 Bluestein got a security detail at his
home, and the experience gave his three-year-old daughter
nightmares.326
Similarly, after President Trump promoted online accusations
that Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers had been
“intentionally misleading the people of Arizona . . .” 327
Bowers’s personal cell phone and home address were
published,328 leading demonstrators to congregate at his
home, honk horns and shout insults until police arrived.329
Bowers told the Select Committee this was the first of at
least nine protests at his home, sometimes with protesters
shouting into bullhorns and calling him a pedophile.330 One
protestor who showed up at his home was armed and believed
to be a member of an extremist militia.331
Sadly, those were not isolated incidents. Stories similar to
Schmidt’s and Bowers’ proliferated after President Trump’s
loss in the election. Examples from each of the States
discussed in this chapter are documented below, but this
list is by no means exhaustive:
Arizona: After Secretary of State Katie Hobbs’s home address
and son’s phone number were publicly released, demonstrators
congregated outside her home chanting “we are watching
you.” 332 A social media user at the time recommended:
“Let’s burn her house down and kill her family and teach
these fraudsters a lesson.” 333 Secretary Hobbs has
continued to receive threats since then, reporting over 100
threats to the FBI in mid-2022, including a September 2021
voicemail message that “you should be hunted” and “will
never be safe in Arizona again.” 334
Arizona: Maricopa County Recorder Adrian Fontes testified
before Congress that his family had “go-bags” packed in case
they needed to evacuate and that, because of the threats, he
had moved his children “out of the family home at least once
for three days in the wake of serious threats to [his]
family’s safety.” 335
Arizona: Paul Boyer, a Republican State senator, had to
evacuate his family, get police protection, and change his
phone number after he voted against jailing Maricopa’s
County Supervisors over election disputes.336
Arizona: On January 5, 2021, a comment on a blog suggested
some members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors
“have earned a good old fashioned neck tie party” as
“punishment for Treason.” 337 According to Board member
Clint Hickman, “the threats never abated.” 338 And on
January 6th, police convinced Hickman and his family to
leave their home.339
Michigan: Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and her family
were driven out of their home for several days after dozens
of protestors with bullhorns and firearms congregated
outside “shouting obscenities and graphic threats into
bullhorns” 340 while she spent time with her son and got him
ready for bed.341 Secretary Benson said that she only feels
safe “sometimes” as a result of continuing threats.342
Michigan: Several members of the Wayne County Board of
Canvassers received threats, as did Aaron Van Langevelde, a
Republican member of the State Board of Canvassers.343 Van
Langevelde was bombarded with communications and people
began showing up at his family’s home, forcing police to
ensure his and his family’s safety and escort him across the
State after he voted to certify Michigan’s election.344
Michigan: Detroit City Clerk Janice Winfrey, a Democrat, and
Rochester Hills City Clerk Tina Barton, a Republican, were
both targeted. Barton had never before received a death
threat in over a decade of work as an election official but,
as a result of the 2020 Presidential election, was subject
to “a torrent of threats and harassment,” such as an
anonymous caller who “repeatedly threatened to kill her and
her family.” 345 Winfrey was confronted outside her home by
a man who indicated he had been surveilling her and that
“You are going to pay dearly for your actions in this
election!” 346 She started carrying a firearm because death
threats against her continued.347
Michigan: Michigan House Speaker Lee Chatfield confirmed
that “I and my family have received numerous threats, along
with members on both sides of the aisle.” 348 This included
the top Democrat on Michigan’s House Oversight Committee,
Rep. Cynthia Johnson, who was threatened with lynching after
she challenged the witnesses that Giuliani offered to her
committee.349 One caller who allegedly threatened to kill
Rep. Johnson and wipe out her family in December 2020 called
the Capitol again on the morning of January 7, 2021, and
said that “everyone better get out of the building because
it’ll fucking explode.” 350
Pennsylvania: Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar
said she received so many threats “I didn’t feel comfortable
walking the dog on the street.” 351 This included a message
in November 2020 threatening to murder her in her home at
night, forcing her and her husband to flee for a week.352
Another voicemail she received after certifying
Pennsylvania’s election results threatened: “You crooked
f***ing bitch. You’re done.” 353
Pennsylvania: House Speaker Bryan Cutler told the Select
Committee there were at least three protests outside either
his district office or his home, and that his
then-15-year-old son was home by himself for the first
one.354 Senate Jake Corman’s spokesperson revealed in
December 2020 that he, too, was being subjected to violent
threats,355 something Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward also
received.356
Pennsylvania: Philadelphia City Commissioner Omar Sabir,
spent several nights evacuated from his home and continued
to receive death threats a year after the 2020 election,
reflecting that, “I feel anxiety every time I walk outside
of the house.” 357 Commissioner Lisa Deeley, another City
Commission colleague, also received death threats and said
she suffers occasional anxiety attacks as a result.358
Georgia: After Georgia Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger’s email and phone number were published, he
said that he and his wife received frequent hostile
messages, some of which “typically came in sexualized
attacks.” 359 As a result, the Secretary’s wife cancelled
visits from their grandchildren out of fear for the kids’
safety.360 That was not an overreaction as that came after
police found self-identified members of the Oath Keepers
outside their home and after someone broke into their
daughter-in-law’s house.361
Georgia: On January 5, 2021, Governor Kemp and Secretary
Raffensperger were reportedly named in a Craigslist post
encouraging people to “put an end to the lives of these
traitors.” 362
Georgia: Fulton County Elections Director Richard Barron was
named and depicted on screen in the video President Trump
played at his December 5th rally. He said that this incident
led to a spike in death threats targeted at election
workers, including himself.363 His team’s registration
chief, Ralph Jones, received death threats following the
election including one calling him a “n[igger] who should be
shot,” and another threatening “to kill him by dragging his
body around with a truck.” 364
Georgia: Election offices in ten Georgia counties received
emailed threats of bombings that would “make the Boston
bombings look like child’s play” and that the “death and
destruction” would continue “[u]ntil Trump is guaranteed to
be POTUS . . . .” 365
One of the most striking examples of the terror that
President Trump and his allies caused came in Georgia, where
election workers Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, mother and
daughter, were besieged by incessant, terrifying harassment
and threats that often evoked racial violence and lynching,
instigated and incited by the President of the United
States.
As described earlier, in a State legislative hearing in
Georgia, Giuliani publicly—and baselessly—accused Freeman
and Moss of engaging in criminal conduct. He showed a video
of Freeman passing Moss a ginger mint before claiming that
the two women, both Black, were smuggling USB drives “as if
they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” 366
President Trump seemed fixated on Freeman and Moss, too. He
played surveillance video showing them inside the State Farm
Arena at a December 5th rally in Georgia,367 and mentioned
Freeman by name 18 times during the January 2nd call to
Secretary of State Raffensperger in which he asked the
Secretary to simply “find” enough votes to ensure
victory.368
Freeman’s and Moss’s lives were forever changed. After their
contact information was published, they were besieged by the
President’s supporters. In early December 2020, Freeman
“told police she had received hundreds of threats at her
home.” 369 Moss’s son also started receiving threatening
phone calls, including one stating he “should hang alongside
[his] nigger momma.” 370
In the wake of President Trump’s December 5, 2020, rally,
Freeman called 911 because strangers had come to her home
trying to lure her out, sending threatening emails and text
messages.371 She pleaded with the 911 dispatcher for help
after hearing loud banging on her door just before 10 p.m.
“Lord Jesus, where’s the police?” she asked the dispatcher.
“I don’t know who keeps coming to my door.” “Please help
me!” 372
Ultimately, Freeman fled from her own home based on advice
from the FBI.373 She would not move back for months.374
Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images
Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images
In her testimony to the Select Committee, Freeman recounted
how she had received “hundreds of racist, threatening,
horrible calls and messages” and that now “[t]here is
nowhere I feel safe—nowhere.” 375 But it’s not just a sense
of security that the President and his followers took from
Freeman. She told the Select Committee that she also lost
her name and reputation:
My name is Ruby Freeman. I’ve always believed it when God
says that he’ll make your name great, but this is not the
way it was supposed to be. I could have never imagined the
events that followed the Presidential election in 2020. For
my entire professional life, I was Lady Ruby. My community
in Georgia where I was born and lived my whole life knew me
as Lady Ruby . . . . Now I won’t even introduce myself by my
name anymore. I get nervous when I bump into someone I know
in the grocery store who says my name. I’m worried about
who’s listening. I get nervous when I have to give my name
for food orders. I’m always concerned of who’s around me.
I’ve lost my name, and I’ve lost my reputation.
I’ve lost my sense of security—all because a group of
people, starting with Number 45 and his ally Rudy Giuliani,
decided to scapegoat me and my daughter Shaye to push their
own lies about how the presidential election was stolen.376
Freeman’s sense of dread is well-founded. According to
Federal prosecutors, a member of the Oath Keepers militia
convicted of multiple offenses for his role in the January
6th insurrection had a document in his residence with the
words “DEATH LIST” written across the top.377
His death list contained just two names: Ruby Freeman and
Shaye Moss.378
ENDNOTES
1. See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, “Risk-Limiting Audit Confirms
Biden Won Georgia,” GPB, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/19/risk-limiting-audit-confirms-biden-won-georgia;
Addie Haney, “Georgia Election Recount Results: Breaking
Down Final Numbers,” 11Alive, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at
https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/elections/georgia-election-recount-results-final-numbers/85-cbaacd70-f7e0-40ae-8dfa-3bf18f318645.
2. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
3. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
4. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
5. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
6. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
7. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
8. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts, (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), at p. 194.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Brad
Raffensperger, (Nov. 22, 2021), pp. 121-122, 126-27.
10. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts, (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), at p. 194.
11. The Georgia Secretary of State’s Chief Operating
Officer, Gabriel Sterling, gave an impassioned public
statement that included these points. “Georgia Election
Official Gabriel Sterling: ‘Someone’s Going to Get Killed’
Transcript,” Rev, (Dec. 1, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-official-gabriel-sterling-someones-going-to-get-killed-transcript.
Shortly thereafter, President Trump fired back on Twitter in
the form of a quote-tweet of a journalist’s post that
included the full footage of these parts of Sterling’s
remarks. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec.
1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521
(quoting Brendan Keefe (@BrendanKeefe), Twitter, Dec. 1,
2020 4:22 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633).
12. See Chapter 1.
13. U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative,
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”).
14. See “Census Bureau Releases 2020 Presidential Election
Voting Report,” United States Census Bureau, (Feb. 17,
2022), available at
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/2020-presidential-election-voting-report.html.
15. Barton Gellman, “The Election That Could Break America,”
Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020) available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424/.
16. Barton Gellman, “The Election That Could Break America,”
Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020) available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424/.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46, 148-53, 158;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin
Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 96, 98; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p.
42. Although certain Select Committee witnesses confirmed
the existence of this state-focused strategy, none testified
that they knew about the strategy before the election.
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46.
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011213. Donald Trump
Jr. publicly urged State legislators to help the same day.
He called on Twitter for his father to “go to total war over
this election” and retweeted a post by Fox News host Mark
Levin urging Republican State legislatures to “GET READY TO
DO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY” by exercising “THE FINAL SAY
OVER THE CHOOSING OF ELECTORS.” David Knowles, “As Vote
Count Swings Toward Biden, Trump’s Backers Hit the Caps-Lock
Key on Twitter,” Yahoo! News, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at
https://www.yahoo.com/video/as-vote-count-swings-toward-biden-trump-backers-hit-the-caps-lock-on-twitter-223931950.html.
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011318 (November 6,
2020, text message from Mark Meadows to Donald J. Trump,
Jr.).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011296 (November 5,
2020, text message from Mark Meadows to Marty Harbin).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011686, MM011687
(November 9, 2020, text messages between Mark Meadows and
Russell Vought).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011560, MM011563
(November 7, 2020, text messages between Mark Meadows and
Rep. Warren Davidson).
25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449, MM011451
(November 6, 2020, text messages between Mark Meadows and
Rep. Andy Biggs).
26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011087 (November 4,
2020, text message from Rick Perry to Mark Meadows).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004070, p. 44; see
also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003041.
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003543 (November
5, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Dan
Huff re: State legislature plenary power under Constitution
to state electoral college electors); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production),
VMH-00003559 (November 5, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to
Johnny McEntee and Dan Huff re: more notes on state
legislature strategy); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000010233_0001 (November 6, 2020, email chain between
Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff re: Contact
Info of key leaders in key States); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000010198_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent
Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Horowitz: How
Republican-controlled state legislatures can rectify
election fraud committed by courts and governors -
TheBlaze); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000010225_0001-10226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email
from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re:
Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching
contact info); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004070, 4103-04,
4111-12, 4124-25 (various text messages between Vincent
Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff discussing the state
legislature plan).
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003009 (November
8, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley and Newt Gingrich
re: More of my exchange with John); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production),
VMH-00004103 (November 6, 2020, text message from Vincent
Haley to Randy Evans).
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002107 (November
5, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley, Daniel Huff, and
Jonny McEntee re: more notes on the state legislature
strategy).
31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004103 (November
6, 2020, text message from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee).
32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004104 (November
6, 2020, text message from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001
- 076P-R000010226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent
Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Contact info of
key leaders in key States and attaching contact info);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000010233_0001
(November 6, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley, Johnny
McEntee, and Daniel Huff re: Contact Info of key leaders in
key States).
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001
- 076P-R000010226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent
Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Contact info of
key leaders in key States and attaching contact info).
35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Vincent Haley Production),
VMH-00004122-VMH-00004123 (November 8, 2020, text messages
between Vincent Haley and Johnny McEntee).
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010533_0001
(November 10, 2020, email from Newt Gingrich to Molly
Michael re: Only two options--please give to POTUS newt).
37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010533_0001
(November 10, 2020, email from Newt Gingrich to Molly
Michael re: Only two options--please give to POTUS newt).
38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010586_0001
(November 10, 2020, email from Mark Meadows to Newt Gingrich
re: Only two options--please give to POTUS newt).
39. Solange Reyner, “Newsmax CEO Ruddy: Trump ‘Very
Concerned’ That Dems Will Steal Election,” Newsmax, (Nov. 4,
2020), available at
https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/chris-ruddy-2020-elections-democrats-white-house/2020/11/04/id/995386/;
Christopher Ruddy (@ChrisRuddyNMX), Twitter, Nov. 12, 2020
4:43 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ChrisRuddyNMX/status/1327004111154319360;
“Digest of Other White House Announcements (Administration
of Donald J. Trump, 2020),” Government Publishing Office, p.
114, available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf;
Michael M. Grynbaum and John Koblin, “Newsmax, Once a
Right-Wing Also-Ran, Is Rising, and Trump Approves,” New
York Times, (Nov. 22, 2020), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/business/media/newsmax-trump-fox-news.html;
Cordelia Lynch, “Trump Ally on President’s Next Move after
Thanksgiving Phone Call,” Sky News, (Dec. 4, 2020),
available at
https://news.sky.com/story/trump-ally-on-presidents-next-move-after-thanksgiving-phone-call-12150612;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000009409_0001
(December 2, 2020, email from John McLaughlin to Molly
Michael re: Newsmax National Poll).
40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM008861-MM008865
(November 7, 2020, email from John McLaughlin to Mark
Meadows and Newt Gingrich re: “Gerald Brant’s birthday
party/ my Nov 7, 2020 memo on ON ‘ELECTORAL L COUNT ACT OF
1887’ AND REPUBLICAN PATHWAYS: [sic],” and attaching memo
forwarded by Christopher Ruddy).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell,
(May 18, 2022), pp. 14-15; Jeremy Herb and Sunlen Serfaty,
“How GOP Lawyer Cleta Mitchell Joined Trump’s ‘Team
Deplorables’ Advancing His False Election Fraud Claims,”
CNN, (Oct. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/13/politics/trump-mitchell-georgia-election/index.html.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell,
(May 18, 2022), pp. 74-75.
43. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman006671.
44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman007670-
Chapman007671, Chapman008087 (November 9, 2020, email chain
between John Eastman, Lisa Nelson, Rep. Seth Grove, and
Cleta Mitchell re: Connections for today! and attaching
memo).
45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),076P-R000010584_0001
(November 10, 2020, email chain scheduling an external
meeting with President Trump).
46. Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, Nov. 11, 2020,
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201111104529/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1326475581005950976
(“Was in Oval yesterday. You are right.”). For attribution
of the account to Warstler, see The RSnake Show, “S01E10 -
Morgan Warstler,” YouTube, at 1:43:00 - 1:44:00, Apr. 20,
2022, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-ojD3QAYfo; Break Up DC
(@BreakItUp3), Twitter, June 16, 2022, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20220616124842/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1537414050510000128
(“NO it is not. I went to the Oval right after election and
spent an hour with Trump sitting at Resolute desk. I explain
it all here: https://youtu.be/k-ojD3QAYfo?t=2724 … Hint :
the electoral count act is unconstitutional - there is only
one slate of electors- whatever the state leg says”).
47. Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, June 15, 2022 7:40
p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20220615234134/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1537218579225268225
(archived) (“She literally was advocating what I told whole
Trump team in Oval- it’s a fact - state legislatures can
choose the electors- no matter what current state law OR
state courts say . . . just ratify it amongst themselves
That’s WHY they call it a plenary power ever since Bush v.
Gore.”).
48. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001
- 076P-R000008530_0001.
49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001
- 076P-R000008528_0003, 076P-R000008530_0001 -
076P-R000008530_0002.
50. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000008528_0001-076P-R000008528_0003,
076P-R000008530_0001-076P-R000008530_0002.
51. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000008531_0001, 076P-R000008257_0001.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 151-52.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 153. This fits with
several major news reports at the time. The New York Times
reported that President Trump went into the meeting on the
11th with “something he wanted to discuss with his
advisors,” and “press[ed] them on whether Republican
legislatures could pick pro-Trump electors in a handful of
key states and deliver him the electoral votes he needs.”
Maggie Haberman, “Trump Floats Improbable Survival Scenarios
as He Ponders His Future,” New York Times, (Nov. 12, 2020,
updated Nov. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/us/politics/trump-future.html.
Similarly, late on November 11th, the Washington Post
reported that President Trump had “raised the idea of
pressuring state legislators to pick electors favorable to
him,” and the Wall Street Journal also called the option of
state legislatures picking new electors “one potential
strategy” discussed by his legal team. Philip Rucker, Josh
Dawsey & Ashley Parker, “Trump Insists He’ll Win, But Aides
Say He Has No Real Plan to Overturn Results and Talks of
2024 Run,” Washington Post, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-results-strategy/2020/11/11/a32e2cba-244a-11eb-952e-0c475972cfc0_story.html;
Rebecca Ballhaus, “What Is Trump’s Legal Strategy? Try to
Block Certification of Biden Victory in States,” Wall Street
Journal, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-trumps-legal-strategy-try-to-block-certification-of-biden-victory-in-states-11605138852.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 148-49.
55. Senator Mitt Romney (@MittRomney), Twitter, Nov. 19,
2020 10:36 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/MittRomney/status/1329629701447573504.
56. This figure is almost certainly a significant
undercount, since it only includes public remarks by
President Trump, public testimony, or the most noteworthy
interviews conducted by one of his subordinates, but it does
not include a review of every single remark targeting State
or local officials during this period by those presidential
subordinates.
57. This figure is also almost certainly an undercount,
since it only includes those posts by President Trump’s
campaign or advisors when they covered new ground that was
substantially different from social media posts that were
already made by President Trump. Also, many of these posts
were replicated across multiple platforms.
58. Jonathan Oosting, “Trump Campaign Lobbies Michigan
Lawmakers to Ignore Vote, Give Him Electors,” Bridge
Michigan, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-campaign-lobbies-michigan-lawmakers-ignore-vote-give-him-electors;
MIRS Monday Podcast, “Call to Legislator From Someone
Claiming to be with Trump Campaign (12/1/2020),” PodBean,
Dec. 1, 2020, available at
https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela
McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001570, (Undated Basic
Script for calls to Representatives/Senators).
59. Paul Bedard, “Exclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators
to Reject Electoral Votes, ‘You Are the Real Power,’”
Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/exclusive-trump-urges-state-legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power.
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production),
CTRL0000020072 (December 24, 2020, copy of voice message and
a transcription) pp. 1–2); see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez
and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to Do Something Huge’: An
Audacious Pitch to Reverse Arizona’s Election Results,” AZ
Central, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
61. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001
(November 12, 2020, email from Rep. Tim Walberg to Molly
Michael).
62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001
(November 12, 2020, email from Rep. Tim Walberg to Molly
Michael). The day after Representative Walberg’s call with
the President, President Trump’s assistant forwarded to the
Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security a
letter signed by two other Michigan legislators outlining
claims of supposed election fraud. Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, (Department of Homeland
Security production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020 email
from Molly Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan
Letter”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (no production listed, Ex. 44 from Chad Wolf
interview), CTRL0000926977 (Nov. 13, 2020 letter to Michigan
Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson from Michigan State
Senators Lana Theis and Tom Barrett).
63. “Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of
Other White House Announcements,” Government Publishing
Office, (Dec. 31, 2020), p. 115, available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf;
Annie Grayer, Jeremy Herb & Kevin Liptak, “Trump Courts
Michigan GOP Leaders in Bid to Overturn Election He Lost,”
CNN, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/19/politics/gop-michigan-results-trump/.
64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012007 (text from Kelli
Ward to Meadows).
65. Brahm Resnik, “‘Stop the Counting’: Records Show Trump
and Allies Pressured Top Maricopa County Officials Over
Election Results,” 12News, (July 7, 2021), available at
https://www.12news.com/article/news/politics/stop-the-counting-records-show-trump-and-allies-pressured-top-maricopa-county-officials-over-election-results/75-61a93e63-36c4-4137-b65e-d3f8bde846a7.
66. Select Committee to Investigation the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview with Clint
Hickman, (Nov. 17, 2021); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors
Production), CTRL0000020004.
67. Brian Slodysko, “EXPLAINER: Why AP called Georgia for
Biden,” Associated Press, (Nov. 13, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/why-ap-called-georgia-for-joe-biden-29c1fb0502efde50fdccb5e2c3611017.
68. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 13,
2020 7:50 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1327413534901350400.jpg
(archived).
69. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 14,
2020 9:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1327619653020110850.jpg
(archived).
70. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16,
2020 9:04 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1328338211284616193.jpg
(archived).
71. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19,
2020 1:46 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329420741553643522.jpg
(archived).
72. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30,
2020 1:59 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1333410419554344964.jpg
(archived).
73. President Donald J. Trump, “Tweets of November 30,
2020,” The American Presidency Project, available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-november-30-2020;
see also Fox 10 Staff, “Tweet mocking Arizona Gov. Doug
Ducey and Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp Now on Billboard,” Fox 10
News, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at
https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/tweet-mocking-arizona-gov-doug-ducey-and-georgia-gov-brian-kemp-now-on-billboard.
74. Miles Bryan, “From Obscure To Sold Out: The Story Of
Four Seasons Total Landscaping In Just 4 Days,” NPR, (Nov.
11, 2020), available at
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/11/933635970/from-obscure-to-sold-out-the-story-of-four-seasons-total-landscaping-in-just-4-d.
75. Matt Friedman, “Man Featured at Giuliani Press
Conference is a Convicted Sex Offender,” Politico, (Nov. 9,
2020), available at
https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2020/11/09/man-featured-at-giuliani-press-conference-is-a-sex-offender-1335241.
76. McKenzie Sadeghi, “Fact Check: No Evidence Vote Was Cast
in Joe Frazier’s Name,” USA Today, (Nov. 14, 2020),
available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/14/fact-check-no-evidence-late-joe-frazier-voted-2020-election/6283956002/;
Ledyard King and John Fritze, “Trump Attorney Rudy Giuliani
Says Trump Won’t Concede, Revives Baseless Claims of Voter
Fraud,” USA Today, (Nov. 7, 2020) available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/07/joe-biden-victory-president-trump-claims-election-far-over/6202892002/.
77. Veronica Stracqualursi, “Republican Election Official in
Philadelphia Says He’s Seen No Evidence of Widespread
Fraud,” CNN, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/11/politics/philadelphia-city-commissioner-2020-election-cnntv/index.html.
78. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 11, 2020
9:03 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1326525851752656898.jpg
(archived).
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at
1:47:00 to 1:48:00, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at
1:47:00 to 1:48:00, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.
81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at
1:47:00 to 1:48:00, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.
82. See McQuade v. Furgason, 91 Mich. 438 (1892). The
various Boards of Canvassers in Michigan know that the
certification process is clerical because they are so
instructed in the official “Michigan Boards of County
Canvassers Manual.” See “Procedures and Duties of the Boards
of County Canvassers,” State of Michigan, (July 2022), pp.
18-19, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/02lehman/BCC_Manual.pdf?rev=7270a5ddcefa465b8ab8b95930ef5890.
83. “Minutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,”
Wayne County Board of Canvassers, (Nov. 17, 2020), p. 1,
available at
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-of-canvassers.aspx.
84. “Minutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,”
Wayne County Board of Canvassers, (Nov. 17, 2020), pp. 1-5,
available at
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-of-canvassers.aspx.
85. “Minutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,”
Wayne County Board of Canvassers, (Nov. 17, 2020), p. 5,
available at
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-of-canvassers.aspx.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Monica
Palmer, (Sept. 28, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (Mar. 9, 2022);
Phone records for Monica Palmer show calls from Ronna
McDaniel at 9:53 PM and 10:04 PM. See Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Feb. 9,
2022).
87. Annie Grayer, Jeremy Herb, and Kevin Liptak, “Trump
Courts Michigan GOP Leaders in Bid to Overturn Election He
Lost,” CNN, (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/19/politics/gop-michigan-results-trump/.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Monica
Palmer, (Sept. 28, 2021). Palmer told the Select Committee
that she could not recall the exact words that President
Trump used on the call, and she claimed that she could not
even recall whether the President raised issues related to
the election.
89. Kendall Karson, Katherine Faulders, and Will Steakin,
“Republican Canvassers Ask to ‘Rescind’ Their Votes
Certifying Michigan Election Results,” ABC News, (Nov. 19,
2020), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/wayne-county-republican-canvassers-rescind-votes-certifying-election/story?id=74290114;
Krystle Holleman and Spencer Soicher, “Pair of Wayne Co.
Board of Canvassers Members File Affidavits to Rescind
Certification of Election Results,” WILX10, (Nov. 19, 2020),
available at
https://www.wilx.com/2020/11/19/pair-of-wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-members-file-affidavits-to-rescind-certification-of-election-results/;
Paul Egan, “GOP Members of Wayne County Board of Canvassers
Say They Want to Rescind Votes to Certify,” Detroit Free
Press, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/19/wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-monica-palmer-william-hartmann/3775242001/.
90. Kendall Karson, Katherine Faulders, and Will Steakin,
“Republican Canvassers Ask to ‘Rescind’ Their Votes
Certifying Michigan Election Results,” ABC News, (Nov. 19,
2020), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/wayne-county-republican-canvassers-rescind-votes-certifying-election/story?id=74290114;
Krystle Holleman and Spencer Soicher, “Pair of Wayne Co.
Board of Canvassers Members File Affidavits to Rescind
Certification of Election Results,” WILX10, (Nov. 19, 2020),
available at
https://www.wilx.com/2020/11/19/pair-of-wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-members-file-affidavits-to-rescind-certification-of-election-results/;
Paul Egan, “GOP Members of Wayne County Board of Canvassers
Say They Want to Rescind Votes to Certify,” Detroit Free
Press, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/19/wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-monica-palmer-william-hartmann/3775242001/.
91. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 18, 2020
10:38 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329086548093014022.jpg
(archived).
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack
Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack
Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack
Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
95. Jonathan J. Cooper, “Arizona Governor Silences Trump’s
Call, Certifies Election,” Associated Press, (Dec. 2, 2020),
available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-arizona-elections-doug-ducey-e2b8b0de5b809efcc9b1ad5d279023f4.
96. Jonathan J. Cooper, “Arizona Governor Silences Trump’s
Call, Certifies Election,” Associated Press, (Dec. 2, 2020),
available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-arizona-elections-doug-ducey-e2b8b0de5b809efcc9b1ad5d279023f4.
97. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020
3:39 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201201024920mp_/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333556242984431616
(archived).
98. President Donald J. Trump, “Tweets of November 30,
2020,” The American Presidency Project, available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-november-30-2020;
“Tweet Mocking Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey and Georgia Gov.
Brian Kemp Now on Billboard,” Fox 10 News, (Dec. 9, 2020),
available at
https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/tweet-mocking-arizona-gov-doug-ducey-and-georgia-gov-brian-kemp-now-on-billboard.
99. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020
3:40 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201201022358/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333556458575818754
(archived).
100. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.
101. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.
102. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.
103. “Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan Legislatures to Hold
Public Hearings on 2020 Election,” Donald J. Trump for
President, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201130045430/https:/www.donaldjtrump.com/media/pennsylvania-arizona-michigan-legislatures-to-hold-public-hearings-on-2020-election/.
104. “Donald Trump Remarks Transcript: Pennsylvania
Republican Hearing on 2020 Election,” Rev, (Nov. 25, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-remarks-transcript-pennsylvania-republican-hearing-on-2020-election.
105. Teresa Boeckel and J.D. Prose, “Pa. GOP Lawmakers Host
Giuliani to Hear Election Concerns. Trump Visits Via Cell
Phone,” York Daily Record, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at
https://www.ydr.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/25/pa-gop-lawmakers-host-rudy-giuliani-hear-election-concerns/6420319002/.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
107. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008474_0001
(November 25, 2020, email from Jared Small confirming that
Trump will not be present in Gettysburg); Philip Rucker,
Ashley Parker, Josh Dawsey, and Amy Gardner, “20 Days of
Fantasy and Failure: Inside Trump’s Quest to Overturn the
Election,” Washington Post, (Nov. 28, 2020), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-overturn/2020/11/28/34f45226-2f47-11eb-96c2-aac3f162215d_story.html;
Alayna Treene and Rebecca Falconer, “Trump Cancels
Pennsylvania Trip for GOP Hearing on Voter Fraud Claims,”
Axios, (Nov. 25, 2020) available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/11/25/trump-pennsylvania-gop-hearing-voter-fraud-claims.
Apparently, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows also
contemplated going to Pennsylvania for the hearing when the
President couldn’t attend. Text messages between Cassidy
Hutchinson and Meadows’s Secret Service detail say, “U heard
how mark is motorcading to gburg right[,] and potus isn’t
anymore.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000080
(Nov. 25, 2020).
108. “Donald Trump Remarks Transcript: Pennsylvania
Republican Hearing on 2020 Election,” Rev, (Nov. 25, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-remarks-transcript-pennsylvania-republican-hearing-on-2020-election.
109. “Pennsylvania Senate Republican Lawmaker Hearing
Transcript on 2020 Election,” Rev, (Nov. 26, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/pennsylvania-senate-republican-lawmaker-hearing-transcript-on-2020-election.
110. “Pennsylvania Senate Republican Lawmaker Hearing
Transcript on 2020 Election,” Rev, (Nov. 26, 2020),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/pennsylvania-senate-republican-lawmaker-hearing-transcript-on-2020-election.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 65–66; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp.
59–60, 62; “Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest
of Other White House Announcements,” Government Publishing
Office, (Dec. 31, 2020), p. 116,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf.
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000062
(Nov. 25, 2020, Cassidy Hutchinson’s text messages with
Bernie Kerik).
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000062
(Nov. 25, 2020, Cassidy Hutchinson’s text messages with
Bernie Kerik).
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 87, 91-92.
115. Howard Fischer, “GOP Officials Still Fighting Arizona’s
Vote Tally on Very Day Biden’s Win Will Be Certified,”
Tuscon.com, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at
https://tucson.com/news/local/gop-officials-still-fighting-arizonas-vote-tally-on-very-day-bidens-win-will-be-certified/article_021fbb5c-673f-549a-9cbb-900178c17079.html.
116. Howard Fischer, “GOP Officials Still Fighting Arizona’s
Vote Tally on Very Day Biden’s Win Will Be Certified,”
Tuscon.com, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at
https://tucson.com/news/local/gop-officials-still-fighting-arizonas-vote-tally-on-very-day-bidens-win-will-be-certified/article_021fbb5c-673f-549a-9cbb-900178c17079.html.
117. Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Arizona State
Legislature Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,” YouTube,
at 2:08:56, Nov. 30, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww&t=7738s.
118. Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Arizona State
Legislature Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,” YouTube,
at 1:21:02, Nov. 30, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww&t=4862s.
119. Jenna Ellis (@JennaEllisEsq), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020
3:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/jennaellisesq/status/1333502306176835588.
120. “Remarks: Donald Trump Calls in to Meeting of Arizona
GOP Lawmakers on Election,” Factbase, (Nov. 30, 2020),
available at
https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-arizona-gop-meeting-election-november-30-2020.
121. Rudy Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020
11;17 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1333626364805533696.
122. “Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan Legislatures to Hold
Public Hearings on 2020 Election,” Donald J. Trump, (Nov.
24, 2020), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201130045430/https:/www.donaldjtrump.com/media/pennsylvania-arizona-michigan-legislatures-to-hold-public-hearings-on-2020-election/;
Jonathan Oosting (@jonathanoosting), Twitter, Nov. 24, 2020
5:35 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/jonathanoosting/status/1331365885123178499;
Jonathan Oosting (@jonathanoosting), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020
3:42 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/jonathanoosting/status/1333511772448370689.
123. See “Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan,”
Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, (June 21, 2020),
available at
https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
124. Wood TV8, “Giuliani and Laura Cox Hold ‘Legal Briefing’
Before Giving Testimony Wednesday Evening,” Facebook Watch,
at 10:30-10:45, Dec. 2, 2020, available at
https://www.facebook.com/woodtv/videos/rudy-giuliani-and-laura-cox-hold-legal-briefing-before-giving-testimony-wednesda/1996033023872394/.
125. Wood TV8, “Giuliani and Laura Cox Hold ‘Legal Briefing’
Before Giving Testimony Wednesday Evening,” Facebook Watch,
at 13:05-13:20, Dec. 2, 2020, available at
https://www.facebook.com/woodtv/videos/rudy-giuliani-and-laura-cox-hold-legal-briefing-before-giving-testimony-wednesda/1996033023872394/.
126. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing,
(Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:03:13-4:04:22, 4:05:59-4:07:09,
available at
https://www.rev.com/tc-editor/shared/QQodU0TgHNW4ACZmBtqq6EbotJVTGos3UifEuLQA8ygjV7GrDDAeGJ6hdps86h_ywJAatI_KepUqEeZnloKHBiByyMI.
127. Edward-Isaac Dovere (@IsaacDovere), Twitter, Dec. 3,
2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/IsaacDovere/status/1334481562193317888.
128. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing,
(Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:09:04, available at
https://www.rev.com/tc-editor/shared/QQodU0TgHNW4ACZmBtqq6EbotJVTGos3UifEuLQA8ygjV7GrDDAeGJ6hdps86h_ywJAatI_KepUqEeZnloKHBiByyMI.
129. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing,
(Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:35:15, available at
https://www.rev.com/tc-editor/shared/QQodU0TgHNW4ACZmBtqq6EbotJVTGos3UifEuLQA8ygjV7GrDDAeGJ6hdps86h_ywJAatI_KepUqEeZnloKHBiByyMI.
130. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,”
YouTube, at 1:56:30 to 1:57:15, 5:29:20-5:32:45, Dec. 3,
2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
131. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs
12.10.20,” Vimeo – Livestream, at 1:51:55-1:52:55, available
at
https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184.
132. Global TV Online, “#LIVE: Georgia State Senate Holds
Meeting on 2020 Election…,” YouTube, at 3:08:00 to 3:09:30,
3:20:15 to 3:21:2, Dec. 30, 2020, available at
https://youtu.be/D5c034r0RlU?t=12016.
133. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,”
YouTube, at 0:33:30-0:58:00, December 3, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Byung
J. Pak, (May 19, 2022), pp. 10-23; United States Senate
Judiciary Committee, Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (August 7,
2021), pp. 30-31, available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/rosen-transcript-final;
Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, No.
1:20-cv-04809 (N.D. Ga., Dec. 6, 2020), ECF No. 72-1,
available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20420664-frances-watson-affidavit;
Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court’s
Order of September 20, 2021 at 5-7, 41-47, 53, 55, Favorito
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135. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,”
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136. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs
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137. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs
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138. Mike Wilkinson, “The Rudy Giuliani ‘Circus’ Has Left
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139. Mike Wilkinson, “The Rudy Giuliani ‘Circus’ Has Left
Lansing. The Reviews Are Bad,” Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 3,
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140. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6,
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141. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506,
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142. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
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143. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
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144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
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145. Mirs Monday Podcast, “Call to Legislator from Someone
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146. Mirs Monday Podcast, “Call to Legislator from Someone
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https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6.
147. Jonathan Oosting, “Trump Campaign Lobbies Michigan
Lawmakers to Ignore Vote, Give Him Electors,” Bridge
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https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-campaign-lobbies-michigan-lawmakers-ignore-vote-give-him-electors.
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Angela McCallum production), McCallum_01_001523
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149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
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150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 8-10; Senator Mike
Shirkey (@SenMikeShirkey), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2020 6:13 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/SenMikeShirkey/status/1329925843053899780.
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 10.
152. “Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of
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153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 16.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-18.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 21-22.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 22.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee
Chatfield (Oct. 15, 2021). Leader Shirkey did not remember
any specific “ask” from the President during the Oval Office
meeting. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 16 (“One thing I do
remember is that he never, ever, to the best of my
recollection, ever made a specific ask. It was always just
general topics[.]”).
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee
Chatfield (Oct. 15, 2021).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.
160. “Legislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,” State
Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at
https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-president-trump/.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee
Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee
Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
163. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter,
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(archived).
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian,
“Former Michigan Resident Slammed with Calls after Trump
Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on Social Media,” Fox 17
West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.
165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012414 (text to Rep.
Scott Perry from Meadows).
166. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012445 (text to Meadows
from Rep. Scott Perry).
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022); Jake Corman and Kerry Benninghoff,
“Pa. Lawmakers Have No Role to Play in Deciding Presidential
Election,” Centre Daily Times, (Oct. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.centredaily.com/opinion/article246527648.html.
168. Barton Gellman, “The Election That Could Break
America,” The Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424/;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022); see Jake Corman, “Pa. Lawmakers
Have No Role to Play in Deciding Presidential Election,”
Centre Daily Times, (Oct. 19, 2020) available at
https://www.centredaily.com/opinion/article246527648.html.
Senator Corman and other Pennsylvania lawmakers sent a
letter to Congress in January that mentioned “numerous
unlawful violations” of State law and asked that Congress
“delay certification of the electoral college.” Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000002160_00001. In his informal
interview with the Select Committee, however, Senator Corman
acknowledged that he signed the letter due to pressure he
was receiving after the election, but explained that he
believed fraud and these types of issues should be
adjudicated in the courtroom, not the legislature, and, in
any event, he said that he was never presented with credible
evidence of voter fraud. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
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173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
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174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
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Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
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179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), p. 21.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), p. 21.
181. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000131
(Giuliani and Ellis voicemail).
182. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000132 (Jenna
Ellis voicemail).
183. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000133
(Giuliani voicemail).
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000134
(Giuliani voicemail).
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 42-44, 46-47. The New York Times
reported that Speaker Cutler spoke with President Trump
twice by phone, Cutler told the Select Committee that this
claim was incorrect and that he only spoke with the
President by phone once, followed by their second
conversation on December 3rd, which was in person. See Trip
Gabriel, “Trump Asked Pennsylvania House Speaker about
Overturning His Loss,” New York Times, (Dec. 8, 2020),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-house-speaker.html;
see also Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey and Rachael Bade, “Trump
Asks Pennsylvania House Speaker for Help Overturning
Election Results, Personally Intervening in a Third State,”
Washington Post, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pennsylvania-speaker-call/2020/12/07/d65fe8c4-38bf-11eb-98c4-25dc9f4987e8_story.html.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 43-44.
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 26-27, 44.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 49-57; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), p. 50.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 50-55.
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 54-55.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 56-57.
193. “Statement on Election Reform,” Pennsylvania Senate GOP
(Dec 3, 2020, accessed July 14, 2022), available at
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194. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6,
2020 12:56 a.m. ET, available at
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(archived).
195. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 8,
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Delegation,” Pennsylvania State GOP, (Dec. 4, 2020, last
accessed July 14, 2022), available at
http://www.pahousegop.com/Display/SiteFiles/1/2020/120420CongressElection2020B.pdf.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), pp. 60-61.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler,
(May 31, 2022), p. 61.
198. Trip Gabriel, “Even in Defeat, Trump Tightens Grip on
State G.O.P. Lawmakers,” New York Times, (Dec. 9, 2020),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-electoral-college.html.
199. Trip Gabriel, “Even in Defeat, Trump Tightens Grip on
State G.O.P. Lawmakers,” New York Times, (Dec. 9, 2020),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-electoral-college.html.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls,
Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election
Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls,
Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election
Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls,
Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election
Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls,
Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election
Review,” AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
41:30-46:35, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og. In his
testimony to the Select Committee, Speaker Bowers said this
appeal to party loyalty occurred in that call or in a later
meeting, and that the President brought it up “more than
once.”
207. Dillon Rosenblatt and Julia Shumway, “Giuliani COVID-19
Diagnosis Closes Arizona Legislature,” Arizona Capitol
Times, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at
https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2020/12/06/giuliani-covid-19-diagnosis-closes-arizona-legislature/;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona
House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021); Vince Leach
(@VinceLeach), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 11:28 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/VinceLeach/status/1333991317500727298.
Speaker Bowers told the Committee that Giuliani and Ellis
were accompanied by Katherine Friess, J. Philip Waldron,
Bernard Kerik, and others. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona House Speaker Rusty
Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021).
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 58-59; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Jenna Ellis, (Mar. 8, 2022), pp.
50-51.
209. “Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russel “Rusty”
Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 35-36; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona House Speaker Rusty
Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021); “Speaker Bowers Addresses Calls for
the Legislature to Overturn 2020 Certified Election
Results,” Arizona State Legislature, (Dec. 4, 2020),
available at
https://www.azleg.gov/press/house/54LEG/2R/201204STATEMENT.pdf.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
53:00-53:40, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
53:00-53:40, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
53:00-53:40, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
53:00-53:40, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
56:00-59:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell
Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 39-41.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
56:00-59:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
56:00-59:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
217. “Trump Allies Leave Voicemail Messages for Maricopa
County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available
at
https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-contested-results/7837919002/.
218. “Trump Allies Leave Voicemail Messages for Maricopa
County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available
at
https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-contested-results/7837919002/.
219. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Clint Hickman, (Nov. 17, 2021); see also Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez, “‘We Need You to Stop the Counting’: Records Detail
Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure Maricopa County
Supervisors,” AZ Central (July 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.
220. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “‘Fighting for Democracy Here’:
Election Audit Pits Maricopa County Republicans vs. Arizona
GOP,” AZ Central, (May 23, 2021) available at
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/05/23/election-audit-pits-maricopa-county-republicans-against-arizona-gop-senators/5186141001/;
see also “Trump allies leave voicemail messages for Maricopa
County supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available
at
https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-contested-results/7837919002/.
221. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production),
CTRL0000020072, pp. 1-2 (December 24, 2020, copy of voice
message and a transcription); see also Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to Do Something Huge’:
An Audacious Pitch to Reverse Arizona’s Election Results,”
AZ Central, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack
Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).
223. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “‘We Need You to Stop the
Counting’: Records Detail Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to
Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2,
2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.
224. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, “‘We Need You to Stop the
Counting’: Records Detail Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to
Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,” AZ Central, (July 2,
2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.
225. Document on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Bill Stepien Production), WS00104-105 (December 5,
2021, email from Joshua Findlay to Matthew Morgan, Justin
Clark, and Bill Stepien at 11:44 p.m.).
226. Brian Kemp (@BrianKempGA), Twitter, Dec. 5, 2020 12:44
p.m., available at
https://twitter.com/briankempga/status/1335278871630008324.
227. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 5,
2020 9:35 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335336916582084614.jpg
(archived). As detailed later in this report, the call for
special sessions of legislatures in various States,
including Georgia, never gained traction and, when all else
failed, became a focus for two Department of Justice
lawyers.
228. Office of Governor Brian P. Kemp, “Gov. Kemp, Lt. Gov.
Duncan Issue Statement on Request for Special Session of
General Assembly,” MadMimi.com, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at
https://madmimi.com/p/50e7a11?pact=1301484-161142215-11561983238-b09ac0db7ff3f3c8bd594d6a33e7f63d0cf4c135.
229. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 8,
2020 3:07 p.m., available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201208200907/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1336401919422640128
(archived) (retweeting Lin Wood (@LLinWood), Twitter, Dec.
8, 2020, 11:22 a.m., available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201208200908/https://twitter.com/LLinWood/status/1336390712380813313
(archived)).
230. Brett Samuels, “Trump Retweets Lawyer Who Said
Republican Officials in Georgia Are ‘Going to Jail’,” The
Hill, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/530250-trump-retweets-lawyer-who-says-republican-officials-in-georgia-are-going-to/.
231. Search results for “‘The Republican Governor of Georgia
refuses’ | ‘As badly as we were treated in Georgia’ | kemp |
@briankempga,” from November 30 to December 31, 2020, Trump
Twitter Archive V2, (last accessed December 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22%5C%22The+Republican+Governor+of+Georgia+refuses%5C%22+%7C+%5C%22As+badly+as+we+were+treated+in+Georgia%5C%22+%7C+kemp+%7C+%40briankempga%22&dates=%5B%222020-11-30%22%2C%222020-12-30%22%5D&results=1.
232. Document on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007750_0001, (December 7, 2020 email from Bill
White to Dan Scavino and others) including screenshot of
Burt Jones (@burtjonesforga), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 11:26
a.m., available at
https://twitter.com/burtjonesforga/status/1335984150789173248),
available at
https://twitter.com/burtjonesforga/status/1335984150789173248).
233. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 7,
2020 1:29 p.m. ET, available at
https://factba.se/biden/topic/twitter?q=burtjonesforga&f=
(archived); Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec.
7, 2020 12:25 p.m., available at
https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1335998988101804035.
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007693_00001.
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007693_00001.
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007693_00001.
237. David Wickert and Greg Bluestein, “Inside the Campaign
to Undermine Georgia’s Election (Part I),” Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 30, 2021), available at
https://www.ajc.com/politics/election/georgia-2020-election-what-happened/.
238. Shepherd’s Sling, “Steven K. Bannon - War Room Pandemic
- Ep. #568/569 (Full 2hrs Podcast),” BitChute, at 16:50 -
18:00, Dec. 8, 2020, available at
https://www.bitchute.com/video/KyK4QPP7Ngyt/; John
Fredericks (@jfradioshow), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 5:30 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/jfradioshow/status/1336075668090654724;
Jim Hoft, “Developing: President Trump Speaks with Georgia
House Speaker David Ralston and Speaker Pro-Tem Jan Jones on
Endorsing Special Session,” Gateway Pundit, (Dec. 7, 2020),
available at
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/12/developing-president-trump-speaks-georgia-house-speaker-david-ralston-speaker-pro-tem-jan-jones-endorsing-special-session/.
239. FYNTV FetchYourNews, “#BKP Has a Live Call-In with
David Ralston,” YouTube, at 2:30 - 3:12 (Dec. 8, 2020),
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201224164814/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdN5vNOl6F4&gl=US&hl=en
(archived); Julie Carr, “Georgia Speaker of the House David
Ralston Joins BKP Politics to Discuss His Call with
President Trump and a Legal Path Forward,” Tennessee Star,
(Dec. 20, 2020), available at
https://tennesseestar.com/2020/12/20/georgia-speaker-of-the-house-david-ralston-joins-bkp-politics-to-discuss-his-call-with-president-trump-and-a-legal-path-forward/.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 162-67.
241. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Georgia Secretary of State Production), GA SOS ORR
(21-344) 005651(Dec. 23, 2020 call between President Trump
and Frances Watson); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Interview
with Frances Watson (Dec. 15, 2021); see also “Georgia
Secretary of State Recording of Trump Phone Call to Election
Investigator,” American Oversight (Mar. 10, 2021), available
at
https://www.americanoversight.org/document/georgia-secretary-of-state-recording-of-trump-phone-call-to-election-investigator.
242. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014152 (December 27,
2020 text message at 5:18 p.m. from Mark Meadows to Jordan
Fuchs).
243. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014153 (December 27,
2020 text message at 5:20 p.m. from Jordan Fuchs to Mark
Meadows).
244. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012317 (November 19,
2020 text message at 9:56 a.m. from Mark Meadows to Brad
Raffensperger).
245. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013362.
246. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013632-33; see also
Newsmax (@newsmax), Twitter, Dec. 11, 2020 9:45 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/newsmax/status/1337589238078922752.
247. Philip Rucker, Ashley Parker, Josh Dawsey, and Seung
Min Kim, “Trump Sabotaging GOP on His Way Out of Office with
Push to Overturn Election,” Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021),
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sabotage-republicans/2021/01/04/df5d301e-4eb1-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
248. “Georgia Sec. of State Discusses Phone Call with Trump
About Election Results,” Good Morning America, at 1:40 to
2:20, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/video/georgia-sec-state-discusses-phone-call-trump-election-75032599.
249. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
250. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full
Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and
Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
251. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full
Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and
Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
(the Washington Post redacted Freeman’s name and instead
used “[name]” in the transcript); “Donald Trump Georgia
Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger:
Says He Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.
253. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full
Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and
Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
254. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3,
2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1345731043861659650.jpg
(archived). The archived image is in universal time.
255. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3,
2021 8:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1345723944654024706.jpg,
(archived).
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
257. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117-32;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 – 000702 (Draft
letter written by Jeffrey Clark).
258. “Senate Committee to Discuss Election Issues in
Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania Senate GOP website (Nov. 24,
2020, last accessed on July 15, 2022), available at
https://www.pasenategop.com/blog/senate-committee-to-discuss-election-issues-in-pennsylvania/;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani,
(May 20, 2022), pp. 65-66.
https://www.pasenategop.com/blog/senate-committee-to-discuss-election-issues-in-pennsylvania/.
259. Jeremy Roebuck and Andrew Seidman, “Pa. GOP lawmaker
Doug Mastriano says he left the Capitol area before the
riot. New videos say otherwise,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (May
25, 2021), available at
https://www.inquirer.com/news/doug-mastriano-capitol-riot-pennslyvania-video-20210525.html.
260. Eric Metaxas, “Interview: Eric Metaxas Interviews
Donald Trump with Douglas Mastriano,” Factba.se Archive,
(Nov. 30, 2020), available at
https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-eric-metaxas-douglas-mastriano-november-30-2020;
Senator Doug Mastriano (@SenMastriano), Twitter, Nov. 30,
2020 5:56 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/senmastriano/status/1333545380965986307.
261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000008230_0001, 076P-R000008231_0001 (email and
attachment from Mastriano to Molly Michael); see also Kelly
v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 950 (2020) (order denying
application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Alito
and denying referral to the full Court).
262. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001378_00001, 076P-R000001379_00001.
263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000003771_0001, 076P-R000003772_0001 (Dec. 21, 2020,
email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael titled “Letter
Requested by the President”).
264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000003771_0001, 076P-R000003772_0001 (Dec. 21, 2020,
email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael titled “Letter
requested by the President”).
265. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000003748_0001, 076P-R000003749_0001, (Dec. 29, 2020,
Doug Mastriano email to Molly Michael titled “Pennsylvania
letter for AG Donoghue regarding election”; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000003753_0001, 076P-R000003754_0001,
(Dec. 22, 2020, Molly Michael email to Rush Limbaugh titled
“From POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production)
076P-R000003761_0001, 076P-R000003762_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020,
Molly Michael email to Pam Bondi titled “From POTUS”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(National Archives Production) 076P-R000003766_0001, (Dec.
21, 2020, Molly Michael email to Lou Dobbs titled “2
attachments from POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000008968_0001, (Jan. 1, 2021, Molly Michael email to
Kevin McCarthy titled “From POTUS”); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, (National Archive Production)
076P-R000003759_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly Michael email to
John Eastman, Justin Clark, and Michael Farris titled “From
POTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production)
076P-R000003763_0001, (December 21, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Christopher Michel re: From POTUS).
266. Charlotte Cuthbertson, “Trump ‘Resolved, Determined’
about Election, Says Pennsylvania Senator,” Epoch Times
(Dec. 24, 2020), available at
https://www.theepochtimes.com/trump-resolved-determined-about-election-says-pennsylvania-senator_3632138.html;
Marc Levy & Mark Scolforo, “White House Invites GOP
Lawmakers in Pennsylvania to Lunch,” Associated Press, (Dec.
23, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-pennsylvania-coronavirus-pandemic-c5b7f43af7794f01f6d339b7258b915a;
Jan Murphy, “Pa. Senators Head to White House for
Pre-Holiday Lunch with President Trump,” Penn Live –
Patriot-News, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/12/pa-senators-head-to-white-house-for-pre-holiday-lunch-with-president-trump.html;
“Ep 608- Pandemic: Merry Christmas Eve Special Hour 1 (w/
Mayor Giuliani, Dr. Peter K. Navarro, Major Sgt. Scotty
Neil, Former Navy Seal Tej Gill, Christopher Flannery ),”
War Room Podcast (Dec. 24, 2020), 25:17 to 25:25, available
at
https://warroom.org/2020/12/24/ep-608-pandemic-merry-christmas-eve-special-hour-1-w-dr-peter-k-navarro-major-sgt-scotty-neil-former-navy-seal-tej-gill-christopher-flannery/.
Charlotte Cuthbertson, “Trump ‘Resolved, Determined’ about
Election, Says Pennsylvania Senator,” Epoch Times (Dec. 24,
2020), available at
https://www.theepochtimes.com/trump-resolved-determined-about-election-says-pennsylvania-senator_3632138.html;
Marc Levy & Mark Scolforo, “White House Invites GOP
Lawmakers in Pennsylvania to Lunch,” Associated Press (Dec.
23, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-pennsylvania-coronavirus-pandemic-c5b7f43af7794f01f6d339b7258b915a;
Jan Murphy, “Pa. Senators Head to White House for
Pre-Holiday Lunch with President Trump,” Penn Live –
Patriot-News (Dec. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/12/pa-senators-head-to-white-house-for-pre-holiday-lunch-with-president-trump.html;
“Ep 608- Pandemic: Merry Christmas Eve Special Hour 1 (w/
Mayor Giuliani, Dr. Peter K. Navarro, Major Sgt. Scotty
Neil, Former Navy Seal Tej Gill, Christopher Flannery)”, War
Room Podcast
(Dec.https://warroom.org/2020/12/24/ep-608-pandemic-merry-christmas-eve-special-hour-1-w-dr-peter-k-navarro-major-sgt-scotty-neil-former-navy-seal-tej-gill-christopher-flannery/.
267. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008298_0001
(December 28, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Mark Meadows
forwarding Senator Doug Mastriano info for the president),
076P-R000007593_0001 (December 28, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Scott Toland forwarding Senator Doug Mastriano
info for the president), 076P-R000003748_0001,
076P-R000003749_0001 (December 29, 2020, email and
attachments from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re:
Pennsylvania letter for AG Donoghue regarding election), ,
076P-R000003745_0001, 076P-R000003746_0001,
076P-R000003747_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Doug
Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Letters requested by
President Trump and attachments).
268. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000003745_0001, 076P-R000003746_0001,
076P-R000003747_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Doug
Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Letters requested by
President Trump and attachments).
269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000003732_0001(Email from Molly Michael to Amy
Swonger, passing along information from Mastriano,
076P-R000008399_0001 (Email from Amy Swonger to Molly
Michael responding)). According to the White House’s
Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, Amy Swonger,
the President repeatedly asked for her to distribute
political materials after the election, which led her to
seek advice from the White House Counsel’s Office because
fulfilling the President’s request would likely violate the
Hatch Act. See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Amy Swonger, (Oct. 28, 2022), pp. 52-53.
270. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439_0001
(White House switchboard call log from Jan. 5, 2022).
271. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000004788_0001, 076P-R000004789_0001-0066 (January 5,
2021, email from Mastriano attaching letter for Vice
President Pence signed by Pennsylvania legislators),
076P-R000004957_0001 (Molly Michael acknowledging receipt),
076P-R000005084_0001 (Molly Michael passing the letter along
to Marc Short), 076P-R000007338_0001 (acknowledgment that
the letter was printed for POTUS), 076P-R000004687_0001,
076P-R000004688_0001 (January 5, 2021, email and attached
letter to Molly Michael re: Caucus Letter to Sen. McConnell
and Rep. McCarthy).
272. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5,
2021 9:59 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&dates=%5B%222021-01-04%22%2C%222021-01-06%22%5D&searchbox=%22BIG+NEWS+IN+PENNSYLVANIA%21+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2F7JqTWYUgOr%22
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 6, 2021 12:46 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22pennsylvania+is+going+to+trump.+The+legislators%22
(archived).
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Douglas
Mastriano, (August 9, 2022), pp. 10-11.
274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153(emails
with Jason Miller re: emails to PA/AZ).
275. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153 (emails
with Jason Miller re: emails to PA/AZ).
276. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153 (emails
with Jason Miller re: emails to PA/AZ).
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 225-26; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp.
128-34.
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001891_00001.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 138-39.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 136-37.
281. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001890_00001, 076P-R000001891_00001 (December 28,
2020, email with attachment from Bernard Kerik to Mark
Meadows re: GIULIANI TEAM STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PLAN -
v1.pdf).
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 225-27; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp.
139-140.
283. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001891_00001.
284. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001891_00001.
285. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000001891_00001.
286. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudy Giuliani Production), RGGLOBAL_DOM_00008525.
287. Shepherd’s Sling, “Steve Bannon’s War Room, Episode
623,” BitChute, at 13:20 - 13:29, Dec. 31, 2020, available
at https://www.bitchute.com/video/KyK4QPP7Ngyt/.
288. Shepherd’s Sling, “Steve Bannon’s War Room, Episode
623,” BitChute, at 17:07 - 18:17, Dec. 31, 2020, available
at https://www.bitchute.com/video/KyK4QPP7Ngyt/.
289. Shepherd’s Sling, “Steve Bannon’s War Room, Episode
623,” BitChute, at 24:49 - 25:14, Dec. 31, 2020, available
at https://www.bitchute.com/video/KyK4QPP7Ngyt/.
290. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 27,
2020 11:53 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/bernardkerik/status/1343238609768501253.
291. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 13,
2020 1:05 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/bernardkerik/status/1338001989846888448.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 43-45; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
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The Select Committee attempted to ask Navarro about his
participation in the call and other topics, but he ignored
the Select Committee’s subpoena and has been indicted by the
Department of Justice.
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BRIEFING FOLLOW UP: ELECTION 2020 | GOT FREEDOM?).
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304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
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334. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, “‘It’s Absolutely Getting
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see also Select Committee to Investigate the January
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available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
364. Linda So, “Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats
are Terrorizing Election Workers,” Reuters, (June 11, 2021),
available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
365. Linda So, “Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats
are Terrorizing Election Workers,” Reuters (June 11, 2021),
available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.
366. GA House Mobile Streaming, “Governmental Affairs
12.10.20,” Vimeo – Livestream, at 2:09:00-2:13:00, available
at
https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at
2:25:45 to 2:26:00, available at
https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.
367. Donald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript Before Senate
Runoff Elections December 5,” Rev, (Dec. 5, 2020), available
at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5;
Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report: Trump
Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers – and Death
Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
368. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi,Amy Gardner and Paulina
Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call
Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5,
2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
(the Washington Post redacted Freeman’s name and instead
used “[name]” in the transcript); “Donald Trump Georgia
Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger:
Says He Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.
369. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report:
Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers – and
Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
370. Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed
May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22 (Amended Complaint at 52),
available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
371. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report:
Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers – and
Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
372. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report:
Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers – and
Death Threats Followed,” Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
373. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No.
21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22,
available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
374. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No.
21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22,
available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ruby
Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ruby
Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
377. Government’s Motion Regarding Anticipated Trial
Evidence and Notice Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) at 1-2, 24-26, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. July 8, 2022), ECF No. 187; Brandi
Buchman (@Brandi_Buchman), Twitter, Oct. 6, 2022 7:27 a.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/Brandi_Buchman/status/1577983997711421441.
378. Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, “Judge Says Oath
Keepers Jury Won’t See ‘Death List’,” CNN (Oct. 6, 2022),
https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/06/politics/judge-says-oath-keepers-jury-wont-see-death-list-trial-day-3.
Georgia Electors cast their Electoral College votes at the
Georgia State Capitol on December 14, 2020.
Georgia Electors cast their Electoral College votes at the
Georgia State Capitol on December 14, 2020.
(Photo by Jessica McGowan/Getty Images)
3
FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGY”
On the morning of January 6th, in his speech at the Ellipse,
President Trump exhorted his thousands of assembled
supporters to march to the U.S. Capitol, explaining that
“[w]e have come to demand that Congress do the right thing
and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated,
lawfully slated.” 1 This was no off-the-cuff remark; it was
the culmination of a carefully planned scheme many weeks in
the making. This plea by the President turned the truth on
its head. There was only one legitimate slate of electors
from the battleground States of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan,
Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, and Trump
wanted them rejected. This scheme involved lawyers, such as
Kenneth Chesebro and Rudy Giuliani, as well as Mark Meadows.
It also was aided at key points by Chairwoman of the
Republican National Committee Ronna McDaniel, Members of
Congress, and Republican leaders across seven States—some of
whom did not know exactly what they were being asked to do.
President Trump oversaw it himself.
President Trump and his allies prepared their own fake
slates of electoral college electors in seven States that
President Trump lost: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And on December 14,
2020—the date when true, certified electors were meeting to
cast their electoral votes for the candidate who had won the
popular vote in each of those States—these fake electors
also met, ostensibly casting electoral votes for President
Trump, the candidate who had lost.
There was no legitimate reason for Trump electors to meet,
vote, and produce fake slates on December 14th in States
that former Vice President Biden won. Instead, this effort
was aimed directly at the President of the Senate (which,
under the Constitution, is the Vice President) in his role
at the joint session of Congress on January 6th. President
Trump and his advisors wanted Vice President Pence to
disregard real electoral college votes for former Vice
President Biden, in favor of these fake competing electoral
slates.
But there never were real, competing slates of electors. By
the time the fake Trump electors met on December 14th,
appropriate government officials in each of the seven States
had already certified their State’s official election
results for former Vice President Biden. No court had issued
an order reversing or calling into question those results,
and most election-related litigation was over. And as
detailed in Chapter 2, despite the illicit efforts of
President Trump and his allies, no State legislature had
agreed to the President’s request to reverse the result of
the election by appointing a different slate of electors.
Given all of this, these groups of Trump backers who called
themselves Presidential electors were never actually
electors, and the votes they purported to cast on December
14th were not valid. They were fake. They had no legal
standing, and their fake votes could not have been used by
Vice President Pence to disregard the real votes of electors
chosen by the voters.
By January 6th, President Trump had been discouraged by his
top lawyers from following through on this plan. The Trump
Campaign’s senior staff attorneys had concerns,2 and several
days before the joint session, the Acting Attorney General
and the Deputy Attorney General blocked the sending of a
letter indicating that there were “competing slates” of
electors, including “in Georgia and several other States.” 3
But this reasoning did nothing to change President Trump’s
rhetoric or plan. He continued to assert that there were
“competing” or “dual” slates of electors to create an
opportunity to stay in office on January 6th.4
These lawyers were right: President Trump’s plan was
illegal. In his June 7, 2022, opinion, Federal District
Judge David Carter wrote that this initiative to “certify
alternate slates of electors for President Trump”
constituted a “critical objective of the January 6 plan.” 5
This followed Judge Carter’s earlier determination in March
that “[t]he illegality of the plan was obvious,” and
“[e]very American—and certainly the President of the United
States—knows that in a democracy, leaders are elected, not
installed. With a plan this ‘BOLD,’ President Trump
knowingly tried to subvert this fundamental principle. Based
on the evidence the Court finds it more likely than not that
President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint
Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.” 6
The fake elector effort was an unlawful, unprecedented and
destructive break from the electoral college process that
our country has used to select its President for
generations.7 It led directly to the violence that occurred
on January 6th. To address the damage that it caused, it is
important to understand how it transpired.
3.1 Laying the Groundwork for the Fake Elector Plan: The
Chesebro Memos
The fake elector plan emerged from a series of legal
memoranda written by an outside legal advisor to the Trump
Campaign: Kenneth Chesebro. Although John Eastman would have
a more prominent role in advising President Trump in the
days immediately before January 6th, Chesebro—an attorney
based in Boston and New York recruited to assist the Trump
Campaign as a volunteer legal advisor—was central to the
creation of the plan.8 Memos by Chesebro on November 18th,
December 9th, and December 13th, as discussed below, laid
the plan’s foundation.
Chesebro’s first memo on November 18th suggested that the
Trump Campaign could gain a few extra weeks for litigation
to challenge Wisconsin’s election results, so long as a
Wisconsin slate of Republican nominees to the electoral
college met on December 14th to cast placeholder electoral
college votes on a contingent basis.9 This memo acknowledged
that “[i]t may seem odd that the electors pledged to Trump
and Pence might meet and cast their votes on December 14
even if, at that juncture, the Trump-Pence ticket is behind
in the vote count, and no certificate of election has been
issued in favor of Trump and Pence.” 10 However, Chesebro
argued that if such a slate of alternate electors gathered
to cast electoral votes on a contingent basis, this would
preserve the Trump Campaign’s options so “a court decision
(or, perhaps, a state legislative determination) rendered
after December 14 in favor of the Trump-Pence slate of
electors should be timely.” 11
On December 9th, Chesebro penned a second memo, which
suggested another purpose for fake electoral college votes
on January 6th. It stated that unauthorized Trump electors
in these States could be retroactively recognized “by a
court, the state legislature, or Congress.” 12 Under this
theory, there would be no need for a court to decide that
the election had been decided in error; instead, Congress
itself could choose among dueling slates of purported
electoral votes—and thereby decide the Presidential
election—even though Article II of the Constitution grants
that power to the electoral college via the States.13
Chesebro’s contemporaneous communications make clear that
the goal was having Congress act on the fake electoral
votes. He emailed an organizer of the fake electors in
Nevada that “the purpose of having the electoral votes sent
in to Congress is to provide the opportunity to debate the
election irregularities in Congress, and to keep alive the
possibility that the votes could be flipped to Trump . .
.” 14 And a legal advisor to the Arizona GOP reportedly
described being told by Chesebro around this time that their
supposed electors “would just be sending in ‘fake’ electoral
votes to Pence so that ‘someone’ in Congress can make an
objection when they start counting votes, and start arguing
that the ‘fake’ votes should be counted.” 15
Many of the States contested by the Trump team had laws that
specified requirements for electors to validly cast and
transmit their votes—and the December 9, 2020, memo
recognized that some of these criteria would be difficult,
if not impossible, for the fake electors to fulfill. (As
described later, most were not fulfilled.) For example,
Nevada State law required that the secretary of state
preside when Presidential electors meet,16 and Nevada
Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske, a Republican, had
already signed a certificate ascertaining the Biden/Harris
electors as the authorized, winning slate.17 Several States
also had rules requiring electors to cast their votes in the
State capitol building, or rules governing the process for
approving substitutes if any original proposed electors from
the November ballot were unavailable. As a result,
Chesebro’s December 9, 2020, memo advised the Trump Campaign
to abide by such rules, when possible, but also recognized
that these slates could be “slightly problematic in
Michigan,” “somewhat dicey in Georgia and Pennsylvania,” and
“very problematic in Nevada.” 18
On December 13th, the fake elector scheme became even
clearer in an email sent by Chesebro to Giuliani. His
message was entitled “Brief notes on ‘President of the
Senate’ strategy.” It addressed how the fake electors
meeting the next day, December 14th, could be exploited
during the joint session of Congress on January 6th by the
President of the Senate—a role that the Constitution grants
to the Vice President of the United States.19 Chesebro
argued that, on January 6th, the President of the Senate
could:
. . . firmly take the position that he, and he alone, is
charged with the constitutional responsibility not just to
open the votes, but to count them—including making judgments
about what to do if there are conflicting votes . . .20
Chesebro’s email suggested that the President of the Senate
(which, under the Constitution, is the Vice President) could
toss out former Vice President Biden’s actual electoral
votes for any State where the Trump Campaign organized fake
electors, simply “because there are two slates of votes.” 21
Of course, there were never two slates of electoral votes,
so this premise itself was fundamentally wrong. But he was
arguing that even if votes by fake electors were never
retroactively ratified under State law, their mere
submission to Congress would be enough to allow the
presiding officer to disregard valid votes for former Vice
President Biden.22 Chesebro suggested this might result in a
second term for President Trump, or, at minimum, it would
force a debate about purported election fraud—neither of
which was a lawful, legitimate reason to organize and
convene fake electors.23
As discussed below and in Chapter 5, John Eastman worked
with Chesebro as January 6th approached and wrote two
additional memos that built upon, and extended, the plan to
use the fake electoral votes during the joint session.24
3.2 President Trump and the Campaign Adopt the Fake Elector
Scheme
In early December, the highest levels of the Trump Campaign
took note of Chesebro’s fake elector plan and began to
operationalize it. On December 6th, White House Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows forwarded a copy of Chesebro’s November
18, 2020, memo to Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller
writing, “Let’s have a discussion about this tomorrow.” 25
Miller replied that he just engaged with reporters on the
subject, to which Meadows wrote: “If you are on it then
never mind the meeting. We just need to have someone
coordinating the electors for states.” 26 Miller clarified
that he had only been “working the PR angle” and they should
still meet, to which Meadows answered: “Got it.” 27 Later
that week, Miller sent Meadows a spreadsheet that the Trump
Campaign had compiled.28 It listed contact information for
nearly all of the 79 GOP nominees to the electoral college
on the November ballot for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.29 And on December 8th,
Meadows received a text message from a former State
legislator in Louisiana recommending that the proposed
“Trump electors from AR [sic] MI GA PA WI NV all meet next
Monday at their state capitols[,] [c]all themselves to
order, elect officers, and cast their votes for the
President. . . . Then they certify their votes and transmit
that certificate to Washington.” 30 Meadows replied: “We
are.” 31
Cassidy Hutchinson, a Special Assistant to the President and
an assistant to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, confirmed
Meadows’s significant involvement in the plan. Hutchinson
told the Select Committee that Meadows followed the progress
of the fake elector effort closely and that she
“remember[ed] him frequently having calls, meetings, and
outreach with individuals and this just being a prominent
topic of discussion in our office.” When asked how many of
his calls or meetings it came up in, she estimated
“[d]ozens.” 32
The evidence indicates that by December 7th or 8th,
President Trump had decided to pursue the fake elector plan
and was driving it. Trump Campaign Associate General Counsel
Joshua Findlay was tasked by the campaign’s general counsel,
Matthew Morgan, around December 7th or 8th with exploring
the feasibility of assembling unrecognized slates of Trump
electors in a handful of the States that President Trump had
lost.33 Findlay told the Select Committee “it was my
understanding that the President made this decision. . .
.” 34 As recounted by Findlay, Morgan conveyed that the
client—President Trump—directed the campaign lawyers to
“look into electors in these potential litigation
States[.]” 35
Ronna McDaniel at the Republican National Convention on
August 24, 2020.
Ronna McDaniel at the Republican National Convention on
August 24, 2020.
(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
President Trump personally called RNC Chairwoman Ronna
Romney McDaniel days before December 14th to enlist the
RNC’s assistance in the scheme.36 President Trump opened the
call by introducing McDaniel to John Eastman, who described
“the importance of the RNC helping the campaign to gather
these contingent electors in case any of the legal
challenges that were ongoing changed the results in any of
the States.” 37 According to McDaniel, she called President
Trump back soon after the call ended, letting him know that
she agreed to his request and that some RNC staffers were
already assisting.38
On December 13th and 14th, President Trump worked with
Rudolph Giuliani on the plan’s implementation. On the 13th,
Miller texted some of his colleagues to check in about the
fake elector meetings scheduled for the following day. He
let them know that Giuliani had told him “POTUS was aware”
that they would be filing litigation in four States just “to
keep the effort going”—which the Select Committee believes
was to create a pretext to claim that it was still possible
for the fake electors to be authorized retroactively.39 (In
subsequent litigation, a Federal district court found that
President Trump “filed certain lawsuits not to obtain legal
relief, but to disrupt or delay the January 6th
congressional proceedings through the courts.” 40) The next
day, Miller sent an email asking whether they were going to
issue a press release about electors, and he was told the
“Mayor [is] going to discuss with POTUS.” 41
3.3 The Campaign Legal Team Bows Out, and Giuliani Steps In
Rudy Giuliani speaks inside the Republican National
Committee Headquarters in November about various lawsuits
related to the 2020 election.
Rudy Giuliani speaks inside the Republican National
Committee Headquarters in November about various lawsuits
related to the 2020 election.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
Not everyone on the campaign was eager to pursue the fake
elector plan. On December 11th, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected a high-profile lawsuit filed by the State of Texas
challenging the election results in Pennsylvania, Georgia,
Michigan, and Wisconsin.42 After that decision, the Trump
Campaign’s senior legal staffers said that they reduced
their involvement in the fake elector effort, apparently
because there was no longer a feasible scenario in which a
court would determine that President Trump actually won any
of the States he contested.43 Justin Clark, who oversaw the
Trump Campaign’s general counsel’s office, said that he
basically conveyed, “I’m out,” and encouraged his colleagues
on the legal team to do the same.44 Findlay told the Select
Committee that “we backed out of this thing,” and Morgan,
his boss, said he had Findlay pass off responsibility for
the electors as “my way of taking that responsibility to
zero.” 45
Clark told the Select Committee that “it never sat right
with me that there was no . . . contingency whereby these
votes would count.” 46 “I had real problems with the
process,” Clark said, because “it morphed into something I
didn’t agree with.” 47 In his view, the fake electors were
“not necessarily duly nominated electors” despite being
presented as such.48 He said he believed he warned his
colleagues that “unless we have litigation pending like in
these States, like I don’t think this is appropriate or, you
know, this isn’t the right thing to do.” 49
Morgan told the Select Committee that he saw no value in
pushing slates of purported electors if they were not
authorized by a State government’s certificate of
ascertainment. As he put it, “[M]y view was, as long as you
didn’t have a certificate of ascertainment, then the
electors were, for lack of a better way of saying it, no
good or not—not valid.” 50 Findlay confirmed that Morgan
told him after the Supreme Court ruling on December 11th
that “there’s not really anything left for us to do on this
project” and that “it doesn’t seem like a good idea for us
to be involved in it.” 51
Campaign lawyers were not the only ones who doubted the
legality of the fake elector plan. The Office of White House
Counsel appears to have expressed concerns about it, as
well. In his testimony to the Select Committee, White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by
mid-December, the electoral process was “done.” Cipollone
told the Select Committee that the White House Counsel’s
office “probably” had discussions about the electors plan
and that his Deputy, Pat Philbin, would have been involved
in evaluating the electors issue.52 In an informal Committee
interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one
of the “bad theories” that were like “Whac-A-Mole” in the
White House during this period.53 Mr. Cipollone agreed with
this characterization.54
In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she
heard at least one member of the White House Counsel’s
Office say that the plan was not legal:
Committee Staff: . . . to be clear, did you hear the White
House Counsel’s Office say that this plan to have alternate
electors meet and cast votes for Donald Trump in States that
he had lost was not legally sound?
Hutchinson: Yes, sir.55
She also recalled a meeting that took place in or before
mid-December during which this view was relayed to Giuliani
and members of his team by lawyers in the White House
Counsel’s Office.56
By December 11th, Findlay emailed his main points of contact
in six battleground States to say “[t]hank you for your work
on the presidential elector project” and, in order to pass
off his responsibilities, let them know that “Rudy’s team
has designated Kenneth Chesebro as the point person for the
legal documents” going forward.57
While the campaign’s core legal team stepped back from the
fake elector effort on December 11th, it nonetheless went
forward because “Rudy was in charge of [it]” and “[t]his is
what he wanted to do,” according to Findlay.58 When Findlay
was asked if this decision to let the effort proceed under
Giuliani’s direction “was coming from your client, the
President,” Findlay responded: “Yes, I believe so. I mean,
he had made it clear that Rudy was in charge of this and
that Rudy was executing what he wanted.” 59 Findlay also
recalled being told that Chesebro’s elector memos had become
“the justification for why Rudy and Ken were going to keep
going forward with this stuff.” 60 He explained that
Giuliani “really bought into Ken’s theory on this,” and that
the two of them “were kind of the main ones driving this”
from that point forward.61 Clark told the Select Committee
that “. . . my understanding of who was driving the process
. . . was Mayor Giuliani and his team.” 62 On December 10th,
when Kenneth Chesebro emailed one of the State party
officials involved in organizing the fake elector effort in
Nevada, he reported that “I spoke this evening with Mayor
Guiliani [sic], who is focused on doing everything possible
to ensure that that [sic] all the Trump-Pence electors vote
on Dec. 14.” 63
In the days that followed this handoff, Chesebro would draft
and distribute documents intended for use in the Trump
team’s fake elector ceremonies that were then shared with
key contacts in Arizona,64 Georgia,65 Michigan,66 Nevada,67
New Mexico,68 Pennsylvania,69 and Wisconsin.70 He also gave
some of the groups step-by-step logistical guidance, such as
when and where they should convene, how many copies each
person would need to sign, and to send their fake votes to
Congress via registered mail.71 “Pretty Simple!” he
commented in some of these emails.72
A campaign operative named Michael Roman was also tapped for
a major operational role in the fake elector effort. When
Findlay sent his email handing off certain responsibilities
for the initiative, he also wrote that Giuliani’s team had
designated Roman “as the lead for executing the voting on
Monday” December 14th.73 Roman was the Trump Campaign’s
Director of Election Day Operations (EDO), with team members
who specialized in political outreach and mobilization in
battleground States where the Trump team now urgently needed
the fake electors to meet on December 14th.
With help from his EDO staff, as well as Giuliani’s team and
RNC staffers working alongside the Campaign as part of the
Trump Victory Committee, Roman ran an improvised “Electors
Whip Operation.” 74 For example, Roman sent an email on
December 12th directing an aide to create “a tracker for the
electors” with tabs for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, listing contact information,
whether they had been contacted, whether they agreed to
attend on December 14th, and names of “[s]ubstitute
electors” to replace any reticent or unavailable
participants as needed.75 Roman referred to others on this
email as the “WHIP TEAM” and directed them to fill out the
spreadsheet, to update him on “what you have and what you
need,” and to plan on a call that evening.76
In the days that followed, this group focused on tracking
which Republicans previously named as President Trump’s
nominees to the electoral college would be willing to show
up for fake elector ceremonies, finding adequate substitutes
for those who refused to attend, and actually coordinating
the unrecognized elector signing ceremonies in seven States
on December 14th.77 In all seven States, these efforts to
mobilize fake electors benefitted from support from the RNC,
as well as the State Republican parties.78 However, it was
the Trump team who drove the process from start to finish,
as one of the fake electors and later co-chair of the
Michigan Republican party, Meshawn Maddock, told an audience
in January 2022: “We fought to seat the electors. The Trump
campaign asked us to do that.” 79
3.4 Some of the Proposed Fake Electors Express Concerns
About the Plan
The Trump team’s fake elector plan raised concerns not just
for several senior officials but also for some of the
Republican activists being recruited to be the fake
electors. Findlay told the Select Committee that “there were
definitely electors in probably most of the States that had
concerns about this process.” 80 After being tasked with
reaching out to the potential fake electors, Findlay
notified his colleagues on December 10th that “a lot of
questions are arising” from them.” 81 He also noted that an
RNC staffer seconded to the Trump Victory Committee
“requested a call with the PA electors and/or leadership to
address concerns,” which “may be necessary to get people to
appear.” 82
The Republican Party of Pennsylvania’s general counsel
relayed several specific concerns to the Trump Campaign via
email on December 13th. Warning that “[w]e’re all getting
call [sic] from concerned Electors,” he elaborated as
follows:
I’m told that on the call with the Electors they were told
that the Ballot form would be conditioned upon ultimate
certification by the Governor, indemnification by the
campaign if someone gets sued or worse, (charged with
something by the AG or someone else), and the receipt by the
Electors of a legal opinion by a national firm and certified
to be accurate by a Pa. lawyer.
What was sent was a “memo” by Chesebro not addressed to the
Electors, and no certification by a Pa. lawyer. To make it
worse, Chesebro describes the Pa. plan as “dicey”. And
there’s no indication by anyone with authority that there’s
any indemnification authorized by the campaign.83
Pennsylvania GOP Chairman Lawrence Tabas informed the Select
Committee that his State’s fake electors never were
indemnified by the Trump Campaign.84
When Wisconsin Republican Party Chairman Andrew Hitt was
notified in late November that “the campaign wants to [sic]
list of electors,” he texted his executive director that “I
am def concerned about their inquiry” and that “I hope they
are not planning on asking us to do anything like try and
say we are only the proper electors.” 85 On December 12th,
after Hitt received a message about a phone call with
Giuliani to discuss the fake elector issue, he texted a
colleague: “These guys are up to no good and its [sic] gonna
fail miserably.” 86 Despite such concerns, Hitt and many
other fake electors participated anyway.87
Even so, 14 of the original Republicans who had been listed
as electoral college nominees on the November ballot bowed
out when the fake Trump electors gathered in December.88
Former Michigan Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land declined
to attend, which the State’s GOP chair, Laura Cox, told the
Select Committee was because “I think she just said she was
uncomfortable with the whole thing” and that she “has her
own beliefs.” 89 A senior advisor for the Pennsylvania GOP
said that Chairman Tabas “did not serve as an elector
because Joe Biden won the election and it was Biden’s
electors that were certified.” 90 Former U.S. Representative
Tom Marino (R–PA) said he backed out because “I’m a
constitutionalist,” and “as a former prosecutor, when the
attorney general says that he’s not finding anything there,
that’s good enough for me.” 91 The other eleven dropouts
included a Georgia State lawmaker, a former State party
chair from New Mexico, two former State party chairs from
Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania’s RNC national
committeewoman.92
Other participants asserted that they would have had much
greater concerns if the Trump team had been more forthcoming
about how the fake electoral votes would be used.93 The
Trump Campaign’s director of election day operations in
Georgia told the Select Committee that “I absolutely would
not have” wanted to participate in organizing the Trump
team’s fake electors in Georgia “had I known that the three
main lawyers for the campaign that I’d spoken to in the past
and were leading up were not on board.” 94 He said he felt
“angry” because “no one really cared if—if people were
potentially putting themselves in jeopardy” by doing this,
and “we were just . . . useful idiots or rubes at that
point.” 95
3.5 On December 14th, The Fake Electors Meet and Vote
On December 14th, using instructions provided by Chesebro,
the fake Trump electors gathered and participated in signing
ceremonies in all seven States. In five of these
States—Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin—the
certificates they signed used the language that falsely
declared themselves to be “the duly elected and qualified
Electors” from their State.96 This declaration was false
because none of the signatories had been granted that
official status by their State government in the form of a
certificate of ascertainment.
The paperwork signed by the fake Trump electors in two other
States contained partial caveats. In New Mexico, the
document they signed made clear that they were participating
“on the understanding that it might later be determined that
we are the duly elected and qualified Electors. . . .” 97 In
Pennsylvania, the document they signed indicated that they
were participating “on the understanding that if, as a
result of a final non-appealable Court Order or other
proceeding prescribed by law, we are ultimately recognized
as being the duly elected and qualified Electors. . . .” 98
All seven of these invalid sets of electoral votes were then
transmitted to Washington, DC. Roman’s team member in
Georgia, for example, sent him an email on the afternoon of
December 14th that affirmed the following: “All votes cast,
paperwork complete, being mailed now. Ran pretty
smoothly.” 99 Likewise, Findlay updated Campaign Manager
Bill Stepien and his bosses on the legal team that the Trump
team’s slate in Georgia was not able to satisfy all
provisions of State law but still “voted as legally as
possible under the circumstances” before transmitting their
fake votes to Washington, DC, by mail.100
On the evening of December 14th, RNC Chairwoman McDaniel
provided an update for President Trump on the status of the
fake elector effort. She forwarded President Trump’s
executive assistant an “Elector Recap” email, which conveyed
that “President Trump’s electors voted” not just in “the
states that he won” but also in six “contested states”
(specifically, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).101 Minutes later, President
Trump’s executive assistant replied: “It’s in front of
him!” 102
The Trump team and the fake electors also engaged in acts of
subterfuge to carry out their plans on December 14th. For
instance, a campaign staffer notified the Georgia
participants via email that he “must ask for your complete
discretion.” 103 He explained that their efforts required
“complete secrecy,” and told them to arrive at the State
capitol building and “please state to the guards that you
are attending a meeting with either Senator Brandon Beach or
Senator Burt Jones.” 104 Indeed, Greg Bluestein of the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that he tried to enter
this group’s meeting room but “[a] guy at the door called it
an ‘education meeting’ and scrambled when I tried to walk
in.” 105
Former Michigan GOP Chair Laura Cox told the Select
Committee that an attorney who “said he was working with the
President’s Campaign” informed her that the Michigan slate
for President Trump was “planning to meet in the capit[o]l
and hide overnight so that they could fulfill the role of
casting their vote in, per law, in the Michigan
chambers.” 106 She said that she “told him in no uncertain
terms that that was insane and inappropriate,” and that she
warned Michigan’s senate majority leader as a precaution.107
Instead, the group of fake electors in Michigan signed their
paperwork in the State GOP headquarters, where staff told
them not to bring phones inside.108
3.6 The Fallout from the Fake Elector Plan
In spite of the Trump Campaign’s efforts to give the fake
electors’ votes the sheen of authenticity, they failed. The
U.S. Senate Parliamentarian noted in correspondence by
January 3rd that materials from the Trump team’s supposed
electors in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Pennsylvania had “no seal of the state” and “no evidence
votes were delivered by the executive of the state for
signature by electors,” 109 and, as a result, these
materials failed to meet requirements of federal law.
Similarly, the Senate Parliamentarian noted that the Trump
team’s slates from Georgia, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania
appeared to violate another statute which requires the
approval of the Governor for the substitution of
electors.110 Meanwhile, the documents from Michigan and
Wisconsin did not even arrive to Congress on time, so they
also had missed the required statutory deadline.111
Several of the Trump team’s fake electoral slates also
failed to follow State rules specifying where they were
required to meet. In Georgia and Wisconsin, State lawmakers
or their staff appear to have helped participants gather
inside their State capitols.112 But in Michigan, the fake
Trump electors were blocked from entering the State capitol
building.113 Despite this, they still signed documents
attesting that they “convened and organized in the State
Capitol, in the City of Lansing, Michigan, and at 2:00 p.m.
. . . performed the duties enjoined upon us.” 114 That
document had been signed earlier in the day off-site, and
one of the signatories even told the Committee she didn’t
join their march to the State capitol building because she
“didn’t see a need to go.” 115
If the entire premise of the fake votes was not enough,
these infirmities also meant that they had no legal
relevance. In no way could they ever have been used by the
Vice President to disregard the real votes of electors
chosen by the voters.
In the weeks between December 14th and January 6th,
President Trump’s team continued to embrace the idea that
the fake electoral votes had a purpose. Although Giuliani
and White House speechwriter Stephen Miller made public
comments on December 14th suggesting that the uncertified
Trump votes were merely contingent, that pretense was
dropped in short order.116
For example, on December 17th, White House Press Secretary
Kayleigh McEnany said on Fox News that in numerous States
“there has been an alternate slate of electors voted upon
that Congress will decide in January.” 117 On December 21st,
President Trump and Vice President Pence each joined parts
of a White House meeting in which Members of Congress from
the Freedom Caucus encouraged the Vice President to reject
Biden electors from one or more of the seven contested
States.118 And days later, Eastman cited the existence of
the fake votes in an email to Boris Epshteyn, a member of
the Giuliani legal team, writing, “[t]he fact that we have
multiple slates of electors demonstrate[s] the uncertainty
of either. That should be enough.” 119
As discussed further in Chapter 5, that email contained
Eastman’s 2-page memo proposing a strategy for January 6th
based on the incorrect legal theory that Vice President
Pence could assert some authority as President of the Senate
to prevent or delay the election of former Vice President
Biden during the joint session. Eastman’s memo relied on the
fake votes, which the memo featured in the very first line:
“7 states have transmitted dual slates of electors.” 120
When Eastman submitted his memo to Epshteyn, he also copied
Chesebro, who had edited the memo and called it “[r]eally
awesome.” 121
By that point, Chesebro and Eastman were coordinating their
arguments about the fake-elector votes and how they should
be used. On January 1, 2021, Chesebro sent an email to
Eastman and Epshteyn that recommended that Vice President
Pence derail the joint session of Congress. In it, he raised
the idea of Vice President Pence declaring “that there are
two competing slates of electoral votes” in several States,
and taking the position that only he, or possibly Congress,
could “resolve any disputes concerning them.” 122
Two days later, Eastman completed his second major memo
advising President Trump and his team on strategies for
January 6th, again arguing that there were “dual slates of
electors from 7 states,” and calling for Vice President
Pence to assert power to act “[a]s the ultimate arbiter” to
take steps that could overturn the election, either by
sending the election back to State legislatures to reassess
or by rejecting Biden’s certified electoral votes from
States in which there were also fake Trump electors.123
By early January, most of the fake elector votes had arrived
in Washington, except those from Michigan and Wisconsin.124
Undeterred, the Trump team arranged to fly them to
Washington and hand deliver them to Congress for the Vice
President himself. “Freaking trump idiots want someone to
fly original elector papers to the senate President . . .”
Wisconsin Republican Party official Mark Jefferson wrote to
Party Chairman Hitt on January 4th.125 Hitt responded, “Ok I
see I have a missed call from [Mike] Roman and a text from
someone else. Did you talk to them already? This is just
nuts. . . .” 126
The next day, Trump Campaign Deputy Director for Election
Day Operations G. Michael Brown sent a text message to other
campaign staff suggesting that he was the person who
delivered the fake votes to Congress.127 After sending the
group a photo of his face with the Capitol in the
background, Brown said, “This has got to be the cover a book
I write one day” and “I should probably buy [Mike] [R]oman a
tie or something for sending me on this one. Hasn’t been
done since 1876 and it was only 3 states that did it.” 128
The reference to 1876 alludes to a controversy during that
election about certain States’ electoral college votes.129
President Trump and his Campaign apparently had assistance
from allies on Capitol Hill for this effort, including
Senator Ron Johnson, his chief of staff, and the chief of
staff to Representative Mike Kelly, although Senator Johnson
has said that “[his] involvement in that attempt to deliver”
fake elector paperwork “spanned the course of a couple
seconds.” 130 On the morning of January 6th, Representative
Kelly’s then-chief of staff texted an aide to the Vice
President, Chris Hodgson, about hand-delivering the fake
elector votes to the Vice President’s team before the joint
session, a message that Hodgson ignored: “Just following
up-any chance you or someone from your team can meet to take
the Michigan and Wisconsin packets.” 131
Senator Ron Johnson, February 12, 2021.
Senator Ron Johnson, February 12, 2021.
(Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)
According to the office of Senator Ron Johnson,
Representative Kelly’s chief of staff then had a phone call
with Senator Johnson’s chief of staff at 11:58 a.m. “about
how Kelly’s office could get us the electors [sic] because
they had it.” 132 Shortly after 11:30 a.m., the Trump
Campaign’s lead attorney in Wisconsin had texted Senator
Johnson expressing a “[n]eed to get a document on Wisconsin
electors to you [for] the VP immediately. Is there a staff
person I can talk to immediately.” 133 Senator Johnson then
put his chief of staff in touch with the campaign to handle
the issue.134
Shortly afterwards, Senator Johnson’s chief of staff texted
Hodgson: “[Sen.] Johnson needs to hand something to VPOTUS
please advise.” 135 When Hodgson asked what it was, the
response he got was, “Alternate slate of electors for MI and
WI because archivist didn’t receive them.” 136 Hodgson did
not mince words: “Do not give that to him [the Vice
President]. He’s about to walk over to preside over the
joint session, those were supposed to come in through the
mail.” 137
Those fake electoral votes, which the Trump team tried for
weeks to manufacture and deliver, never made it to the Vice
President. But they would have been invalid even if they did
arrive on time. The Trump team’s activities were based on
the false pretense that these fake electoral votes had a
decisive role to play at the joint session of Congress. And
yet any such role that they could have played would have
helped unlawfully obstruct an official proceeding that
determines how our Nation carries out the peaceful transfer
of power between Presidents.
Indeed, as the joint session approached, Senator Mike Lee
had expressed grave concerns about the fake elector effort
in a series of text messages to one of the Trump team’s
senior legal advisors. Although Senator Lee had spent a
month encouraging the idea of having State legislatures
endorse competing electors for Trump, he grew alarmed as it
became clear that the Trump team wanted the fake electors’
votes to be considered on January 6th even without
authorization from any State government body.138
Senator Mike Lee, April 28, 2016.
Senator Mike Lee, April 28, 2016.
(Photo by Leigh Vogel/Getty Images)
On December 30th, Senator Lee texted Trump advisor Cleta
Mitchell that January 6th was “a dangerous idea,” including
“for the republic itself.” 139 He explained that, “I don’t
think we have any valid basis for objecting to the electors”
because “it cannot be true that we can object to any state’s
presidential electors simply because we don’t think they
handled their election well or suspect illegal
activity.” 140 Senator Lee even questioned her about the
plan’s dangerous long-term consequences: “[w]ill you please
explain to me how this doesn’t create a slippery slope
problem for all future presidential elections?” 141
ENDNOTES
1. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol
Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
2. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0021349 (December
13, 2020, and December 14, 2020, text messages between Tim
Murtaugh, Justin Clark, Jason Miller, and Eric Herschmann);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin
Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 116; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25,
2022), pp. 70–72; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 38–43.
3. See Chapter 4; Senate Committee on the Judiciary Majority
Staff Report, Subverting Justice: How the Former President
and His Allies Pressured DOJ to Overturn the 2020 Election,
(Oct. 7, 2021), pp. 20–39, 188, and Key Document H at pp.
185–191, available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
4. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475,
Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, email titled “PRIVILEGED
AND CONFIDENTIAL—Dec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docx” from
John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with
attached memo titled “January 6 scenario”); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source),
CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo);
John C. Eastman, “Privileged and Confidential–Jan 6
Scenario,” (Jan. 3, 2021), available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario;
John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from
Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a ‘Coup’,” American
Greatness, (Sep. 30, 2021), available at
https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/
(embedded). See also Chapter 5.
5. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3,
2020–January 20, 2021 at 23, Eastman v. Thompson, No.
8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356, available
at
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840.356.0_1.pdf.
6. Order re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 36, Eastman v. Thompson, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), available at
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840.260.0_10.pdf.
7. The Trump team tried to justify its fake-elector scheme
based in part on the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon election. At that
time, following a close vote in Hawaii, Republican and
Democratic electors each met and cast purported electoral
college votes on the same day because there was ongoing
litigation and a pending recount. Circumstances in 2020 were
different, however, in part because there were no pending
recounts. Kenneth Chesebro reportedly recognized this
difference in an email copied to Rudolph Giuliani that
acknowledged certain concerns about their efforts could be
“valid,” because, as he put it, “in the Hawaii 1960
incident, when the Kennedy electors voted[,] there was a
pending recount.” Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater,
“Arizona Officials Warned Fake Electors Plan Could ‘Appear
Treasonous’,” New York Times, (Aug. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/us/politics/arizona-trump-fake-electors.html.
8. David Thomas, “Lawyer Group Says Trump Attorney Broke
Ethics Rules in Fake Elector Plan,” Reuters, (Oct. 12,
2022), available at
https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/lawyer-group-says-trump-attorney-broke-ethics-rules-fake-elector-plan-2022-10-12/;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125
(November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The
Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Electoral Votes”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman
University Production), Chapman025124 (December 7, 2020,
email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment “2020-11-20
Chesebro memo on real deadline2.pdf”); Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay
Production), JF037 (November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth
Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s
Electoral Votes”). See also Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and
Luke Broadwater, “Memos Show Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan.
6 and Alternate Electors,” New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.
10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125
(November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The
Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Electoral Votes”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman
University Production), Chapman025124 (December 7, 2020,
email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment “2020-11-20
Chesebro memo on real deadline2.pdf”); Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay
Production), JF037 (Nov. 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth
Chesebro titled “The Real Deadline for Settling a State’s
Electoral Votes”). See also Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and
Luke Broadwater, “Memos Show Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan.
6 and Alternate Electors,” New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.
11. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125,
(November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The
Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Electoral Votes”)
(underlining in original); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman025124, (December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth
Chesebro with attachment “2020-11-20 Chesebro memo on real
deadline2.pdf”); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), CTRL0000082463_00009,
(November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “The
Real Deadline for Settling a State’s Electoral Votes”); Alan
Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, “Memos Show
Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,”
New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.
12. Emphasis added. Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF044,
(December 9, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled
“Statutory Requirements for December 14 Electoral Votes”);
Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, “Memos
Show Roots of Trump’s Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate
Electors,” New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.
13. U.S. Const., art. II, §. 1, cl. 2: (“Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative,
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”).
14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID
000778, (December 11, 2020, email from Jim DeGraffenreid to
Kenneth Chesebro with subject “URGENT—Trump-Pence campaign
asked me to contact you to coordinate Dec. 14 voting by
Nevada electors”).
15. Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, “‘Kind of
Wild/Creative’: Emails Shed Light on Trump Fake Electors
Plan,” New York Times, (July 26, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/26/us/politics/trump-fake-electors-emails.html
(emphasis in original). Although this alleged email
described by the New York Times was not produced to the
Select Committee, it matches certain information in a
privilege log provided to the Select Committee by its
reported sender. This includes the same reported sender
(Jack Wilenchik), direct recipient (Boris Epshteyn), seven
cc’ed recipients in the same order (Christina Bobb, Lee
Miller, Dennis Wilenchik, Aaron Green, Josh Offenhartz,
Christine Ferreira, and Victoria Stevens), title (“RE:
[EXTERNAL]FW: petition for Cert and Motion for Expedited
Consideration”), and date (12/8/2020), with only a
negligible one-minute discrepancy in the time sent (4:27
p.m. versus 4:26 p.m.). See Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, (Jack Wilenchik Production),
CTRL0000922311, line 9 (Sept. 7, 2022, Jack Wilenchik
Production 09_07_2022 - PrivLog UPDATED).
16. “Nevada Revised Statutes,” Title 24—Elections, Chapter
298—Presidential Electors and Elections, Nevada State
Legislature, available at
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-298.html#NRS298Sec065.
17. “Nevada Certificate of Ascertainment 2020,” National
Archives and Records Administration, (Dec. 2, 2020, also
later updated Dec. 10, 2020), available at
https://www.archives.gov/files/electoral-college/2020/ascertainment-nevada.pdf.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF044 (December 9,
2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled “Statutory
Requirements for December 14 Electoral Votes”). Where it
wouldn’t be possible to comply with State law, as in Nevada,
Chesebro advised the so-called electors to proceed anyway,
writing: "[T]hese technical aspects of state law are
unlikely to matter much in the end." Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid
Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000778, (December 11, 2020, email
from Jim DeGraffenreid to Kenneth Chesebro with subject
“URGENT—Trump-Pence campaign asked me to contact you to
coordinate Dec. 14 voting by Nevada electors”).
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708
(January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John
Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which includes in
the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to
Rudy Giuliani titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief
Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708
(January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John
Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which includes in
the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to
Rudy Giuliani titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief
Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708
(January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John
Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which includes in
the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to
Rudy Giuliani titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief
Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708
(January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John
Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which includes in
the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to
Rudy Giuliani titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief
Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”). In his email,
Mr. Chesebro argues that the President of the Senate should
open “two envelopes” from the contested States including
Arizona, “announce[] that he cannot and will not . . . count
any electoral votes from [the contested State] because there
are two slates of votes,” and refuse to count them unless
the election is “rerun,” the courts engage in “adequate
judicial review,” or the State’s legislature “appoint[s]
electors.” From this language, it is clear that Mr. Chesebro
contemplated the fake votes being used in Congress without a
court or State government adopting, ratifying, or otherwise
selecting them as the proper electoral college votes from a
contested State. To be fair, Chesebro concludes this email
by telling Giuliani that “[m]any more points would need to
be analyzed in making a complete argument that the President
of the Senate possesses the sole power to count electoral
votes, and anything to the contrary in the Electoral Count
Act is unconstitutional.” Despite that caution, the very
next sentence advocates for a vigorous assertion of that
power: “But at minimum this seems a defensible
interpretation of the Twelfth Amendment, and one that ought
to be asserted, vigorously, by whoever has the role of
President of the Senate.”
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708
(January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John
Eastman titled “Fwd: Draft 2, with edits”, which includes in
the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to
Rudy Giuliani titled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL—Brief
Notes on “President of the Senate” strategy”).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475,
Chapman053476, (Dec. 23, 2020 email titled “PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL—Dec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docx” from John
Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with
attached memo titled “January 6 scenario”); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source),
CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo);
John C. Eastman, “Privileged and Confidential–Jan 6
Scenario,” (Jan. 3, 2021), available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario
and embedded at John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal
Conduct from Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a
‘Coup’,” American Greatness (Sep. 30, 2021), available at
https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/.
25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003771.
26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003771 (emphasis
added).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003769.
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010783, MM010784.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010783, MM010784.
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013515.
31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013516.
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 54–55.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 27–28.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 29.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 86–87.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna
Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7–8. Ms. McDaniel
didn’t recall the exact date of the call, but thought it was
at least “a few days before December 14th” and may have been
sometime before the Supreme Court rejected the case Texas v.
Pennsylvania on December 11th.
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna
Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 8–9.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna
Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9–13. McDaniel asserted
to the Select Committee that even after December 14th she
was under the impression that the seven slates of fake
electors were strictly contingent in nature pending
authorization by a court of law, and that she relayed this
to several concerned Republican officials in the contested
States. See id., at 18. However, there is also no indication
that she took action to condemn or block the misuse of these
contingent elector slates by January 6th.
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0021349, (December
13, 2020, text message from Jason Miller to Justin Clark and
Eric Herschmann). For instance, on December 11th, Chesebro
wrote to a lawyer working on litigation efforts in Arizona,
asking him to file a petition that would keep the litigation
alive through the 14th: “[C]an you get the cert. petition on
file by Monday? Reason is that Kelli Ward & Kelly Townsend
just spoke to the Mayor about the campaign’s request that
all electors vote Monday in all contested states. Ward and
Townsend are concerned it could appear treasonous for the AZ
electors to vote on Monday if there is no pending court
proceeding that might, eventually, lead to the electors
being ratified as the legitimate ones. Which is a valid
point . . . .” Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, “Arizona
Officials Warned Fake Electors Plan Could ‘Appear
Treasonous,’” The New York Times, (Aug. 2, 2022), available
at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/us/politics/arizona-trump-fake-electors.html
(emphasis in original).
40. Order re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 15, Eastman
v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. Oct.
19, 2022), ECF No. 372.
41. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0019417 (December 14,
2020, emails between Jason Miller and Boris Epshteyn).
42. Order Dismissing Bill of Complaint and Denying
Certiorari, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ___, (Dec. 11,
2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87–88.
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 116.
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 69; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25,
2022), p. 74.
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 118.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 114.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 116, 118. However, Justin
Clark’s message in an email dated December 24th seems to
potentially contradict his suggestions that the campaign
legal team fully backed out: “In terms of political
judgements on January 6 I know . . . that plans are being
discussed and executed: alternate slates have been
submitted, votes are being whipped, all of the arguments are
in place and a not insignificant ad b[u]y was made
highlighting the issues in the election.” Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (William Stepien
Production), WS 00036.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 39–40.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 69–70,
73.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick
Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 75–76.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64–65. (Hutchinson later
clarified that she recalled hearing that from Pat Cipollone
and, potentially, also Pat Philbin.)
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 64–65.
57. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF052.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87–88.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87–88.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 44.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 30.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 125.
63. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production),
CTRL0000044010_00031 (Dec. 10, 2020 email from Kenneth
Chesebro to James DeGraffenreid and others).
64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF051, JF054.
65. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001_000004,
108751.0001_000019, 108751.0001_000020, 108751.0001_000021,
108751.0001_000024.
66. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF049.
67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID
000786; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Michael McDonald Production), MCDONALD 000789.
68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF061.
69. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061077.
70. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011.
72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (David Shafer
Production), 108751.0001 000004; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production),
CTRL0000061077; Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID
000786; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kenneth Chesebro Production),
KC_Elector_Correspondence_000211,
KC_Elector_Correspondence_000215.
73. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF052.
74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897,
CTRL0000083898.
75. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897.
76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897. Members
of this team appear to have included Trump Victory Committee
or Trump Campaign EDO State or regional directors for
relevant States, including Arizona and New Mexico (Thomas
Lane), Georgia (Robert Sinners), Michigan (Shawn Flynn),
Nevada (Jesse Law and Valerie McConahay), Pennsylvania
(James Fitzpatrick), and Wisconsin (Ryan Terrill, who had
originally worked on North Carolina issues but later shifted
to Wisconsin), as well as Mr. Roman’s deputy (G. Michael
Brown). See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Laura Cox Production), Laura Cox 000339; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudy Giuliani
Production), RGGLOBAL_DOM_00001373; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production)
XXM-0010338, XXM-0008776, XXM-0011867; Richard Ruelas,
“Trump Campaign Official Subpoenaed by FBI Appears to Be at
Meeting of Fake Arizona Electors,” Arizona Republic, (June
23, 2022), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2022/06/23/fbi-subpoenas-thomas-lane-trump-campaign-arizona/7708133001/;
Jonathan Oosting, “Trump Fake Elector Probe into 2020 Race
Expands with Michigan Subpoenas,” Bridge Michigan, (June 23,
2022), available at
https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-fake-elector-probe-2020-race-expands-michigan-subpoenas;
Zach Montellaro and Holly Otterbein, “Trump Calls for Poll
Watchers. Election Officials Call for Calm,” Politico,
(Sept. 30, 2020), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/30/trump-poll-watchers-election-423996;
Luke Broadwater, “Jan. 6 Inquiry Subpoenas 6 Tied to False
Pro-Trump Elector Effort,” New York Times, (Feb. 15, 2022),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/us/politics/jan-6-subpoenas-trump.html.
77. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083898.
78. David Shafer (@DavidShafer), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020
12:51 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/DavidShafer/status/1338542161932021762;
David Shafer (@DavidShafer), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 1:07
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/DavidShafer/status/1338546066346676224;
“Republican Electors Cast Procedural Vote, Seek to Preserve
Trump Campaign Legal Challenge,” Pennsylvania Republican
Party website, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at
https://pagop.org/2020/12/14/republican-electors-cast-procedural-vote/;
“Statement on Republican Electors Meeting,” Republican Party
of Wisconsin, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at
https://wisgop.org/republican-electors-2020/; Republican
Party of Arizona (@AZGOP), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 5:13 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/AZGOP/status/1338608056985239554.
79. Marshall Cohen, Zachary Cohen, and Dan Merica, “Trump
Campaign Officials, Led by Rudy Giuliani, Oversaw Fake
Electors Plot in 7 States,” CNN, (Jan. 20, 2022), available
at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/politics/trump-campaign-officials-rudy-giuliani-fake-electors/index.html.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 58.
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0016071 (December 10,
2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Nick Trainer and Matt
Morgan re: Presidential Elector Issues).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0016071 (December 10,
2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Nick Trainer and Matt
Morgan re: Presidential Elector Issues); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25,
2022), pp. 55–59; Michael C. Bender, “Republicans Hire Nine
Regional Directors for Trump 2020 Election,” Wall Street
Journal, (May 8, 2019), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-campaign-hires-nine-regional-directors-for-2020-election-11557355628.
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061085
(December 13, 2020, email chain between Thomas King III and
James Fitzpatrick re: Pa. Electors).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lawrence
Tabas, (Apr. 11, 2022).
85. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000076 (December 4,
2020, Text messages between Andrew Hitt and Mark Jefferson);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb.
28, 2022), p. 8.
86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000083 (December 12,
2020, Text messages between Andrew Hitt and Mark Jefferson).
87. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037949
(December 14, 2020, memorandum from purported electors in
Wisconsin).
88. Kira Lerner, “UPDATED Trump’s Fake Electors: Here’s the
Full List,” News from the States, (June 29, 2022), available
at
https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/updated-trumps-fake-electors-heres-full-list;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568,
CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945, CTRL0000037946,
CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14,
2020, memoranda from slates of purported electors in
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Laura Cox, (May
3, 2022), pp. 77–78.
90. Beth Reinhard, Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey, Emma Brown, and
Rosalind S. Helderman, “As Giuliani Coordinated Plan for
Trump Electoral Votes in States Biden Won, Some Electors
Balked,” Washington Post, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/electors-giuliani-trump-electoral-college/2022/01/20/687e3698-7587-11ec-8b0a-bcfab800c430_story.html.
91. Beth Reinhard, Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey, Emma Brown, and
Rosalind S. Helderman, “As Giuliani Coordinated Plan for
Trump Electoral Votes in States Biden Won, Some Electors
Balked,” Washington Post, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/electors-giuliani-trump-electoral-college/2022/01/20/687e3698-7587-11ec-8b0a-bcfab800c430_story.html.
92. Kira Lerner, “UPDATED Trump’s fake electors: Here’s the
full list,” News from the States, (June 29, 2022), available
at
https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/updated-trumps-fake-electors-heres-full-list.
93. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50–51.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Sinners, (June 15, 2022), pp. 18-19.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Sinners, (June 15, 2022), pp. 37-38.
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568,
CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945 CTRL0000037946,
CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14,
2020, memoranda from slates of purported electors in
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin).
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037946
(December 14, 2020, memorandum from purported electors in
New Mexico).
98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037948
(December 14, 2020, memorandum from purported electors in
Pennsylvania).
99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083893
(December 14, 2020, email chain from Robert Sinners to Mike
Roman and others re: Whip Update).
100. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (William Stepien Production), WS 00095, WS 00096
(December 14, 2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Matt
Morgan, Justin Clark, and cc’ing Bill Stepien re: Georgia
Update).
101. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000009527_0001, (December 14, 2020, forwarded email
from Ronna McDaniel to Molly Michael with the subject line:
“FWD: Electors Recap—Final”).
102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000009527_0001, (December 14, 2020, forwarded email
from Ronna McDaniel to Molly Michael with the subject line:
“FWD: Electors Recap—Final”).
103. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Shawn Still Production), CTRL0000042623_00018
(December 13, 2020, email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan
subject: “Fwd: Information on Duties of Presidential
Electors – Monday, December 14th”).
104. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Shawn Still Production), CTRL0000042623_00018
(December 13, 2020, email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan
subject: “Fwd: Information on Duties of Presidential
Electors – Monday, December 14th”).
105. Greg Bluestein (@bluestein), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020
11:32 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/bluestein/status/1338522299360800771;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shawn Still, (Feb.
25, 2022), pp. 41–48; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman,
“Exclusive: Fulton County DA Sends ‘Target’ Letters to Trump
Allies in Georgia Investigation,” Yahoo! News, (July 15,
2022), available at
https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-trump-allies-in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Laura Cox, (May
3, 2022), pp. 53–54.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Laura Cox, (May
3, 2022), pp. 53–54.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Mayra Rodriguez,
(Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 14–18.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001,
VP-R0000418_0001 (January 3, 2021, email from Elizabeth
MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker” with attachment);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), 00094 (Attachment to email from
Elizabeth MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker”).
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001,
VP-R0000418_0001 (January 3, 2021, email from Elizabeth
MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker” with attachment);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), 00094 (Attachment to email from
Elizabeth MacDonough, subject “RE: COV tracker”).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 144–45, 206–07.
112. In Wisconsin they were able to enter with apparent help
from the chief of staff for then majority leader of the
Wisconsin State Senate, Scott Fitzgerald, who now represents
Wisconsin in the U.S. House of Representatives. In Georgia,
a freelance reporter who has testified to the Fulton County
grand jury claims to have found that the room in which the
fake electors met was reserved by the office of Georgia
House Speaker David Ralston, which is consistent with what
Georgia GOP Chairman David Shafer told the Select Committee.
See “Open Records Regarding Wisconsin’s Fake Electors
Suggest Congressman Scott Fitzgerald Played Significant Role
in Trying to Overturn a Free and Fair Election,” Office of
Wisconsin State Senator Chris Larson, (Jan. 25, 2022),
available at
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/07/Larson/media/2056/1-25-22-fitzgerald-electors-pr.pdf;
Letter from Cyrus Anderson, Deputy Sergeant at Arms,
Wisconsin State Senate to State Sen. Chris Larson, attaching
documents, Jan. 24, 2022, available at
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/07/Larson/media/2052/12-14-20-open-records-request-results-short.pdf;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of David Shafer, (Feb.
25, 2022), pp. 93–94, 106; Michael Isikoff and Daniel
Kladman, “Exclusive: Fulton County DA Sends ‘Target’ Letters
to Trump Allies in Georgia Investigation,” Yahoo! News,
(July 15, 2022), available at
https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-trump-allies-in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html;
George Chidi, “Bearing Witness,” The Atlanta Objective with
George Chidi, (June 29, 2022), available at
https://theatlantaobjective.substack.com/p/bearing-witness;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Shawn
Still Production), 108755.0001_000009 (December 13, 2020,
email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan re: “Fwd: Information
of Duties of Presidential Electors – Monday Dec. 14th”).
113. Daniel Villareal, “Michigan Republicans Tried to Submit
Fake Electoral Votes to Capitol,” Newsweek, (Dec. 15, 2020),
available at
https://www.newsweek.com/michigan-republicans-tried-submit-fake-electoral-votes-capitol-1555028.
114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945, p. 2
(December 14, 2020, memorandum of purported Michigan
electors for Donald J. Trump).
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Mayra Rodriguez,
(Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 18, 21; Laina G. Stebbins, “Feds Serve
Subpoenas to Pro-Trump Fake Electors in Michigan,” Michigan
Advance (June 23, 2022), available at
https://michiganadvance.com/blog/feds-serve-subpoenas-to-pro-trump-fake-electors-in-michigan/.
116. Brett Samuels, “Stephen Miller: ‘Alternate’ Electors
Will Keep Trump Election Challenge Alive,” The Hill, (Dec.
14, 2020), available at
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/530092-stephen-miller-alternate-electors-will-keep-trump-challenge-alive-post/;
Steve Bannon’s War Room Radio, “STEVE BANNON’S WAR ROOM
RADIO SPECIAL EPISODE582,” BitChute, (aired on Dec. 14,
2020, reposted on BitChute Aug. 22, 2021), at 10:30–13:00,
available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/v889V3Thxgcj/.
117. Mike Wereschagin, “Pa. Republicans’ Hedged Language May
Have Saved Them from Prosecution over Electoral Vote
Scheme,” Lancaster Online, (Jan. 17, 2022), available at
https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/pa-republicans-hedged-language-may-have-saved-them-from-prosecution-over-electoral-vote-scheme/article_849d4f7e-7589-11ec-8881-6383a823557d.html.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 143-48.
119. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475
(December 23, 2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and
Ken Chesebro).
120. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053476 (Word
Document, “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL January 6 Scenario,”
attached in Dec. 23, 2020, John Eastman email to Boris
Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475
(December 23, 2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and
Ken Chesebro).
122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061863
(January 1, 2021, Kenneth Chesebro email to John Eastman and
Boris Epshteyn at 10:26 p.m.).
123. Both of Dr. Eastman’s memos described here are
discussed at length in the chapter addressing President
Trump’s pressure on the Vice President. See Chapter 5. See
also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475,
Chapman053476, (Dec. 23, 2020 email titled “PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL—Dec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docx” from John
Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with
attached memo titled “January 6 scenario”); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source),
CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo);
John C. Eastman, “Privileged and Confidential–Jan 6
Scenario,” (Jan. 3, 2021), available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario
and embedded at John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal
Conduct from Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a
‘Coup’,” American Greatness (Sep. 30, 2021), available at
https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001,
VP-R0000418_0001 (January 3, 2021 email and attachment from
Senate Parliamentarian to Office of the Vice President);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production) 00094 (additional copy of same
attachment sent from Senate Parliamentarian to Office of the
Vice President).
125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000089 (January 4,
2021, Andrew Hitt text message to Mark Jefferson at 9:02
p.m.).
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000089 (January 4,
2021, Andrew Hitt text message to Mark Jefferson at 9:02
p.m.).
127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576,
McCallum_01_001577 (Michael Brown text message to Angela
McCallum at undetermined time); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Angela McCallum (Dec. 8, 2021), p.
122.
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576,
McCallum_01_001577 (Michael Brown text message to Angela
McCallum at undetermined time); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Angela McCallum (Dec. 8, 2021), p.
122.
129. The Select Committee does not know where Brown
delivered the fake votes. The Select Committee attempted to
contact Brown multiple ways, including by subpoena, but
servers could not locate him and he never responded to
outreach. The Select Committee served Mike Roman with a
subpoena, but he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and did
not answer any substantive questions about the fake-elector
scheme. What the Select Committee has determined, however,
is that Brown likely delivered the fake electoral college
votes to at least one of President Trump’s allies in
Congress. See Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Michael Roman, (Aug. 10, 2022), p. 40.
130. Jason Lemon, “Johnson Says Involvement With 1/6 Fake
Electors Plan Only ‘Lasted Seconds’,” Newsweek, (Aug. 21,
2022), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-seconds-1735486;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021,
text message at 8:41 a.m. ET from Matt Stroia to Chris
Hodgson); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_000035
(Jan. 6, 2021, text message around 12:37 p.m. ET from Sean
Riley to Chris Hodgson) (“Johnson needs to hand something to
VPOTUS please advise . . . “Alternate slate of electors for
MI and WI because archivist didn’t receive them . . .”).
131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00007
(January 6, 2021, Matt Stroia text message to Chris Hodgson
at 8:41 a.m.).
132. Lawrence Andrea, “Pennsylvania Congressman Concludes
Internal Investigation with Few Answers After Ron Johnson’s
Claims About False Electors,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
(July 14, 2022), available at
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2022/07/14/few-answers-mike-kellys-probe-into-false-electors-ron-johnson-pennsylvania-wisconsin/10059776002/.
133. “The Vicki McKenna Show—Keep and Bear Arms,” iHeart
Radio, June 23, 2022, at 9:30–15:00, available at
https://www.iheart.com/podcast/139-vicki-mckenna-27246267/episode/the-vicki-mckenna-show-keep-98666092/?position=570&embed=true;
John Solomon, “Jan. 6 Panel’s Ron Johnson Narrative Exposes
Ills of One-Sided Hearing,” Just The News, (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://justthenews.com/government/jan-6-panels-ron-johnson-narrative-exposes-ills-one-sided-hearing
(linking to image of text message available at
https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-06/TroupisJohnson1.pdf).
134. “The Vicki McKenna Show—Keep and Bear Arms,” iHeart
Radio, June 23, 2022, at 9:30–15:00, available at
https://www.iheart.com/podcast/139-vicki-mckenna-27246267/episode/the-vicki-mckenna-show-keep-98666092/?position=570&embed=true;
John Solomon, “Jan. 6 Panel’s Ron Johnson Narrative Exposes
Ills of One-Sided Hearing,” Just The News, (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://justthenews.com/government/jan-6-panels-ron-johnson-narrative-exposes-ills-one-sided-hearing
(linking to image of text message available at
https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-06/JohnsonTroupis2Redacted.pdf).
135. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035
(January 6,2021, Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at
12:37 p.m. ET).
136. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035
(January 6, 2021, Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson
at 12:37 p.m. ET).
137. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035
(January 6, 2021, Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson
at 12:37 p.m. ET).
138. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013494, MM014589,
MM014592, MM014595, MM014598, MM014722 (Mark Meadows text
messages with Sen. Mike Lee on December 8, 2020, January 3,
2021, and January 4, 2021); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production),
CM00015452, CM00015477 (Cleta Mitchell text messages with
Sen. Mike Lee on December 9, 2020 and December 30, 2020).
139. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.
140. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.
141. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.
4
“JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME”
4.1 The DOJ Found No Significant Evidence of Fraud
U.S. Attorney General William Barr knew there would be
trouble before all the votes had been counted. “So, right
out of the box on election night, the President claimed that
there was major fraud underway,” Barr explained. “I mean,
this happened, as far as I could tell, before there was
actually any potential of looking at evidence.” 1 President
Trump was quick to claim, “there was major fraud” based
solely on the phenomenon known as the “Red Mirage.” 2
As explained elsewhere in this report, Democrats were more
inclined to vote via mail-in ballot during the 2020
Presidential election than Republicans, who were more likely
to vote in-person on election day. This was widely known,
and partly a result of, President Trump’s own public
statements criticizing mail-in balloting. It also created a
gap in the timing of how votes were tallied. The early vote
tally favored Republicans on election night because the
mail-in ballots, which skewed toward Democrats, were not yet
fully counted. This occurred not just in 2020, but also in
previous elections.3 The President knew of this phenomenon
but exploited it on election night, nonetheless, as he and
his allies had planned to do.4
President Trump exploited this timing gap and used it as
“the basis for this broad claim that there was major fraud,”
Barr said.5 But the Attorney General “didn’t think much of
that.” People “had been talking for weeks and everyone
understood for weeks that that was going to be what happened
on election night,” Barr explained.6 Cities with Democratic
majorities in the battleground States wouldn’t have their
votes fully counted until “the end of the cycle,” with “a
lot of Democratic votes coming in at the end.” 7 This was
not some well-guarded secret, as “everyone understood that
the dynamic of election night in many States would be
whether or not the Democratic votes at the end of the day
would overcome the election day votes.” 8
Within days of the election, the President made an
“avalanche” of fraud allegations. It “was like playing
Whac-A-Mole,” Barr explained, “because something would come
out one day and the next day it would be another issue.” 9
Barr told his “staff very soon after the election” that he
“didn’t think the President would ever admit that he lost
the election, and he would blame it on fraud, and then he
would blame the actions and evidence on the Department of
Justice.” 10
Barr soon took steps to investigate claims of fraud in the
2020 Presidential election, even in the absence of evidence.
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) longstanding policy had
been to avoid any substantive investigations until after the
election’s results were certified.11 As the country’s
premier Federal law enforcement agency, DOJ is justifiably
concerned that its substantial power can influence the
outcome of an election, and it has enacted policies to
mitigate this possibility.12
On November 7, 2020, the media declared former Vice
President Biden the winner of the Presidential election. Two
days later, on November 9th, Attorney General Barr
authorized wider investigations into claims of election
fraud.13 Barr instructed DOJ and FBI personnel “to pursue
substantial allegations of voting and vote tabulation
irregularities prior to the certification of elections in
your jurisdictions in certain cases.” 14 Barr noted that
nothing in his memo “should be taken as any indication that
the Department has concluded that voting irregularities have
impacted the outcome of any election.” 15
4.2 November 23, 2020: Barr Challenges President Trump’s
Election Lies
As Barr predicted, the President did call on him for
information about alleged election fraud. Trump challenged
him with a blizzard of conspiracy theories in three
face-to-face meetings after the election. The first such
meeting occurred on November 23, 2020.
On November 23rd, the Attorney General spoke with White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone, who said that it was important
for him come to the White House and speak to President
Trump.16 Barr had not seen the President since before the
election in late October, and the White House counsel
believed that it was important that the Attorney General
explain what the Department of Justice was doing related to
claims of election fraud.17
Attorney General William Barr at the Department of Justice
on December 21, 2020.
Attorney General William Barr at the Department of Justice
on December 21, 2020.
(Photo by Michael Reynolds-Pool/Getty Images)
“The President said there had been major fraud and that, as
soon as the facts were out, the results of the election
would be reversed,” Barr recalled. Trump continued “for
quite a while,” and Barr was “expecting” what came next.18
President Trump alleged that “the Department of Justice
doesn’t think it has a role looking into these fraud
claims.” 19 Barr anticipated this line of attack because the
President’s counsel, Rudolph Giuliani, was making all sorts
of wild, unsubstantiated claims.20 And Giuliani wanted to
blame DOJ for the fact that no one had come up with any real
evidence of fraud.21 Of course, by the time of this meeting,
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices had been explicitly authorized to
investigate substantial claims for 2 weeks and had yet to
find any evidence of significant voter fraud.22
Barr explained to the President why he was wrong. DOJ was
willing to investigate any “specific and credible
allegations of fraud.” 23 The fact of the matter was that
the claims being made were “just not meritorious” and were
“not panning out.” 24 Barr emphasized to the President that
DOJ “doesn’t take sides in elections” and “is not an
extension of your legal team.” 25
During the November 23rd meeting, Barr also challenged one
of President Trump’s central lies. He “specifically raised
the Dominion voting machines, which I found to be one of the
most disturbing allegations.” 26 “Disturbing,” Barr
explained, because there was “absolutely zero basis for the
allegations,” which were being “made in such a sensational
way that they obviously were influencing a lot of people,
members of the public.” 27 Americans were being deceived
into thinking “that there was this systematic corruption in
the system and that their votes didn’t count and that these
machines, controlled by somebody else, were actually
determining it, which was complete nonsense.” 28 Barr
stressed to the President that this was “crazy stuff,”
arguing that not only was the conspiracy theory a waste of
time, but it was also “doing [a] great, great disservice to
the country.” 29
As Attorney General Barr left the meeting, he talked with
Mark Meadows, the White House Chief of Staff, and Jared
Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law.30 “I think he’s
become more realistic and knows that there’s a limit to how
far he can take this,” Meadows said, according to Barr.31
Kushner reassured Barr, “we’re working on this, we’re
working on it.” 32 Barr was hopeful that the President was
beginning to accept reality.33 The opposite happened.
“I felt that things continued to deteriorate between the
23rd and the weekend of the 29th,” Barr recalled.34 Barr was
concerned because President Trump began meeting with
delegations of State legislators, and it appeared to him
that “there was maneuvering going on.” 35 Barr had “no
problem” with challenging an election “through the
appropriate process,” but “worried” that he “didn’t have any
visibility into what was going on” and that the “President
was digging in.” 36
4.3 December 1, 2020: President Trump is Irate After Barr
Says There is No Significant Fraud
Attorney General Barr had been clear that DOJ was
investigating claims of fraud. The Department simply was not
turning up any real evidence of malfeasance, and certainly
nothing that would overturn the election. Just as Barr
feared, the President turned on DOJ anyway.
On November 29, 2020, Fox News’s Maria Bartiromo interviewed
President Trump. It was his first TV interview since he lost
his bid for reelection. The President claimed the election
was “rigged” and rife with “fraud.” 37 President Trump
repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the claim
that Dominion’s voting machines had “glitches,” which moved
“thousands of votes from my account to Biden’s account.” 38
President Trump pointed to “dumps of votes,” a reference to
the batches of mail-in ballots that had been tabulated later
in the counting process.39 He rambled off various other,
spurious allegations, including that dead people voted in
significant numbers.40
“This is total fraud,” the President said.41 “And how the
FBI and Department of Justice—I don’t know—maybe they’re
involved, but how people are getting away with this
stuff—it’s unbelievable. This election was rigged. This
election was a total fraud.” 42
“Where is the DOJ and the FBI in all of this, Mr.
President?” Bartiromo asked.43 “You have laid out some
serious charges here. Shouldn’t this be something that the
FBI is investigating? Are they? Is the DOJ investigating?”
Bartiromo asked incredulously.44
“Missing in action,” the President replied, “can’t tell you
where they are.” 45 He conceded that when he asked if DOJ
and FBI were investigating, “everyone says yes, they’re
looking at it.” 46 But he didn’t leave it there. “You would
think if you’re in the FBI or Department of Justice, this
is, this is the biggest thing you could be looking at,”
President Trump said. “Where are they? I’ve not seen
anything. I mean, just keep moving along. They go onto the
next President.” 47 He claimed the FBI was not even
investigating Dominion, adding that votes processed in its
machines “are counted in foreign countries.” 48
None of this was true. Just 6 days earlier, Attorney General
Barr had explained to President Trump how DOJ and FBI were
investigating fraud claims. Barr also made it a point to
emphasize that the Dominion claims were nonsense. The
President simply lied. The “crazy stuff,” as Barr put it,
was all Trump could cite.
Attorney General Barr then decided to speak out. He invited
Michael Balsamo, an Associated Press (AP) reporter, to lunch
on December 1st. Barr told the journalist that “to date, we
have not seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a
different outcome in the election.” 49
That made the President irate.
Later that evening, Attorney General Barr met with President
Trump at the White House. It was their second face-to-face
meeting after the November election.50 At first, President
Trump didn’t even look at Attorney General Barr.51 The
President “was as mad as I’ve ever seen him, and he was
trying to control himself,” Barr said.52 The President
finally “shoved a newspaper” with the AP quote in Barr’s
face.53
“Well, this is, you know, killing me. You didn’t have to say
this. You must’ve said this because you hate Trump—you hate
Trump,” Barr remembered him saying.54 “No, I don’t hate you,
Mr. President,” Barr replied. “You know, I came in at a low
time in your administration. I’ve tried to help your
administration. I certainly don’t hate you.” 55
President Trump peppered him with unsupported conspiracy
theories.56 Because he had authorized DOJ and FBI to
investigate fraud claims, Attorney General Barr was familiar
with the conspiracy theories raised by the President. The
“big ones” he investigated included claims such as: Dominion
voting machines switched votes, votes had been “dumped at
the end of the night in Milwaukee and Detroit,”
non-residents voted in Nevada, the number of ballots counted
in Pennsylvania exceeded the number of votes cast, as well
as a story about a truck driver supposedly driving thousands
of pre-filled ballots from New York to Pennsylvania, among
others.57 Under Attorney General Barr, DOJ would also
investigate a false claim that a video feed in Fulton County
captured multiple runs of ballots for former Vice President
Biden. As explained in detail in Chapter 1 of this report,
there was no truth to any of these allegations, but that
didn’t stop President Trump from repeatedly citing these
fictional accounts.
“And I told him that the stuff that his people were
shoveling out to the public was bullshit, I mean, that the
claims of fraud were bullshit,” Barr recalled about the
December 1st meeting.58 “And, you know, he was indignant
about that. And I reiterated that they wasted a whole month
of these claims on the Dominion voting machines and they
were idiotic claims.” 59
President Trump repeated that there had been a “big vote
dump” in Detroit.60 But Attorney General Barr quickly
parried this claim.61 There was nothing suspicious in how
the votes flowed into a central location, Barr explained,
because that is how votes are always counted in Wayne
County.62 Moreover, Barr pointed out that the President
performed better in Detroit in 2020 than he had in 2016. “I
mean, there’s no indication of fraud in Detroit,” Barr
said.63 Barr explained that the “thing about the truck
driver is complete, you know, nonsense.” 64 DOJ and FBI had
investigated the matter, including by interviewing the
relevant witnesses.65 There was no truck filled with
ballots.
Nothing that Attorney General Barr said during that meeting
could satisfy President Trump. So, the President shifted the
focus to Barr. He complained that the Attorney General
hadn’t indicted former FBI Director James Comey and that
U.S. Attorney John Durham’s investigation into the origins
of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation hadn’t made
more progress.66 “Look, I know that you’re dissatisfied with
me,” Barr said, “and I’m glad to offer my resignation.” 67
President Trump pounded the table in front of him with his
fist and said, “Accepted.” 68
White House lawyers Pat Cipollone and Eric Herschmann
tracked Barr down in the parking lot after he left.69 They
convinced Barr to stay in the administration.70 But his days
as Attorney General were numbered. President Trump was not
going to stop spreading conspiracy theories. Nor would the
President cease in his effort to co-opt DOJ for his own
corrupt political purposes.
President Trump released a video on Facebook the very next
day.71 He repeated many of the same lies, including the
conspiracy theory about Dominion voting machines switching
votes. The President also offered charts, falsely claiming
that fraudulent “vote dumps” had swung the election against
him.72 Among the examples he cited was the supposed “vote
dump” in Detroit, Michigan.73 In fact, Barr had already
debunked this and other claims.
On December 3, 2020, Rudolph Giuliani appeared before the
Georgia Senate Government Oversight Committee to allege that
massive cheating had occurred during the election.74
Giuliani offered a video recorded on election night at the
State Farm Arena in Atlanta, Georgia, as a key piece of
evidence.75 Giuliani alleged that the video showed a secret
suitcase of ballots being double- and triple-counted after
Republican poll watchers had been inappropriately
dismissed.76 The video was selectively edited and showed
nothing of the sort. The Georgia Secretary of State’s Office
investigated and immediately debunked the claim, finding
that the secret suitcase was just a secure box and nothing
nefarious had occurred.77 President Trump, Giuliani and
others continued to push the lie anyway.
On December 4th, Attorney General Barr asked Byung J.
(“BJay”) Pak, who was then the U.S. Attorney for the
Northern District of Georgia, to independently investigate
the State Farm claim. Barr told Pak that this was a
“priority,” because “he was going to go to the White House
for a meeting” and the “issue might come up.” Barr asked Pak
to “try to substantiate the allegation made by Mr.
Giuliani.” 78
Pak watched the video from State Farm Arena and asked the
FBI to investigate the matter further. Pak told the Select
Committee that FBI agents “interviewed the individuals”
shown in the video who were supposedly “double, triple
counting” the ballots, and “determined that nothing
irregular happened in the counting and the allegations made
by Mr. Giuliani were false.” 79 And, as noted above, the
supposed “suitcase” was a secure storage container used to
store ballots. With this evidence in hand, Pak told Attorney
General Barr that there was no substance to the
allegations.80
4.4 December 14, 2020: Barr Submits His Resignation
Finally, Attorney General Barr had had enough. He submitted
his resignation on December 14, 2020.81 During an interview
with the Select Committee, former Attorney General Barr
reflected on his face-to-face encounters with President
Trump in November and December 2020:
And, in that context, I made clear I did not agree with the
idea of saying the election was stolen and putting out this
stuff which I told the President was bullshit. And, you
know, I didn’t want to be part of it. And that’s one of the
reasons that went into me deciding to leave when I did.
I observed, I think it was on December 1st, that—you know, I
believe you can’t live in a world where the incumbent
administration stays in power based on its view, unsupported
by specific evidence, that the election—that there was fraud
in the election.82
Around mid-day on December 14th, Attorney General Barr met
with President Trump and Meadows in the Oval Office to
discuss his resignation.83 When he arrived, and even before
Barr could mention his resignation, President Trump began
speaking at length about the recently released Allied
Security Operations Group (ASOG) report on Dominion voting
machines in Antrim County, Michigan.84 While the Attorney
General had been briefed on the allegations in Antrim County
and did not find them credible, he promised the President
that he would have DOJ investigate them.85 The Attorney
General then told President Trump that he had come for a
separate reason and wished to speak to the President
privately, so Meadows left.86
Former Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen testifies
before the Select Committee on June 23, 2022.
Former Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen testifies
before the Select Committee on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
Barr told President Trump that it was clear the President
was dissatisfied with him as Attorney General and that he
had decided to resign.87 President Trump accepted his
resignation and asked Barr who would replace him; Attorney
General Barr recommended Jeffrey A. Rosen as Acting Attorney
General and Richard Donoghue as his deputy.88 Although
President Trump called Donoghue to discuss the possibility
of appointing him Acting Attorney General, Donoghue advised
that normal procedures be followed and Rosen be named Acting
Attorney General.89 President Trump followed this advice,
and upon Barr’s departure, Rosen became Acting Attorney
General while Donoghue would function as his deputy.
4.5 Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen and Acting Deputy
Attorney General Richard Donoghue Hold the Line
Barr felt that he was leaving the Department in the hands of
two trusted lieutenants. But President Trump immediately
began to pressure Rosen and Donoghue, just as he had Barr.
On December 14, 2020, the day Barr resigned, Molly Michael,
Special Assistant to the President and Oval Office
Coordinator, sent an email to Acting Attorney General
Jeffrey Rosen. The email had two documents attached, both of
which were labeled “From POTUS.” 90 The first was a set of
talking points focused on false allegations of voter fraud
in Antrim County, Michigan. The second document was the same
ASOG report the President had given Barr.91
The next day, President Trump held a meeting in the White
House with Acting Attorney General Rosen, Acting Deputy
Attorney Donoghue, Cipollone, Meadows, Acting Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security Ken Cuccinelli, and Acting
General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security Chad
Mizelle.92 Barr did not attend, even though he was not
scheduled to leave DOJ until the following week. The timing
of the meeting was notable, as the previous day the
electoral college had met and cast their votes in favor of
former Vice President Biden.
Former Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue
testifies before the Select Committee on June 23, 2022.
Former Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue
testifies before the Select Committee on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
During testimony before the Select Committee, Donoghue
explained that the December 15th, meeting “was largely
focused on” the ASOG report.93 According to Donoghue, the
President “was adamant that the report must be accurate,
that it proved that the election was defective, that he in
fact won the election, and the [D]epartment should be using
that report to basically tell the American people that the
results were not trustworthy.” 94 President Trump discussed
“other theories as well,” including erroneous allegations of
voter fraud in Georgia and Pennsylvania, but “the bulk of
that conversation on December 15th focused on Antrim County,
Michigan.” 95 President Trump asked why DOJ wasn’t “doing
more to look at this” and whether the Department was “going
to do its job.” 96
The Department of Justice was doing its job. In fact,
Attorney General Barr had ordered unprecedented
investigations into the many specious claims of voter fraud.
The President simply didn’t want to hear the truth—that DOJ
found that not one of the bogus claims was true. As
explained in Chapter 1, the original vote totals in Antrim
County were the result of a human error that had since been
corrected, not the result of any problem with Dominion
machines or software. There was no evidence of fraud.
4.6 President Trump is Introduced to Jeffrey Clark
On December 21, 2020, 11 House Republicans met with
President Trump at the White House to discuss their plans
for objecting to the certification of the electoral college
vote on January 6th.97 After the meeting, Mark Meadows
tweeted: “Several members of Congress just finished a
meeting in the Oval Office with @realDonaldTrump preparing
to fight back against mounting evidence of voter fraud. Stay
tuned.” 98 Among those in attendance was Congressman Scott
Perry, a Republican from Pennsylvania.99
By the next day, Representative Perry had introduced a
little-known DOJ official named Jeffrey Clark to the
President.100 At the time, Clark was the Acting Head of the
Civil Division and Head of the Environmental and Natural
Resources Division at the Department of Justice.101 Clark
had no experience in, or responsibilities related to,
investigating allegations of election fraud.
President Trump called Acting Attorney General Rosen
“virtually every day” between December 23rd and January
3rd.102 The President usually discussed his
“dissatisfaction” with DOJ, claiming the Department was not
doing enough to investigate election fraud.103 On Christmas
Eve, Trump brought up Jeffrey Clark’s name. Rosen found it
“peculiar,” telling the Select Committee: “I was quizzical
as to how does the President even know Mr. Clark?” 104
Former Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Clark appears on a
screen during a Select Committee hearing on June 23, 2022.
Former Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Clark appears on a
screen during a Select Committee hearing on June 23, 2022.
(Photo by Mandel Ngan-Pool/Getty Images)
Rosen then spoke directly with Clark on December 26th.105
Clark revealed that he had met with the President in the
Oval Office several days prior.106 Clark had told the
President that if he were to change the leadership at the
Department of Justice, “then the Department might be able to
do more” to support the President’s claims that the election
had been stolen from him.107
In his discussion with Acting Attorney General Rosen, Clark
was “defensive” and “apologetic,” claiming that the meeting
with President Trump was “inadvertent and it would not
happen again, and that if anyone asked him to go to such a
meeting, he would notify Rich Donoghue and me [Rosen].” 108
Of course, Clark had good reasons to be defensive. His
meeting with President Trump and Representative Perry on
December 22nd was a clear violation of Department policy,
which limits interactions between the White House and the
Department’s staff. As Steven Engel, former Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, explained
to the Select Committee, “it’s critical that the Department
of Justice conducts its criminal investigations free from
either the reality or any appearance of political
interference.” 109 For that reason, the Department has
longstanding polices in place, across administrations, to
“keep these communications as infrequent and at the highest
levels as possible, just to make sure that people who are
less careful about it, who don’t really understand these
implications, such as Mr. Clark, don’t run afoul of the of
those contact policies.” 110 Rosen added that only the
Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General “can have
conversations about criminal matters with the White House,”
or they can “authorize” someone from within DOJ to do so.111
Clark had no such authorization.
Representative Perry continued to advocate on Clark’s
behalf. The Congressman texted Meadows on December 26th,
writing: “Mark, just checking in as time continues to count
down. 11 days to 1/6 and 25 days to inauguration. We gotta
get going!” 112 Representative Perry followed up: “Mark, you
should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he
explained to me why the principal deputy [position] won’t
work especially with the FBI. They will view it as not
having the authority to enforce what needs to be done.” 113
Meadows responded: “I got it. I think I understand. Let me
work on the deputy position.” 114 Representative Perry then
sent additional texts: “Roger. Just sent you something on
Signal”, “Just sent you an updated file”, and “Did you call
Jeff Clark?” 115
4.7 December 27th Phone Call
On December 27, 2020, President Trump called Acting Attorney
General Rosen once again. At some point during the lengthy
call, Rosen asked that Acting Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue be conferenced in.116 According to Donoghue’s
contemporaneous notes, Trump referenced three Republican
politicians, all of whom had supported the President’s
election lies and the “Stop the Steal” campaign.117 One was
Representative Scott Perry. Another was Doug Mastriano, a
State senator from Pennsylvania who would later be on the
grounds of the U.S. Capitol during the January 6th
attack.118 President Trump also referenced Representative
Jim Jordan from Ohio, praising him as a “fighter.” 119
Representatives Perry and Jordan had often teamed up to
spread lies about the election. The two spoke at a “Stop the
Steal” rally in front of the Pennsylvania State capitol in
Harrisburg, just days after the November election.120 The
pair also pressed their conspiratorial case during
interviews with friendly media outlets.121
President Trump made a “stream of allegations” during the
December 27th call.122 As reflected in his notes, Donoghue
considered the call to be an “escalation of the earlier
conversations,” with the President becoming more adamant
that “we weren’t doing our job.” 123 President Trump
trafficked in “conspiracy theories” he had heard from
others, and Donoghue sought to “make it clear to the
President these allegations were simply not true.” 124
Donoghue sought to “correct” President Trump “in a serial
fashion as he moved from one theory to another.” 125
The President returned to the discredited ASOG report, which
former Attorney General Barr had already dismissed as
complete nonsense. ASOG had claimed—based on no
evidence—that the Dominion voting machines in Antrim County,
Michigan had suffered from a 68 percent error rate. As noted
above and in Chapter 1, that was not close to being true.
Bipartisan election officials in Antrim County completed a
hand recount of all machine-processed ballots on December
17, 2020, which should have ended the lies about Dominion’s
voting machines.126 The net difference between the machine
count and the hand recount was only 12 out of 15,718 total
votes.127 The machines counted just one vote more for former
Vice President Biden than was tallied during the hand
recount.128 Donoghue informed the President that he “cannot
and should not be relying on” ASOG’s claim, because it was
“simply not true.” 129 This did not stop the President from
later repeating the debunked allegation multiple times,
including during his January 6th speech at the Ellipse.130
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked a “series”
of other conspiracy theories offered by President Trump
during the December 27th call as well. One story involved a
truck driver “who claimed to have moved an entire tractor
trailer of ballots from New York to Pennsylvania.” 131 There
was no truth to the story. The FBI “interviewed witnesses at
the front end and the back end of” the truck’s transit
route, “looked at loading manifests,” questioned the truck
driver, and concluded that there were no ballots in the
truck.132
President Trump then returned to the conspiracy theory about
voting in Detroit. Former Attorney General Barr had already
debunked the claim that a massive number of illegal votes
had been dumped during the middle of the night, but the
President would not let it go. President Trump alleged that
someone “threw the poll watchers out,” and “you don’t even
need to look at the illegal aliens voting—don’t need to.
It’s so obvious.” 133 The President complained that the “FBI
will always say there’s nothing there,” because while the
Special Agents (“the line guys”) supported him, the Bureau’s
leadership supposedly did not.134 This was inconsistent with
Donoghue’s view.135 But President Trump complained that he
had “made some bad decisions on leadership” at the FBI.136
President Trump also “wanted to talk a great deal about
Georgia, [and] the State Farm Arena video,” claiming it was
“fraud staring you right in the face.” 137 President Trump
smeared Ruby Freeman, a Georgia election worker who was
merely doing her job, as a “Huckster” and an “Election
scammer.” 138 President Trump said the “networks,” meaning
the television networks, had “magnified the tape and saw
them running them [ballots] through repeatedly.” 139 The
President repeated the lie that Democrats had “[c]losed the
facility and then came back with hidden ballots under the
table.” 140 He suggested that both Rosen and Donoghue “go to
Fulton County and do a signature verification.” They would
“see how illegal it is” and “find tens of thousands” of
illegal ballots.141
President Trump “kept fixating” on the supposed suitcase in
the video.142 But Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue
debunked the President’s obsession. “There is no suitcase,”
Donoghue made clear.143 Donoghue explained that the DOJ had
looked at the video and interviewed multiple witnesses. The
“suitcase” was an official lock box filled with genuine
votes.144 And election workers simply did not scan ballots
for former Vice President Biden multiple times.145 All of
this was recorded by security cameras.146
In response to what President Trump was saying during the
conversation, Rosen and Donoghue tried to make clear that
the claims the President made weren’t supported by the
evidence. “You guys must not be following the internet the
way I do,” the President remarked.147 But President Trump
was not finished peddling wild conspiracy theories.
The President pushed the claim that Pennsylvania had
reported 205,000 more votes than there were voters in the
state.148 “We’ll look at whether we have more ballots in
Pennsylvania than registered voters,” Acting Attorney
General Rosen replied, according to Donoghue. They “[s]hould
be able to check that out quickly.” 149 But Rosen wanted
President Trump to “understand that the DOJ can’t and won’t
snap its fingers and change the outcome of the election. It
doesn’t work that way.” 150
“I don’t expect you to do that,” President Trump responded.
“Just say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me
and the Republican Congressmen.” 151
Donoghue explained this “is an exact quote from the
President.” 152
“We have an obligation to tell people that this was an
illegal, corrupt election,” President Trump told the DOJ
team at another point in the call.153 President Trump
insisted this was DOJ’s “obligation,” even though Rosen and
Donoghue kept telling him there was no evidence of fraud
sufficient to overturn the outcome of the election. “We are
doing our job,” Donoghue informed the President. “Much of
the info you’re getting is false.” 154
The call on December 27th was contentious for additional
reasons. President Trump did not want to accept that the
Department of Justice was not an arm of his election
campaign. He wanted to know why the Department did not
assist in his campaign’s civil suits against States. There
was a simple answer: There was no evidence to support the
campaign’s claims of fraud.155
Donoghue and Rosen also “tried to explain to the President
on this occasion and on several other occasions that the
Justice Department has a very important, very specific, but
very limited role in these elections.” 156 The States “run
their elections” and DOJ is not “quality control for the
States.” 157 DOJ has “a mission that relates to criminal
conduct in relation to federal elections” and also has
“related civil rights responsibilities.” 158 But DOJ cannot
simply intervene to alter the outcome of an election or
support a civil suit.159
When President Trump made these demands on December 27th, it
was already crystal clear that the Department of Justice had
found no evidence of systemic fraud.160 The Department
simply had no reason to assert that the 2020 Presidential
contest was “an illegal corrupt election.” 161
“People tell me Jeff Clark is great” and that “I should put
him in,” President Trump said on the call. “People want me
to replace the DOJ leadership.” 162 Donoghue responded
“[S]ir, that’s fine, you should have the leadership you
want, but understand, changing the leadership in the
Department won’t change anything.” 163
The President did not really care what facts had been
uncovered by the Department of Justice. President Trump just
wanted the Department to say the election was corrupt, so he
and the Republican Congressmen could exploit the statement
in the days to come, including on January 6th. And when
Rosen and Donoghue resisted the President’s entreaties, he
openly mused about replacing Rosen with someone who would do
the President’s bidding.
Representative Scott Perry, November 14, 2022.
Representative Scott Perry, November 14, 2022.
(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)
4.8 Congressman Scott Perry Calls Donoghue
Toward the end of the December 27th call, President Trump
asked Donoghue for his cell number.164 Later that day,
Representative Perry called Donoghue to press the
President’s case.165 Representative Perry was one of
President Trump’s key congressional allies in the effort to
overturn the election’s results. Representative Perry was an
early supporter of the “Stop the Steal” campaign and, as
noted above, addressed the crowd at one such event outside
the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg on November 5,
2020.166 In December 2020, Representative Perry was also one
of 27 Republican Congressmen who signed a letter requesting
that President Trump “direct Attorney General Barr to
appoint a Special Counsel to investigate irregularities in
the 2020 election.” December 9, 2020—more than 1 week after
Barr told the press there was no evidence of significant
fraud.167 There was no reason to think that a Special
Counsel was warranted. Representative Perry and the other
congressmen advocated for one to be appointed anyway.
Representative Perry attended the December 21st Oval Office
meeting along with at least 10 other congressional
Republicans to discuss the strategy for objecting to the
electoral college votes on January 6th. Along with 125 other
Republican Members of Congress, Representative Perry also
supported Texas’s lawsuit against Pennsylvania and three
other states.168 That is, Representative Perry supported
Texas’s effort to nullify the certified electoral college
vote from four states, including his own home state.
Donoghue took notes during his conversation with
Representative Perry and provided those notes to the Select
Committee.169 The notes reflect that when Representative
Perry called Donoghue on December 27th, Representative Perry
explained that President Trump asked him to call and that
he, Representative Perry, did not think DOJ had been doing
its job on the election.170 Representative Perry brought up
other, unrelated matters and argued that the “FBI doesn’t
always do the right thing in all instances.” 171
Representative Perry also brought up Jeff Clark. He said he
liked him and thought that Clark “would do something about
this,” meaning the election fraud allegations.172
On the evening of December 27th, Representative Perry
emailed Donoghue a set of documents alleging significant
voting fraud had occurred in Pennsylvania.173 One document
asserted that election authorities had counted 205,000 more
votes than had been cast.174 Representative Perry also
shared this same claim on Twitter the following day.175
President Trump kept raising the same claim. Sometimes there
was an alleged discrepancy of 205,000 votes, other times it
was supposedly 250,000 votes.176 Either way, it was not
true.
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue forwarded
Representative Perry’s email to Scott Brady, who was the
U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania at
the time.177 As Brady soon discovered, there was no
discrepancy.178 President Trump’s supporters came up with
the claim by comparing the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s
website, which reported the total number of votes as 5.25
million, to a separate State election registry, which showed
only 5 million votes cast.179 The problem was simple:
Pennsylvania’s election site had not been updated.180 The
totals for four counties had not yet been reported on the
election site. Once those votes were counted on the site,
the totals matched. This was simply not an example of fraud,
as President Trump, Representative Perry and others would
have it.
4.9 December 28, 2020: The Clark Letter
On December 28, 2020, Clark sent a 5-page draft letter to
Donoghue and Rosen.181 The letter was addressed to three
Georgia State officials: Governor Brian Kemp, Speaker of the
House David Ralston, and President Pro Tempore of the Senate
Butch Miller. It contained places for Rosen and Donoghue to
affix their signatures, which they steadfastly refused to
do.182 The letter, if signed and sent, may very well have
provoked a constitutional crisis.183
The letter was attached to an email from Clark, in which he
requested authorization to attend a classified briefing by
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
“led by DNI Ratcliffe on foreign election interference
issues.” 184 ODNI did not find any foreign interference in
the voting process or counting,185 but Clark apparently
believed some of the conspiracy theories that had been
floated. Specifically, Clark claimed that “hackers have
evidence (in the public domain) that a Dominion machine
accessed the internet through a smart thermostat with a net
connection trail leading back to China.” Clark added: “ODNI
may have additional classified evidence.” 186 This crackpot
claim had been shared by other Trump officials and
associates as well.187 Ultimately, after Clark received the
ODNI briefing, “he acknowledged [to Donoghue] that there was
nothing in that briefing that would have supported his
earlier suspicion about foreign involvement.” 188
Clark intended to send the letter to officials in Georgia
and several other contested States that President Trump
needed to flip if he was going to overturn the election
results. “The Department of Justice is investigating various
irregularities in the 2020 election for President of the
United States,” Clark wrote.189 Clark continued: “The
Department will update you as we are able on investigatory
progress, but at this time we have identified significant
concerns that may have impacted the outcome of the election
in multiple States, including the State of Georgia.” 190
Clark continued by arguing that Georgia’s State legislature
should call a special session. “In light of these
developments, the Department recommends that the Georgia
General Assembly should convene in special session so that
its legislators are in a special position to take additional
testimony, receive new evidence, and deliberate on the
matter consistent with its duties under the U.S.
Constitution,” Clark wrote.191 Clark referenced the fake
electors that the President and his campaign organized and
argued that there were two competing slates of electors,
both of which were legitimate.192 “The Department believes
that in Georgia and several other States, both a slate of
electors supporting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a separate
slate of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on
[December 14, 2020] at the proper location to cast their
ballots, and that both sets of those ballots have been
transmitted to Washington, D.C., to be opened by Vice
President Pence,” Clark wrote.193
The letter was a lie. Senior DOJ officials—Barr, Rosen and
Donoghue—had repeatedly stated the opposite. They found no
evidence of fraud that would have impacted the election’s
results—none. But since mid-November, the Trump Campaign’s
legal team under Giuliani attempted to execute its
dual-track strategy of both filing lawsuits and convincing
state legislatures in contested states to appoint separate
slates of Presidential electors for President Trump.194 By
late December, however, the dual-track approach had largely
failed, and no legislatures had sent a second lawful slate
of electors for Trump to Congress. Clearly, President Trump
and his campaign team could not get the job done. So, the
President and those around him sought to use the hefty
imprimatur of the U.S. Department of Justice to achieve the
same thing. No doubt, a letter coming from the Department of
Justice is different from a meandering call from Giuliani or
one of his associates. And, because it was December 28th and
there was little more than a week until the January 6th
joint session of Congress, President Trump needed more, and
soon. Clark’s letter, which laid out a plan that was almost
identical to what President Trump and his team had pressured
State officials to carry out virtually since election day,
could have been just what President Trump needed.
Several examples demonstrate the parallels between President
Trump’s and Rudolph Giuliani’s approach to overturning the
election in November and December, and what Clark proposed
in this letter. First, the letter sought to have the Georgia
State legislature convene a special session to focus on
allegations of fraud in the election.195 Giuliani and his
team had been making calls to State legislatures and telling
them in both official and unofficial State legislature
committee hearings that State legislatures should convene in
special sessions.196 They also argued that State
legislatures had the authority to convene a special session
themselves, despite limitations in State law requiring such
a session to be convened by the governor.197 Clark included
the same argument in his draft letter.198
Additionally, the draft letter recommended that the Georgia
legislature consider choosing the alternate—fake—slate of
electoral college electors that sent fake electoral college
votes to Congress and Vice President Pence.199 Having State
legislatures choose Trump electors in States where President
Trump lost was one of the Trump team’s early goals
immediately after the election, but it didn’t work.200 When
no State legislature appointed its own set of electors
before December 14th, the Trump Campaign arranged for
electors to meet in contested States anyway and cast fake
electoral college votes.201 This letter, with the Department
of Justice seal at the top, was just one more way that
President Trump and those close to him could pressure State
officials to send competing electoral college votes to
Congress for consideration during the joint session, despite
former Vice President Biden’s certified victory in each of
the contested States.
Despite the similarities between the requests in Clark’s
proposed letter and the requests that President Trump and
his team made to State officials for nearly 2 months, the
extent to which Clark directly coordinated his actions with
the Trump Campaign and its outside advisors is unclear.
Clark asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and various other
privileges to avoid answering the Select Committee’s
questions about these and other topics.202 When Giuliani was
asked during his Select Committee deposition whether he
remembered discussing DOJ issuing a letter like Clark’s,
Giuliani refused to answer because it implicated
attorney-client privilege with President Trump, but when
asked if he recalled ever recommending that Clark be given
election-related responsibilities at DOJ, Giuliani said, “I
do recall saying to people that somebody should be put in
charge of the Justice Department who isn’t frightened of
what’s going to be done to their reputation, because the
Justice Department was filled with people like that.” 203
And the investigation has also revealed that Clark and John
Eastman were in communication throughout this period.204
One person who had worked with Eastman and others in his
circle was a lawyer installed to work with Clark at the
Department of Justice in mid-December—the final weeks of the
Trump administration—named Ken Klukowski.205 Klukowski was a
Trump administration political appointee serving as a senior
counsel under Clark in DOJ’s Civil Division.206 After
serving as a lawyer in the Office and Management and Budget
(OMB) for more than a year and volunteering as a lawyer for
the Trump Campaign after election day, Klukowski only joined
the Department when the administration’s personnel staff
“expedite[d]” his appointment because the White House’s
Presidential Personnel Office “want[ed] him in soon.” 207
On the morning of December 28th, Clark asked Klukowski to
draft the Georgia letter for him.208 Clark dictated the
substantive key points of the letter to Klukowski and told
him exactly what to include.209 After several meetings with
Clark throughout the day to update him on progress,
Klukowski turned in his assignment and gave the letter to
Clark, which Clark sent along to Acting Attorney General
Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue, as
described above.210
Donoghue quickly responded to Clark’s email, stating “there
is no chance that I would sign this letter or anything
remotely like this.” 211 The plan set forth by Clark was
“not even within the realm of possibility.” 212 Donoghue
warned that if they sent Clark’s letter, it “would be a
grave step for the Department to take and it could have
tremendous Constitutional, political and social
ramifications for the country.” 213 Contrary to President
Trump’s and Clark’s wild claims about the election, Donoghue
stressed that DOJ’s ongoing investigations related to
matters of such a “small scale that they simply would not
impact the outcome of the Presidential Election.” 214
Clark’s assertion to the contrary was baseless.
Donoghue and Rosen reaffirmed their strong opposition to the
draft letter in a “contentious” meeting with Clark on
December 28th.215 “What you are doing is nothing less than
the United States Justice Department meddling in the outcome
of a presidential election,” Donoghue admonished Clark, to
which Clark indignantly responded, “I think a lot of people
have meddled in this election.” 216
Under questioning by Rosen and Donoghue, Clark eventually
also revealed that he had been in a meeting in the Oval
Office with President Trump. Donoghue demanded to know, “Why
the hell are we hearing your name from the President of the
United States and a Congressman?” 217 When Clark was
reminded that meeting the President without authorization or
informing his superiors was a clear violation of the White
House contacts policy, he retorted, “It’s a policy, there’s
a lot more at stake here than a policy.” 218 In fact, the
contacts policy was designed for situations just like this
where political figures might try to influence criminal
investigations or legal actions taken by the Department of
Justice, as President Trump attempting to do.219
In the days that followed, Clark called witnesses, got a
briefing from ODNI and pursued his own investigations.
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue was “shocked” to
learn that Clark did not cease his efforts even after
learning there was “no foreign interference.” 220 Instead of
adhering to the facts, Clark “doubled down.” During a
follow-up meeting on January 2nd, Clark acknowledged he had
received the ODNI briefing, and he acknowledged that there
was nothing in the briefing that would have supported his
earlier suspicion about foreign involvement, but he
nevertheless “spewed out some of these theories, some of
which we’d heard from the President, but others which were
floating around the internet and media, and just kept
insisting that the Department needed to act and needed to
send those letters.” 221
4.10 December 29th Meeting
The next day, Rosen, Donoghue, and Engel had a meeting with
Mark Meadows, Pat Cipollone, and Cipollone’s deputy, Pat
Philbin, in the White House Chief of Staff’s office.222
While the meeting dealt primarily with the Presidential
transition, the group discussed a draft civil complaint
modeled after Texas v. Pennsylvania that the President
wanted the Department of Justice to file challenging the
results of the Presidential election, tentatively called
United States v. Pennsylvania.223 The DOJ officials said
that they had not had time to thoroughly review the proposed
suit, but initially indicated that it appeared to be flawed
and did not seem “viable” for DOJ to file.224 Meadows
suggested that the DOJ leadership meet with William Olson
and Kurt Olsen, the two attorneys affiliated with the Trump
Campaign that had been working on the proposed suit, and
added that Eastman and a retired judge from North Carolina
named Mark Martin both had views about the lawsuit.225
In this meeting, Meadows also raised a new and outrageous
allegation of election fraud: that an Italian company had
been involved in changing votes in the Presidential
election.226 According to Meadows, there was a man, whom
Donoghue later learned was in an Italian prison, who claimed
to have information supporting the allegation and that CIA
officers stationed in Rome were either aware of the plot to
interfere in the election or had participated in it.227
Donoghue described how it was apparent that Meadows was not
clear on the specifics of the allegation but passed them
along to DOJ to investigate, nonetheless.228 Following the
meeting Donoghue provided the information to the FBI, which
quickly determined that the allegations were not
credible.229 Meadows and other senior officials in the Trump
administration, however, pressed DOJ to investigate every
allegation of fraud regardless of how absurd or specious.
In the days after the December 29th meeting with Meadows,
the senior DOJ officials more closely examined the proposed
United States v. Pennsylvania lawsuit and determined that
DOJ could not file it.230 Engel was principally tasked with
examining the veracity of the suit and summarized his
analysis in a series of talking points that he provided to
Donoghue on December 31st.231 Engel concluded that for
multiple reasons, the proposed lawsuit lacked merit. First,
the U.S. Government did not have standing to challenge how a
State administered its election.232 Such a challenge could
only be brought by President Trump as a candidate and his
campaign, or, possibly, an aggrieved electoral college
elector.233 Second, there was no identified precedent in the
history of the Supreme Court establishing that such a
lawsuit could be filed by the U.S. Government.234 Third, by
late December, States had already certified the results of
their elections and the electoral college had met, so suing
States by this point would not impact the results of the
election.235 Finally, unlike Texas v. Pennsylvania, which
was one State suing another State, this lawsuit would not
automatically be heard by the Supreme Court, so it should
have been filed in a Federal district court months prior—if
at all—to have any possibility of impacting the outcome of
the election.236
Steven Engel testifies before the Select Committee on June
23, 2022.
Steven Engel testifies before the Select Committee on June
23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
When asked about it during his interview with the Select
Committee, Engel described United States v. Pennsylvania as
“a meritless lawsuit” and said, “there was never a question”
about whether “the Department was going to file” it.237 As
senior DOJ officials had already explained to President
Trump multiple times in November and December 2020, the
Department of Justice was strictly limited in what
election-related actions it could take. It could not oversee
States’ actions in administering their elections, and it
could not support litigation filed by President Trump’s
campaign.238 Nonetheless, President Trump continued to push
DOJ to file this lawsuit over the following days and
essentially act as an arm of his political campaign.
4.11 Rosen’s December 30th Call with President Trump
Even after the December 29th meeting, President Trump and
those working on his behalf still wanted DOJ leadership to
file United States v. Pennsylvania. On December 30th, Acting
Attorney General Rosen had a phone call with President Trump
that included a discussion about the lawsuit.239 During the
call, Rosen clearly explained to the President that DOJ
could not file the lawsuit.240 Rosen said, “This doesn’t
work. There’s multiple problems with it. And the Department
of Justice is not going to be able to do it.” 241 According
to Rosen, President Trump accepted what he said without
argument.242 Yet President Trump and his allies continued
pressuring the Department to file the lawsuit.
4.12 December 31st Meeting
On December 31st, 2020, President Trump suddenly returned to
Washington, DC, from Florida, where he had been celebrating
Christmas. Shortly after Air Force One landed, Rosen and
Donoghue were summoned to the Oval Office once again. They
met with the President that afternoon. President Trump “was
a little more agitated than he had been in the meeting on
the 15th,” according to Donoghue.243 The President remained
“adamant that the election has been stolen, that he won,
that the American people were being harmed by fraud, and
that he believed the Justice Department should be doing
something about it.” 244
The President once again raised the prospect of naming Clark
the Acting Attorney General.245 Donoghue and Rosen repeated
what they had told the President previously—that he “should
have the leaders that” he wanted, “but it’s really not going
to change anything.” 246
President Trump again asked why DOJ would not file a
complaint with the Supreme Court, alleging that the election
was fraudulent. Rosen and Donoghue explained, once more,
that the DOJ did not have standing.247 DOJ represents the
Federal government, not the American people. President Trump
was incredulous and became “very animated.” 248 The
President kept repeating the same questions, “How is that
possible? How can that possibly be?” 249
President Trump also floated the prospect of naming a
special counsel, suggesting Ken Cuccinelli from the
Department of Homeland Security as a possible candidate.250
“This sounds like the kind of thing that would warrant
appointment of a special counsel,” Donoghue recalled the
President saying.251 The President did not order the DOJ to
name a special counsel, but he was clearly still thinking
about it. Donoghue and Rosen “didn’t say a lot” in response,
but simply pointed out that there was no evidence to support
the many individual allegations that had been made, so there
was “no evidence that would warrant appointing a special
counsel.” 252
President Trump again raised the Antrim County, Michigan
allegations.253 As mentioned above, bipartisan election
officials in Antrim County completed a hand recount of all
ballots on December 17th.254 This should have resolved the
matter once and for all. There was simply no evidence that
Dominion’s machines had manipulated the result. But
President Trump would not accept this reality.
During the December 31st meeting, the President also raised
the prospect of seizing the voting machines. “Why don’t you
guys seize machines?” he asked.255 “You guys should seize
machines because there will be evidence,” Donoghue recalled
President Trump saying.256 Rosen pushed back, saying the DOJ
had no basis to seize voting machines from the States. They
needed a search warrant, but there was no evidence to
justify one.257 Rosen explained to President Trump again
that the DOJ has no responsibility for oversight, as the
States conduct the elections. Rosen added that to the extent
that any Federal agency is involved, it is the Department of
Homeland Security, which ensures “software selection and
quality control.” 258 At that point, the President called
Ken Cuccinelli.259 Donoghue recalled the President saying
something along the lines of, “Ken, the Acting Attorney
General is telling me it’s your job to seize machines.” 260
Rosen had said nothing of the sort, but Cuccinelli quickly
shot down the President’s line of inquiry, making it clear
that the Department of Homeland Security had no such
authority.261 White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was also in
attendance and supported the DOJ leadership throughout the
meeting.262
When Rosen spoke to Clark by phone on December 31st or
January 1st, Clark revealed that he had spoken to the
President again, despite previously promising Rosen and
Donoghue that he would inform them of any other contact that
he received from the White House.263 Clark told Rosen that
President Trump had offered Clark the position of Acting
Attorney General and asked him to respond by Monday, January
4th. Clark, however, said that he needed to do some “due
diligence” related to claims of election fraud before
deciding whether he would accept the President’s offer.264
4.13 January 2, 2021: Rosen and Donoghue Confront Clark
Again
On Saturday, January 2nd, Rosen and Donoghue attempted, once
again, to persuade Clark to stand down. The two reiterated
that Clark should stop meeting with the President.265
Donoghue reprimanded Clark, emphasizing that he was the boss
and that Clark’s ongoing contacts with the President were a
violation of DOJ’s White House contact policy.266 Clark
acknowledged that he had been briefed by the ODNI, as he had
requested, and “that there was nothing in that briefing that
would have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign
involvement.” 267 Nevertheless, Clark still wanted to send
his letter to Georgia and other contested States alleging
voter fraud.268
During the conversation, Clark confirmed President Trump had
offered him the position of Acting Attorney General.269
Clark told Rosen that he would decline the offer—if Rosen
and Donoghue signed his dishonest letter to officials in
Georgia.270 The two refused once again, making it clear
“that there was no way we were going to sign that
letter.” 271 Rosen reiterated his decision in an email on
the night of January 2nd, writing: “I confirmed again today
that I am not prepared to sign such a letter.” 272
That same day, President Trump attempted to coerce Georgia
Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger into manufacturing
enough votes to steal the election in that State. That call
is discussed in Chapter 2 of this report. But one part of it
deserves mention here. During that same call, President
Trump brought up BJay Pak, whom President Trump had
appointed as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
Georgia. President Trump referred to Pak as “your
never-Trumper U.S. attorney there.” 273 The implication was
that Pak was not doing enough to validate President Trump’s
fictitious claims of voter fraud. President Trump’s mention
of Pak proved to be ominous.
4.14 January 3, 2021: Clark Informs DOJ Leadership that He
Will Accept President Trump’s Offer
On January 3rd, Clark informed Rosen that he had decided to
accept the President’s offer to serve as the Acting Attorney
General. Clark offered Rosen the position of his deputy.274
Rosen thought that Clark’s offer was “preposterous” and
“nonsensical.” 275 Rosen told the Select Committee that
“there was no universe where I was going to do that to stay
on and support someone else doing things that were not
consistent with what I thought should be done.” 276 Donoghue
believed it was a done deal, and Clark would become the head
of DOJ. But Pat Cipollone told Rosen that it was “not a done
deal and that we should fight this out at the White
House.” 277
White House call logs from January 3rd show that President
Trump and Clark spoke four times that day starting at 6:59
a.m.278 The first three calls of the day, two in the morning
and one in the early afternoon, show that the President
spoke with “Mr. Jeffrey Clark.” 279 The final call between
the two of them, from 4:19 to 4:22 p.m., however, shows that
President Trump spoke to “Acting Attorney General Jeffrey
Clark,” suggesting that Clark had, in fact, accepted the
President’s offer.280
Acting Attorney General Rosen told the Select Committee that
he would have felt comfortable being replaced by either
Donoghue or Engel, but he did not “want for the Department
of Justice to be put in a posture where it would be doing
things that were not consistent with the truth, were not
consistent with its own appropriate role, or were not
consistent with the Constitution.” 281
As a result, Rosen took four immediate steps to try and
prevent Clark’s ascension to Attorney General. First, he
called Meadows and asked him to set up a meeting for that
evening with President Trump.282 Second, he spoke to
Cipollone, who told Rosen that Clark’s appointment was not
inevitable and that he would also be at the meeting that
evening to support Rosen and Donoghue.283 Third, Rosen
called Engel and asked him to come to DOJ headquarters so he
could attend the White House meeting.284 Finally, Rosen
asked Donoghue and another senior Department attorney named
Patrick Hovakimian to convene a meeting of the rest of the
Department’s leadership to describe the situation to them
and hear how they would react to Clark’s appointment.285
Hovakimian set up a conference call. Although some of the
Assistant Attorneys General were not able to participate in
the call, all of those who did agreed that they would resign
if Rosen were removed from office.286 Pat Hovakimian drafted
a resignation letter that read:
This evening, after Acting Attorney General Jeff Rosen over
the course of the last week repeatedly refused the
President’s direct instructions to utilize the Department of
Justice’s law enforcement powers for improper ends, the
President removed Jeff from the Department. PADAG Rich
Donoghue and I resign from the Department, effectively
immediately.287
Hovakimian never sent the letter because the threat of mass
resignations dissuaded President Trump from replacing Rosen.
Regardless, the letter stated a plain truth: President Trump
was trying to use DOJ for his own “improper ends.”
The January 3, 2021, Oval Office meeting
At Rosen’s request, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows
arranged a meeting with the President at 6:15 p.m. that
evening.288
Select Committee graphic
Select Committee graphic
We should pause to reflect on the timing and purpose of the
meeting. Congress was set to meet in a joint session in less
than 72 hours. The States had already certified their
electors. Former Vice President Biden was going to be
certified as the winner of the 2020 Presidential election.
There was no material dispute over Biden’s victory. Trump
and his lawyers had not produced any evidence of significant
fraud. Instead, they presented one nonsensical conspiracy
theory after another. The DOJ and FBI were forced to debunk
these claims—and they did.
None of this stopped President Trump’s effort to subvert
DOJ. Quite the opposite. The President pushed forward with a
plan to install Jeff Clark as the Acting Attorney General,
apparently to attempt to interfere with the certification of
the electoral college vote on January 6th. It is for this
reason Rosen requested an emergency meeting on January 3rd.
Before heading into the Oval Office, Rosen and Donoghue
discussed the possible leadership change with Cipollone and
Pat Philbin. “They were completely opposed to it,” Donoghue
explained.289 In fact, no one who attended the Oval Office
meeting supported the leadership change—other than Jeff
Clark.290 Donoghue didn’t initially join the meeting, but
the President soon called him in.291
During the meeting, Clark attempted to defend the
last-minute move to make him Acting Attorney General. Clark
said he would “conduct real investigations that would, in
his view, uncover widespread fraud.” 292 Clark declared that
this was the “last opportunity to sort of set things
straight with this defective election,” and he had the
“intelligence,” the “will,” and “desire” to “pursue these
matters in the way that the President thought most
appropriate.” 293 Everyone else quickly disagreed.294
President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do,
and both confirmed they would resign.295 Donoghue added that
theirs would not be the only resignations. “You should
understand that your entire Department leadership will
resign,” Donoghue recalled saying.296 This included every
Assistant Attorney General. “Mr. President, these aren’t
bureaucratic leftovers from another administration,”
Donoghue continued.297 “You picked them. This is your
leadership team. You sent every one of them to the Senate;
you got them confirmed.” 298 Donoghue argued that the
President would look bad in the wake of the mass
resignations. “What is that going to say about you, when we
all walk out at the same time?” 299 Donoghue recalled asking
the President. “And what happens if, within 48 hours, we
have hundreds of resignations from your Justice Department
because of your actions? What does that say about your
leadership?” 300 Steve Engel reinforced Donoghue’s point,
saying that Clark would be leading a “graveyard.” 301
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as
well, describing Clark’s letter as a “murder-suicide
pact.” 302 Cipollone warned that the letter would “damage
everyone who touches it” and no one should have anything to
do with it.303
Some of the participants in the meeting argued that Clark
was the wrong person for the job of Attorney General. Clark
attempted to defend his credentials, arguing that he had
been involved in complicated civil and environmental
litigation.304 “That’s right. You’re an environmental
lawyer,” Donoghue fired back.305 “How about you go back to
your office, and we’ll call you when there’s an oil
spill.” 306
The meeting lasted approximately 3 hours.307 Only toward the
end of the contentious affair did President Trump decide to
reverse his earlier decision to make Clark the Acting
Assistant Attorney General. Donoghue recalled President
Trump addressing Clark along the following lines:
I appreciate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you
being willing to suffer the abuse. But the reality is,
you’re not going to get anything done. These guys are going
to quit. Everyone else is going to resign. It’s going to be
a disaster. The bureaucracy will eat you alive. And no
matter how you want to get things done in the next few
weeks, you won’t be able to get it done, and it’s not going
to be worth the breakage.308
Clark tried to change President Trump’s mind, saying
“history is calling, this our opportunity” and “we can get
this done.” 309 But the President was clearly rattled by the
threat of mass defections and reiterated that the change
would not happen. President Trump then wondered what would
happen to Clark, and if Donoghue was going to fire him.
Donoghue explained that only the President had that
authority. That was the end of the matter. “And we all got
up and walked out of the Oval Office,” Donoghue recalled.310
But for one DOJ employee, the matter was not entirely
settled. During the January 3rd meeting in the Oval Office,
President Trump complained bitterly about BJay Pak, the U.S.
Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia.311 Barr had
tasked Pak with investigating the State Farm Arena video in
early December 2020. Like the FBI and Georgia State
officials, Pak concluded that nothing nefarious had
occurred. President Trump was dissatisfied.312
“No wonder nothing’s been found in Atlanta, because the U.S.
attorney there is a Never Trumper,” Donoghue recalled the
President saying.313 Donoghue objected, saying Pak had “been
doing his job.” 314 But the President insisted, pointing out
that Pak criticized him years earlier. “This guy is a Never
Trumper,” the President reiterated.315 “He should never have
been in my administration to begin with. How did this guy
end up in my administration?” 316 The President threatened
to fire Pak.317 When Donoghue pointed out that Pak was
already planning to resign the next day, a Monday, President
Trump insisted that it be Pak’s last day on the job.318 Pak
later confirmed to Donoghue that he would be leaving the
next day.319
President Trump asked if those in attendance at the Oval
Office meeting knew Bobby Christine, who was the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia.320 Even
though Pak had a first assistant, who was next in line for
Pak’s job upon his resignation, President Trump wanted
Christine to take the role.321 Christine did take over for
Pak, but he did not find any evidence of fraud either. It
was Donoghue’s impression that Christine “concluded that the
election matters . . . were handled appropriately.” 322
Later in the evening of January 3rd, President Trump called
Donoghue to pass along yet another conspiracy theory.323 The
President had heard that an ICE agent outside of Atlanta was
in custody of a truck filled with shredded ballots.324
Donoghue explained that ICE agents are part of the
Department of Homeland Security, so the matter would be
under that Department’s purview. President Trump asked
Donoghue to inform Ken Cuccinelli.325 That story—like all
the others—turned out to be fiction when DOJ investigators
evaluated the claim. The truck was carrying shredded
ballots, but they were from a previous election. The old
ballots had been shredded to make room for storing ballots
from the 2020 election.326
4.15 President Trump’s Unprecedented Attempt to Subvert the
DOJ
The most senior DOJ officials at the end of President
Trump’s term stopped him from co-opting America’s leading
law enforcement agency for his own corrupt purposes. Recall
that Attorney General Barr commented “you can’t live in a
world where the incumbent administration stays in power
based on its view, unsupported by specific evidence, that
the election—that there was fraud in the election.327
Richard Donoghue concluded that Jeffrey Clark’s letter “may
very well have spiraled us into a constitutional
crisis.” 328
Jeffrey Rosen summed up his short time as the Acting
Attorney General like this:
[D]uring my tenure, we appointed no special prosecutors, we
sent no letters to States or State legislators disputing the
election outcome; we made no public statements saying the
election was corrupt and should be overturned; we initiated
no Supreme Court actions, nor filed or joined any other
lawsuits calling into question the legitimacy of our
election and institutions.329
President Trump attempted to get DOJ to do each of those
things.
ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8. The Select Committee recognizes
and appreciates the investigation conducted by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary and the report it issued about
this Chapter’s topic. See Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
117th Cong. 1st sess., Subverting Justice: How the Former
President and His Allies Pressured DOJ to Overturn the 2020
Election, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8; See Margaret Talev, “Exclusive:
Dem Group Warns of Apparent Trump Election Day Landslide,”
Axios, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at
https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios.
3. See Chapter 1.
4. See Chapter 1.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8–9.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8–9.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8–9.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8–9.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 23.
11. Richard C. Pilger, ed., “Federal Prosecution of Election
Offenses: Eighth Edition,” Department of Justice (December
2017), p. 84, available at
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download.
12. Richard C. Pilger, ed., “Federal Prosecution of Election
Offenses: Eighth Edition,” Department of Justice (December
2017), p. 84 available at
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download. The
DOJ further advises that “federal law enforcement personnel
should carefully evaluate whether an investigative step
under consideration has the potential to affect the election
itself.” The department’s concern is that “[s]tarting a
public criminal investigation of alleged election fraud
before the election to which the allegations pertain has
been concluded runs the obvious risk of chilling legitimate
voting and campaign activities.” Moreover, “[i]t also runs
the significant risk of interjecting the investigation
itself as an issue, both in the campaign and in the
adjudication of any ensuing election contest.” Id.
13. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000616-617 (November 9,
2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).
14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000616-617 (November 9,
2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).
15. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000616-617 (November 9,
2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 18–19.
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 19–20.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 20.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 22.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 22–23.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 22–23.
37. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
38. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
39. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
40. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
41. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 4:20, Nov.
29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox
News, “Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview
Since the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
42. “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on
Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 4:25, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
43. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
44. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
45. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
46. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
47. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald
Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29,
2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News,
“Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First Interview Since
the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis
Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First
TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,”
CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
48. Fox News, “Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First
Interview Since the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68;
“Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox
News - November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available
at ; Fox News, “Trump Asks, ‘Where’s Durham?’ During First
Interview Since the Election,” YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68;
see also Alexis Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave
Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was
Filled with Lies,” CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.https://vimeo.com/485180163;
see also Alexis Benveniste, “Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo Gave
Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was
Filled with Lies,” CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.
49. Michael Balsamo, “Disputing Trump, Barr Says No
Widespread Election Fraud,” Associated Press, (Dec. 1, 2020,
updated June 28, 2022), available at
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50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23–24. Also attending the
meeting were Pat Cipollone (Chief White House Counsel to the
President), Pat Philbin (Deputy White House Counsel to the
President), Eric Herschmann, and Barr’s chief of staff, Will
Levi. Id.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23–24.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23–24.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23–24.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23–24.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24–25.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25–26.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 11, 25–26.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25–26.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25–26.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
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William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 26–28.
71. “Campaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020
Election Results,” C-SPAN, Dec. 2, 2020, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-2020-election-results;
“Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript
December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
72. “Campaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020
Election Results,” C-SPAN, Dec. 2, 2020, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-2020-election-results;
“Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript
December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
73. “Campaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020
Election Results,” C-SPAN, Dec. 2, 2020, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-2020-election-results;
“Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript
December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
Trump said: “Here’s an example. This is Michigan. At 6:31 in
the morning, a vote dump of 149,772 votes came in
unexpectedly. We were winning by a lot. That batch was
received in horror. We have a company that’s very suspect.
Its name is Dominion. With the turn of a dial or the change
of a chip, you can press a button for Trump and the vote
goes to Biden. What kind of a system is this?” Id.
74. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,”
YouTube, at 1:56:30 - 1:57:15, 5:29:20 - 5:32:45, Dec. 3,
2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
75. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,”
YouTube, at 1:56:30 - 1:57:15, 5:29:20 - 5:32:45, Dec. 3,
2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
76. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate Election Hearing,”
YouTube, at 0:33:30 - 0:58:00, Dec. 3, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw. The Trump
campaign also shared the video online. Donald J Trump,
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from Under a Table AFTER Poll Workers Left,” YouTube, Dec.
3, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVP_60Hm4P8.
77. Gabriel Sterling (@GabrielSterling), Twitter, Dec. 4,
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At the time, Gabe Sterling was the Chief Operating Officer
in the Georgia Secretary of State’s Office.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022),
available at
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79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
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80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Byung
Jin Pak, (May 19, 2022), p. 19.
81. “Read William Barr’s Resignation Letter to President
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82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 65–66.
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 28.
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 28.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 28–30.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 30.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 32.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 32.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 39–40.
90. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000425,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000426,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000429 (December 14,
2020, email from Molly Michael to Jeffrey Rosen subject
“From POTUS” with two attachments).
91. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000425,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000426,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000429 (December 14,
2020, email from Molly Michael to Jeffrey Rosen subject
“From POTUS” with two attachments).
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 32–33.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
96. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed
Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), at p. 34,
available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080
(December 21, 2020, WAVES visitor records).
98. Mark Meadows (@MarkMeadows), Twitter, Dec. 21, 2020 6:03
pm, available at
https://twitter.com/MarkMeadows/status/1341157317451124745.
99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (WAVES
visitor records for December 21, 2020).
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael,
(March 24, 2022), pp. 205–06; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000009364_0001 (December 21 and 22, 2020 email chain
between Molly Michael and Jeffrey Clark discussing a
December 22, 2020 meeting at the White House); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000009365_0001 (December 22, 2020 email
from Molly Michael to staff regarding a meeting at 6 p.m. in
the Yellow Oval with Jeffrey Clark and another guest);
Jonathan Tamari & Chris Brennan, “Pa. Congressman Scott
Perry Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center
of Election Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021),
available at
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 52–53.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 117th sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 55–56, 78.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 55–56.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 53–55.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (May 11, 2009,
memorandum laying out the policy for “Communications with
the White House and Congress”).
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26,
2020, text message from Rep. Perry to Mark Meadows).
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM0140100 (December 26,
2020, text message from Rep. Perry to Mark Meadows).
114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014101 (December 26,
2020, text message from Mark Meadows to Rep. Perry).
115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014102-014103,
MM014178.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47–48.
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000735.
118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000735; Ryan Deto,
“Sen. Mastriano and Former State Rep. Saccone among Trump
Supporters who Occupied U.S. Capitol,” Pittsburgh City
Paper, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/sen-mastriano-and-former-state-rep-saccone-among-trump-supporters-who-occupied-us-capitol/Content?oid=18690728;
Erin Bamer, “Mastriano Defends Protest Appearance; Other GOP
Lawmakers Say Little,” York Dispatch, (Jan. 7, 2021),
available at
https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/2021/01/07/mastriano-at-no-point-did-he-storm-us-capitol/6579049002/.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-50; see also
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000735.
120. Dan Geiter, “Rally to ‘Stop the Steal’ of the 2020
Election” PennLive, (Nov. 5, 2020) available at
https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/.
121. See, e.g., Scott Perry for Congress, “#StopTheSteal,”
Facebook, November 6, 2020, available at
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=406418637058079.
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47–48, 53.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
126. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in
Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting
Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec.
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127. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in
Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting
Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec.
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128. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in
Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting
Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec.
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129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice
Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue
about call with President Trump).
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/january6th.
131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.
132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice
Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue
about call with President Trump).
133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 55-56; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000741 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60–61.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60–61.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60–61.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54–55; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58. Trump also
mentioned the possibility of the DOJ saying the “election is
corrupt or suspect or not reliable” during a public press
conference. “We told him we were not going to do that,”
Donoghue explained. Id. at p. 59.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739,
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 61.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
160. Donoghue testified before the Select Committee: “There
were isolated instances of fraud. None of them came close to
calling into question the outcome of the election in any
individual state.” Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June
23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27,
2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call
with President Trump).
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 65.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-75.
166. Dan Gleiter, “Rally to ‘Stop the Steal’ of the 2020
Election,” Penn Live, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at
https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/.
167. Letter from the Office of Rep. Lance Gooden and Signed
by 26 other Members of Congress to the President of the
United States, Dec. 9, 2020, available at
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000176-4701-d52c-ad7e-d7fdbfe50000.
168. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief by U.S.
Representative Mike Johnson and 125 other Members, Texas v.
Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (Dec. 10, 2020) (No. 155,
Orig.), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163550/20201211132250339_Texas%20v.%20Pennsylvania%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20126%20Representatives%20--%20corrected.pdf.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72–73; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27,
2020, handwritten notes). Donoghue’s handwritten notes from
the call are dated Dec. 28, 2020, but he confirmed the call
took place on Dec. 27.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72–73; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27,
2020, handwritten notes).
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72–73; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, (Dec. 27,
2020, handwritten notes).
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 73; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27,
2020, handwritten notes).
173. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000001 -
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000018.
174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000008.
175. RepScottPerry (@RepScotPerry), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020
6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/RepScottPerry/status/1343693703664308225.
176. See Chapter 1.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 74–75.
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75–76.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75–76.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75–76.
181. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
182. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28,
2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
185. See National Intelligence Council, Intelligence
Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections, (Mar. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2192-intelligence-community-assessment-on-foreign-threats-to-the-2020-u-s-federal-elections
(declassified version of a January 7, 2021, report to
President Trump, senior Executive Branch officials, and
Congressional leadership). The report concluded, among other
things, “We have no indications that any foreign actor
attempted to alter any technical aspect of the voting
process in the 2020 US elections, including voter
registration, casting ballots, vote tabulation, or reporting
results.”
186. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
187. Zachary Cohen & Sara Murray, “New Details Shed Light on
Ways Mark Meadows Pushed Federal Agencies to Pursue Dubious
Election Claims,” CNN, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/02/politics/mark-meadows-election-fraud-liaison/index.html;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022) at pp. 168–69.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
189. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
190. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
191. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
192. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
193. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
194. See Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the Trump Campaign’s
efforts to overturn the results of the election in contested
states and have fake Electoral College electors submit fake
votes to Congress.
195. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
196. See Chapter 2 for additional information on these
hearings.
197. See Chapter 2; see also Ga. Const., art. V, § 2, ¶ VII.
198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
199. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 –
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.
200. See Chapter 2.
201. See Chapter 3.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark,
(Feb 2, 2022), pp. 24–27.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 101–03.
204. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman production), Chapman061893 (January 1,
2021, emails between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); see
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon
Production, July 1, 2022) (showing five calls between John
Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from January 1, 2021, through
January 8, 2021).
205. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 182. The Select
Committee questioned, and sought documents from, Klukowski
about his interactions with Eastman and others related to
the 2020 election and the January 6th joint session of
Congress. Klukowski, however, objected to certain questions,
and withheld a number of relevant communications, on the
basis of attorney-client privilege, work product, or the
First Amendment, including communications that he had with
Eastman. For example, on December 9th, before Klukowski
joined the Department of Justice, he sent an email to
Eastman with an attachment of draft talking points arguing
that state legislators in states where Biden won could
disregard the election results and appoint electors for
Trump. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman028219,
Chapman028220 (December 9, 2020, email from Klukowski to
Eastman, attaching memo). Those same talking points were
circulated the same day among Ken Blackwell, Ed Meese, John
Eastman, Jason Miller, Alan Dershowitz, and Chief of Staff
Mark Meadows with Blackwell’s comment, “A constitutional
road map to victory and DJT’s reelection! It’s a matter of
political will and courage to do the right thing.” See
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman
University Production), Chapman027943, Chapman027944
(Klukowski was not included on the email from Blackwell, but
his talking points were attached). During his deposition
with the Select Committee, Klukowski said that the document
containing the talking points looked like a document he had
drafted, but asserted attorney-client privilege when asked
certain questions asked about the document. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (June 10, 2022), pp. 27-29. The Select Committee
also obtained from a source other than Klukowski an email
sent to him, Eastman, Rep. Louis Gohmert’s Chief of Staff,
and others on December 28th with the subject line “VP
Briefing on 1/6/21 Meeting” and a message from Edward
Corrigan that said, “I believe the VP and his staff would
benefit greatly from a briefing by John and Ken” but
cautioned to “make sure we don’t overexpose Ken given his
new position.” See Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman056164 (December 28, 2020, email to Klukowski and
others). Klukowski said he never participated in such a
briefing, but Eastman did in the days leading up to January
6th and encouraged the Vice President to prevent or delay
the certification of the presidential election during the
joint session of Congress. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (June 10, 2022),
pp. 50–57; see also Chapter 5 about Eastman and his
communications with the Vice President. As described here,
Klukowski drafted the letter for Clark that included
discussions about state legislatures, Electoral College
electors, and the joint session of Congress.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 17.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 23; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice
Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-12142021-000104.
Klukowski’s first day on the job was December 15th. When
asked why he would be willing to start a job on December
15th that would end by January 20th, Klukowski said that he
had been trying to get to the Department of Justice for
several months, he was “hopeful” that he could “get as many
medals on my chest as possible during that short period of
time,” and “given that it was going to cross the New Year’s
dateline, [he] figured [his] resume would say Department of
Justice 2020 and 2021,” enabling him to get into an
interview for future jobs before a future employer “would
find out how few of days in each of those calendar years we
were actually talking about.” Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021),
pp. 30, 41.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 65–66.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 71–73.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth
Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 66, 75–76.
211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28,
2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
212. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28,
2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
213. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28,
2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
214. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28,
2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing
Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosen’s reply to Donoghue).
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 81–82.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 83.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (Department of
Justice policy),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000685 (White House
policy).
220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 27–28.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 86–87; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey
Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 79–80, 91–92, 132–33.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 91–93, 132–33.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 87; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey
Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 91–93, 132–33.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 88–89; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000678 (January 1,
2021, email from Mark Meadows to Jeffrey Rosen with link to
YouTube video); Brad Johnson, “Rome, Satellites, Servers: an
Update,” YouTube, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210102201919/https:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=YwtbK5XXAMk&feature=youtu.be
(archived) (showing the conspiracy Meadows asked DOJ to
investigate).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 88-90.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 89.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 90-91.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 87, 91-92;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000708 (December 31,
2020, email from Steven Engel to Richard Donoghue attaching
“U.S. v. Penn OJ suit”).
231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000708 -
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (December 31,
2020, email from Steven Engel to Richard Donoghue attaching
“U.S. v. Penn OJ suit” re: one pager, with document titled
“Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the
Supreme Court”); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp.
91–92.
232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (Document
titled “Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit
in the Supreme Court”).
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (Document
titled “Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit
in the Supreme Court”).
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (Document
titled “Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit
in the Supreme Court”).
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certificationevents-07262021-000709 (Document
titled “Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit
in the Supreme Court”).
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-Certificationevents-07262021-000709 (Document
titled “Evaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit
in the Supreme Court”). The memo cites “United States v.
Texas” although it likely refers to the case filed by Texas
and rejected by the Supreme Court, Texas v. Pennsylvania.
See Order Dismissing Bill of Complaint and Denying
Certiorari, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ___, (Dec. 11,
2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 33.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 87, 91–92
(noting the Department’s limited authority relative to
United States v. Pennsylvania); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
(summarizing the many times Department officials told the
President about the limited authority to take actions
related to the election).
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96–97.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96–97.
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96–97.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96–97.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 106.
244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 106.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 107.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 107.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 107–08.
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.
252. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 108–09.
253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 108–09.
254. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in
Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting
Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec.
17, 2020), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109–10.
259. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 110.
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 110.
261. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109–10.
262. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109–11.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey
Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 72–73.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey
Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 72–73.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 113–14.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 111–15.
270. Rosen confirmed this during testimony before the Select
Committee. “ADAM KINZINGER: So in that meeting did Mr. Clark
say he would turn down the President’s offer if you reversed
your position and signed the letter? JEFFREY A. ROSEN: Yes.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
272. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2,
2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue re: Two
Urgent Action Items).
273. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript);
Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript
and Audio of the Call between Trump and Raffensperger,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117–18; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117–18; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117–18; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 118.
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001
- 076P-R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House
Presidential Call Log).
279. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001
- 076P-R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House
Presidential Call Log).
280. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001
– 076P-R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House
Presidential Call Log).
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 118; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (“And so
it was unanimous; everyone was going to resign if Jeff Rosen
was removed from the seat,” Donoghue explained). The only
exception was John Demers, the Assistant Attorney General
for the National Security Division. Donohue encouraged
Demers to stay on because he didn’t want to further
jeopardize national security. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue,
(Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 119–20.
287. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000729 (January 3,
2021, Resignation Letter by Patrick Hovakimian).
288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 121–22; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
289. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 122.
290. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 127. “It was
definitely a consensus. We were all on the same page except
for Jeff Clark,” Donoghue said. Id. The Oval Office meeting
attendees include Jeffrey Rosen, Richard Donoghue, Pat
Cipollone, Pat Philbin, Eric Herschmann, Steve Engel, Jeff
Clark and President Trump. See id., at 123.
291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 122.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 124–25.
295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
296. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126–27.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 133.
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131–32.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 132.
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 132.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 129–31.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Byung
Jin Pak, (May 19, 2022), pp. 11–19.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129–30.
319. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 134–35.
320. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 130.
321. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 130.
322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 135–36.
323. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 133–34.
324. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 133–34.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 134.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 134–37.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 66.
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 8–9.
5
“A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY”
On the morning of January 6, 2021, Vice President Michael R.
Pence gathered his staff to pray. Vice President Pence and
his closest advisors knew the day ahead “would be a
challenging one.” 1 They asked God for “guidance and wisdom”
in the hours to come.2 No Republican had been more loyal to
President Donald J. Trump throughout his turbulent
presidency than Vice President Pence. The Vice President
rarely, if ever, criticized his boss. But as January 6th
approached, President Trump turned on his own Vice
President.
President Trump was desperate. As described in the previous
chapters, the President was searching for a way to stay in
power. He had lost the election to former Vice President
Biden. He had run out of legal options to overturn the
election weeks earlier, when his lawyers lost nearly every
court challenge they filed.
The President pursued other means as well. President Trump
and his lawyers tried to convince State and local officials
to overturn the election, but they met resistance. Those
same officials would not break the law or violate their oath
to the Constitution. President Trump and his associates
tried to convince State legislatures to replace the
legitimate electors won by former Vice President Biden with
Trump electors. The Trump Campaign even convened their own
fake electors who submitted false electoral votes to
Washington. But those efforts failed, too.
President Trump also attempted to use the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for his own corrupt political purposes.
President Trump offered the job of Acting Attorney General
to a loyalist. He wanted this same DOJ official, Jeffrey
Clark, to send a letter to several States suggesting that
they should certify the fake electors convened by the Trump
Campaign. President Trump’s effort to subvert the DOJ came
to a head on January 3rd, when the Department’s senior
personnel and lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office
threatened mass resignations if Clark was installed.
At that point, theories about a role the Vice President
could play at the joint session had been circulating in
certain corners of the internet and among Trump-supporting
attorneys.3 President Trump focused his attention on the man
who had loyally served by his side for four years.
On January 4, 2021, President Trump summoned Vice President
Pence to a meeting in the Oval Office with John Eastman, a
law professor representing President Trump in litigation
challenging the election result. Eastman argued, on
President Trump’s behalf, that the Vice President could take
matters into his own hands during the joint session on
January 6th. Eastman offered Vice President Pence two
options. First, the Vice President could unilaterally reject
the certified electors from several States won by former
Vice President Biden, thereby handing the presidency to
President Trump. Or, according to Eastman, Vice President
Pence could delay the joint session to give State
legislatures the opportunity to certify new electors loyal
to the President. Eastman admitted, in front of the
president, that both options violated the Electoral Count
Act of 1887, the statute that sets forth the process for
counting and disputing electoral votes during the joint
session.4 Eastman admitted as much in a subsequent
conversation with the Vice President’s staff as well.5
Therefore, President Trump knew, or should have known, that
this scheme was illegal—in fact, it violated the Electoral
Count Act and the U.S. Constitution. President Trump
repeatedly demanded that Vice President Pence go through
with it anyway.
Vice President Pence rejected President Trump’s demands
“many times” on January 4th and in the days that followed.6
Vice President Pence correctly pointed out that he had no
power to take any action other than counting the certified
electoral votes. America’s founders could not possibly have
contemplated a scenario in which the Vice President could
unilaterally reject electoral votes and decide the outcome
of a Presidential election. However, instead of backing
down, President Trump ratcheted up the pressure even
further, relentlessly harassing Vice President Pence both in
public and in private.
President Trump used his bully pulpit, at rallies and on
Twitter, to lie to his supporters. President Trump told them
that Vice President Pence had the power to deliver another 4
years in the White House. It was not true. President Trump’s
campaign of coercion became so intense that Marc Short, Vice
President Pence’s Chief of Staff, alerted the head of the
Vice President’s Secret Service detail to the impending
danger. On January 5th, Short warned that as the
“disagreements” between President Trump and Vice President
Pence “became more public, that the president would lash out
in some way.” 7
Indeed, President Trump did. And those around him recognized
that his lashing out at the Vice President could have
disastrous consequences. On the morning of January 6th, an
agent in the Secret Service’s intelligence division was
alerted to online chatter “regarding the VP being a dead man
walking if he doesn’t do the right thing.” 8 A few minutes
later, another agent made a comment that turned out to be an
ominous prediction: “I saw several other alerts saying they
will storm the [C]apitol if he [the Vice President] doesn’t
do the right thing etc.” 9
During his speech at the Ellipse on January 6th, President
Trump repeatedly pointed his finger at Vice President Pence.
President Trump insisted that “if Mike Pence does the right
thing, we win the election.” 10 President Trump added: “And
Mike Pence is going to have to come through for us, and if
he doesn’t, that will be a, a sad day for our country
because you’re sworn to uphold our Constitution.” 11
President Trump’s scheme required Vice President Pence to
break his oath to the Constitution, not uphold it. By the
time President Trump spoke at the Ellipse, he also knew that
Vice President Pence had no intention of overturning the
election.
President Trump then sent a mob to the U.S. Capitol. He did
so even after being informed by the Secret Service that
people in the crowd possessed weapons. He wanted his
supporters to intimidate Vice President Pence and any other
Republican who refused his demands. The President told the
crowd assembled before him to march down Pennsylvania
Avenue, to “our Republicans, the weak ones” at the U.S.
Capitol, “to try and give them the kind of pride and
boldness that they need to take back our country.” 12
The mob overran the U.S. Capitol in short order. At 2:24
p.m., while the attack was well underway, President Trump
tweeted:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have
been done to protect our Country and our Constitution,
giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts,
not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked
to previously certify. USA demands the truth!13
Again, the opposite was true. Vice President Pence showed
courage on January 6th. The Vice President refused to be
intimidated by President Trump’s mob, even as chants of
“Hang Mike Pence!” echoed throughout the halls of the U.S.
Capitol and a makeshift gallows was constructed on the
Capitol grounds.14
It is no mystery why the mob turned on Vice President Pence.
President Trump told his supporters that the election was
stolen, and that Vice President Pence had the power, but
lacked the courage, to fix it. None of this was true.
President Trump and Vice President Pence have both reflected
on the events of January 6th in the months since then. Vice
President Pence has described President Trump’s demands as
“un-American.” 15 President Trump has since insisted that
Vice President Pence “could have overturned the
Election!” 16 Asked about the calls to hang the Vice
President, President Trump said it was “common sense.” 17
In early 2022, U.S. District Judge David Carter evaluated
the Trump-Eastman scheme to pressure the Vice President.
Judge Carter described it as “a campaign to overturn a
democratic election, an action unprecedented in American
history.” 18 It was “a coup in search of a legal theory,”
Judge Carter found, that likely violated at least two
Federal laws.19 The Trump-Eastman scheme was not a feature
of the U.S. Constitution, as President Trump told his
supporters. Instead, it “would have permanently ended the
peaceful transition of power, undermining American democracy
and the Constitution.” 20
And it all began because President Trump refused to accept
the result of the election, expressed through the votes of
81 million Americans.
5.1 President Trump and His Allies Embark on a Desperate
Gambit to Block Certification of the 2020 Presidential
Election.
The Intellectual Framework for the Theory that the Vice
President Could Change the Outcome of the Election at the
Joint Session Emerged from Discussions Among the Lawyers
Working with the Trump Campaign After the 2020 Election.
When the electoral college met to cast votes for the
certified winner in each State on December 14, 2020, any
possibility of President Trump reversing his defeat came to
an end. The contest was decided well before then, but
December 14th marked what should have been the formal end of
the Trump campaign. Former Vice President Biden had won the
election and his victory was cemented by the States’
electoral votes. Instead of bowing to this reality, some
pro-Trump lawyers had already begun scheming ways to deny
the inevitable. Over the course of the post-election period,
as their other plans each failed, the importance of January
6th and the need to pressure Vice President Pence increased.
These same lawyers concluded that the Vice President could
help President Trump subvert the election on January 6th,
but they would need Vice President Pence to set aside
history and the law to do so. They’d need him to violate the
Electoral Count Act of 1887 (“the ECA”). The ECA had
governed the joint session for 130 years, but it was an
inconvenient barrier for President Trump’s plan to stay in
office.
Kenneth Chesebro Articulated a “President of the Senate”
Strategy in Early December, When the Trump Campaign was
Convening “Alternate” Electors in Key States President Trump
Lost.
On December 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro, a pro-Trump lawyer,
sent a memo to Rudolph Giuliani, the President’s lead
outside counsel, upon request from Trump Campaign official
Boris Epshteyn.21 Chesebro laid out a “‘President of the
Senate’ strategy,” arguing that the “President of the
Senate” (“he, and he alone”) is charged with “making
judgments about what to do if there are conflicting
votes.” 22 Chesebro argued that when the joint session met
on January 6th, the President of the Senate should not count
Arizona’s electoral college votes for former Vice President
Biden, “[b]ecause there are two slates of votes.” 23 Of
course, there were not two legitimate “slates of votes” from
Arizona. There were the official electors, certified by the
State, and a group of fake electors convened by the Trump
campaign.
Chesebro’s memo set President Trump’s pressure campaign on a
course to target the Vice President on January 6.24 Judge
Carter found that the “draft memo pushed a strategy that
knowingly violated the Electoral Count Act” and “is both
intimately related to and clearly advanced the plan to
obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6,
2021.” 25 That plan was also advanced by John Eastman.26
On December 23, John Eastman Drafted the First of His Two
“January 6th Scenario” Memos, Articulating the Argument that
Under the Constitution the Vice President is the “Ultimate
Arbiter.”
On December 23, 2020, Eastman wrote a two-page memo
summarizing ways to ensure that “President Trump is
re-elected.” 27 Eastman suggested that Vice President Pence
could refuse to count the electoral college votes from seven
States: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. According to Eastman, Vice
President Pence could simply reject these States’ electoral
college votes. At that point, President Trump would have 232
electoral college votes compared to former Vice President
Biden’s 222. This was sufficient, in Eastman’s view, to
guarantee President Trump’s victory, because he would have a
majority of the electoral college votes. “Pence then gavels
President Trump as re-elected,” Eastman wrote.
Eastman considered the possibility that Democrats in
Congress would object, stating the plain truth that 270
electoral college votes are necessary to win. In that event,
according to Eastman, the election could be sent to the
House of Representatives.28 The Republican-majority of
delegations in the House would then re-elect Trump as
president. Eastman concluded: “The main thing here is that
Pence should do this without asking for permission—either
from a vote of the joint session or from the Court. . . .
The fact is that the Constitution assigns this power to the
Vice President as the ultimate arbiter. We should take all
of our actions with that in mind.” 29
From the start, President Trump was looped in on Eastman’s
proposal. The same day Eastman started preparing the memo,
he sent an email to President Trump’s assistant Molly
Michael, at 1:32 p.m.: “Is the President available for a
very quick call today at some point? Just want to update him
on our overall strategic thinking.” 30 Only five minutes
later, Eastman received a call from the White House
switchboard; according to his phone records, the
conversation lasted for almost 23 minutes.31
Eastman Changed His Evaluation of the 12th Amendment, and
the Role of the Vice President, After President Trump Lost
the Election.
In Eastman’s theory, which was the foundation of President
Trump’s January 6th plot, the Vice President of the United
States is the “ultimate arbiter” and could unilaterally
decide the victor of the 2020 Presidential election.32
However, just before the 2020 presidential election, Eastman
had acknowledged in writing that the Vice President had no
such expansive power.
In the course of a lengthy exchange of ideas and emails
throughout the pre- and post-election period with an
individual named Bruce Colbert, Eastman provided comments on
a letter Colbert was drafting to President Trump.33 The
draft letter purported to provide recommendations of
“crucial legal actions” for the Trump Campaign to take “to
help secure your election victory as President of the United
States.” 34 One of the draft letter’s recommendations was
that “the President of the Senate decides authoritatively
what ‘certificates’ from the states to ‘open.’” In response,
Eastman wrote on October 17, 2020, “I don’t agree with this”
and continued, “[t]he 12th Amendment only says that the
President of the Senate opens the ballots in the joint
session and then, in the passive voice, that the votes shall
then be counted. 3 USC § 12 says merely that he is the
presiding officer, and then it spells out specific
procedures, presumptions, and default rules for which slates
will be counted. Nowhere does it suggest that the President
of the Senate gets to make the determination on his own. §
15 doesn’t, either.” 35
By the first week of December, Eastman’s correspondence with
this same individual illustrates that he was open to
advocating for the very point he had rejected before the
election—that is, that “the 12th Amendment confers
dispositive authority on the President of the Senate to
decide which slate to count.” 36 And on December 5, 2020,
Eastman wrote to Colbert, “I have spoken directly with folks
at the top of the chain of command on this. They are now
aware of the issues.” 37
The emails also signaled another idea that Eastman would
continue to repeat in the coming weeks: that the Vice
President could act without getting permission from a court.
Specifically, he argued that they could take the position
that the Vice President’s authority was a “non-justiciable
political question”—in other words, that Vice President
Pence could just act, and no court would have jurisdiction
to rule on the issue.38 As Eastman’s emails later in the
month make clear, he thought there was an important reason
to keep this issue out of the courts—they would rule that
the theory was unlawful.
Eastman’s “January 6 Scenario” Clearly Required the Vice
President to Violate the Electoral Count Act, the Federal
Law Governing the Certification of Presidential Elections.
There are other parts of Eastman’s two-page December 23rd
memo worthy of attention. Eastman wrote that Vice President
Pence could recuse himself from presiding over the joint
session of Congress on January 6th. In that event, the
session would be overseen by the Senate President Pro
Tempore, Senator Charles Grassley. Eastman was clearly
arguing that Vice President Pence (or Senator Grassley)
should violate the Electoral Count Act. “When he gets to
Arizona, he announces that he has multiple slates of
electors, and so is going to defer decision on that until
finishing the other States,” Eastman wrote.39 “This would be
the first break with the procedure set out in the Act.” 40
This “break” with “procedure” that Eastman’s memo was openly
advocating for was in other words the Vice President
breaking the law. When Chesebro read Eastman’s memo, he
commented favorably, declaring it “[r]eally awesome.” 41
At this point, Eastman continued, Congress would likely
follow the “process” set forth in the Electoral Count Act,
and “the two houses [would] break into their separate
chambers” for debate.42 But Eastman advised “we should not
allow the Electoral Count Act constraint on debate to
control” and the Trump team “should demand normal rules
(which includes the filibuster).” 43 Eastman thought this
would create a “stalemate,” giving “the state legislatures
more time to weigh in to formally support the alternate
slate of electors, if they had not already done so.” 44 As
discussed previously in this report, at the time he drafted
this memo—and throughout the post-election period—Eastman,
Giuliani, President Trump and others were simultaneously
working to replace certified electors for former Vice
President Biden in certain States. Eastman, Giuliani, and
President Trump all pressured State legislators to name
their own separate electors or to certify the campaign’s
fake electors.
Eastman’s Theory was—in the Words of President Trump’s
Senior White House and Campaign Officials—“Insane,” “Crazy,”
“Nutty” and it Would Never Practically Work.
Eric Herschmann, an attorney working for President Trump in
the White House, met with Eastman to discuss his memo.
Herschmann thought Eastman’s plan was “crazy.” Herschmann
summarized the conversation to the Select Committee:
And I said to him, hold on a second, I want to understand
what you’re saying. You’re saying you believe the Vice
President, acting as President of the Senate, can be the
sole decisionmaker as to, under your theory, who becomes the
next President of the United States? And he said, yes. And I
said, are you out of your F’ing mind, right? And that was
pretty blunt. I said, you’re completely crazy. You’re going
to turn around and tell 78 plus million people in this
country that your theory is, this is how you’re going to
invalidate their votes because you think the election was
stolen? I said, they’re not going to tolerate that. I said,
you’re going to cause riots in the streets. And he said
words to the effect of there’s been violence in this history
of our country to protect the democracy or to protect the
[R]epublic.45
As recounted by Herschmann, Eastman was shockingly
unconcerned with the prospect of violence should Vice
President Pence follow his and President Trump’s recommended
course.
Herschmann asked a straightforward question—if the States
wanted to recertify their electors, then why weren’t they
doing it themselves? “Why aren’t they already coming into
session and saying, we want to change the [S]tates, and why
do you need the VP to go down this path[?]” 46 Eastman had
no response. In addition to being “crazy,” Herschmann
“didn’t think there was any chance in the world” that
Eastman’s plan “could work.” 47
Herschmann pressed Eastman further, asking if he had “any
precedent at all for the VP or anyone acting in the capacity
as the President of the Senate declaring some statute
invalid.” 48 Eastman replied “no,” but argued that “these
are unprecedented times.” 49 Herschmann was unimpressed,
calling this a “ridiculous” answer.50
White House Counsel Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone thought
the Eastman plan was “nutty.” 51 Trump Campaign official
Jason Miller testified that the Campaign’s General Counsel,
Matt Morgan, and Deputy Campaign Manager, Justin Clark,
thought Eastman was “crazy,” understood that there was “no
validity to [his theory] in any way, shape, or form,” and
shared their views with “anyone who would listen.” 52
The Vice President’s Conclusion that He Did Not Have the
Ability to Affect the Outcome of the Election
Vice President Pence’s counsel, Greg Jacob, was
simultaneously researching the role of the Vice President
during the joint session. The Office of the Vice President
produced a preliminary staff memo on the subject on October
26, 2020.53 Jacob then discussed the matter with Marc Short
on election day or the day before.
This wasn’t the first time Jacob would be required to write
a memo about the Vice President’s role in the electoral
process. Before the election, Short explained to him that
some in the White House were encouraging President Trump to
prematurely declare victory on election night.54 Of course,
that is exactly what President Trump did. Jacob and Short
wanted to avoid the Vice President getting drawn in to any
such declarations, and Jacob pointed to his role in
presiding over the counting of the electoral votes on
January 6th as a reason not to. Jacob sent a memo to Short
on election day reflecting this advice.55
Then, on December 7, 2020, the Lincoln Project aired a
provocative ad taunting President Trump, saying that Vice
President Pence “Will Put the Nail in Your Political Coffin”
during the joint session on January 6th.56 This prompted a
discussion between Jacob and Vice President Pence.57 Jacob
authored another memo, dated December 8, 2020.58 Jacob
continued researching the Vice President’s role during the
joint session into early January. Jacob told the Select
Committee that his view of the matter was not fully formed
until then.59
Jacob did extensive research on and historical analysis of
both the Electoral Count Act of 1887 and the 12th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.60 The 12th Amendment contains a
single relevant line: “The President of the Senate shall, in
the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
counted.” 61 Though Jacob concluded that this line was
“inartfully drafted,” it said nothing about resolving
disputes over electoral votes.62
Greg Jacob testifies before the Select Committee on June 16,
2022.
Greg Jacob testifies before the Select Committee on June 16,
2022.
Photo by House Creative Services
Jacob concluded that the Vice President must adhere to the
Electoral Count Act.63 The ECA has been followed for 130
years and “every single time that there has been any
objection to electors, it has been resolved in accordance
with the Electoral Count Act procedures,” Jacob testified.64
After reviewing the history and relevant cases, Jacob found
that “[t]here is no justifiable basis to conclude that the
Vice President has that kind of authority” to affect the
outcome of the presidential election.65 Jacob stated that
his “review of text, history, and, frankly, just common
sense” all confirmed that the Vice President had no such
power.66
President Trump’s Allies Filed Lawsuits Seeking a Court
Order Directing Vice President Pence Not to Count Certain
Electoral Votes.
Representative Louie Gohmert outside the Capitol on March
17, 2021.
Representative Louie Gohmert outside the Capitol on March
17, 2021.
(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
One of President Trump’s congressional allies,
Representative Louie Gohmert (R–TX), pushed a version of
Eastman’s theory in the courts. On December 27, 2020,
Representative Gohmert and several of the Trump Campaign’s
fake electors for the State of Arizona (including Republican
Party Chair Kelli Ward) filed suit against Vice President
Pence in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas.67 As Ward explained to Marc Short in a phone call the
day the suit was filed, President Trump was aware of the
lawsuit and had signed off on it: “We wouldn’t have done
that without the president telling us it was okay,” she told
him.68
In the suit, the Plaintiffs alleged that there were
“competing slates” of electors from five States.69 They
asked the court to rule that portions of the Electoral Count
Act of 1887 were unconstitutional and that “the Twelfth
Amendment contains the exclusive dispute resolution
mechanisms” for determining an objection raised by a Member
of Congress to the electors submitted by any State.70
Essentially, Representative Gohmert was asking the court to
tell Vice President Pence that he was prohibited from
following the procedures set forth in the Electoral Count
Act. Much like Eastman’s theory, the Gohmert plaintiffs
asserted that the Vice President has the “exclusive
authority and sole discretion” to determine which electoral
votes to count.71
Although the Gohmert suit was premised on the same theory
Eastman advocated, Eastman did not agree with the decision
to file suit. Eastman argued that filing a suit against the
Vice President had “close[] to zero” chance of succeeding,
and there was a “very high” risk that the court would issue
an opinion stating that “Pence has no authority to reject
the Biden-certified ballots.” 72 As highlighted by Judge
Carter, Eastman’s theory was that Vice President Pence
should take this action “without asking for permission” from
Congress or the courts.73 Another attorney, Bill Olson,
stated that getting a judicial determination “that Pence is
constrained by [the Electoral Count Act]” could “completely
tank the January 6 strategy.” 74 Those who were advocating
to press on with the Eastman scheme did not want to bring it
before a Federal judge because of the high risk that a
court’s determination that the scheme was illegal would stop
the plan to overturn the election dead in its tracks.
Eastman himself pushed this cavalier attitude towards the
courts and compliance with the law during a call with
Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers on January 4th. During
this call, just two days before the joint session, Eastman
pressed Speaker Bowers to bring the Arizona House into
session to certify Trump electors or decertify the Biden
electors.75 Speaker Bowers responded as he had previously
responded to similar entreaties by Giuliani and President
Trump: by explaining that doing so would require him to
violate his oaths to the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions and
that he “wasn’t going to take such an action.” 76
Undeterred, Eastman still pushed Speaker Bowers to “just do
it and let the courts sort it through.” 77
Ultimately, Representative Gohmert’s legal gambit failed; a
U.S. district judge dismissed the case quickly.78 The
judge’s ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court, which
rejected Gohmert’s appeal without further consideration.79
Other Individuals Advising President Trump and His Campaign
Also Advocated for a Role for the Vice President at the
Joint Session.
John McEntee, February 28, 2020.
John McEntee, February 28, 2020.
(Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images)
Other individuals inside and outside the White House also
advanced versions of the theory that the Vice President had
agency in the joint session. The issue of Vice President
Pence’s role came up during a December meeting in the Oval
Office. Either President Trump or his chief of staff, Mark
Meadows, tasked John McEntee, the director of the
Presidential Personnel Office, with researching the matter
further.80 Though McEntee was one of President Trump’s close
advisors, he was not a lawyer and had no relevant
experience. Yet, he wrote a one-page memo claiming that “the
VP has substantial discretion to address issues with the
electoral process.” 81
This wasn’t the only one-page analysis drafted by McEntee
before January 6th.82 He later proposed a “middle path” in
which he envisioned the Vice President accepting only half
the electoral votes from six disputed States (specifically,
Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona and
Nevada).83 McEntee portrayed this as a way to avoid
“disenfranchis[ing]” States while still achieving the
desired result: delivering a second term to President Trump.
McEntee conveyed this memo to the President with a cover
note reading, “This is probably our only realistic option
because it would give Pence an out.” 84 McEntee told the
Select Committee that this judgment was based on his
assessment that “it was, like, pretty obvious [the Vice
President] wasn’t going to just reject . . . the electors or
whatever was being asked of him at that time.” 85
Jenna Ellis on December 2, 2020 in Lansing, Michigan.
Jenna Ellis on December 2, 2020 in Lansing, Michigan.
(Photo by Rey Del Rio/Getty Images)
Another advocate of a plan for the Vice President to play a
role in the joint session was Jenna Ellis, a lawyer working
for the Trump Campaign. She argued in two memos that Vice
President Pence had the power to delay the counting of
certified electoral votes. In the first memo, addressed to
President Trump and dated December 31, 2020, Ellis advised
that Vice President Pence should “not open any of the votes”
from six States that “currently have electoral delegates in
dispute.” 86 Ellis asserted that this “dispute” provided
“sufficient rational and legal basis to question whether the
[S]tate law and Constitution was followed.” Ellis proposed a
delay of ten days, as the Vice President and Congress
awaited a “response from the [S]tate legislatures, which
would then need to meet in an emergency electoral session.”
If any of the State legislatures “fails to provide a timely
response, no electoral votes can be opened and counted from
that [S]tate.” Ellis claimed that Vice President Pence would
not be “exercising discretion nor establishing new
precedent,” but instead “simply asking for clarification
from the constitutionally appointed authority.” 87
Ellis sent the substance of this memorandum in an email to
Fox News host Jeanine Pirro on January 1, 2021, under the
subject line “Constitutional option.” 88 And, on January 4,
2021, she sent the same substance to Fox News contributor
John Solomon under the subject line “Pence option.” 89
Ellis addressed a second memo, dated January 5, 2021, to Jay
Sekulow, an outside attorney who represented President Trump
during his first impeachment proceedings and in other
litigation.90 Ellis again claimed that Vice President Pence
had the power to delay the certification of the vote. Ellis
recommended that the Vice President should, when he arrived
at the first contested State (Arizona), “simply stop the
count” on the basis that the States had not made a “final
determination of ascertainment of electors.” “The [S]tates
would therefore have to act.” 91
Sekulow clearly disagreed. “Some have speculated that the
Vice President could simply say, ‘I’m not going to accept
these electors,’ that he has the authority to do that under
the Constitution,” Sekulow said during an episode of his
radio show.92 “I actually don’t think that’s what the
Constitution has in mind.” Sekulow added that the Vice
President serves a merely “ministerial, procedural
function.” 93
In addition, Herschmann discussed this memo with Sekulow.
They agreed that Ellis did not have the “qualifications or
the experience to be giving advice on this” or to be
“litigating the challenges” that President Trump’s team was
filing in court.94 Herschmann did not think that Sekulow
shared the memo with the President.95
5.2 President Trump and his Allies Exert Intense Public and
Private Pressure on the Vice President in Advance of the
Joint Session of Congress on January 6th
January 2, 2021: The Vice President Meets with His Advisors,
Cementing His Intended Path for the Joint Session.
On January 2, 2021, Vice President Pence met with his
counsel Greg Jacob, Chief of Staff Marc Short, and Matt
Morgan to discuss the joint session.96 Morgan was the Trump
Campaign’s General Counsel and had previously served as
counsel to Vice President Pence. At this point, the Vice
President already had a clear understanding of what his role
would be in the electoral count.97 Vice President Pence was
concerned that most people did not understand how the
certification of the electoral votes worked. So Jacob began
drafting a statement for the Vice President to issue on
January 6th. The statement was intended to provide a “civic
education” on the joint session, explaining to the American
people his actions, including why the Vice President “didn’t
have the authorities that others had suggested that he
might.” 98
The men discussed the various points of pressure being
applied to the Vice President, including Eastman’s theories,
the Gohmert suit, Ellis’s arguments, as well as how the
electoral count process should work. They also discussed
allegations of irregularities and maladministration of the
election, concluding that none of the allegations raised was
sufficient to reverse President Trump’s defeat.99
While Vice President Pence recognized Congress’s authority
under the Electoral Count Act to raise objections to the
certification, neither he nor his staff were aware of any
evidence of fraud that would have had a material effect on
the outcome of the election in any State.100 Because of
President Trump’s repetition of election fraud allegations,
Jacob and the Vice President’s staff conducted their own
evaluation of these claims. Jacob asked Morgan to send the
campaign’s best evidence of election “fraud,
maladministration, irregularities, [and] abuses in the
system.” 101 The Vice President’s legal staff memorialized
the review they conducted of these materials in a memo to
Vice President Pence, which concluded: “most allegations of
substantive voter fraud—defined to mean the casting of
illegal ballots in violation of prevailing election laws—are
either relatively small in number, or cannot be
verified.” 102
Vice President Pence also discussed the Trump Campaign’s
fake electors with his advisors. Both Jacob and Morgan
assured Vice President Pence that there were not dual slates
of electors. The electors organized by the Trump Campaign
were not valid.103 Morgan had already written a memo on the
topic in December, concluding that the “alternate”
electors—that is, fake—lacked a certificate of ascertainment
issued by the State.104 Without such an ascertainment, the
Trump Campaign’s fake electors had no standing during the
joint session. Jacob had also prepared a “flow chart” memo
outlining each of the legal provisions implicated in the
joint session on January 6th.105 Jacob advised Vice
President Pence that “none of the slates that had been sent
in would qualify as an alternate slate within the meaning of
the Electoral Count Act.” 106 Vice President Pence was still
worried that the fake elector issue was sowing confusion, so
he wanted his statement on January 6th to be as transparent
as possible.107
That same day, January 2nd, Marc Short released a brief
statement on behalf of the Vice President. “Vice President
Pence shares the concerns of millions of Americans about
voter fraud and irregularities in the last election,” the
statement read. “The vice president welcomes the efforts of
members of the House and Senate to use the authority they
have under the law to raise objections and bring forward
evidence before the Congress and the American people on
January 6th.” 108 Short testified that the statement was
consistent with the Vice President’s view that he did not
have the power to reject electors.109 Short issued this
statement because of the “swirl” regarding the question of
“where [Vice President Pence] stood.” 110
Steve Bannon’s podcast, War Room: Pandemic, was one of the
primary sources of this swirl.
January 2, 2021: Eastman and Bannon Question the “Courage
and Spine” of Vice President Pence.
Steve Bannon’s podcast, War Room: Pandemic, was one of the
primary sources of this swirl. Eastman was a guest on a
January 2nd episode of Bannon’s show. Much of their
conversation focused on Vice President Pence, and the belief
that he had the power to overturn the election.
“[W]e are entering into one of the most, um, important
constitutional crisis [sic] the country’s ever had,” Bannon
said.111 Bannon complained that Vice President Pence had
“spit the bit,” meaning he had given up on efforts to keep
President Trump in power.112 Eastman claimed that the
election had been “illegally conducted,” and so the
certified votes now “devolved back to the [S]tate
legislature[s], and the only other place where it devolved
back to is to Congress and particularly the Vice President,
who will sit in presiding over a Joint Session of Congress
beginning on January 6 to count the ballots.” 113 Eastman
claimed that the Vice President (and Congress) had the power
to reject the certified electors from several States
out-of-hand. “[T]hey’ve got multiple slates of ballots from
seven states,” Eastman said. “And they’ve gotta decide []
which is the valid slate to count . . . I think they have
that authority to make that determination on their own.” 114
Bannon claimed the Vice President of the United States is
“hardwired in,” and an “actual decisionmaker.” 115 The Vice
President’s role is not “ministerial,” Bannon declared.116
Eastman agreed.117 “Are we to assume that this is going to
be a climactic battle that’s going to take place this week
about the very question of the constitutionality of the
Electoral Count Act of 1887?” Bannon asked.118
Eastman replied, “I think a lot of that depends on the
courage and the spine of the individuals involved.” Bannon
asked Eastman if he meant Vice President Mike Pence. “Yes,”
Eastman answered.119
January 3, 2021: Eastman Drafts Another “January 6 Scenario”
Memo “War Gaming” the Ways that Vice President Pence Could
Change the Outcome of the Election.
The next day, January 3, 2021, Eastman drafted a six-page
memo that imagined several scenarios for January 6th, only
some of which led to President Trump’s victory.120 In a
section titled, “War Gaming the Alternatives,” Eastman set
forth the ways he thought President Trump could remain in
power.121 Importantly, Eastman concluded that President
Trump could remain president if—and only if—Vice President
Pence followed Eastman’s illegal advice and determined which
electoral college ballots were “valid.” 122 In another
scenario, Eastman imagined that President Trump may somehow
win re-election in January 2021 if Vice President Pence
remanded the electoral votes to State legislatures, such
that they could have ten days to investigate President
Trump’s baseless claims of fraud. In that case, Eastman
allowed that former Vice President Biden may still win,
should the State legislatures determine that the evidence
was “insufficient to alter the results of the election.” 123
Eastman Knew that there Were No Valid “Alternate” Slates,
But He Nonetheless Predicated His Advice to the Vice
President and President on this Claim.
In his six-page memo, consistent with the earlier two-page
memo, Eastman states that “the Trump electors” met and
transmitted votes, finding that “[t]here are thus dual
slates of electors from 7 [S]tates.” 124 Even since January
6th, Eastman has continued to affirm and defend his
assertion that there were dual slates of electors, writing:
“Trump electors from seven [S]tates in which election
challenges were still pending met (albeit of their own
accord) on the date designated by Congress, cast their
votes, and transmitted those votes to Congress.” 125
Eastman used these slates as a premise for his argument that
the result of the election was disputed. However, Eastman
acknowledged on multiple occasions—both before and after
January 6th—that these “dual slates” had no legal
significance. In an email sent on December 19, 2020, Eastman
wrote that the seven Trump/Pence slates of electors “will be
dead on arrival in Congress” “unless those electors get a
certification from their State Legislators.” 126 Of course,
this certification never came and there was no basis for any
action on the “dual slates.” 127
Nevertheless, on December 23, 2020, Eastman used the
existence of these slates as a justification for the Vice
President to act, in an email to Boris Epshteyn, a Trump
Campaign lawyer. “The fact that we have multiple slates of
electors demonstrates the uncertainty of either. That should
be enough.” 128
Again after January 6th, Eastman acknowledged in an email
that the fake electors’ documents were invalid and
irrelevant.129 “Alas,” he said, “[T]hey had no authority”
because “[n]o legislature certified them.” 130
Eastman concluded his memo by asserting that his plan was
“BOLD, Certainly,” but he attempted to justify it, arguing
that “this Election was Stolen by a strategic Democrat plan
to systematically flout existing election laws for partisan
advantage; we’re no longer playing by Queensbury Rules,
therefore.” 131
Eastman repeated what he wrote in his earlier, shorter memo,
claiming that Vice President Pence should act “without
asking for permission—either from a vote of the joint
session or from the Court.” 132 Eastman claimed “that the
Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as the
ultimate arbiter.” 133 Eastman ended on an especially
hyperbolic note. If the election’s results were not upended,
“then the sovereign people no longer control the direction
of their government, and we will have ceased to be a
self-governing people. The stakes could not be higher.” 134
January 4, 2021: President Trump and Eastman Meet with Pence
and His Staff in the Oval Office.
Eastman Argues in an Oval Office Meeting that the Vice
President can Reject Electoral Votes or that He Can Delay
the Certification, Sending the Electoral Votes Back to the
States.
Late in the afternoon of January 4, 2021, President Trump
summoned Vice President Pence to the Oval Office for a
showdown.135 President Trump and Eastman sought to convince
the Vice President that he had the power to refuse to count
the certified electors from several States won by former
Vice President Biden.
Short and Jacob attended with the Vice President.136 Trump’s
chief of staff, Mark Meadows, was only briefly present,
leaving as the meeting started.137
The White House Counsel is Excluded from the Meeting.
One key lawyer was conspicuously absent: Pat Cipollone, the
White House Counsel. Cipollone and his deputy, Pat Philbin,
were shooting down a series of “terrible” proposals at the
time.138 Philbin told the Select Committee that he
considered resigning every day from approximately November
15 until the end of the administration.139 Philbin had
researched the Vice President’s role in the January 6th
joint session and concluded that Vice President Pence had no
power to affect the outcome.140 Cipollone agreed and
informed Short and Jacob that this was the opinion of White
House Counsel’s Office.141
Mark Meadows invited Cipollone to speak with Eastman prior
to the Oval Office meeting.142 Cipollone told Eastman that
his scheme was “not something that is consistent with the
appropriate reading of the law.” 143 After delivering this
assessment directly to Eastman in Meadows’ office, Cipollone
walked to the Oval Office with the intent to attend the
meeting. However, by the time the Vice President and his
staff arrived, Cipollone was gone.144
Pat Cipollone is seen on a screen during a Select Committee
hearing on July 12, 2022.
Pat Cipollone is seen on a screen during a Select Committee
hearing on July 12, 2022.
(Photo by Sarah Silbiger-Pool/Getty Images)
Cipollone declined to testify as to what he told President
Trump or why he did not attend the Oval Office meeting, but
he was clear that he didn’t end up attending the meeting
because of something that happened after he walked into the
Oval Office.145 Whatever happened, Cipollone maintained, was
protected by executive privilege, suggesting that he was
asked to leave by the President.146 What is clear, however,
is that Cipollone had already shared his view directly with
Meadows and Eastman, i.e., that the proposal President Trump
and Eastman were about to advocate to the Vice President was
illegal.147
During this Oval Office Meeting, Eastman Admits that Both
Paths are Based on the Same Legal Theory and Concedes His
Plan Violates the Electoral Count Act.
During the Oval Office meeting, Eastman claimed that there
were two legally viable options.148 First, Vice President
Pence could reject outright the certified electors submitted
by several States, and second, he could suspend the joint
session and send the “disputed” electoral votes back to the
States.149 Eastman advised that the Vice President had the
“raw authority to determine objections himself,” according
to Jacob.150 However, by the end of the meeting Eastman was
emphasizing the second option that he argued would be “more
politically palatable” than the “more aggressive” option of
the Vice President rejecting electoral votes outright.151 If
Vice President Pence did not want to reject the electors,
Eastman claimed, then the Vice President could send the
certified electoral votes back to the States for further
deliberation.
Eastman later conceded that both actions were based on the
same underlying legal theory of the Vice President’s
power.152 Eastman also admitted—during this meeting with the
President and Vice President—that his proposal violated the
Electoral Count Act.153 Moreover, Eastman eventually
acknowledged that the concept of the Vice President
unilaterally rejecting electors was not supported by
precedent and that the Supreme Court would never endorse
it.154
Jacob recorded his reflections on the January 4th meeting in
a contemporaneous memo to the Vice President.155 Jacob’s
memo confirms that Eastman admitted that his proposal
violated the law in the presence of President Trump.
First, Jacob wrote, Eastman acknowledged that “his proposal
violates several provisions of statutory law”—namely, the
Electoral Count Act of 1887.156 Jacob’s memo explains that
the Electoral Count Act calls for all vote certificates to
be “acted upon,” and any objections to a State’s
certificates be “finally disposed of.” However, as Jacob
wrote, Eastman was proposing instead that “no action be
taken” on the certificates from the States Eastman asserted
were “contested.” And, according to the Electoral Count Act,
the Vice President (as President of the Senate) is to “call
for objections.” But Eastman did not want the Vice President
to “call for objections” for these States. As Jacob noted,
this would have deprived Congress of the ability under the
Act to make, debate, and vote on objections.157
Additionally, the Electoral Count Act contains a provision
that requires any “competing slates of electors” to be
“submitted to the Senate and House for debate and
disposition.” As Jacob noted, Eastman conceded that the
“alternate” (fake) electors’ votes were not proper. But
Eastman’s proposal still would have refused to count the
real electors’ votes from those States and instead referred
both the real and fake electors’ votes to State legislatures
“for disposition.” Finally, in order for State legislatures
to take action to determine which of the slates should be
counted, Eastman’s proposal called for “an extended recess
of the joint session.” But this too would have violated the
Electoral Count Act, which provides only for very short
delays.158
There was another foundational problem with Eastman’s plan.
There were no legitimate “competing” or “alternate” slates
of electors. President Trump, Eastman and others had
manufactured the conditions they needed in order to claim
that the election result was “disputed” by convening fake
electors who sent fake documents to Washington before
January 6th. And their efforts to convince State
legislatures to certify Trump electors had already failed.
Jacob noted in his memo that in the Oval Office meeting,
Eastman conceded “no legislature has appointed or certified
any alternate slate of electors” and that the purported
“alternate slates” (fake electors) were illegitimate without
what Jacob described as “the imprimatur of approval by a
State legislature.” 159 Moreover, Eastman acknowledged that
“no Republican-controlled legislative majority in any
disputed States has expressed an intention to designate an
alternate slate of electors.” 160 In other words, Eastman
acknowledged that the fake votes were invalid, that no State
legislature had approved them, and no State legislature
would approve them.161 But President Trump and Eastman still
pressed this unlawful scheme on the Vice President. Although
Eastman started the January 4th Oval Office meeting
maintaining that Vice President Pence had unilateral
authority to reject electors, by the end of the meeting he
conceded that he would “not recommend that the Vice
President assert that he has the authority unilaterally to
decide which of the competing slates of electors should be
counted.” 162
Jacob ended his memo with a scathing summary. “If the Vice
President implemented Professor Eastman’s proposal, he would
likely lose in court,” Jacob wrote. “In a best-case scenario
in which the courts refused to get involved, the Vice
President would likely find himself in an isolated standoff
against both houses of Congress, as well as most or all of
the applicable State legislatures, with no neutral arbiter
to break the impasse.” 163
Following the Oval Office meeting, during the evening of
January 4, 2021, Jacob invited Eastman to send along “any
written materials on electoral vote counting issues,”
including a law review article by Laurence Tribe that
Eastman had cited in the Oval Office meeting that day, for
Jacob to review on the Vice President’s behalf.164 Jacob
reviewed everything that Eastman submitted; nothing changed
the analysis he had already done for the Vice President,
indeed much of it did not even support Eastman’s own
arguments.165
The Vice President was Not Persuaded by Eastman’s Theory and
Remained Convinced That His Role at the Joint Session would
be Merely Ceremonial.
Pence did not relent on January 4th, or at any point during
the harrowing two days that followed. “[F]rom my very first
conversation with the Vice President on the subject, his
immediate instinct was that there is no way that one person
could be entrusted by the Framers to exercise that
authority,” Jacob testified. “And never once did I see him
budge from that view, and the legal advice that I provided
him merely reinforced it. So, everything that he said or did
during [the January 4th meeting in the Oval Office] was
consistent with his first instincts on this question.” 166
January 4, 2021: President Trump Publicly Pressures the Vice
President During a Rally Speech in Georgia.
President Trump did not relent either. His instinct was to
increase public pressure on Vice President Pence, despite
the Vice President’s consistent message to President Trump
about the limits of his authority. That evening, during a
Senate campaign rally in Dalton, Georgia, President Trump
made it seem as if the Presidential election hadn’t already
been decided and projected his unhinged ambitions onto his
opponents.167 President Trump claimed that “there’s nothing
the radical Democrats will not do to get power that they so
desperately crave,” including “the outright stealing of
elections, like they’re trying to do with us.” 168
“We’re not going to let it happen,” President Trump said,
adding, “I hope Mike Pence comes through for us, I have to
tell you.” President Trump called Vice President Pence a
“great vice president,” a “great guy,” as well as a
“wonderful” and “smart man.” But he alluded to the Vice
President’s role, “he’s going to have a lot to say about
it,” and added an ominous note. “Of course, if he doesn’t
come through, I won’t like him quite as much,” President
Trump said.169
January 5, 2021: Eastman Pressures Pence’s Staff in a
Private Meeting While President Trump Tweets.
In a Reversal of Where the Oval Office Meeting Ended the Day
Before, Eastman Argues that Pence Should Reject Electors
Outright.
Eastman met with Jacob and Short again the following day.170
During the Oval Office meeting the Vice President had made
clear that he would not unilaterally reject electors, and,
by pivoting to recommend the Vice President send the
electors back to the States, Eastman seemed to recognize
this. But the following morning, Eastman returned to
pressing for the more “aggressive” path.171
Jacob recorded Eastman’s request on January 5, 2021, in a
handwritten note: “Requesting VP reject.” 172 Jacob later
summarized Eastman’s remarks as follows: “I’m here asking
you to reject the electors.” 173 This overnight reversal
surprised Jacob because Eastman was returning to the more
aggressive position he had seemed to abandon in the Oval
Office meeting the day before.174 President Trump’s tweets
that morning may explain Eastman’s reversal. While Eastman
was meeting with the Vice President’s staff, his client,
President Trump, was pressing the argument publicly.
At 11:06 a.m. on the morning of January 5th, President Trump
tweeted: “The Vice President has the power to reject
fraudulently chosen electors.” As his tweet made clear,
President Trump would not be persuaded by reason—or the law.
The President made this public statement despite the Vice
President’s clear and consistent rejection of this theory
including during an in-person meeting the day before. During
that same meeting, Eastman conceded that this “aggressive”
path of rejecting electors was not advisable.
Herschmann briefly participated in the January 5th meeting,
seeing it as “an opportunity . . . to just chew [Eastman]
out.” 175 Herschmann had already pushed back “brutal[ly]” on
Eastman’s theory regarding the Vice President. In this
conversation, he emphasized the need to fact check dubious
claims of election fraud.176 Herschmann told Eastman that
“someone better make sure” that the allegations Eastman
provided to members of Congress were accurate before they
objected to the certification of the vote the next day.177
“[N]othing should come out of someone’s mouth that [isn’t]
independently verified and [] reliable.” 178
At the End of the Morning Meeting, Eastman Concedes to
Pence’s Counsel That His Theory Has No Historical Support.
Jacob then had his own “Socratic” debate with Eastman over
the legal merits of his position. According to Jacob,
Eastman conceded much ground by the end of the session.
Eastman “all but admitted that it [his plan] didn’t
work.” 179
For example, Eastman had previously claimed to have found
historical support in the actions of John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson, who both presided over the counting of electoral
votes when they were Vice President. Not so. Jacob told the
Select Committee that Eastman conceded in private that the
cases of Jefferson and Adams did not serve “as examples for
the proposition that he was trying to support of a Vice
Presidential assertion of authority to decide disputes[,]
because no dispute was raised in either case during the
joint session.” Jacob added: “And, moreover, there was no
[question] as to the outcomes in those States.” 180
Eastman conceded that there was no historical support for
the role that he and President Trump were pushing Vice
President Pence to play. No Vice President—before or after
the adoption of the Electoral Count Act—had ever exercised
such authority. This included then-Vice President Richard
Nixon’s handling of the electoral votes of Hawaii following
the 1960 election. Though Eastman and other Trump lawyers
used this Hawaii example to justify the theory that the Vice
President could unilaterally choose which electors to count,
Eastman admitted to Jacob that Vice President Nixon had not
in fact done what Eastman was recommending Vice President
Pence do.181
Eastman also admitted that he would not grant the expansive
powers he advocated for Vice President Pence to any other
Vice President. Eastman did not think that Vice President
Kamala Harris should have such power in 2025, nor did he
think that Vice President Al Gore should have had such
authority in 2001.182 He also acknowledged that his theory
would lose 9-0 at the Supreme Court.183
According to Jacob, Eastman “acknowledged by the end that,
first of all, no reasonable person would actually want that
clause [of the 12th Amendment] read that way because if
indeed it did mean that the Vice President had such
authority, you could never have a party switch thereafter.”
If politicians followed Eastman’s advice, “[y]ou would just
have the same party win continuously if indeed a Vice
President had the authority to just declare the winner of
every State.” 184
The Vice President’s office was unmoved by Eastman’s
specious reasoning. As he left Marc Short’s office, Eastman
was thinking of his client’s reaction. “They’re going to be
really disappointed that I wasn’t able to persuade you,”
Eastman said.185
Former Republican Officials with Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Experience All Agreed with Vice President Pence’s
Conclusion about His Limited Role at the Joint Session.
John Michael Luttig testifies before the Select Committee on
June 16, 2022.
John Michael Luttig testifies before the Select Committee on
June 16, 2022.
Photo by House Creative Services
As President Trump’s pressure campaign intensified, the Vice
President’s outside counsel, Richard Cullen, turned for
support to John Michael Luttig, a conservative former judge
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.186
Eastman had clerked for Luttig—a man with impeccable legal
and conservative credentials—more than two decades prior.
Luttig rejected Eastman’s so-called legal analysis of the
Vice President’s role in no uncertain terms. In a series of
tweets, posted at 9:53 a.m. on January 5th, Luttig set forth
his legal conclusions.
“The only responsibility and power of the Vice President
under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral
college votes as they have been cast,” Judge Luttig wrote.
“The Constitution does not empower the Vice President to
alter in any way the votes that have been cast, either by
rejecting certain of them or otherwise.” 187
Confusion in the media about where the Vice President stood
on this issue prompted former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan
to reach out to the Vice President to share his belief that
the Vice President had no unilateral authority.188 Short
also spoke with former Speaker Ryan and as he testified to
the Select Committee, “I said to him, Mr. Speaker, you know
Mike . . . you know he recognizes that. And we sort of
laughed about it, and he said, I get it.” 189
The Vice President also consulted with former Vice President
Dan Quayle, who reinforced and affirmed Vice President
Pence’s consistent understanding of his role.190
January 5, 2021: President Trump Again Pressures Vice
President Pence in a One-on-One Meeting at the White House
and Another Phone Call with Eastman.
President Trump demanded to see Vice President Pence again
that same day. Vice President Pence had canceled a planned
lunch with President Trump, intending to work on the
statement he planned to issue on January 6th to explain
publicly why he wouldn’t bow to the President’s pressure.191
But Pence couldn’t avoid Trump. Vice President Pence had to
delay a Coronavirus Task Force meeting later that same day
when he was called to the Oval Office to meet with the
President.192
The two men met alone, without staff present. While we have
not developed direct evidence of what was discussed during
this one-on-one meeting between the President and Vice
President, it did not change the fundamental disagreement
between them about the limits of the Vice President’s
authority during the joint session. Jacob said the Vice
President left the meeting “determined.” 193 Vice President
Pence did tell Marc Short what transpired during the
meeting, but Short refused to tell the Select Committee what
was said.194 Short described Vice President Pence’s demeanor
as “steady.” 195 Short testified that the below excerpt from
the book Peril may have been sensationalized but was
generally consistent with Short’s understanding of the
discussion:
“If these people say you have the power, wouldn’t you want
to?” Trump asked.
“I wouldn’t want any one person to have that authority,”
Pence said.
“But wouldn’t it almost be cool to have that power?” Trump
asked.
“No,” Pence said. “Look, I’ve read this, and I don’t see a
way to do it. We’ve exhausted every option. I’ve done
everything I could and then some to find a way around this.
It’s simply not possible. My interpretation is: No. . . .
“No, no, no!” Trump shouted. “You don’t understand, Mike.
You can do this. I don’t want to be your friend anymore if
you don’t do this.” 196
Later that day, Jacob and Short were both present for a call
between President Trump and Vice President Pence.197 Eastman
and at least one other lawyer were with President Trump on
the call as well.198
Eastman recognized that Vice President Pence was not going
to change his mind on rejecting electors outright, but he
still asked if the Vice President would consider sending the
electors back to the States.199 “I don’t see it,” Vice
President Pence responded, “but my counsel will hear out
whatever Mr. Eastman has to say.” 200
Jacob received other calls from Eastman on January 5th.201
Jacob told the Select Committee that he had a detailed
discussion with Eastman concerning the ways his proposal
would violate the Electoral Count Act.202 Eastman resorted
to a ridiculous argument—comparing their current situation
to the crisis that faced President Abraham Lincoln during
the Civil War. Eastman invoked President Lincoln’s
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.203 He also told
Jacob to “stay tuned” because “we” were trying to get some
letters from State legislators indicating that they were
interested in the Vice President sending the electors back
to the States.204
January 5, 2021: An Accurate New York Times Article about
the Vice President Prompts a False Statement in Response by
President Trump.
On the evening of January 5th, The New York Times published
an article titled, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks
Power to Change Election Result.” 205 The Times reported on
the tension brewing within the White House, citing “people
briefed on the conversation” between President Trump and
Vice President Pence that had taken place in the Oval Office
the previous day. “Vice President Mike Pence told President
Trump on Tuesday [January 4th] that he did not believe he
had the power to block congressional certification of Joseph
R. Biden, Jr.’s victory in the presidential election despite
Mr. Trump’s baseless insistence that he did,” the Times
reported.206
The Times’ report was published at approximately 7:36 that
evening.207 Jason Miller called President Trump to make sure
he had seen it.208 President Trump spoke to Miller at least
twice, once at 8:18 p.m. and a second time at 9:22 p.m.209
Immediately after concluding his second call with Jason
Miller, President Trump asked to speak to the Vice
President; President Trump and Vice President Pence spoke
from 9:33 to 9:41 p.m.210 President Trump also spoke with
Steve Bannon and Eastman, among others.211
At 9:58 p.m. on January 5th, President Trump issued a
statement that he had dictated to Jason Miller disputing the
Times’ account.212 President Trump lied—repeatedly—in his
short statement.213 The President claimed the article was
“fake news.” It wasn’t. President Trump claimed he and Vice
President Pence were “in total agreement that the Vice
President has the power to act.” They weren’t. President
Trump claimed the election “was illegal.” It wasn’t.
President Trump then laid out Vice President Pence’s options
for the next day, summarizing Eastman’s theory:
Our Vice President has several options under the U.S.
Constitution. He can decertify the results or send them back
to the [S]tates for change and certification. He can also
decertify the illegal and corrupt results and send them to
the House of Representatives for the one vote for one
[S]tate tabulation.214
This was also a blatant attempt to mischaracterize the Vice
President’s position in the hope that public opinion would
somehow sway the resolute Vice President. President Trump
knew full well at the time that he and Vice President Pence
were not “in total agreement.” The Vice President’s counsel,
Greg Jacob, was shocked by the statement.215 “[T]he Vice
President was not in agreement that the Vice President had
the power to take the actions that were being asked of him
that day,” Jacob later told the Select Committee.216 Marc
Short was furious as well and called Jason Miller to
forcefully “express [his] displeasure that a statement could
have gone out that misrepresented the Vice President’s
viewpoint without consultation.” 217
The Vice President was “obviously irritated that a statement
putting words in his mouth” was issued by the President and
considered issuing his own statement contradicting President
Trump’s.218 Ultimately, Pence and Short concluded that it
was not worthwhile since it was already late in the evening
and they expected the question to be resolved by Vice
President Pence’s “Dear Colleague” letter the next day.219
January 5, 2021: Bannon Publicly Amplifies the Pressure on
Vice President Pence.
While President Trump misrepresented the Vice President’s
agreement with Eastman’s theory, his on-again, off-again
political advisor, Steve Bannon, pressed President Trump’s
campaign against Vice President Pence in public. Bannon
echoed the public pressure on Pence that the President
continued to propagate by talking about his purported
authority. The Select Committee learned from phone records
that Bannon spoke to President Trump at least twice on
January 5th.220
During a January 5, 2021, episode of War Room: Pandemic,
Bannon and his guests openly berated Vice President Pence.
Bannon cited an erroneous news report claiming that Senator
Grassley would preside over the certification of the
electoral college vote—instead of Vice President Pence.221
Bannon’s cohost, Raheem Kassam, took credit for the public
pressure placed on Vice President Pence. “I want to remind
people who has been sitting here, saying ‘Light Pence Up’
for the last couple of weeks. Right? That would be Raheem
Kassam.” They then discussed President Trump’s speech in
Georgia the previous evening. “I think the President of the
United States took your advice last night, wrote a line in
there,” Bannon said. To which Kasseem responded: “. . . and
yours . . . hold the line.”
Jack Posobiec, an alt-right personality with a large Twitter
following, chimed in quoting a member of their audience as
saying that “Pence will betray Donald Trump.” 222 In
response, Bannon stated: “Call the play. Run the play.” 223
The “play” was Bannon’s version of the “Green Bay Sweep”—a
plan to subvert the transfer of power on January 6th named
for a brutally effective power running play developed in the
National Football League (NFL) in the 1960’s. Steve Bannon’s
political version of the sweep was intended to undermine the
legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election.
One account of Bannon’s “Green Bay Sweep” comes from Peter
Navarro, Director of the White House Office of Trade and
Manufacturing Policy. Navarro refused to cooperate with the
Select Committee and was subsequently indicted for contempt
of Congress. Although he doesn’t fully explain in his book,
In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s Plague Year, how
Bannon’s sweep was intended to work, Navarro writes that
Vice President Pence was envisioned as the “quarterback” who
would “assert his constitutional power” to delay
certification.224 Navarro writes that his own role was to
“carefully document the fraud and myriad election
irregularities,” while Bannon’s “role was to figure out how
to use this information—what he called the ‘receipts.’” 225
Navarro’s account helps explain why Trump and his loyalists
became so fixated on Vice President Pence. They saw Vice
President Pence as their last hope for keeping President
Trump in office. Navarro writes of Pence’s supposed
“betrayal.” 226 In a telling sentence, Navarro likens Vice
President Pence to Brutus, a Roman politician and the most
famous assassin of Julius Caesar. Navarro writes:
On this cold, momentous day, I shiver as I think to myself,
“January 6 will be either Mike Pence’s finest hour or the
traitorous ‘Et tu, Brute?’ end of both his and Donald
Trump’s political careers.” 227
The goal of these Trump allies was clear: to overturn the
election result.228 Statements by participants in this
effort indicate there were several different endgame
strategies in mind. One was to get the Vice President to
unilaterally reject the Electoral College votes of Arizona,
Georgia, Pennsylvania, and other States, then simply declare
that Trump had won a majority of the electors actually
submitted. The other major possibility was to reject or
“return” the Electoral College votes of these States and
then declare there was no majority in the Electoral College
process, thereby triggering a so-called contingent election
under the 12th Amendment.229 This would have meant that the
House of Representatives had chosen the president not on the
basis of one-member-one-vote, but on the basis of
one-State-one-vote, pursuant to the 12th Amendment. Donald
Trump’s strategists emphasized repeatedly that the GOP had a
27-to-22 margin in control of the States’ Congressional
delegations, with Pennsylvania being tied at 9-to-9,
therefore presumably a non-factor.
5.3 President Trump and his Allies Continue to Pressure the
Vice President on January 6th, Threatening His Life and Our
Democracy.
January 6, 2021: President Trump Continued to Falsely Assert
in Multiple Tweets Posted the Morning of January 6th that
the Vice President Had a Role to Play in the Outcome of the
Election.
Despite the public pressure initiated by the President and
amplified by Bannon, Navarro and others, there was no
ambiguity in the Vice President’s decision. By January 6th,
President Trump had been told multiple times that Vice
President Pence was not going to reject the certified
electors from any State. Nor was Vice President Pence going
to move for a delay and send the electors back to the
States. Either move would have been illegal, requiring Vice
President Pence to break the law, violating his oath to the
U.S. Constitution. Pence made his decision clear “[m]any
times” to President Trump, and he was “very consistent” in
rejecting the President’s demands.230 President Trump
continued to publicly pressure the Vice President anyway.
At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, President Trump tweeted:
If Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will
win the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the
mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent
numbers in a process NOT approved by their State
Legislatures (which it must be). Mike can send it back!231
Later that morning, at 8:17 a.m., President Trump tweeted
again:
States want to correct their votes, which they now know were
based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process
never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to
do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike,
this is a time for extreme courage!232
And, at 8:22 a.m., President Trump tweeted again, making a
pitch for Congress to choose him, as if people’s votes on
election day and the electoral college didn’t matter:
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR COUNTRY,
NEEDS THE PRESIDENCY MORE THAN EVER BEFORE—THE POWER OF THE
VETO. STAY STRONG!233
President Trump’s tweets made it clear that he thought the
Republican State legislatures would simply deliver him
victory. President Trump emphasized this point, writing
twice that if Vice President Pence gave in, “we win.”
However, there was no sign of a change in the Vice
President’s position. A moment of truth was looming.
January 6, 2021: President Trump Has a “[H]eated”
Conversation with Vice President Pence Before his Rally on
the Ellipse.
President Trump tried to reach Vice President Pence by phone
early that morning.234 He finally talked to his Vice
President at approximately 11:20 a.m.235 The exchange
quickly became contentious.
President Trump on the phone in the Oval Office.
President Trump on the phone in the Oval Office.
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
Eric Herschmann, a lawyer in the White House Counsel’s
Office, overheard the conversation. Members of President
Trump’s family and other White House officials were present
as well.236 Herschmann recalled that “it started off as a
calmer tone, everything, and then it became heated.” 237
Ivanka Trump also described the call as “pretty heated.” 238
Ivanka Trump elaborated: “It was a different tone than I’d
heard him take with the Vice President before.” 239 Ivanka
Trump told her Chief of Staff, Julie Radford, that “her dad
had just had an upsetting conversation with the Vice
President.” 240 President Trump had even called Vice
President Pence the “P Word.” 241
Nick Luna, President Trump’s personal assistant (commonly
known as the “body man”), was also in the Oval Office during
the conversation. Luna told the Select Committee that
President Trump called Vice President Pence a “wimp” on the
call, with President Trump adding that he “made the wrong
decision” in choosing Pence as his running mate.242
Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence’s National Security
Advisor, also heard the conversation. President Trump “told
the Vice President that, you know, he has legal authority to
send these folks [the electors] back to the respective
States,” Kellogg told the Select Committee.243 President
Trump insisted that Vice President Pence had the
“constitutional authority to” reject certain electoral
college votes.244 When Vice President Pence would not budge,
President Trump told him “you’re not tough enough to make
the call.” 245
But Vice President Pence would not be bullied. The Vice
President, who was at his residence at the time, had been
meeting with Greg Jacob to finalize the statement he would
be releasing later that day. When the President called,
Pence stepped away to answer the phone. According to Jacob,
when Pence returned, he did not say anything about the
call—but he looked “steely, determined, [and] grim,” as he
reentered the room.246
c. January 6, 2021: Trump, Eastman and Giuliani Continue to
Pressure Vice President Pence at the Ellipse Rally.
Despite the Vice President’s unwavering stance, the
President and his outside counsel continued to turn up the
heat of public pressure.
At President Trump’s urging, thousands had gathered on the
morning of January 6th to hear the President and others
speak at a rally held at the Ellipse, a park just south of
the White House. Before President Trump spoke, Eastman took
the stage alongside Giuliani. Both would further amplify the
President’s public pressure on the Vice President, but when
Giuliani spoke on the Ellipse, he already knew that what
Eastman had outlined would never practically happen.
At 9:31 a.m. that morning, Giuliani called Eric Herschmann
“out of the blue” to ask him for his view and analysis of
the practical implications of Eastman’s theory.247 According
to Herschmann, after an “intellectual discussion about . . .
the VP’s role,” Giuliani agreed that the “practical
implication of [what Eastman had proposed] would be almost
impossible.” 248 Immediately after this 5½ minute
conversation with Herschmann, Giuliani had two calls with
the White House, at 9:41 a.m. and 9:53 a.m.249
Giuliani recognized Eastman who joined him on stage,
claiming that he was “one of the preeminent constitutional
scholars in the United States.” 250
Giuliani said Vice President Pence could either “decide on
the validity of these crooked ballots, or he can send it
back to the legislat[ures], give them five to 10 days to
finally finish the work.” 251 He added that that they had
“letters from five legislat[ures] begging us to do
that.” 252 This was not true. At most, what Giuliani,
Eastman and other allies of President Trump had managed to
procure were letters from individual State legislators or
groups of State legislators. None of the letters came from a
majority of any State’s legislative chamber, let alone a
majority of an entire State legislature.253
For instance, a letter that Eastman described to Jacob as a
“[m]ajor new development” on the evening of January 5th
contained the signatures of 21 members of the Pennsylvania
Senate.254 Eastman claimed that it “now looks like PA
Legislature will vote to recertify its electors if Vice
President Pence implements the plan we discussed,” but the
letter asked only for a “delay” in certification to “allow
for due process.” 255 The Select Committee learned from the
most senior Pennsylvania Senate Republican that he signed
the letter because of pressure he was feeling due to the
voluminous post-election outreach from President Trump,
Trump allies, and the public.256 And, he only agreed to sign
a letter directed to Congressional leaders—not the Vice
President—after raising in a conversation with Vice
President Pence’s brother, Congressman Greg Pence, his
desire to avoid pressuring the Vice President.257
Moreover, as Jacob explained, “what any of the State
legislatures said they did or did not want to do had no
impact on the legal analysis of what the Vice President’s
authorities were.” 258 There was simply no legal path to
send any votes back to the States on January 6th.
On the stage at the President’s rally on the Ellipse,
Giuliani repeated a conspiracy theory about the “crooked
Dominion machines . . . deliberately” changing votes via an
algorithm.259 He explained that the 10-day delay in the
certification would be used “to see the machines that are
crooked” and “to find criminality there”—demonstrating that
his repeated assertions of a stolen election were not based
on any real proof, or even evidence, of actual widespread
fraud or criminality.260
“Let’s have trial by combat,” Giuliani told the crowd.261
Eastman came to the microphone following Giuliani, and he
proceeded to repeat proven falsehoods regarding voting
machines. He then issued his “demand”:
And all we are demanding of Vice President Pence is this
afternoon, at 1:00, he let the legislatures of the state
look into this so we get to the bottom of it, and the
American people know whether we have control of the
direction of our government, or not. We no longer live in a
self-governing republic if we can’t get the answer to this
question. This is bigger than President Trump. It is a very
essence of our republican form of government, and it has to
be done. And anybody that is not willing to stand up to do
it, does not deserve to be in the office. It is that
simple.262
Eastman told the assembled crowd that nothing less than the
fate of the American Republic was in Vice President Pence’s
hands.
President Trump Directs the Angry Mob at the Capitol to
Pressure Vice President Pence.
When President Trump later took the stage at the Ellipse, he
heaped praise on Giuliani and Eastman. “He’s got guts,
unlike a lot of people in the Republican Party,” President
Trump said of Giuliani. “He’s got guts. He fights, he
fights.” 263 President Trump described Eastman as “one of
the most brilliant lawyers in the country.” 264 President
Trump claimed that Eastman had looked at the election and
said, “What an absolute disgrace that this can be happening
to our Constitution.” 265 Trump falsely argued that the keys
to the election were in Vice President Pence’s hands,
saying:
And he [Eastman] looked at Mike Pence, and I hope Mike is
going to do the right thing. I hope so. I hope so. Because
if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election. . .
. [T]his is from the number one, or certainly one of the
top, Constitutional lawyers in our country. He has the
absolute right to do it.266
President Trump repeatedly lied, claiming that several
States wanted to overturn former Vice President Biden’s
victory:
States want to revote. The States got defrauded. They were
given false information. They voted on it. Now they want to
recertify. They want it back. All Vice President Pence has
to do is send it back to the States to recertify and we
become president and you are the happiest people.267
Contrary to the statement President Trump dictated the night
before, he all but admitted that Vice President Pence did
not agree with him:
And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: “Mike, that
doesn’t take courage. What takes courage is to do nothing.
That takes courage.” And then we’re stuck with a president
who lost the election by a lot and we have to live with that
for four more years. We’re just not going to let that
happen.268
Later in his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump
repeated:
So, I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And
I hope he doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people
that he’s listening to.269
This was nothing less than a direct appeal to the large
angry crowd to pressure Vice President Mike Pence to change
his settled and oft-repeated conclusion about the limits of
his authority. It was a shocking attempt to use public
opinion to change the Vice President’s position. President
Trump launched a mob toward the Capitol with the false hope
that there was a scenario in which Vice President Pence
would do what Eastman and President Trump had asked him to
do, preventing the transfer of authority to President-elect
Biden.
Vice President Pence Fulfilled his Duty on January 6th
The Vice President Waited to Release His Statement Out of
Deference to President Trump, Who Was Still Speaking on the
Ellipse, and Ultimately Released It Just Minutes Before the
Joint Session Convened at 1:00 p.m.
President Trump’s speech began late and ran long. He didn’t
finish speaking until approximately 1:10 p.m.—after the
joint session had begun at 1:00 p.m. Minutes before he
gaveled the joint session into order, Vice President Mike
Pence released the “Dear Colleague” letter he had been
working on for days with his staff.270 There was never any
ambiguity in Vice President Pence’s understanding of his
role and authority, but he wanted to make it clear for
everyone to see. “This may be the most important thing I
ever say,” Vice President Pence remarked.271
“Today it will be my duty to preside when the Congress
convenes in Joint Session to count the votes of the
Electoral College, and I will do so to the best of my
ability,” Vice President Pence wrote. Vice President Pence
explained that his “role as presiding officer is largely
ceremonial” and dismissed the arguments that he could take
unilateral action as contrary to his oath to support and
defend the Constitution:
As a student of history who loves the Constitution and
reveres its Framers, I do not believe that the Founders of
our country intended to invest the Vice President with
unilateral authority to decide which electoral votes should
be counted during the Joint Session of Congress, and no Vice
President in American history has ever asserted such
authority. Instead, Vice Presidents presiding over Joint
Sessions have uniformly followed the Electoral Count Act,
conducting the proceedings in an orderly manner even where
the count resulted in the defeat of their party or their own
candidacy.272
Vice President Pence Adheres to the U.S. Constitution and
Complies with the Law Governing the Certification of the
Presidential Election.
Vice President Pence during the Joint Session of Congress.
Vice President Pence during the Joint Session of Congress.
(Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)
When Vice President Pence gaveled the opening of the joint
session, he knew that many of his Republican colleagues
planned to challenge the election’s results based on
fictitious claims of fraud. The Vice President took steps to
ensure that those objections adhered to the process set
forth in the Electoral Count Act.
Every four years, on January 6th, vice presidents read from
a script that remains essentially unchanged. Eastman’s
theory of the Vice President’s power and the Trump
Campaign’s scheme to convene and submit the slates of
“alternate” (fake) electors motivated Vice President Pence
and his advisors to alter the script and to make sure they
were prepared to respond to any unexpected actions in the
joint session.273
Vice President Pence met with the Senate Parliamentarian on
January 3rd to discuss the joint session and revised the
joint session scripts in consultation with her office.274
Vice President Pence and the Parliamentarian agreed that the
Vice President’s role is ministerial.275
The Vice President knew that the fake slates of electors
organized by the Trump Campaign were not certified by the
States and thus were not valid; he revised the script for
the joint session to be transparent with the American people
about what the Vice President would—and wouldn’t—be doing
during the joint session.276
One of the most noticeable and important changes to the
script was directed specifically at thwarting the fake
electors scheme. The Vice President knew, informed by the
research and analysis of his staff, that absent
certification of the electoral votes by a State authority,
the purported “alternate” slates were “not consequential”
and would play no role in the certification of the
Presidential election at the joint session.277 The Senate
Parliamentarian confirmed this understanding.278
For decades, Vice Presidents read a similar simple passage
concerning the ascertainment of the vote. Most recently,
Vice President Joseph Biden read this passage aloud in 2017,
as did his most recent predecessors:
After ascertainment has been had that the certificates are
authentic and correct in form, the tellers will count and
make a list of the votes cast by the electors of the several
States.
On January 6, 2021, Vice President Pence read from a revised
script (emphasis added):
After ascertaining that the certificates are regular in form
and authentic, tellers will announce the votes cast by the
electors for each state, beginning with Alabama, which the
parliamentarians advise me is the only certificate of vote
from that State and purports to be a return from the State
that has annexed to it a certificate from an authority of
that State purporting to appoint or ascertain electors.279
Vice President Pence used the same phrasing for each of the
50 States counted.
The Vice President’s attention to this issue was warranted.
Trump’s allies pushed the fake electors scheme until the
very end. Although the Trump Campaign had taken pains to
direct the fake electors to send their documents to the
appropriate authorities immediately after voting on December
14th, and though the Senate Parliamentarian’s and Vice
President’s offices had been tracking the receipt by mail of
both the legitimate and fake certificates, the Trump
Campaign apparently became concerned that two States’
documents had not been received before the joint session.280
On January 4th, the Trump campaign asked Republican Party
officials in Wisconsin to fly their fake electors’ documents
to Washington, DC.281 Shortly after, staffers for
Representative Mike Kelly (R–PA) and Senator Ron Johnson
(R–WI) reached out to Vice President Pence’s Director of
Legislative Affairs, apparently seeking to deliver the fake
certificates.282 A message from Senator Johnson’s staffer
was sent just minutes before the beginning of the joint
session. This staffer stated that Senator Johnson wished to
hand-deliver to the Vice President the fake electors’
certificates from Michigan and Wisconsin. The Vice
President’s aide unambiguously turned him away.283
Vice President Pence made certain to call for objections as
well, in compliance with the Electoral Count Act. After the
tellers read off the votes cast for each State, he asked:
“Are there any objections to counting the certificate of
vote of the state . . . that the teller has verified,
appears to be regular in form and authentic?” 284
For most States, there were no objections. Republicans only
rose to object to the States that President Trump contested.
The first such state was Arizona. At approximately 1:46
p.m., Congressman Paul Gosar (R–AZ) announced his
objection.285 “I rise for myself and 60 of my colleagues to
object to the counting of the electoral ballots from
Arizona,” Gosar said.286
Vice President Pence then asked: “Is the objection in
writing and Signed by a senator?” It was. Senator Ted Cruz
endorsed the unfounded challenge to Arizona’s electoral
votes.287 Because the objections complied with the law, Vice
President Pence directed the House and Senate to withdraw
from the joint session so that the House and Senate could
separately debate and vote on the objection.288
When the joint session finally resumed after the attack on
the Capitol, the clerks announced the results of each
chamber’s vote. Just six U.S. Senators voted for the
objection to the counting of Arizona’s electoral college
votes. The objection was also defeated in the House, though
121 Republican Members voted to reject Arizona’s legitimate
electors.289 Pennsylvania was the only other State the
chambers debated, after the House’s objection was signed by
Senator Josh Hawley (R–Mo.).290
5.4 President Trump Endangers Pence’s Life, Causing the Vice
President, His Family, and Staff to Narrowly Miss the
Rioters as They Flee the Mob Attacking the Capitol.
As the debate over Arizona’s legitimate electors took place
on the Senate floor, the Vice President’s staff could see
trouble brewing outside.291 From inside the Vice President’s
ceremonial office, staffers witnessed the crowds swelling on
the east side of the Capitol. Then, the rioters broke
through security barriers.292 Jacob told young staffers that
they should stand back from the windows, because the Vice
President’s office was not “the most popular office on the
block right now.” 293
The Vice President was presiding over the Senate debate on
the Arizona objection when the noise from the rioters became
audible and those in the Senate Chamber realized the rioters
had entered the Capitol.294 The Secret Service evacuated
Vice President Pence from the Senate floor at 2:12 p.m.295
Twelve minutes later, at 2:24 p.m., President Trump tweeted
that Vice President Pence “didn’t have the courage to do
what should have been done to protect our country and our
Constitution.” 296 By that time, the Secret Service had
moved the Vice President to his ceremonial office across the
hall.297 But the situation was spiraling out of control—and
they wouldn’t stay there long. As Sarah Matthews, the Deputy
White House Press Secretary, later explained: President
Trump’s tweet was like “pouring gasoline on the fire.” 298
Thirty seconds after President Trump’s tweet, rioters who
were already inside the Capitol opened the East Rotunda door
just down the hall. A mere thirty seconds later, rioters
breached the crypt one floor below the Vice President.
Though the Vice President refused the Secret Service’s first
two attempts to evacuate him from his ceremonial office, the
situation quickly became untenable and the Vice President
was told that the Secret Service could no longer protect him
in this office in the Capitol that was quickly being
overrun.299 Marc Short recalls Tim Giebels, the head of the
Vice President’s Secret Service protective detail, saying,
“At this point, I can’t protect you behind these glass
doors, and so I need to move you.” 300 This time, the third,
the Secret Service was not asking the Vice President to
move; they were stating the fact that the Vice President
must be moved.301 At 2:20 p.m., NSC staff monitoring radio
communications reported that the second floor of the Capitol
and the door to the Senate Chamber “ha[ve] now been
breached.” 302
At 2:25 p.m., the Secret Service rushed the Vice President,
his family, and his senior staff down a flight of stairs,
through a series of hallways and tunnels to a secure
location.303 The Vice President and his team stayed in that
same location for the next four and a half hours.
The angry mob had come within 40 feet of the Vice President
as he was evacuated.304 President Trump never called to
check on Vice President Pence’s safety, so Marc Short called
Mark Meadows to tell him they were safe and secure.305 Short
himself became persona non grata with President Trump. The
President directed staff to revoke Short’s access to the
White House after Vice President Pence refused to betray his
oath to the Constitution.306 Marc Short never spoke with
President Trump again.307
After arriving at the secure location, the head of the Vice
President’s Secret Service detail wanted to move the Vice
President away from the Capitol, and staff hurried into the
waiting vehicles. But the Vice President refused to get in
the car.308 As Greg Jacob explained in his testimony to the
Select Committee:
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
The Vice President wouldn’t get in his car. . . . [H]e was
determined that unless there was imminent danger to bodily
safety that he was not going to abandon the Capitol and let
the rioters have a victory of having made the Vice President
flee or made it difficult to restart the process later that
day.309
It was an unprecedented scene in American history. The
President of the United States had riled up a mob that
hunted his own Vice President.
The Vice President’s staff came to believe that the theory
“pushed and sold” to the public that the Vice President had
a role to play in the joint session was a cause of the
attack on the Capitol. “The reason that the Capitol was
assaulted was that the people who were breaching the Capitol
believed that . . . the election [outcome] had not yet been
determined, and, instead, there was some action that was
supposed to take place in Washington, D.C., to determine
it,” Jacob said.310 “I do think [the violence] was the
result of that position being continuously pushed and sold
to people who ended up believing that with all their
hearts.” 311 The people had been “told that the Vice
President had the authority” to determine the outcome of the
election during the joint session.312
Of course, that was President Trump’s and John Eastman’s
plan all along—to convince people that the election had been
stolen, and that Vice President Pence could take action to
change the outcome during the joint session on January 6th.
Jacob was writing an email to Eastman when the Capitol was
breached.313 At 2:14 p.m., just before being evacuated,
Jacob hurriedly hit send on his email, but not before adding
the following: “thanks to your bullshit, we are now under
siege.” 314
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
Eastman quickly replied to Jacob’s email and, incredibly,
blamed Vice President Pence and Jacob for the attack. “The
‘siege’ is because YOU and your boss did not do what was
necessary to allow this to be aired in a public way so the
American people can see for themselves what happened,”
Eastman wrote.315 Naturally, Jacob was “somewhere between
aghast and livid.” 316 It was “ridiculous” to blame Vice
President Pence for the attack, when he simply followed the
law.317
The Joint Session Reconvenes: “Let’s Get Back to Work.”
The Senate reconvened at approximately 8:06 p.m.318
Congressional leadership and the Vice President insisted on
finishing the work of the people. “Today was a dark day in
the history of the United States Capitol,” Vice President
Pence said. “But thanks to the swift efforts of U.S. Capitol
Police, federal, state and local law enforcement, the
violence was quelled. The Capitol is secured, and the
people’s work continues.” The Vice President addressed
“those who wreaked havoc in our Capitol today,” saying “you
did not win.” Vice President Pence continued:
Violence never wins. Freedom wins. And this is still the
people’s house. And as we reconvene in this chamber, the
world will again witness the resilience and strength of our
democracy, for even in the wake of unprecedented violence
and vandalism at this Capitol, the elected representatives
of the people of the United States have assembled again on
the very same day to support and defend the Constitution of
the United States.
“Let’s get back to work,” Vice President Pence concluded.319
Despite the violence that had unfolded at the Capitol,
Eastman kept agitating for further delay. At 11:44 p.m. on
January 6th, Eastman sent yet another email to Greg
Jacob.320 In a shockingly tone-deaf manner, Eastman claimed
that the Electoral Count Act had been violated already, by
allowing debate beyond two hours, so—he argued—Vice
President Pence should no longer be concerned that what
President Trump and Eastman had pressured him to do also
would violate it.321 “Of course,” as Jacob pointed out, the
debate couldn’t have been completed in two hours due to the
“intervening riot of several hours.” 322
Eastman argued that Vice President Pence should “adjourn for
10 days to allow the legislatures to finish their
investigations, as well as to allow a full forensic audit of
the massive amount of illegal activity that has occurred
here.” 323 Eastman described this—a delay in the
certification of the vote and the peaceful transfer of power
with no legal or historical precedent or support, based on
entirely specious and disproven allegations of election
fraud, following on a violent attack on the seat of American
democracy—as a “relatively minor violation.” 324
Vice President Pence later described Eastman’s email as
“rubber room stuff,” meaning it was certifiably crazy.325
5.5 Aftermath of the Attack.
Eastman called Herschmann on January 7th to discuss
litigation on behalf of the Trump Campaign in Georgia.326
This gave Herschmann another opportunity to lay into
Eastman. “[Are] you out of your F’ing mind?” Herschmann
asked. “I only want to hear two words coming out of your
mouth from now on: orderly transition.” Herschmann said.
After some berating, Eastman repeated after Herschmann:
“Orderly transition.” “Now I’m going to give you the best
free legal advice you’re ever getting in your life,”
Herschmann said. “Get a great F’ing criminal defense lawyer,
you’re going to need it.” 327 Days afterward, Eastman sent
an email to Giuliani, making a request that tacitly
acknowledged just how much trouble he was in: “I’ve decided
that I should be on the pardon list, if that is still in the
works.” 328
Vice President Pence and his team never bowed to President
Trump’s relentless pressure. They began January 6, 2021,
with a prayer. The attack on the U.S. Capitol delayed the
peaceful transfer of power. The joint session did not end
until early in the morning on January 7th.
At 3:50 a.m. that morning, Short texted Vice President Pence
a passage from Second Timothy, chapter 4, verse 7: “I fought
the good fight. I finished the race. I have kept the
faith.” 329
ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan.
26, 2022), pp. 10-11.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan.
26, 2022), pp. 10-11.
3. See, e.g., Ivan E. Raiklin (Former Green Beret Commander)
(@Raiklin), Twitter, Dec. 22, 2020, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201222232155/https://twitter.com/Raiklin/status/1341520753984942081
(archived) (“America, @VP @Mike_Pence MUST do this,
tomorrow!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Dec. 23, 2020 7:40:30 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201224033528/http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
(archived).
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb.
1, 2022), pp. 95, (“[T]he Vice President mostly asked a
series of questions in that meeting of Mr. Eastman”), 130
(Q: “Did John Eastman ever admit, as far as you know, in
front of the President that his proposal would violate the
Electoral Count Act?” A: “I believe he did on the 4th.” Q:
“Okay. And can you tell us what the President’s reaction
was?” A: “A I can’t.”); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000107 (Greg Jacob memo to Vice President Pence, titled
“Analysis of Professor Eastman’s Proposals”).
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb.
1, 2022), p. 96 (Eastman acknowledging that the legal basis
for his proposed paths was the same and, as recounted by
Greg Jacob, “[y]ou couldn’t get there either way unless you
. . . set aside a number of the positions of the Electoral
Count Act”).
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan.
26, 2022), pp. 26-27 (“But just to pick up on that, Mr.
Short, was it your impression that the Vice President had
directly conveyed his position on these issues to the
President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague
Letter, but directly to President Trump?” A: “Many times.”
Q: “And had been consistent in conveying his position to the
President?” A: “Very consistent.”).
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan.
26, 2022), pp. 18-20.
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (U.S. Secret Service Production), CTRL0000092958
(January 6, 2021, message at 10:39 a.m. ET).
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (US Secret Service Production), CTRL0000092978
(January 6, 2021, message at 10:43 a.m. ET).
10. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol
Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
11. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol
Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
12. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol
Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
13. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346900434540240897
(archived).
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Rebecca
Shabad, “Noose Appears Near Capitol; Protesters Seen
Carrying Confederate Flags,” NBC News, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/live-blog/electoral-college-certification-updates-n1252864/ncrd1253129#blogHeader.
15. See Quint Forgey, “‘Almost No Idea More Un-American’:
Pence Breaks with Trump on Jan. 6,” Politico, (June 25,
2021), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/25/pence-trump-jan-6-496237.
16. Statement by Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the
United States of America, Jan. 30, 2022, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20220131171840/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/news/news-8nkdvatd7g1481
(archived) (“If the Vice President (Mike Pence) had
‘absolutely no right’ to change the Presidential Election
results in the Senate, despite fraud and many other
irregularities, how come the Democrats and RINO Republicans,
like Wacky Susan Collins, are desperately trying to pass
legislation that will not allow the Vice President to change
the results of the election? Actually, what they are saying,
is that Mike Pence did have the right to change the outcome,
and they now want to take that right away. Unfortunately, he
didn’t exercise that power, he could have overturned the
Election!”) (emphasis added).
17. Mike Allen, “Exclusive Audio: Trump Defends Threats to
‘Hang’ Pence,” Axios, (Nov. 12, 2021), available at
available at
https://www.axios.com/2021/11/12/trump-hang-mike-pence-january-6-audio
(“Jonathan Karl: ‘Were you worried about him during that
siege? Were you worried about his safety?’ Trump: ‘No, I
thought he was well-rotected, and I had heard that he was in
good shape. No. Because I had heard he was in very good
shape. But, but, no, I think—’ Karl: ‘Because you heard
those chants—that was terrible. I mean—’ Trump: ‘He could
have—well, the people were very angry.’ Karl: ‘They were
saying ‘hang Mike Pence.’’ Trump: ‘Because it’s common
sense, Jon. It’s common sense that you’re supposed to
protect. How can you—if you know a vote is fraudulent,
right?—how can you pass on a fraudulent vote to Congress?
How can you do that?’) (emphasis added).
18. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
19. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 36, 40, 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d
1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM)
(“Based on the evidence, the Court finds that it is more
likely than not that President Trump and Eastman dishonestly
conspired to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on
January 6, 2021.”).
20. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708. This
document was ordered to be produced to the Select Committee
by Judge Carter over Eastman’s assertion of attorney-client
privilege and upon a finding that the crime-fraud exception
to the attorney-client privilege applied. Order Re Privilege
of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 41-42, Eastman v.
Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708.
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708.
24. Neither Eastman nor Chesebro provided substantive
answers in response to the Select Committee’s questions
about the development of this strategy. See Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of John Eastman, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Chesebro, (Oct.
25, 2022). It is thus difficult to determine who first
suggested this concept. Evidence obtained by the Select
Committee suggests that key players like Eastman, Giuliani,
and Epshteyn were starting to discuss the Vice President’s
role at the joint session in late November or early
December. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 71–73
(discussing conversations involving Mark Meadows, Rudolph
Giuliani’s legal team, and Members of Congress in late
November or early December); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman023534 (December 5, 2020 email from John Eastman
remarking that “folks at the top of the chain of command on
this . . . are now aware of the issues”). See also Michael
Wolff, Landslide: The Final Days of the Trump Presidency
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2021), p. 135 (describing
post-Thanksgiving outreach from Boris Epshteyn to the White
House regarding the Vice President theory).
25. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 41-42, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156,
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (“Because
the memo likely furthered the crimes of obstruction of an
official proceeding and conspiracy to defraud the United
States, it is subject to the crime-fraud exception and the
Court ORDERS it to be disclosed.”).
26. The Select Committee’s investigation found that Eastman
was communicating about the joint session with Kenneth
Chesebro in December 2020. See e.g., Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chapman University
Production), Chapman053460, Chapman053475 (December 23,
2020, emails between John Eastman, Kenneth Chesebro, and
Boris Epshteyn regarding procedural proposals for joint
session).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976. This
memo was originally obtained by the Washington Post’s Bob
Woodward and Robert Costa and subsequently published by CNN.
“READ: Trump Lawyer’s Memo on Six-Step Plan for Pence to
Overturn the Election,” CNN, (Sept. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/21/politics/read-eastman-memo/index.html.
28. Under the Constitution, if no candidate receives a
majority of electoral college votes, this triggers a process
where the House of Representatives decides the president.
When that happens, each State gets one vote for President,
chosen by the Representatives from that state. The candidate
who receives a majority of the 50 State votes becomes the
president. At the time, there were more Republicans than
Democrats in 26 of the 50 State House delegations, leading
Eastman to predict that “President Trump [would be]
re-elected” under that scenario. See Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chapman University
Production), Chapman052976.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976. Note
that Eastman has acknowledged the authenticity of a publicly
disclosed version of this document, describing it as “a
preliminary, incomplete draft” of “the legal memo [he] wrote
in January.” John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal
Conduct from Deciding an Election Is Not Endorsing a
‘Coup’,” American Greatness, (Sept. 30, 2021), available at
https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/
(linking to two-page document titled “PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL, January 6 scenario, available at
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2021/images/09/20/eastman.memo.pdf).
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053561
(December 23, 2020 email from John Eastman to Molly
Michael).
31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Verizon Production, July 11, 2022) (Dec. 23, 2020
cellular data records from John Eastman). The morning that
Eastman began preparing the memo, he received a call from
Boris Epshteyn at 8:58 am. Eleven minutes later, Eastman
called Chesebro, and the two spoke for over 41 minutes.
Eastman continued to trade calls with Epshteyn and Chesebro
throughout the day. See Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, July 11, 2022)
(December 23, 2020, phone records for John Eastman).
32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976, p. 2
(Memo regarding January 6 scenario).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003226.
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228. Note
that this letter refers to, and purports to supplement, the
recommendations of what Eastman described in his
correspondence with Mr. Colbert as “a major war game
simulation” that he claimed—on October 24, 2020—was “already
before the President and his team.” Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Chapman University
Production), Chapman031983. The war game exercise in which
Eastman participated is reflected in a report issued by the
Claremont Institute and the Texas Public Policy Foundation.
“79 Days Report”, (Oct. 20, 2020), available at
https://www.texaspolicy.com/79-days-to-inauguration-taskforce-report/.
35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228
(emphasis added).
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983.
37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023534.
38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983.
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo
regarding January 6 scenarios).
40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo
regarding January 6 scenarios).
41. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052966
(December 23, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro).
42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo
regarding January 6 scenarios).
43. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo
regarding January 6 scenarios).
44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo
regarding January 6).
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26; see also id., at 36-377
(stating that he did not understand Eastman’s statement to
be suggesting that violence would be justified to keep
President Trump in office).
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 28.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26, 28-29.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 142, 152.
53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000731.
Neither this memo, nor a December 8, 2020, memo that
followed, reflects the full advice that Greg Jacob
ultimately gave to the Vice President regarding the joint
session. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg
Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 10–11, 32. The OVP Legal Staff
memo, dated October 26, 2020, is titled “The
Unconstitutionality of the Electoral Count Act.” This memo
adopts certain legal academics’ criticism of the Electoral
Count Act and introduces several concepts that would later
be cited by proponents of the theory of an expansive view of
the Vice President’s power. Greg Jacob’s legal memo to the
Vice President, dated December 8, 2020, notes that the
Electoral Count Act prescribes the process for counting
electoral votes “to the extent it is constitutional” and
seems to allow for the possibility of the Vice President
“assert[ing] a constitutional privilege.” Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 079P-R0000785. Through his extensive research
and analysis, Greg Jacob’s understanding developed both as
to the legal and historical precedent for the joint session
and ultimately led him to the unavoidable conclusions that,
one, the Electoral Count Act governed the joint session and,
two, its procedures had never been deviated from since it
was passed.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob
Deposition, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 11–13, 25–26 (noting that
Marc Short didn’t “name names” of the people he was
concerned would encourage the President to prematurely
declare victory).
55. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
079VP-R000011579_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0002 (November 3,
2020, Greg Jacob memo to Marc Short, titled “Electoral Vote
Count”). The Election Day memo identifies the 12th Amendment
and the Electoral Count Act as the relevant legal framework,
but leaves open “whether it is the Vice President, or
Congress, that has ultimate constitutional authority to
decide electoral vote disputes.” It also represents an
incomplete understanding of the factual precedents,
describing then-Vice President Nixon’s conduct in January
1961 as “single-handedly resolv[ing] a dispute over
competing slates of electors that were submitted by the
State of Hawaii.” (In fact, after additional research Jacob
concluded the opposite was true.) As addressed elsewhere in
this chapter, this memo does not reflect Greg Jacob’s full
legal analysis or ultimate advice, nor the Vice President’s
conclusion, about the authority of the Vice President at the
joint session.
56. Daniel Villarreal, “Lincoln Project Ad Tells Trump That
Pence ‘Will Put the Nail in Your Political Coffin’,”
Newsweek, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/lincoln—project-ad-tells-trump-that-pence-will-put-nail-your-political-coffin-1553331.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 13; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun.
16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26,
2022), pp. 135–36 (noting the ad buy was limited to “D.C.
and Palm Beach”).
58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000785_0001,
079P-R0000785_0002, 079P-R0000785_0003, 079P-R0000785_0004
(December 8, 2020, Greg Jacob memo to Vice President Pence,
titled “January 6 Process for Electoral Vote Count”); see
also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 32. This December 8, 2020, memo reflects
Jacob’s more detailed understanding of the mechanics of
“modern practice” under the Electoral Count Act, including
the process by which the House and Senate separate to debate
a member of the House’s objection if it is signed by a
Senator, but not the full analysis of the precedent that
Jacob would ultimately do before January 6, 2021.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 102.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 33, 102.
61. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl 3; U.S. Const., Amend. XII.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 14–16.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 14–16.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. In
testimony given at a Select Committee hearing, Judge Luttig
disagreed with Jacob’s characterization of the sentence
carried through from the Constitution to the 12th Amendment,
describing it instead as “pristine[ly] clear,” but the
witnesses were in agreement that there was “no basis in the
Constitution or laws of the United States at all for the
theory espoused by Mr. Eastman.” Id.; see Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (“I am
in complete agreement with Judge Luttig; it is unambiguous
that the Vice President does not have the authority to
reject electors.”). Note that Vice President Pence
apparently agreed with Jacob regarding the clarity of the
Constitutional language, as Jacob testified that he joked,
“I can’t wait to go to heaven and meet the Framers and tell
them, ‘The work that you did in putting together our
Constitution is a work of genius. Thank you. It was divinely
inspired. There is one sentence that I would like to talk to
you a little bit about.’” Id.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
67. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435,
(No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
68. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2022), p. 443.
69. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435,
(No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
70. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435,
(No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
71. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435,
(No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.
72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman055337
(December 22, 2020, John Eastman email to William Olson,
Larry Joseph, Mark Martin, Kurt Olson, Kris Kobach, Phillip
Jauregui, Pat McSweeney, and Don Brown, titled “Re: Draft
Complaint”).
73. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021
at 6, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D.
Cal. 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman055337
(December 22, 2020, William Olson email to Larry Joseph,
Mark Martin, Kurt Olson, Kris Kobach, John Eastman, Phillip
Jauregui, Pat McSweeney, and Don Brown, titled “Re: Draft
Complaint”).
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 42–45;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman
University Production), Chapman003584, (January 4, 2021,
emails between John Eastman and Andrew Pappas, coordinating
the call between Eastman and Speaker Bowers). Eastman also
asked Speaker Bowers to sign a letter drafted by Arizona
Rep. Mark Finchem directed to Vice President Pence asking
him not to certify the election on January 6th; Bowers
refused. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 45–46.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 46. Speaker
Bowers had already addressed publicly both the pressure he
was receiving to overturn the result of the election as well
as his firm belief that doing so would violate his oath of
office. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rusty Bowers Production), CTRL0000062389 (Nov. 18,
2020, Dear Colleague letter with attached “Post-Election
Frequently Asked Questions”), Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Rusty Bowers Production),
CTRL0000071098_00069 (December 4, 2020, Press Release titled
“Speaker Bowers Addresses Calls for the Legislature to
Overturn 2020 Certified Election Results).
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Russell “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 46. Speaker
Bowers also received a call on the morning of January 6th
from Representative Andy Biggs in which Rep. Biggs asked
Speaker Bowers to sign a letter being sent by other Arizona
legislators and/or to support decertification of Arizona’s
electors; Speaker Bowers again refused. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
78. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, 443 (E.D.
Tx. 2021).
79. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2021).
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 132–34.
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (John McEntee Production), McEntee0001 (document
titled “JEFFERSON USED HIS POSITION AS VP TO WIN”).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000236-000238
(John McEntee note and drafted analysis, titled “PENCE CAN
LET THE STATES DECIDE”). Note that the Select Committee
received both documents from the National Archives in a
format consistent with the documents having been torn apart
and taped back together.
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000236-237 (John
McEntee note and drafted analysis, titled “PENCE CAN LET THE
STATES DECIDE”).
84. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000237; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28,
2022), p. 147.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 147-48.
86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Short production), J6C-TSM-0001, J6C-TSM-0002. Note
that the file name of the document
(“MEMO_POTUS_January6VPAction.pdf”) is visible in an email
in which Marc Short forwards to Greg Jacob the memo received
from Mark Meadows. Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000033, VP-R0000034.
87. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000034.
88. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007206Ellis.
89. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007472Ellis.
90. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), CTRL0000916457_00002,
(January 5, 2021, memo from Jenna Ellis to Jay Sekulow).
This document was published by Politico on December 10,
2021. Betsy Woodruff Swan and Kyle Cheney, “Trump Campaign
Lawyer Authored 2 Memos Claiming Pence Could Halt Biden’s
Victory,” Politico, (Dec. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/10/trump-lawyer-pence-biden-524088.
In response to a Select Committee subpoena, Ellis produced a
privilege log reflecting several communications from Ellis
to Sekulow on January 5 and 6, 2021, each of which was
described as “[e]mail discussion of internal legal strategy
for possible pending litigation.”
91. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), CTRL0000916457_00002
(January 5, 2021, memo from Ellis to Jay Sekulow).
92. Politico (@politico), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 2:31 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/politico/status/1346539955724681221 (“‘I
actually don’t think that’s what the Constitution has in
mind,’ Jay Sekulow, the chief counsel of the American Center
for Law & Justice, says about the possibility of Pence
rejecting the Electoral College results”).
93. Politico (@politico), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 2:31 p.m.
ET, available at
https://twitter.com/politico/status/1346539955724681221.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 208.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 208.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 68; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 19, 113. Matt Morgan
was at the time a lawyer with Elections, LLC serving as
General Counsel of the Trump Campaign and also acting as
counsel to Vice President Pence’s leadership PAC.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117, 125 (“I had no
question about what he was going to do on January 6th.”).
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 68. See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p.
179 (stating that the reasons why Vice President Pence
wanted to issue a public statement included the public
discourse, letters from State legislators, and reporting
about communications between the President and Vice
President).
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 166-68 (“I’m not aware of any evidence
that the campaign had, and I’m not aware of any evidence the
campaign shared with our office that would have again
provided specific evidence of theft or fraud that would have
had a material change in any of the States.”).
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt
Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 99–00; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
36-37.
102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000745; see
also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 38. Following the meeting on January 2,
2021, Greg Jacob shared the following memo with Matt Morgan.
See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack, (Matt Morgan
Production), AGSC16-000103.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 61-62.
104. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000066; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt Morgan,
(Apr. 25, 2022), p. 74 (“My view, for an electoral count
vote to count, you need a certificate of ascertainment and
then the vote of the elector itself, that the vote of an
elector without a certificate of ascertainment would not be
validly submitted.”).
105. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000698; see
also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production),00131; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p.
128 (stating that as of the date of this memo, January 2,
2021, “there were no open questions at that point that I’m
aware of.”).
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 52.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 68-69. Jacob shared a draft version of
the statement with Matt Morgan. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25,
2022), pp. 119-120. This draft version clearly set forth
Vice President Pence’s position, “I Preside, Congress
Decides.” The draft statement read: I cannot believe that
the Framers, who above all else feared the concentrated
power of a Caesar, intended to appoint a single individual,
often directly interested in the outcome, to unilaterally
determine the validity of electoral votes. In the wrong
hands, such a power would be the undoing of the Republic.”
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Matt
Morgan Production), AGSC16-000149.
108. Philip Rucker, Josh Dawsey, ‘‘Growing Number of Trump
Loyalists in the Senate Vow to Challenge Biden’s Victory,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senators-challenge-election/2021/01/02/81a4e5c4-4c7d-11eb-a9d9-1e3ec4a928b9_story.html.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 166–68.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 165-66.
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
3 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
6 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
116. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
8 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p.
7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
119. Andrew Kaczynski, Em Steck, “Trump Lawyer John Eastman
Said ‘Courage and the Spine’ Would Help Pence Send Election
to the House in Comments before January 6,” CNN, (Oct. 30,
2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/30/politics/kfile-john-eastman-said-pence-could-throw-election-to-house/index.html.
120. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171 (January 3, 2021,
6-page Eastman memo). Note that Eastman publicly disclosed
this document, describing it as “the final version of [his]
memo” and embedding it with a filename “Jan 3 Memo on Jan 6
Scenario.” John C. Eastman, “Trying to Prevent Illegal
Conduct From Deciding an Election Is Not Endorsing a
‘Coup’,” American Greatness, (Sept. 30, 2021), available at
https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/.
Eastman has also tried to rewrite history with regard to
this memo, arguing that it noted that Congress has the power
to make the final determination regarding electoral votes,
even though the memo concludes, “[t]he fact is that the
Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as the
ultimate arbiter. We should take all of our actions with
that in mind.” See John McCormack, “John Eastman vs. the
Eastman Memo,” National Review, (Oct. 22, 2021), available
at
https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/john-eastman-vs-the-eastman-memo
(emphasis added).
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, pp. 4-5 (January 3,
2021, 6-page Eastman memo) .
122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021,
6-page Eastman memo) (describing the majority of the “TRUMP
WINS” scenarios as resulting from the Vice President
unilaterally determining “which” electoral slate from a
State is valid, after “asserting that the authority to make
that determination under the 12th Amendment . . . is his
alone (and anything in the Electoral Count Act to the
contrary is therefore unconstitutional).”).
123. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021,
6-page Eastman memo) p. 5.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021,
6-page Eastman memo) p. 2; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman052976 (December 23, 2020, 2-page Eastman memo).
125. John C. Eastman, “Constitutional Statesmanship,”
Claremont Review of Books, (Fall 2021) available at
https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/constitutional-statesmanship/.
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman043035
(December 19, 2020, email from John Eastman to Bruce
Colbert, re: Latest draft). It is not clear what
relationship or connection existed between John Eastman and
Bruce Colbert before the election; documents produced to the
Select Committee demonstrate that Eastman and Mr. Colbert
exchanged dozens of emails during the time period covered by
the Select Committee’s subpoena to Chapman University
(November 3, 2020, to January 20, 2021).
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun. 16, 2022),
available at
[https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.] (Judge
Luttig testifying, “[T]here was no support whatsoever in
either the Constitution of the United States nor the laws of
the United States for the Vice President, frankly, ever to
count alternative electoral slates from the States that had
not been officially certified by the designated State
official in the Electoral Count Act of 1887.”).
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475,
(December 23, 2020, email from John Eastman to Boris
Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, “FW: Draft 2, with edits”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman
University Production), Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020,
2-page Eastman memo).
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman063984
(January 10, 2021, email from John Eastman to Valerie Moon,
re: Tell us in layman’s language, what the heck happened
with the dual electors? Please?). This email appears to be a
response by Eastman to an unsolicited email from a member of
the public.
130. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman063984
(January 10, 2021, email from John Eastman to Valerie Moon,
re: Tell us in layman’s language, what the heck happened
with the dual electors? Please?).
131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3,
2021, 6-page Eastman memo).
132. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3,
2021, 6-page Eastman memo).
133. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3,
2021, 6-page Eastman memo).
134. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3,
2021, 6-page Eastman memo).
135. The pressure placed on the Vice President by the
President was a “multiweek campaign” that reached a
crescendo in the days before January 6th. Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 33.
The Vice President’s Chief of Staff, Marc Short, saw the
separation between the President and the Vice President
building for weeks. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 34–35, 216-17.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 191, 204-05; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 82;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 191, 204-05.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 49
(regarding the declaration of martial law), 56 (regarding
the appointment of Sidney Powell as special counsel), 58–59,
66 (regarding the seizure of voting machines), 110
(regarding the elevation of Jeff Clark to Acting Attorney
General).
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick
Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 5. Philbin told the Select
Committee that in the end he decided not to resign out of a
sense of obligation: “All of the pilots can’t jump off the
plane because there’s still a lot of passengers in the back
and we need to land the plane.”
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick
Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 79 (“My
view was that the Vice President didn’t have the legal
authority to do anything except what he did.”), 81
(testifying that his views on the role of the Vice President
were “extremely aligned” with the Vice President’s staff),
88 (“I thought that the Vice President did not have the
authority to do what was being suggested under a proper
reading of the law.”); See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13,
2022).
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85–86.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 94
(testifying that the privileged interaction that resulted in
his exclusion from the meeting took place in the presence of
Meadows and Eastman, but before the Vice President, Short,
and Jacob arrived).
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85–86
(“I did walk to that meeting and I did go into the Oval
Office with the idea of attending that meeting, and then I
ultimately did not attend the meeting.”).
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86, 94.
Cipollone refused to describe further why he didn’t attend
the meeting—“[t]he reasons for that are privileged”—and
would not tell the Select Committee whether he voluntarily
decided not to attend or was told not to.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Antony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85, 88.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 88–89 (“[A]t the meeting on the 4th,
Eastman expressed the view that both paths were legally
viable.”).
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 89. See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 90
(“I think that was threaded throughout, that, again, both
were legally viable but that the preferred course would be
to send it back to the States.”), 91 (“. . . he [Eastman]
thought that the more prudent course was a procedural send
it back to the States, rather than reject electors.”), 93
(“On the 4th, I think that he said that both were legally
viable options. But I do think that he said that he was not
saying that that was the one that the Vice President should
do.”).
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 89, 91 (“[H]e thought that the more
prudent course was a procedural send it back to the states,
rather than reject electors”), 96 (“[M]y impression was he
was thinking more acceptance [by] the country of the action
taken”). See also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearings on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June
16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 96; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June
16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 95, 130 (Q: “Did John Eastman ever
admit, as far as you know, in front of the President that
his proposal would violate the Electoral Count Act?” A: “I
believe he did on the 4th.” Q: “Okay. And can you tell us
what the President’s reaction was?” A: “A I can’t.”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (Greg Jacob
writing after the Oval Office meeting on January 4th,
“Professor Eastman acknowledges that his proposal violates
several provisions of statutory law.”).
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 202–03.
155. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 127.
156. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107
(“Professor Eastman acknowledges that his proposal violates
several provisions of statutory law”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
127–28.
157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.
158. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107. Jacob
notes in his memo that Eastman’s proposal also “contradicted
the opinion authored by Republican Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Bradley as the decided vote on the Electoral
Commission of 1877.” Whereas Eastman wanted the Vice
President to refer the manufactured dispute over slates of
electors back to the State legislatures, Justice Bradley
wrote that the President of the Senate (the Vice President)
“is not invested with any authority for making any
investigation outside of the joint meeting of the two
Houses.”
159. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107
(“[Professor Eastman] stated that in his view, the
imprimatur of approval by a State legislature is important
to the legitimacy of counting any slate of electors other
than the one initially certified by the State’s
executive.”).
160. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.
161. When pressed by Eric Herschmann on whether states
really wanted to certify an alternate slate, and why they
hadn’t taken steps to do so on their own, Eastman had no
explanation or response. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 28–29.
162. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107
(“Professor Eastman does not recommend that the Vice
President assert that he has the authority unilaterally to
decide which of the competing slates of electors should be
counted”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg
Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 127.
163. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000085.
165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000182,
VP-R0000183, VP-R0000180, VP-R0000181; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
102–03 (“[I]n fact, there were no materials, new materials
that were actually presented to me by Mr. Eastman . . . I
was open to receiving anything that anybody wanted to give
me that might bear on that question . . . But I also
correctly was of the view that I had already looked at
everything and that we knew [] where we stood.”).
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 95.
167. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ (“Hello, Georgia, by the way.
There’s no way we lost Georgia. There’s no way. That was a
rigged election, but we’re still fighting it and you’ll see
what’s going to happen. We’ll talk about it.”).
168. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ.
169. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia:
Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 96, 105; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 201; Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), VP-R0000182.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short
Deposition (Jan. 26, 2022) p. 201; see also, Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1,
2022) pp. 92, 94, 106; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun.
16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
172. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Greg Jacobs Production), CTRL0000070421, p. 1 (Jan.
5, 2021, Greg Jacob handwritten notes).
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; See also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb.
1, 2022), pp. 92 (“He, again, came into the meeting saying,
‘What I’m here to ask you to do is to reject the
electors.’”).
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 93–95. Eastman acknowledged to Jacob
that the previous day’s discussions had included the “send
it back to the states” path, but he reaffirmed that the ask
on the morning of January 5th was to reject electors
outright. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg
Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 105; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (“So on
the 4th, that had been the path that he had said, ‘I am not
recommending that you do that,’ but on the 5th, he came in
and expressly requested that.”).
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24-25.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26-27.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 24.
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 24.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 107, 117.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 107–08. Jacob debated with Eastman all
of the historical examples, concluding that in “the 130
years of practice” the Electoral Count Act had been followed
“every single time”; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 109-10.
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 108. What Jacob found when he looked into
the Nixon example is that first, there were no competing
slates of electors from Hawaii. In fact, a Republican slate
was originally certified by the outgoing Governor, but after
a judicially ordered recount, it was clear that the
Democratic candidate had won, and the incoming Governor
certified a new slate consistent with the outcome of the
election after the recount. Then-Vice President Nixon, when
he arrived at Hawaii in the joint session, “magnanimously”
acknowledged that it was clear that Hawaii’s votes for
Kennedy were the correct votes and called for objections (of
which there were none). This precedent was therefore an
example of the Vice President complying with the Electoral
Count Act’s procedures regarding objections to electors. See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb.
1, 2022), pp. 15-16.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110 (“[H]e ultimately acknowledged that
none of [the Justices] would actually back this position
when you took into account the fact that what you have is a
mildly ambiguous [constitutional provision], a nonsensical
result that has all kinds of terrible policy implications,
and uniform historical practice against it”).
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110.
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 111. Jacob told the Select Committee he
did not know to whom Eastman was referring when he indicated
“they” would be disappointed that Vice President Pence had
not been convinced it was appropriate to reject electors.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 95–96, 210–11.
187. J. Michael Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
9:53 a.m. ET, et seq., available at
https://twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592
(“The only responsibility and power of the Vice President
under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral
college votes as they have been cast,”).
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 151-52.
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 151-52.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 152, 209; see also Tom Hamburger, Josh
Dawsey, and Jacqueline Alemany, “Jan. 6 Panel Grapples with
How to Secure Testimony from Lawmakers, Pence,” Washington
Post, (Jan. 15, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/15/jan-6-subpoenas-committee
(“‘I did not notice any hesitation on his part,’ Quayle said
of his conversation with Pence. ‘I interpreted his questions
as looking for confirmation that what he was going to do was
right and that he had no flexibility. That’s the way I read
it. Given the pressure he was under, I thought it was
perfectly normal, very smart on his part to call me.’”).
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 157.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 158; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 215-17.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 157-58.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 215.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 216.
196. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, Peril, (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2021), p. 229; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 215-16.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 160.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 220-22; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 116, 120. Note
that Marc Short recalled that it was this afternoon phone
call that led to the in-person meeting between Eastman and
Jacob, however, documents received by the Select Committee
and Jacob’s more detailed recollection of his interactions
with Eastman establishes that the in-person meeting occurred
in the morning of January 5, 2021.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
(describing the message on this phone call between the Vice
President and President Trump with Eastman’s participation
as, “Well, we hear you loud and clear, you are not going to
reject. But remember last night, I said that there was this
more prudent course where you could just send it back to the
States? Would you be willing to do that[?]”); see also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb.
1, 2022), pp. 96-97, 120.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 121.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 121-22 (describing calls from Eastman
and at least one other lawyer (likely either Kurt Olsen or
Bill Olson)).
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 123 (recounting Eastman’s argument that
election fraud was resulting in the Constitution being
“shredded across all these different states” and comparing
it to the Civil War).
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-24.
205. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have
Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,” New
York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106003845/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.
The same Times reporters had also published on January 4th
an article again accurately reporting that President Trump
“had directly pressed Mr. Pence to find an alternative to
certifying Mr. Biden’s win.” Annie Karni and Maggie
Haberman, “Pence’s Choice: Side with the Constitution or His
Boss,” New York Times, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/us/politics/pence-trump.html.
206. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have
Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,” New
York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.
207. Maggie Haberman and Anne Karni, “Pence Said to Have
Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,” New
York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106003845/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html
(archived version showing original publication date of Jan.
5, 2021, at 7:36 p.m. ET).
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 169-70.
209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439,
(CTRL0000082597) (January 5, 2021, White House Presidential
call log).
210. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439,
(CTRL0000082597) (January 5, 2021, White House Presidential
call log).
211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439,
(CTRL0000082597) (January 5, 2021, White House Presidential
call log).
212. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021,
9:58 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367?lang=en
(emphasis added); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 175 (“[T]ypically on
these, I might have a couple of wording suggestions . . .
ultimately the way this came out was the way he wanted [it]
to.”); see id at 174-76.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26,
2022), p. 224; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris
Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 184-85.
214. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021,
9:58 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367?lang=en.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 161 (“[W]hoever drafted the statement it
was not accurate.”).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 161.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 163.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 223.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 223.
220. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000082597,
(reflecting calls with Mr. Stephen Bannon on Jan. 5, 2021,
from 8:57 a.m. to 9:08 a.m. and from 9:46 p.m. to 9:52
p.m.).
221. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082317
(Jan. 5, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript) (Bannon:
“All hell is going to break loose tomorrow. Just understand
this: All hell is going to break loose tomorrow. It’s going
to be quick . . . It’s the fog of war.” Bannon discussed
putting Sen. Grassley’s number on the screen, and suggested
they encourage users at TheDonald.win to contact the
Senator. (At the time, users at TheDonald.win were openly
planning for violence and to surround the U.S. Capitol on
January 6. See Chapter 6.) Bannon told his audience. “I’ll
tell you this, it’s not going to happen like you think it’s
going to happen, Ok? It’s going to be quite extraordinarily
different. And all I can say is strap in.”).
222. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription) CTRL0000082317,
(Jan. 5, 2021) (Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Select Committee Transcription) CTRL0000082317,
(Jan. 5, 2021) (Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).
224. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s
Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021),
p. 252.
225. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s
Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021),
p. 263.
226. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s
Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021),
p. 271.
227. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s
Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021),
p. 252.
228. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of America’s
Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021),
p. 263.
229. See e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27 (“But just to pick up on that,
Mr. Short, was it your impression that the Vice President
had directly conveyed his position on these issues to the
President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague
Letter, but directly to President Trump?” A: “Many times.”
Q: “And had been consistent in conveying his position to the
President?” A: “Very consistent.”); see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 102 (“[T]hat’s where the Vice President started.
That’s where he stayed the entire way.”); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p.
181 (“I believe that the Vice President was consistent in
his understanding of the law and the precedent and his
belief as to what his authority was and was not on January
6th.”).
231. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346698217304584192
(archived).
232. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106131747/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346808075626426371
(archived).
233. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106132244/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346809349214248962
(archived).
234. At 9:02 a.m., President Trump instructed the White
House operator to call back with the Vice President; the
operator instead informed the President at 9:15 a.m. that a
message was left for the Vice President. Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), P-R000261 (Presidential Call Log, White House
Switchboard), P-R000255 (Daily Diary).
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (“11:20 –c
w/ VPOTUS”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (“The
President talked on a phone call to an unidentified
person”); see also Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 12 (stating that a
military aide interrupted Pence’s meeting with staff to
inform the Vice President that the President was holding to
speak with him).
236. Present in the Oval Office during the call with the
Vice President were Melania Trump, Donald Trump, Jr., Ivanka
Trump, Eric Trump, Kimberly Guilfoyle, and Lara Trump, as
well as Mark Meadows, Stephen Miller, Eric Herschmann, and
Gen. Keith Kellogg. See Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 30-32, 37.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 39.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 41.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford,
(May 24, 2022), pp. 17-18.
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford,
(May 24, 2022), p. 19 (“And the word that she relayed to you
that the President called the Vice President—apologize for
being impolite—but do you remember what she said her father
called him?” “The ‘P’word.”). See also Peter Baker, Maggie
Haberman, and Annie Karni, “Pence Reached His Limit with
Trump. It Wasn’t Pretty,” New York Times, (Jan. 12, 2021),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-pence-trump.html;
Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show,
(New York: Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273–74 (“[Y]ou said, ‘You
can be a patriot or you can be a pussy.’ Did you really say
that or is that an incorrect report? ‘‘I wouldn’t dispute
it,’ [President Trump] answered.”).
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg,
(Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald J. Trump, Jr., (May
3, 2022), p. 84 (“I know the line of questioning was about
sending it back to the States, but that’s about the extent
of my recollection.”).
244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg,
(Dec. 14, 2021), p. 91 (“Q: [Y]ou said he told the Vice
President that he has the legal authority to reject certain
votes. Is that what you said? A: That he had the
constitutional authority to do that, yes.”); see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 48 (describing it as “a
general discussion about the legal and constitutional
authority of the VP”).
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg,
(Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 169.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9,
2022).
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 40–41.
249. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
250. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat,’” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
251. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat,’” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
252. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat,’” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat
(“We now have letters from five legislators begging us to do
that. They’re asking us. Georgia, Pennsylvania, Arizona,
Wisconsin, and one other coming in.”).
253. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Marc Short Production), J6C-TSM-0003, J6C-TSM-0004,
(January 6, 2021, email from Molly Michael to March Short
containing subject line “2057Rayburn_20210106_002040.pdf”
and an attached letter). The letter bore the signatures of
19 of the 60 members of the Arizona House and 4 of the 30
members of the Arizona Senate.
254. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005235,
Chapman005236, (January 5, 2021, email from John Eastman to
Greg Jacob with an attached letter dated January 4, 2021).
In an interview given after January 6th, Eastman argued that
the Vice President still should have acted on the basis of
the statement of a minority of the Pennsylvania legislature
because “it was over Christmas, and they were having trouble
getting ahold of people to sign the letter.” John McCormack,
“John Eastman vs. the Eastman Memo,” National Review, (Oct.
22, 2021), available at
https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/john-eastman-vs-the-eastman-memo/.
255. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005235,
Chapman005236.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake
Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022). Corman told the Select Committee
that he understood the Vice President’s role at the joint
session was not substantive.
258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 167-68; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 14;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 166-67.
259. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
260. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
261. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.
262. “Rudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trump’s Washington,
D.C. Rally: Wants ‘Trial by Combat’,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat
(emphasis added). Note in particular Eastman’s assertions
regarding voting machines, for example, “They put those
ballots in a secret folder in the machines. Sitting there
waiting until they know how many they need.” Eastman would
later describe what he was calling on the Vice President to
do as merely “to pause the proceedings.” John C. Eastman,
“Setting the Record Straight on the POTUS ‘Ask’,” The
American Mind, (Jan. 18, 2021), available at
https://americanmind.org/memo/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-potus-ask/.
263. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
264. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
265. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
266. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
267. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
268. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
269. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part
of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
270. Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:02
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/Mike_Pence/status/1346879811151605762.
Between 12:45 and 1:00 p.m., Vice President Pence processed
with the Senate to the House Chamber. See Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp.
202-03. The Vice President’s statement was issued publicly
and distributed on the House floor before the Vice President
convened the joint session at approximately 1:05 p.m. See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb.
1, 2022), p. 173; see also Donna Cassata and Felicia Sonmez,
“Congress Meets in Joint Session to Confirm Biden’s Win,
Over the Objections of Dozens of Republicans,” Washington
Post, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/congress-electoral-college-vote-live-updates/#link-DUX3QUF3TVDNZDEGO7KIK2JSYE.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 164.
272. Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:02
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/Mike_Pence/status/1346879811151605762;
see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000121,
(January 6, 2021, Dear Colleague letter issued by Vice
President Pence).
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 27-28 (testifying that, in consultation
with the Senate Parliamentarian, the Vice President
purposefully revised the standard language used by previous
vice presidents at the joint session of Congress because of
efforts by the Trump Campaign and allies to create the
public perception that there were “other slates of electors
that were being considered or [] being put forward.”).
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 186-88; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 53-54; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar.
30, 2022), pp. 50-51. The Senate Parliamentarian offers
advice and guidance on compliance with the Senate’s rules.
See CRS Report, The Office of the Parliamentarian in the
House and Senate, (Nov. 28, 2018) RS20544. The Office of the
Secretary of the Senate, on behalf of the Senate
Parliamentarian and her staff, declined requests for
information about this topic, as well as other January
6-related topics, from the Select Committee citing the
independent relationship of the Senate and House as well as
“historical congressional norms.”
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 64; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 54-56 (testifying
that the Vice President’s understanding of his role as
explained in the Dear Colleague letter he released on
January 6th was set as of his meeting with the
Parliamentarian on January 3rd).
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 68-70; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 2728;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), 00163, (Vice President Superscript for
Joint Session to Count Electoral Ballots January 6, 2021),
00181, (Response to Submissions NOT Certified by a State);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), VP-R0000103_0001 (Pence
joint session scripted responses).
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 42. Jacob learned through the media that
Trump electors had met and purported to cast electoral votes
but, seeing no indication that any of the groups that met
had “an imprimatur of State authority,” he concluded that
they would not qualify as competing slates under the
Electoral Count Act. See Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 51; see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 54 (“I’m sure I, either in my oral conversation
with Elizabeth [MacDonough] or in looking at this
spreadsheet, confirmed my conclusion that none of these had
the requisite State authority.”).
278. The Senate Parliamentarian and her staff tracked the
receipt of legitimate electoral votes from the states as
well as the private citizen submissions (including the fake
slates submitted by Trump electors) and identified the many
deficiencies of the fake documents. Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP R0000323_0001 (Jan. 3, 2021 email exchange with Senate
Parliamentarian), VP R0000417_0001 (Jan. 2 and 3, 2021 email
exchange with Senate Parliamentarian), VP R0000418_0001
(list of deficiencies in alternate elector slates);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), 00094, (list of deficiencies in
alternate elector slates). The Senate Parliamentarian
reviewed each purported slate of electoral votes to separate
those in regular form and authorized by a State from those
submitted by private citizens—the Trump Campaign’s fake
electors fell into this latter category. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), pp. 53- 54; see also Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 44-45.
279. “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at
11:07–11:37, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session
(emphasis added).
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt,
(Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 94-95. See also Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000076, VP-R0000417, VP-R0000418, (January 3, 2021,
emails and spreadsheet showing OVP staff tracking the
arrival of fake electors’ certificates).
281. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000090 (text messages
exchanged between Republican officials in Wisconsin,
including statement that “[f]reaking trump idiots want
someone to fly original elector papers to the Senate
President.”).
282. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00012, (message from
Rep. Kelly’s Chief of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson
on Jan. 6, 2021, at 8:41 am), 00058, (messages from Senator
Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson on
Jan. 6, 2021, around 12:37 pm).
283. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00058 (Chris Hodgson
responding to Sean Riley, “Do not give that to him. He’s
about to walk over to preside over the joint session, those
were supposed to come in through the mail[.]” And, “The VP
absolutely should not receive any mail that hasn’t been
screened.”).
284. See, e.g., “House Chamber During Joint Session,”
C-SPAN, at 15:33–15:59, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.
285. Karoun Demirjian, “GOP Members Object to Arizona’s
Electoral Votes for Biden,” Washington Post, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/congress-electoral-college-vote-live-updates/#link-TSWL74F2SVHBHET7GQR5IEP6FI
.
286. “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at
15:59–17:16, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.
287. “House Chamber During Joint Session,” C-SPAN, at
17:16–18:01, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.
288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 29.
289. House vote on Arizona (Roll No. 10): 167 Cong. Rec. H93
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 121-303; House vote on PA (Roll
No. 11): 167 Cong. Rec. H112 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021):
138-282; Senate vote on Arizona (Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.):
167 Cong. Rec. S31-32 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 6-93; Senate
vote on PA (Rollcall Vote. No. 2 Leg.): 167 Cong. Rec. S38
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 7-92.
290. Katie Meyer, “Congress Certifies Pa. Results, Biden’s
Victory After Chaotic Day of Violent Insurrection,” WHYY,
(Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://whyy.org/articles/casey-fitzpatrick-condemn-violent-insurrection-as-congress-moves-toward-certifying-biden/.
291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 173-74.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 173-75.
293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 193.
294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 208-09.
295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 208-10; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
P-R001019 – P-R001020 (Jan. 6, 2021, NSC Chat Log).
296. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346900434540240897.
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019 –
P-R001020 (NSC Chat Log).
298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 37-38.
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.
302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019 –
P-R001020 (NSC Chat Log).
303. See Chapter 8; see also Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 31-32.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 63-65.
306. On the evening of January 6, 2021, the President’s
Military Aide told the Vice President’s Military Aide (who
relayed it to the Secret Service) that Marc Short’s access
to the White House complex had been cancelled. Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service
Production), CTRL0000513149 (January 6-7, 2021 emails),
CTRL0000673145, (January 6, 2021 emails). Several people
relayed to Marc Short that “some who instigated the
President”—possibly Peter Navarro—suggested to the President
that “Marc was responsible for leading the Vice President on
the path he took,” which resulted in the President
exclaiming that Mr. Short should be locked out of the White
House. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc
Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 236-37; see also Biba Adams,
“Pence’s Chief of Staff Denied Entry into WH: Trump ‘Blaming
Me’,” Yahoo News, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at
https://www.yahoo.com/video/pence-chief-staff-denied-entry-173848235.html.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 238.
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 31, 45 (“The reason was he felt like,
for the world’s greatest democracy, to see a motorcade, a
15-car motorcade fleeing the Capitol would send all the
wrong signals. So he was adamant to say: I want to stay here
in the Capitol.”); see also Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing
on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess.,
(June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 29-31, 44-45; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January
6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 198.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 198-99.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 198-99.
313. Jacob told the Select Committee that he recognized that
January 6 was going to be “an historically important day”
and he wanted to memorialize exactly what he thought of the
arguments made by Eastman on January 5th, to supplement the
memo he wrote to Vice President Pence reflecting the
arguments Eastman made on January 4th. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp.
200-01.
314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005370
(January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John
Eastman).
315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005379
(January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John
Eastman).
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 200.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob,
(Feb. 1, 2022), p. 200.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson,
(Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 246-47.
319. “READ: Mike Pence’s Statement to the Senate on the
Storming of the Capitol,” U.S. News, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2021-01-06/read-mike-pences-statement-to-the-senate-on-the-storming-of-the-capitol;
see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris
Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 246 (testifying that the Vice
President wrote his remarks himself in his ceremonial office
after the Capitol was cleared).
320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155,
(January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John
Eastman).
321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, p. 1,
(January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John
Eastman).
322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155,
(January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John
Eastman). Note that Greg Jacob’s testimony establishes that
this email was likely received on January 6, 2021, at 11:44
p.m., not at 4:44 a.m. the following morning as shown on the
face of this document as produced. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 205.
As noted in the Executive Summary, the Select Committee also
received certain documents in UTC time, which is five hours
ahead of EST.
324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005479
(January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John
Eastman). This email represents John Eastman again
encouraging, in writing and just after the violent attack on
the Capitol had been quelled, that the Vice President use
this as a justification for a further and much more serious
violation of the law—delaying the certification. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. Eastman
attempted to minimize what he was doing by calling the
Electoral Count Act a “minor procedural statute.” Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), p. 133. In an email sent at 1:33 p.m., just before
the Capitol was breached, Eastman wrote, “I’m sorry Greg,
but this is small minded. You’re sticking with minor
procedural statutes while the Constitution is being
shredded.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000166.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
328. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman0064047,
(January 11, 2021, email from John Eastman to Rudy
Giuliani).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 35-36.
6
“BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!”
On December 14, 2020, electors around the country met to
cast their Electoral College votes. Their vote ensured
former Vice President Joe Biden’s victory and cemented
President Donald J. Trump’s defeat. The people, and the
States, had spoken. Members of President Trump’s own Cabinet
knew the election was over. Attorney General William Barr
viewed it as “the end of the matter.” 1 Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia concurred.2
That same day, Scalia told President Trump directly that he
should concede defeat.3
President Trump had no intention of conceding. As he plotted
ways to stay in power, the President summoned a mob for
help.
At 1:42 a.m., on December 19th, President Trump tweeted:
“Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be
wild!” 4
The President’s tweet galvanized tens of thousands of his
supporters around the country. President Trump had been
lying to them since election day, claiming he won, and that
the Democrats had stolen victory from him. Now, with a
single tweet, the President focused his supporters’ anger on
the joint session of Congress in Washington, DC on January
6th.
Anika Navaroli, the longest-tenured member of Twitter’s
Trust and Safety Policy team, monitored the reaction to
President Trump’s “be wild” tweet. She told the Select
Committee that the President was “essentially staking a flag
in DC . . . for his supporters to come and rally.” 5 The
tweet created a “fire hose” of calls to overthrow the U.S.
Government. President Trump’s supporters had a new sense of
urgency because they felt “as if their Commander in Chief”
had summoned them.6
For many extremists and conspiracy theorists, the
President’s announcement was a call to arms.7
For the Proud Boys—described in more detail below—and their
leader, Henry “Enrique” Tarrio, President Trump’s tweet set
in motion a chain of events that led directly to the attack
on the U.S. Capitol. In the days that followed, the Proud
Boys reorganized their hierarchy, imposed a stricter
chain-of-command, and instructed followers to go “incognito”
on January 6th.8 The Proud Boys had made their presence
known at previous pro-Trump events, including “Stop the
Steal” rallies, where they brandished their black and yellow
apparel and engaged in street brawls.9 Suddenly, they did
not want to stand out from the crowd. They wanted to blend
in. They were planning something big.10
Tarrio allegedly used encrypted messages to plot the January
6, 2021, attack. On January 4, 2021, Tarrio told his men
that they should “storm the Capitol.” 11 While the attack
was underway, Tarrio claimed credit in a private chat,
writing: “We did this.” 12 And on the evening of January
6th, Tarrio released a video of a man, presumably Tarrio
himself, dressed in an odd costume standing in front of the
U.S. Capitol. The eerie production had been recorded prior
to the events of that day. Tarrio—who was not in Washington,
DC on January 6th13—titled it, “Premonition.” 14
Tarrio’s video appears on a screen during a Select Committee
hearing on June 09, 2022.
Tarrio’s video appears on a screen during a Select Committee
hearing on June 09, 2022.
Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images
The Oath Keepers, a far-right, anti-government militia
movement—also described in more detail below—began planning
for January 6th after the President’s tweet as well. Stewart
Rhodes, the group’s leader, had agitated against the U.S.
Government for years.15 Immediately following the 2020
presidential election, Rhodes and others schemed to stop the
peaceful transfer of power. They stored weapons outside of
Washington, DC,16 hoping that President Trump would deputize
them as his own militia.17 An Oath Keeper leader, Kelly
Meggs, read President Trump’s December 19th tweet and
commented in a Facebook message: “He called us all to the
Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!! Sir Yes Sir!!!” 18
The Oath Keepers formed two military “stacks” and marched up
the steps of the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. Meggs led one
of them.19
Members of both the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers have been
charged with “seditious conspiracy” and other serious
crimes, including conspiracy to interfere with a Federal
proceeding; some, including Stewart Rhodes, have been
convicted.20 U.S. law defines seditious conspiracy as
plotting “to overthrow,” or “to oppose by force,” or to use
“force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law
of the United States.” 21 Some of the two groups’ members
have already admitted that this is what they intended to
do.22
Other extremists and conspiracy theorists mobilized after
President Trump’s tweet as well. These movements are
described in more detail in subsequent sections. Three
Percenter militias—another far-right, anti-government
movement—shared “#OccupyCongress” memes23 and planned for
violence at the U.S. Capitol.24 Nick Fuentes, leader of the
white nationalist “Groypers,” rallied his followers for
January 6th.25 Fuentes bragged afterwards that the “Capitol
siege was fucking awesome.” 26 Users on TheDonald.win, a
website populated by some of President Trump’s most ardent
fans, openly discussed surrounding and occupying the U.S.
Capitol.27
Adherents of QAnon, a bizarre and dangerous conspiracy cult,
believed January 6th would bring the prophesied “Storm” — a
violent purge of Democrats and government officials promised
by the mysterious online personality known only as “Q.” 28
QAnon’s devotees flocked to Washington, DC because of the
President’s tweet and subsequent rhetoric. They shared a
digital banner, “Operation Occupy the Capitol,” which
depicted the U.S. Capitol being torn in two.29
One especially notorious conspiracy theorist, Alex Jones,
repeatedly told his InfoWars’ viewers that January 6th would
be a day of reckoning.30 Jones is known for his outlandish
conspiracy-mongering, including his baseless claim that the
massacre of school children at Sandy Hook Elementary School
was really a “false flag” operation staged by the U.S.
Government. Of course, his vicious lie was disproven in
court, but Jones is obsessed with “deep state” conspiracy
theories and often propagates them.31 After the 2020
presidential election, Jones argued that President Trump
should use the power of the Government to impose martial law
on American citizens.32 Along with his InfoWars co-hosts,
Jones amplified President Trump’s “Big Lie” and relentlessly
promoted President Trump’s “wild” protest. One of Jones’
co-hosts floated the idea of “storming right into the
Capitol.” 33 Jones himself marched to the Capitol January
6th.34
Jones’s influence helped shape the planning for January 6th
behind the scenes as well. The Select Committee investigated
how event organizers and the White House staff planned
President Trump’s rally at the Ellipse, a park south of the
White House. This event was intended to rile up the
President’s supporters just prior to the joint session of
Congress. A wealthy heiress paid for the event after
listening to Jones’ InfoWars rant about the importance of
President Trump’s tweet. She spent $3 million with the goal
to “get as many people there as possible.” 35 It worked —
Americans who believed the election was stolen flocked to
the Nation’s capital.
By January 5th, President Trump’s supporters—a large, angry
crowd ready for instructions—had assembled in Washington.
That evening, he could hear his raucous supporters at a
rally not far from the White House. The President knew his
supporters were “angry,” 36 and he planned to call on them
to march on the U.S. Capitol.37 He even wanted to join them
on the march.38 It was all part of President Trump’s plan to
intimidate officials and obstruct the joint session of
Congress.
“We fight like hell,” President Trump told the crowd
assembled at the Ellipse on January 6, 2021. “And if you
don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country
anymore.” 39 Some of those in attendance, as well as
elsewhere in Washington that day, were already prepared to
fight. They had begun preparing two and a half weeks earlier
— when President Trump told them it would “be wild!”
6.1 How Far-right Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists
Planned for January 6th
The “Stop the Steal” Coalition
President Trump’s “be wild” tweet immediately mobilized
extremists and conspiracy theorists in the “Stop the Steal”
coalition. The phrase “Stop the Steal” was originally coined
in early 2016 by President Trump’s longtime political
advisor, Roger Stone.40 At the time, Stone alleged first
that Candidate Trump’s Republican rivals were attempting to
steal Candidate Trump’s nomination.41 After Trump became the
nominee, Stone repurposed the saying to claim that former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would steal the
presidency. 42 When President Trump won the 2016 election,
“Stop the Steal” was rendered moot—and did not become a
significant political movement until President Trump’s
defeat on election night in 2020.43 As early as November 5,
2020, Stone advised associates that he intended to
reconstitute “Stop the Steal” by building an army of lawyers
and suing “like there’s no tomorrow.” 44
Ali Alexander, a rightwing provocateur who has worked
closely with Stone,45 quickly organized a new “Stop the
Steal” campaign. On November 10, 2020, Alexander established
“Stop the Steal” as an entity incorporated in Alabama.46
Alexander added a bank account and various websites.47
One of Alexander’s key allies in the “Stop the Steal”
movement was Alex Jones. Prior to January 6th, Jones riled
up crowds both in-person and online with incendiary rhetoric
about the election. Jones’ InfoWars was also a platform for
others in the election-denial coalition. For instance, both
Enrique Tarrio and Stewart Rhodes made multiple appearances
on InfoWars, including between election day 2020 and January
6, 2021.48
Another frequent guest on InfoWars was Roger Stone — a nexus
character in the “Stop the Steal” coalition.49 Stone
recommended that then Presidential Candidate Donald Trump
appear on Jones’s show in December 2015.50 Trump accepted
the invitation and praised Jones at length during his
appearance.51 The significance of Trump’s interview with
Jones should not be underestimated. Donald Trump was a
leading presidential contender at the time and would go on
to win the election. His appearance with Jones normalized
InfoWars, welcoming its conspiracy-minded audience into
Trump’s base.52 Trump did not appear on InfoWars again.
However, Stone continued to make regular guest
appearances.53
After election day 2020, Alexander Jones, and other “Stop
the Steal” organizers, held rallies around the country to
protest fictional claims of voter fraud. These events
provided an opportunity for radicals and extremists to
coalesce. The Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters
were all attendees. QAnon adherents were well-represented.
So, too, were the white nationalist Groypers and their
leader, Nick Fuentes.
“Stop the Steal” events and other protests throughout 2020
helped build the momentum for January 6th. The Select
Committee collected data on 85 right-wing events between
January 1, 2020, and January 20, 2021, which were inspired
by opposition to COVID-19 lockdown measures, racial justice
protests, and, later, the perceived theft of President
Trump’s victory.54 Far-right extremists protested at or
inside State capitols, or at other government buildings, in
at least 68 instances.55 Of those, 49 occurred during the
period after the election through January 6th.56 In the year
leading up to January 6th, there were at least nine events
at which far-right actors entered State capitols.57At least
four of these capitol incursions—in Michigan,58 Idaho,59
Arizona,60 and Oregon61—involved identifiable individuals
who later participated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
Consider, for example, the protests held in Atlanta between
November 18 and 21, 2020. Leaders and rank-and-file members
of the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Groypers, gathered
outside the State capitol and the governor’s mansion for
nonstop events, including armed protests. Enrique Tarrio62
and Stewart Rhodes63 personally led contingents of the Proud
Boys and Oath Keepers, respectively.
Jones first announced the Atlanta events on InfoWars on
November 16th. In his announcement, Jones teased that he
would be joined by Roger Stone and also called on listeners
to “surround the governor’s mansion” in order to prevent the
election results from being certified.64 Fuentes advertised
that he would be speaking at the capitol every day at
noon.65 In fiery speeches across Atlanta, Fuentes spread
election lies as well as wink-and-nod hints at intimidation
and violence.66
Alex Jones and Ali Alexander inside the Georgia State
Capitol during a “Stop the Steal” rally on November 18, 2020
in Atlanta, Georgia.
Alex Jones and Ali Alexander inside the Georgia State
Capitol during a “Stop the Steal” rally on November 18, 2020
in Atlanta, Georgia.
Photo by Elijah Nouvelage/Getty Images
Alexander, standing alongside Jones and Fuentes outside the
State capitol on November 18th, exhorted the crowd to “storm
the capitol” with them.67 The three men led a crowd into the
State capitol building. On November 20th, Roger Stone gave a
speech outside the Georgia capitol. Speaking through a
telephone held up by Alexander, Stone advanced election
lies, and finished with a provocative rallying cry: “Victory
or death!” 68 That same day, Fuentes told the crowd, “Look,
we’ve been in front of the State capitol, maybe we’ve been
trying the wrong approach.” 69 Days earlier, at a nighttime
event outside the governor’s mansion, Alexander, again
flanked by Jones and Fuentes, goaded the crowd: “We’ll light
the whole shit on fire.” 70
While the crowd did not turn violent, the “Stop the Steal”
protests in Atlanta, Georgia, prefigured January 6th in
important respects. “Stop the Steal” organizers tried to use
the mob they had assembled — including extremists from the
Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters and Groypers — to
intimidate lawmakers and overturn the election results in
Georgia, which was required to certify former Vice President
Biden’s victory in the State by the end of that week.71 They
implored their followers to “storm the capitol.” 72 As
discussed in Chapter 8, this same coalition of radicals did
just that on January 6, 2021.
Other “Stop the Steal” events helped pave the way for the
events of January 6th. Two rallies in Washington D.C. — on
November 14 and December 12, 2020 — were critically
important. Alexander’s “Stop the Steal” was not the only
protest organization present at these events. Both were
called “Million MAGA Marches” and drew in other rally
organizers. One of these other protests was called the
“Jericho March” prayer rally.73 Regardless, the same
constellation of actors that appeared in Atlanta also
incited Trump supporters in Washington.
“Million MAGA March” protest on November 14, 2020 in
Washington, DC.
“Million MAGA March” protest on November 14, 2020 in
Washington, DC.
Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images
For instance, during the Jericho March rally on December
12th, Stewart Rhodes called on President Trump to invoke the
Insurrection Act as part of a desperate gambit to remain in
power. In Rhodes’ vision, he would lead militiamen on behalf
of President Trump when others tried to remove him from
office.74 If President Trump did not invoke the Insurrection
Act, Rhodes warned the crowd, then they would be forced to
wage a “much more desperate [and] much more bloody war.”
Alex Jones also gave an incendiary speech at the Jericho
March event, declaring: “I don’t know who is going to the
White House in 38 days, but I sure know this, Joe Biden is a
globalist, and Joe Biden will be removed, one way or
another!” 75
As the crowds gathered in Washington on December 12th,
President Trump was publicly lobbying the Supreme Court to
hear his fictious claims of election fraud. The President
assailed the Supreme Court on Twitter throughout the day.76
The “Stop the Steal” coalition was eager to help. After the
Jericho March event ended, Jones, his InfoWars co-host Owen
Shroyer, and Ali Alexander led a march on the Supreme Court.
Once there, the crowd chanted slogans such as “Stop the
Steal!”; “1776!!”; “Our revolution!”; and “The fight has
just begun!!” 77
President Trump made sure to let the protesters in
Washington know that he personally approved of their
mission. During the November rally, President Trump waved to
the crowd from his presidential motorcade.78 Then, on the
morning of December 12th, President Trump tweeted: “Wow!
Thousands of people forming in Washington (D.C.) for Stop
the Steal. Didn’t know about this, but I’ll be seeing them!
#MAGA.” 79 Later that day, President Trump flew over the
protesters in Marine One.80
When President Trump tweeted one week later that there would
be a “wild” protest in Washington on January 6th, the “Stop
the Steal” coalition immediately began to mobilize. Jones
posted an article on the InfoWars website asking readers if
they would “answer President Trump’s call to defend the
Republic?” 81 The next day, December 20th, Jones devoted
much of his InfoWars show to the President’s announcement.
Jones told his audience several times that if 10 million
Americans came to Washington, DC on January 6th, Congress
would have to listen to them.82 He repeated this idea over
the course of the episode, saying things such as, “He’s
calling you, he needs your help, we need your help, we need
10 million people there,” “[w]e need martial law and have to
prevent the police state of foreigners from taking over.”
Jones added: “It’s literally in our hands. It’s literally up
to us.” 83
Other InfoWars hosts promoted the “wild” protest as well. In
late December, Matt Bracken told InfoWars viewers that it
may be necessary to storm the U.S. Capitol. “We’re going to
only be saved by millions of Americans moving to Washington,
occupying the entire area, if — if necessary storming right
into the Capitol,” Bracken said. “You know, they’re — we
know the rules of engagement. If you have enough people, you
can push down any kind of a fence or a wall.” 84
Far-right extremists planned to do just that.
6.2 The Proud Boys: “[Y]ou Want to Storm the Capitol”
From the Proud Boys’ founding in 2016, violence was
intrinsic to their mission. “We will kill you. That’s the
Proud Boys in a nutshell,” their founder said.85 New
recruits pledge an oath, established in the group’s bylaws,
identifying themselves as unapologetic “Western
chauvinists,” 86 promoting an exclusionary, hyper-masculine
interpretation of Western culture.87 They find common ground
in an embrace of misogyny and hate for their perceived
enemies.88 The group is somewhat ethnically diverse, but
their public and private messages fester with toxic white
supremacist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic slurs.89
The Proud Boys have participated in, or instigated, protests
since their founding.90 They’ve long been known as street
brawlers looking for a fight.91 But 2020 was a watershed
year for the group. As protests spread around the country,
the Proud Boys deputized themselves as agents of law and
order—vigilantes against perceived threats.92 More often,
they played the role of instigators.93 They portrayed
themselves as counter-protesters and identified their
targets as Black Lives Matter and Antifa—though they were
hard-pressed to define their organizational enemies.94
A Proud Boy during a “Stop the Steal” rally on November 7,
2020 in Salem, Oregon.
A Proud Boy during a “Stop the Steal” rally on November 7,
2020 in Salem, Oregon.
Photo by Nathan Howard/Getty Images
During the presidential debate on September 29, 2020,
President Trump was asked to disavow far-right extremists,
including the Proud Boys. The President did not explicitly
condemn the group. Instead, he seemingly endorsed their
mission. “Stand back and stand by,” President Trump told the
Proud Boys, before adding, “but I’ll tell you what . . .
somebody’s got to do something about Antifa and the
left.” 95 The President’s words electrified the group,
injecting new life into their recruitment and activities.
According to Nick Quested, a filmmaker who spent significant
time with the group and testified before the Select
Committee, the Proud Boys had found their “savior” in
President Trump.96
Joseph Biggs, a senior Proud Boy, immediately trumpeted
President Trump’s debate statement on Parler,97 a fringe
social media platform. Biggs made it clear that the Proud
Boys were ready to fight Antifa.98 The group’s size
“tripled” in response to President Trump’s apparent
endorsement, according to Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boys
leader who has pleaded guilty to seditious conspiracy in
relation to January 6th.99 Similarly, Enrique Tarrio and
another Proud Boys member, George Meza, testified to the
Select Committee that the President’s comment was a pivotal,
energizing moment.100 The group started selling merchandise
with their new “stand back and stand by” slogan the very
same night.101
As the presidential votes were tallied, the Proud Boys
became agitated at the prospect that President Trump would
lose. On November 5, 2020, Biggs posted on social media,
“It’s time for fucking war if they steal this shit.” 102 As
former Vice President Joe Biden’s victory became apparent,
Proud Boys leaders directed their ire toward others in the
Government. Biggs, speaking on a Proud Boys livestream show
with Tarrio and others, warned that government officials are
“evil scum, and they all deserve to die a traitor’s death.”
Ethan Nordean—another Proud Boys leader who allegedly helped
lead the attack at the Capitol—responded, “Yup, Day of the
Rope,” 103 referring to a day of mass lynching of “race
traitors” in the white supremacist novel The Turner
Diaries.104
The Proud Boys in Washington prior to January 6th
Within days of the election, dozens of “Stop the Steal”
protests were organized around the country.105 The Proud
Boys participated alongside other right-wing extremist
groups in some of them, including a November 7, 2020,
protest outside of the Pennsylvania State capitol in
Harrisburg.106 The two events in Washington, DC — on
November 14, 2020, and the other on December 12, 2020 —
proved to be especially important for the group’s evolution.
The daytime events on both dates passed by without violence
or major unrest, but as the sun set, bouts of violence
erupted,107 driven by clashes between far-right extremist
groups—chiefly the Proud Boys—and counter-protesters.108
Among far-right extremists, the Proud Boys had the largest
showing in both November and December,109 with roughly 200
to 300 Proud Boys at the November 14th rally, and the same
number or more in December.110 As discussed in Chapter 8,
they mustered about the same contingent for the attack on
the U.S. Capitol.
The gathering on November 14th provided a chance for Tarrio
to socialize with rally leaders and far-right celebrities.
In fact, his travel to DC by private jet appears to have
been paid for by Patrick Byrne, a businessman who had
President Trump’s ear in the last weeks of his presidency
and encouraged the President to authorize the seizure of
voting machines in a December 18th meeting.111 Tarrio’s
testimony and photographs from the day show that he met with
“Stop the Steal” organizer Ali Alexander that evening, and
the pair toasted each other.112 Tarrio described the event
as a “historic” meeting of Trump supporters and celebrated
the opportunity to share that platform with Alexander,
Jones, and Jones’ InfoWars co-host, Owen Shroyer.113 Shroyer
would later be charged with crimes committed during the
January 6th attack.114
A month later, the Proud Boys returned to the Nation’s
capital. On the evening of December 11th, hundreds of Proud
Boys and friends gathered in downtown Washington, DC to
listen to an impromptu bullhorn speech by Tarrio and
Nordean, along with Roger Stone and Shroyer.115 Stone
implored the crowd to “fight to the bitter end.” 116
The next day, as the Proud Boys marched in force on the
streets, Tarrio teased in a social media post that he had a
meeting in the White House.117 The visit, which was only a
public White House tour, appears to have been facilitated by
a friend, Bianca Gracia, the head of Latinos for Trump.118
As the rallies concluded the next day, the Proud Boys took
to the streets again. Two key events occurred that evening.
First, members of the Proud Boys tore down a Black Lives
Matter banner from a historically Black church in downtown
Washington, DC.119 They filmed themselves burning it.120
Tarrio was eventually charged with destruction of
property.121 He was arrested on January 4, 2021, and banned
from Washington, DC, barring him from joining the group at
the Capitol.122 As explained in Chapter 8, however, Tarrio’s
arrest did not stop him from conspiring with his men on
January 6th.
Minutes after the flag burning, a man wearing black clothes
walked into a crowd of Proud Boys.123 Assuming he was
associated with Antifa, they began pushing and harassing
him, and he drew a knife in response.124 In the ensuing
melee, four Proud Boys suffered stab wounds, including
Bertino, a confidant to Tarrio.125 Bertino’s wounds were
severe and life-threatening, preventing him from joining the
group on January 6th. 126
Storming the Winter Palace
The Proud Boys began to reorient and formalize their
operations to focus on January 6th after President Trump’s
December 19th tweet. Inspired, in part, by Bertino’s
stabbing, the Proud Boys centered their new hierarchy in
group chats that used terms such as “Ministry of Self
Defense” (MOSD).127 However, the words “Self Defense” were
misleading: Enrique Tarrio and others would soon go on the
offense. And the MOSD served as their organizational
scaffolding for the January 6, 2021, attack.
On December 20, 2020, Tarrio established a “national rally
planning committee” and created an encrypted MOSD chat to
organize their activities.128 Tarrio added Proud Boys
leaders from across the country, including several who
played lead roles in the violence on January 6th.129 In the
ensuing weeks, the Proud Boys traded equipment
recommendations, shared maps marked with law enforcement
positions, and established command and control
structures.130 A separate encrypted chat, named “Boots on
the Ground,” was established for foot soldiers who would be
in Washington, DC on January 6th.131
The Proud Boys’ planning for January 6th was a significant
step in the group’s evolution. Previously, they were loosely
organized. The MOSD was created to enforce a “top down
structure” with a defined leadership.132 Tarrio stressed the
command structure by telling members that they needed to
“[f]it in [] or fuck off.” 133
From the start, it was clear that MOSD chat members were
intensely interested in disrupting the electoral count on
January 6th. On December 20, 2020, one MOSD leader stated,
“I assume most of the protest will be at the capital [sic]
building given what’s going on inside.” 134 On December 29,
2020, in a group message to the MOSD, a member wrote, “I
know most of the events will be centered around freedom
plaza.” Tarrio responded, “Negative. They’re centered around
the Capitol.” 135
On December 30, 2020, Tarrio received an intriguing document
titled, “1776 Returns.” 136 The document was apparently sent
to him by cryptocurrency investors in South Florida.137 The
file’s author(s) divided their plan into five parts,
“Infiltrate, Execution, Distract, Occupy and Sit-In,” with
the goal of overrunning several Federal buildings around the
U.S. Capitol. The plan specifically mentioned House and
Senate office buildings, setting forth steps for occupying
them. The author(s) called for “the masses to rush the
building[s],” distract law enforcement in the area by
pulling fire alarms around the city, target specific
Senators’ offices, and disguise participants’ identities
with COVID masks.138
One proposal mentioned in the document is titled, “Storm the
Winter Palace.” 139 This is a reference to a dramatic
reenactment of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, during which
Vladimir Lenin ordered his forces to take over the Romanovs’
residence in Petrograd. The “Winter Palace” was the seat of
the provisional government, which had held out against the
Bolshevik revolutionaries. The Proud Boys would frame their
actions on January 6th as part of the American Revolution.
But the “1776 Returns” document shows their inspiration came
at least in part from the Communist Revolution, which led to
70-plus years of totalitarian rule. No historical event has
been less American.
The Proud Boys did not adopt the “1776 Returns” plan in
full. Several Proud Boys testified that they were unaware of
the document before it became public.140 But the document
does appear to have been significantly edited while in the
Proud Boys’ hands.141 The person who sent it to Tarrio—his
ex-girlfriend, Eryka Gemma Flores—commented, “The revolution
is [more] important than anything.” To which Tarrio
responded: “That’s what every waking moment consists of
. . . I’m not playing games.” 142
On January 3rd, Tarrio posted a conspicuous question on
Telegram: “What if we invade it?” The first response to his
post read: “January 6th is D day [sic] in America.” 143 In
private, on the Proud Boys’ leadership group message,
planning continued. One MOSD leader, John Stewart, floated a
plan that centered around “the front entrance to the Capitol
building.” 144 At 7:10 p.m. on January 3rd, Stewart wrote to
the MOSD leaders:
I mean the main operating theater should be out in front of
the house of representatives. It should be out in front of
the Capitol building. That’s where the vote is taking place
and all of the objections. So, we can ignore the rest of
these stages and all that shit and plan the operations based
around the front entrance to the Capitol building. I
strongly recommend you use the national mall and not
Pennsylvania avenue though. It’s wide-open space, you can
see everything coming from all angles.145
Early the next morning, on January 4th, Tarrio sent a voice
memo to the same group of MOSD leaders stating, “I didn’t
hear this voice until now, you want to storm the
Capitol.” 146
One of Tarrio’s comrades in the Proud Boys’ leadership,
Charles Donohoe—who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct
an official proceeding and assaulting, resisting, or
impeding certain officers147—later told authorities that by
January 4th he “was aware that members of MOSD leadership
were discussing the possibility of storming the
Capitol.” 148 Donohoe “believed that storming the Capitol
would achieve the group’s goal of stopping the government
from carrying out the transfer of presidential power” and
“understood that storming the Capitol would be illegal.” 149
By the following evening, January 5th, Tarrio was discussing
with other Proud Boy leaders a “tactical plan” for the
following day. Their “objective” was “to obstruct, impede,
or interfere with the certification of the Electoral College
vote.” 150 Moreover, Donohoe understood that the Proud Boys
“would pursue this through the use of force and violence, in
order to show Congress that ‘we the people’ were in
charge.” 151 On January 6th, Charles Donohoe understood that
two of his fellow Proud Boys’ leaders — Ethan Nordean and
Joe Biggs — “were searching for an opportunity to storm the
Capitol.” 152
Jeremy Bertino, the Proud Boys leader who was stabbed on the
night of December 12th, later told authorities that his
fellow extremists plotted to stop the peaceful transfer of
power. In October 2022, Bertino pleaded guilty to “seditious
conspiracy” and other crimes.153 Bertino admitted that the
Proud Boys traveled to Washington, DC on January 6, 2021,
“to stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote.”
They “were willing to do whatever it would take, including
using force against police and others, to achieve that
objective.” 154
In testimony before the Select Committee, Bertino recalled a
telling text exchange with Tarrio on the evening of January
6th. “I was like, ‘holy shit,’ or something like that I said
to him,” Bertino recalled. “And I was like, ‘I can’t believe
this is happening,’ or something like that, and
‘1776.’ ” 155
Tarrio replied to Bertino: “Winter Palace.” 156
6.3 The Oath Keepers: “He Called Us All to the Capitol and
Wants Us to Make it Wild!!!”
The Oath Keepers, founded in 2009 by Elmer Stewart Rhodes,
is a far-right anti-government organization. The group
targets former and current military and law enforcement for
recruitment. Their name refers to the oath taken by public
servants to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. The
Oath Keepers’ claimed fealty to the U.S. Constitution is
belied by their obsession with conspiracy theories about
alleged evil-intentioned elites in the Government.157 Rhodes
has often spouted these conspiracy theories on InfoWars.158
Over the summer of 2020, the Oath Keepers organized armed
groups, ostensibly to serve as volunteer, self-appointed
security at protests around the country. The Oath Keepers
used the protests to draw in new recruits.159 They also
built muscle memory by coordinating for these events. For
example, the Oath Keepers hired Michael Greene, who later
coordinated Oath Keepers’ activities on January 5th and 6th,
to lead security operations in multiple cities around the
country.160 In the early part of 2020, protests against
COVID-related lockdowns served as additional growth and
networking opportunities. Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the
Oath Keepers, met the Oath Keepers at a lockdown protest in
Austin, Texas in early 2020. SoRelle saw these COVID events
as a “coalescing moment” for different far-right groups.161
The “Stop the Steal” movement created another opportunity
for the Oath Keepers to grow their influence. Rhodes
repeatedly amplified the stolen election conspiracy theory.
On November 10, 2020, he posted a “Call to Action!” on the
Oath Keepers website, alleging the election was “stolen” and
exhorting his followers to “refuse to EVER recognize this as
a legitimate election, and refuse to recognize Biden as a
legitimate winner.” 162 Under a section entitled “What We
the People Must Do,” Rhodes quoted a “patriot from Serbia,
who also loves America.” The Serbian author described how
his fellow countrymen fomented a political revolution. Parts
of the statement presaged the attack on the U.S. Capitol:
. . . Millions gathered in our capital [sic]. There were no
barricades strong enough to stop them, nor the police
determined enough to stop them. Police and Military aligned
with the people after few hours of fist-fight [sic]. We
stormed the Parliament. And burned down fake state
Television! WE WON!163
The Oath Keepers were obsessed with the Insurrection Act —
seeing it as a way for President Trump to cling to power.
Rhodes believed that the President could empower militias
like the Oath Keepers to enforce law and order after other
Americans refused to accept President Trump’s rule.164
Indeed, President Trump had been intensely interested in the
Insurrection Act as a potential tool to quell the protests
in summer 2020.165 Rhodes wished the Act had been invoked
then, but he did not give up on the fantasy.166 As mentioned
above, Rhodes called for President Trump to invoke the
Insurrection Act during his speech in Washington on December
12, 2020.167
That day, Rhodes also coordinated with Jericho March
organizers to provide security.168 He coordinated with a
paramilitary group known as 1st Amendment Praetorian (1AP),
to guard VIPs, including retired Lieutenant General Michael
Flynn and Patrick Byrne.169 Rhodes indicated that the Oath
Keepers would be “working closely” with them for the
event.170
The Oath Keepers continued to call for President Trump to
invoke the Insurrection Act throughout December 2020,
arguing that the President needed to do so to “Stop the
Steal.” 171 This fantasy reflected a warped sense of
reality. Rhodes testified that President Trump could have
mobilized “unorganized militia,” including the Oath Keepers,
to suppress an insurrection if he attempted to stay in power
after losing the election.172 But the Oath Keepers
themselves were the ones contemplating insurrection. On
December 10, 2020, Rhodes messaged others: “Either Trump
gets off his ass and uses the Insurrection Act to defeat the
Chicom puppet coup or we will have to rise up in
insurrection (rebellion) against the ChiCom puppet Biden.
Take your pick.” 173 Rhodes was blunt in other messages to
the Oath Keepers, writing: “We need to push Tump [sic] to do
his duty. If he doesn’t, we will do ours. Declare
Independence. Defy[,] Resist[,] Defend[,] Conquer or Die.
This needs to be our attitude.” 174
6.4 “Trump Said It’s Gonna be Wild!!!!!!! It’s Gonna be
Wild!!!!!!!”
As the Proud Boys began their plans for January 6th, Kelly
Meggs, the leader of the Florida chapter of the Oath
Keepers, reached out. In the past, the Proud Boys and the
Oath Keepers had their differences, deriding each other’s
tactics and ethos during the summer 2020 protests.175 But
President Trump’s tweet on December 19th conveyed a sense of
urgency which provided the two extremist rivals the
opportunity to work together for a common goal.
After President Trump’s tweet, Meggs called Enrique Tarrio.
They spoke for 3 minutes and 26 seconds.176 Meggs also sent
a message on Facebook, bragging about an alliance he had
formed among the Oath Keepers, the Florida Three Percenters,
and the Proud Boys: “We have decided to work together and
shut this shit down.” 177 The Oath Keepers were making plans
of their own, too.
“Oath Keepers president [Rhodes] is pretty disheartened,”
Roberto Minuta, one of Rhodes’ men, messaged someone on
December 19th. “He feels like it’s go time, the time for
peaceful protest is over in his eyes. I was talking with him
last night.” 178 Minuta has been charged with “seditious
conspiracy” and other crimes.179
In the days that followed, the Oath Keepers planned for
violence. They used encrypted chats on Signal to discuss
travel plans, trade tips on tactical equipment to bring, and
develop their plans for once they were on the ground in the
DC area.180 On December 21st, 2020, Joshua James messaged
the group, stating, “SE region is creating a NATIONAL CALL
TO ACTION FOR DC JAN 6TH. . . . 4 states are
mobilizing[.]” 181 Meggs, Rhodes, and others created several
different chat groups to coordinate for January 6th.182
On December 22nd, Meggs echoed President Trump’s tweet in a
Facebook message to someone else:
Trump said It’s gonna be wild!!!!!!! It’s gonna be
wild!!!!!!! He wants us to make it WILD that’s what he’s
saying. He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make
it wild!!! Sir Yes Sir!!! Gentlemen we are heading to DC
pack your shit!!” 183
Meggs also wrote that the Oath Keepers would have 50–100
members in Washington, DC on January 6th.184
The Oath Keepers hosted periodic group video meetings to
discuss plans for January 6th. Richard Dockery, a former
Oath Keepers member, testified to the Select Committee about
a video call that took place around December 31st, and
related specifically to planning for January 6th.185 During
the call, Oath Keepers’ leadership announced plans to
provide security for far-right celebrities like Roger
Stone.186 If there were any problems while they were
providing security, “there was a quick reaction force in
Virginia that would come help them out . . . and that they
would have firearms.” 187
Rhodes announced during an episode of InfoWars in November
2020 that the Oath Keepers had established a “Quick Reaction
Force” (QRF) outside of Washington, DC.188 After President
Trump announced the “wild” protest, the group’s advanced
coordination largely focused on planning related to their
QRF, as well as the various security details for VIPs and
stage areas on January 5th and 6th.189 Oath Keepers from
North Carolina, Florida, South Carolina, and Arizona
converged on the Comfort Inn in Ballston, Virginia, and used
the location to store their cache of weapons for January
6th.190 Oath Keepers leaders communicated actively about the
QRF for January 6th.191 Rhodes and another contingent of
Oath Keepers stayed at the Hilton Garden Inn in Vienna,
Virginia, and stored weapons there as well.192
Rhodes amassed an arsenal of military-grade assault weapons
and equipment in the days leading up to January 6th. On
December 30th, Rhodes spent approximately $7,000 on two
night-vision devices and a weapon sight and shipped them to
Marsha Lessard, a rally organizer who lived near Washington,
DC and who had previously been in contact with the
organizers of the Ellipse rally.193 On January 1st and 2nd,
Rhodes purchased additional weapons and accessories at a
cost of approximately $5,000.194 The following day, January
3rd, Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle departed Texas for
Washington, DC. While traveling, Rhodes spent an additional
$6,000 on an AR-style rifle and firearms attachments.195
Making one final shopping trip in Mississippi, Rhodes
purchased $4,500 of firearms equipment including more
sights, magazines, and weapons parts on January 4th.196
On the morning of January 6th, with weapons stockpiled,
Rhodes messaged the Signal group of Oath Keepers leaders:
We have several well equipped [sic] QRFs outside DC. And
there are many, many others, from other groups, who will be
watching and waiting on the outside in case of worst case
[sic] scenarios.197
6.5 “Ready to Step in And Do What Is Needed”
Stewart Rhodes’s and Oath Keepers’ lawyer Kellye SoRelle
arrived in Washington on the afternoon of January 5th.198
They immediately went to Freedom Plaza, where President
Trump had instructed rally organizers to give some of his
most extreme supporters time to speak.199 As a small group
of Oath Keepers patrolled Freedom Plaza, they were able to
see the results of President Trump’s call to mobilize. 200
SoRelle testified that there were Oath Keepers, Proud Boys,
and “Alex Jones people” mingling together in the crowd, with
“just a small distinction between them.” 201
The Oath Keepers later found themselves at the Phoenix Park
Hotel,202 where they ate and drank with a motley coalition
of far-right political activists who were united in their
shared belief in President Trump’s Big Lie. 203 Among them
were: Proud Boys-linked Bianca Gracia of Latinos for Trump;
Joshua Macias, leader of Vets for Trump;204 and Amanda
Chase, a Virginia State senator.205 In a livestream
discussion moderated by Chase, they promoted false election
fraud claims. Macias and Rhodes encouraged President Trump
to invoke the Insurrection Act and call up combat veterans
who are “ready to step in and do what is needed.” 206
SoRelle later told the Select Committee that there was
discussion of going to “storm the Capitol,” although she
claimed that this was “normal” discussion and supposedly did
not indicate violence or “any of that type of stuff.” 207
That same evening, Gracia asked SoRelle and Rhodes to follow
her to a garage where she was supposed to meet Proud Boys
leader Enrique Tarrio,208 who had just been released from
custody and ordered to leave the DC area.209 Instead of
immediately leaving Washington, DC, Tarrio instead made his
way to a garage near the hotel where the others gathered.
210 Portions of the ensuing meeting were captured on video
by documentary filmmaker Nick Quested and his camera crew.
SoRelle claims that she was asked to attend to discuss
Tarrio’s legal woes, 211 but there is evidence indicating
that the conversation turned tactical.
Tarrio discussed the court’s order, informing the group he
was going north to Maryland, so he could “stay close just to
make sure my guys are ok.” 212 Tarrio discussed his
confiscated phone with Gracia. He told her that “they
couldn’t get in there,” apparently referencing the
two-factor authentication enabled on his phone.213 Tarrio
also appeared familiar with another attendee, Vets for Trump
leader Macias, who rested his hand on Tarrio’s shoulder at
various points.214 Rhodes and Tarrio shook hands.215
Much of the substantive conversation between Rhodes, Tarrio,
and the others cannot be heard because Tarrio asked
Quested’s camera crew to stop recording.216 However, some of
the conversation is audible from afar and Rhodes can be
heard telling Tarrio that he “has three groups in Tyson’s
Corner,” 217 a reference to the QRFs that he had mustered in
the event that President Trump called the Oath Keepers into
service.
Tarrio later expressed appreciation for Rhodes’s presence at
the garage meeting and underscored that their two
organizations needed to stand together on January 6th.
Tarrio explained that the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers are
“just two different groups” and that he and Rhodes “don’t
get along,” but said that “for situations like this where
there is a need to unite regardless of our differences . . .
what he did today was commendable.” 218 Tarrio added that
Rhodes’s presence at the garage meeting was “thoughtful”
because Rhodes had “quickly provided security” for the
meeting and “seemed concerned” about Tarrio’s legal
situation.219 In a likely nod to prior coordination between
Proud Boys and Oath Keepers at other post-election events,
Tarrio further explained that “my guys have helped him
[Rhodes] out in the past,” and that he and Rhodes have
“mutual respect” for one another. 220 Tarrio then traveled
north to a hotel near Baltimore, Maryland, where he stayed
through the events of the next day.221
6.6 “Friends of Stone”
As explained above, a constellation of far-right characters
came together in late 2020 as part of the “Stop the Steal”
cause. Among them was Roger Stone, a right-wing political
operative whose career as a self-trumpeted dirty trickster
stretched back decades. Stone is arguably President Trump’s
oldest political advisor.222 For example, he worked for
Donald Trump’s independent presidential bid during the 2000
campaign.223 In addition to his political connections, Stone
cultivated relationships with far-right extremists,
including the two groups charged with seditious conspiracy:
the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys.
The Select Committee found that at least seven members of
the Oath Keepers provided security for Stone, or were seen
with him, in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on
the U.S. Capitol.224 Text messages released by Edward
Vallejo, an Oath Keeper charged with seditious conspiracy
and other crimes, show that Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggs
discussed providing security for Stone.225 Some of these
Oath Keepers guarded Stone during an event at Freedom Plaza
in Washington, DC on the night of January 5th.226 Stone was
also flanked by Oath Keepers outside of the Willard Hotel on
the morning of January 6th.227 One of the Oath Keepers who
provided security for Stone was Joshua James, who pleaded
guilty to seditious conspiracy, obstruction of Congress and
other charges in March 2022.228 James was also reportedly
seen in Stone’s hotel room at the Willard hours before the
attack on the U.S. Capitol.229
Roger Stone in front of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2021
in Washington, DC.
Roger Stone in front of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2021
in Washington, DC.
Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images
Stone has a longstanding, close relationship with the Proud
Boys. Stone has taken the Proud Boys oath230 and repeatedly
defended the group.231 Danish documentarians filmed him
working with Proud Boys for years.232 In one scene, filmed
in 2019, Stone warmly greets Joe Biggs, a Proud Boys leader
central to the Capitol violence. Stone says of Biggs: “My
guy, right here.” 233 In a 2019 court case, Stone identified
Enrique Tarrio as one of his volunteers, explaining that
Tarrio had access to his phone and could post to Stone’s
Instagram account from it.234
As mentioned above, Stone, Tarrio and another Proud Boy
leader, Ethan Nordean, addressed an impromptu rally in
Washington, DC on the night of December 11, 2020. Owen
Shroyer, an InfoWars host, was also with them.235 “We will
fight to the bitter end for an honest count of the 2020
election,” Stone told the crowd. “Never give up, never quit,
never surrender, and fight for America!” 236 A few weeks
later, on January 2, 2021, Tarrio led a Proud Boys protest
outside of Senator Marco Rubio’s home in Florida. The Proud
Boys wanted to convince Rubio to vote against certification
of the vote on January 6th.237 Stone reportedly called into
the event to speak to Tarrio’s crowd.238
One way in which Stone maintained these contacts was through
a Signal chat group named “F.O.S.” — or Friends of Stone.
239 Two days after the election, Stone sent a text: “We
provide information several times a day. So please monitor
the F.O.S. feed so you can act in a timely fashion.” 240 Ali
Alexander and Stone continued to coordinate about Stop the
Steal strategy and events between the election and January
6th.241 In addition to Alexander, Stone’s “Friends” on the
Signal chat included Rhodes and Tarrio.242
In July 2020, President Trump granted Stone clemency after
he was convicted of lying to Congress and other charges.243
Then, on December 23rd, President Trump pardoned Stone.244
Several days later, at a dinner on the evening of December
27th, Stone thanked President Trump. In a post on Parler,
Stone wrote that he “thanked President Trump in person
tonight for pardoning me” and also recommended to the
President that he “appoint a special counsel” to stop “those
who are attempting to steal the 2020 election through voter
fraud.” Stone also wrote that he wanted “to ensure that
Donald Trump continues as our president.” 245 Finally, he
added: “#StopTheSteal” and “#rogerstonedidnothingwrong.” 246
The Select Committee has learned that Stone discussed the
January 6th event with the President, likely at this same
dinner on December 27th.247 The President told Stone he “was
thinking of speaking.” 248
The Select Committee sought to question Roger Stone about
his relationships with President Trump and far-right
extremists, as well as other issues. During his deposition,
Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment right nearly 90 times.249
Stone has publicly stated that he committed no wrongdoing
and that he encouraged a peaceful protest.250
6.7 White Nationalists: “The Capitol Siege was Fucking
Awesome…”
Nick Fuentes is an online provocateur who leads a white
nationalist movement known as “America First,” or the
“Groypers.” Fuentes immediately responded to President
Trump’s “be wild” tweet. On December 19, 2020, Fuentes wrote
on Twitter: “I will return to Washington DC to rally for
President Trump on January 6th!” 251 Fuentes and his
Groypers did return to Washington, DC for the joint session.
As the attack was underway, Fuentes incited followers from
his perch immediately outside of the U.S. Capitol. Some of
his followers joined the attack inside, with one even
sitting in Vice President Pence’s seat on the Senate
dais.252
Fuentes and a fellow Groyper leader, Patrick Casey, rose to
prominence in 2017 after rallying at the Charlottesville
“Unite the Right” event.253 For years, the Groypers have
repeatedly promoted white supremacist and Christian
nationalist beliefs, often cloaked in wink-and-nod humor,
puns, or religion, and they regularly gin up public
opposition to other right-wing organizations or politicians
whom they deem insufficiently conservative.254
Fuentes was a key voice for “Stop the Steal” conspiracy
theories leading up to January 6th. He spent 2 months
leading rallies in State capitals across the country,255
spreading the Big Lie and livestreaming coded calls to
violence.256 He also used his livestream to raise
significant funds between November 2020 and January 2021.257
On November 9, 2020, Fuentes promised, “GROYPERS ARE GOING
TO STOP THIS COUP!” 258 Two days later, Fuentes organized a
“Stop the Steal” rally at the Michigan State Capitol. He
told the crowd that they should be “more feral” in their
tactics to overturn the election, suggesting that they
target lawmakers in their homes.259 On November 14th,
Fuentes rallied a crowd of his followers at the Million MAGA
March in Washington, DC, pushing “Stop the Steal”
conspiracies, calling for President Trump to rule for life,
and exhorting his followers to “storm every State capitol
until January 20, 2021, until President Trump is inaugurated
for 4 more years.” 260
As discussed above, Fuentes was a prominent figure at the
“Stop the Steal” rally in Atlanta, Georgia, in November
2020.261 He promoted election conspiracies, criticized the
Republican Party, joked about the Holocaust, and denounced
former Vice President Biden as illegitimate.262 Fuentes also
suggested his followers intimidate politicians in their
homes.263
On December 12th, Fuentes again rallied a crowd of
supporters at the “Stop the Steal” events in Washington, DC,
calling for the destruction of the Republican Party because
it had failed to overturn the election.264 As others spoke
at the Jericho March rally, Fuentes headlined a “Stop the
Steal” protest just a few blocks away.265
On January 4th, Fuentes suggested that his followers kill
State legislators who don’t support efforts to overturn the
2020 election. As discussed in Chapter 2, President Trump
and his surrogates were pressuring State legislators at the
time to do just that. Fuentes complained that his side “had
no leverage.” Fuentes then asked: “What can you and I do to
a state legislator, besides kill them?” He then quickly
added: “Although we should not do that. I am not advising
that, but I mean, what else can you do, right?266
On January 5th, Casey advertised the marches in Washington,
DC on his Telegram channel and provided repeated updates on
the logistics of getting into the city. Casey also spoke to
his followers about the next day’s rally on a livestream on
DLive.267 As discussed in Chapter 8, the Groypers clearly
played a role in the January 6th attack. They even planted
their flag in the inner chambers of the U.S. Capitol.268
Fuentes crowed about the attack the day after, tweeting:
“The Capitol Siege was fucking awesome and I’m not going to
pretend it wasn’t.” 269 In another tweet on January 7th,
Fuentes wrote: “For a brief time yesterday the US Capital
[sic] was once again occupied by The American People, before
the regime wrested back control.” 270
Despite his boasts on Twitter, Fuentes exercised his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to provide information about his organizing activities to
the Select Committee.271
6.8 The Three (III%) Percenters: “#OccupyCongress”
The Oath Keepers were not the only anti-government
extremists who viewed President Trump’s December 19th tweet
as a call to arms. Militias around the country were
similarly inspired to act. “People were retweeting it right
and left. . . . I saw people retweeting it, talking about,
yeah, it’s going to be crazy, going to be a huge crowd,”
Michael Lee Wells, a militia leader in North Carolina, told
the Select Committee.272 Members of militias known as the
“Three Percenters” were electrified.
The Three Percenters believe that three percent of American
colonists successfully overthrew the British during the
American Revolution.273 This is not true. Far more than a
tiny fraction of the colonial population fought in or
supported the Revolutionary War.274 Regardless, this
ahistorical belief has become an organizing myth for
militias around modern-day America.
As with the Oath Keepers, many Three Percenters have turned
against the U.S. Government, such that they equate it with
the British monarchy and believe it should be overthrown.275
The movement does not have one, centralized hierarchy.
Instead, semi-autonomous branches organize and run
themselves.276 The Three Percenter cause was growing prior
to the attack on the U.S. Capitol. Jeremy Liggett, a militia
leader in Florida, told the Select Committee it was “trendy”
in far-right circles to identify with the Three Percenter
movement in the months leading up to January 6th.277
President Trump tapped into this well of anti-government
extremism. The President’s repeated insistence that the
election had been stolen resonated with militia members who
were already inclined to believe in shady political
conspiracies. The President’s December 19th tweet mobilized
Three Percenters around the country. Suddenly, they had a
focal point for their anti-government beliefs: the joint
session of Congress on January 6th. Court filings and other
evidence reveal that Three Percenters immediately began
planning for violence after President Trump’s “be wild”
announcement.
For example, Lucas Denney and Donald Hazard led a militia
affiliated with the Three Percenter movement called the
“Patriot Boys of North Texas.” Both Denney and Hazard were
charged with assaulting officers on January 6th.278 Denney
pleaded guilty and has been sentenced to 52 months in
prison.279 After President Trump’s tweet, they discussed
travel plans, as well as the need to procure body armor,
helmets, knuckle gloves and pepper spray.280 But they did
not plan to act alone. Instead, they saw themselves as part
of a coalition. In multiple messages, both Denney and Hazard
claimed they were also affiliated with Proud Boys and
intended to work with them on or before January 6th.281
Denney repeatedly cited President Trump’s tweet. “Trump
himself is calling for a big protest in DC on January 6th.
I’m not going to miss this one,” Denney told Hazard on
December 21st.282 On December 30th, Denney wrote in a
Facebook message:
Trump has called this himself. For everyone to come. It’s
the day the electoral college is suppose to be certified by
congress to officially elect Biden. But, Pence is in charge
of this and he’s going to throw out all the votes from
States that were proved to have fraud. There’s so much more
going on behind the scenes though. That’s why he’s called
this rally for support. . . . Trump will stay President
. . .283
As this message indicates, Denney was well-aware of
President Trump’s multi-part plan to disrupt the transfer of
power. He thought that Vice President Pence had the power to
“throw out” electoral votes, just as the President demanded.
In other messages, Denney claimed that President Trump
wanted militias to descend on Washington, DC so they could
serve as a security force against a perceived threat from
Antifa and Black Lives Matter on January 6th. 284
Additional messages between the two reveal their intent to
march on the U.S. Capitol. For instance, Denney attempted to
post two banners on Facebook that advertised events on
January 6th.285 Both banners contained the hashtag
“#OccupyCongress.” The pictures contained images of the U.S.
Capitol and referenced “The Great Betrayal.” One of them
read “If They Won’t Hear Us” and “They Will Fear Us.” In
another post, Denney wrote: “I can’t wait to be in the
middle of it on the front line on the 6th.” 286
Curiously, Denney had also heard a “rumor” that President
Trump would march with them. On January 4, 2021, he stated
in a Facebook message:
Things are going to be happening here. Trump is going to be
speaking to everyone Wed [January 6] before everyone marches
to the capital [sic]. Rumour [sic] has it that he may march
with us. I’ll tell you more when you get here on where to be
wed and what time so you have the best seats. 287
On or about January 6th, Denney sent another message via
Facebook, writing: “Trump speaking to us around 11 am then
we march to the capital and after that we have special plans
that I can’t say right now over Facebook. But keep an eye
out for live feed tomorrow from me. Tomorrow will be
historic.” 288 Later on January 6th, during the attack,
Hazard was captured on video bragging: “We have stormed our
nation’s capitol.” 289
The Patriot Boys of North Texas were not the only Three
Percenter group that mobilized after President Trump’s
tweet. The Department of Justice has alleged that multiple
other cadres of Three Percenter militiamen prepared for
violence on January 6th and then took part in the attack on
the U.S. Capitol.
In Florida, a Three Percenter organization known as the
“Guardians of Freedom” established a “B-squad” for January
6th because they allegedly wanted to avoid being called a
“militia.” 290 These men were led by Jeremy Liggett,
mentioned above.291
On December 24, 2020, the B-squad sent out a flyer, “CALLING
ALL PATRIOTS!” to Washington, D.C.292 The flyer read: “The
Guardians of Freedom III% are responding to the call from
President Donald J. Trump to assist in the security,
protection, and support of the people as we all protest the
fraudulent election and re-establish liberty for our nation.
JOIN US & Thousands of other Patriots!” 293 The B-Squad
claimed it was the “right & duty of the people to alter or
to abolish” the Government.294 Its members discussed
bringing tactical gear to Washington, DC.295
On December 30th, Liggett posted a meme to Facebook stating
that “3% Will Show In Record Numbers In DC.” 296 When the
Select Committee asked about this post, Liggett downplayed
its significance or disclaimed any knowledge about other
Three Percenter groups that might “show in record
numbers.” 297 However, on January 3, 2021, Liggett posted a
“safety video” on Facebook in which he and others dressed in
military gear. Liggett instructed listeners about
self-defense and the tools they (like him) could bring to
Washington, DC, including “an expandable metal baton, a
walking cane and a folding knife.” 298 He advised “all of
you Patriots going to Washington, D.C. . . . to support
Trump,” and to “keep up the fight.” 299 Several “B-squad”
members have been charged with civil disorder and disorderly
and disruptive conduct, which took place while rioters
nearby were assaulting officers in the tunnel area of the
Capitol’s Lower West Terrace on January 6th.300
In California, another group of men associated with the
Three Percenter movement quickly began plotting their next
moves after President Trump’s tweet. Alan Hostetter and
Russell Taylor ran a non-profit known as the American
Phoenix Project, which protested COVID-19 lockdowns and the
2020 election results, while also promoting violence ahead
of January 6th.301 Ahead of the joint session, Hostetter and
Taylor organized a small group in an encrypted chat they
named “The California Patriots — DC Brigade.” 302
On December 19th, Taylor linked to President Trump’s “will
be wild” tweet and asked members of the chat “Who is
going?” 303 The same day, Hostetter posted a message to his
Instagram account, explaining he was traveling to
Washington, DC on January 6th because President Trump
“tweeted that all patriots should descend on Washington DC”
and that day “is the date of the Joint Session of Congress
in which they will either accept or reject the
fake/phony/stolen electoral college votes.” 304 The next
day, Taylor renamed the Telegram chat as “The California
Patriots-Answer the Call Jan 6.” 305 On December 29th,
Taylor posted to that chat: “I personally want to be on the
front steps and be one of the first ones to breach the
doors!” 306
Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor and
their alleged co-conspirators exchanged messages about
bringing weapons, such as hatchets, bats, or large metal
flashlights, as well as possibly firearms, with them to
Washington, DC. 307 They were “ready and willing to
fight.” 308 In one message, Hostetter predicted that January
6th would be similar to the “War of Independence” because
“[t]here will likely be 3% of us again that will commit
fully to this battle, but just as in 1776 patriots will
prevail.” 309
There are additional examples of how President Trump’s “be
wild” tweet led Three Percenters to descend on the U.S.
Capitol. One Three Percenter group issued an open letter on
December 16, 2020, announcing that they “stand ready and are
standing by to answer the call from our President should the
need arise that We The People are needed to take back our
country from the pure evil that is conspiring to steal our
country away from the American people. . . . We will not act
unless we are told to.” 310 In late December, after the
President’s tweet, The Three Percenters Original (TTPO)
issued a letter to its members announcing that “this
organization will be answering that call!” 311
There is also additional evidence showing that militia
groups like the Three Percenters coordinated with other
groups both before and on January 6th. Josh Ellis, the owner
of the MyMilitia website, testified that he used Zello (a
walkie-talkie app) when he was in Washington, DC on January
6th. The Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, other militia members,
and “regular patriots” all used these Zello channels in the
leadup to January 6th and in response to President Trump’s
December 19th tweet. They used these channels to share
intelligence.312
6.9 QAnon: “Operation Occupy the Capitol”
Shortly after the January 6th attack, a video of a bearded
man in a “Q” shirt chasing U.S. Capitol Police Officer Ryan
Goodman through the halls of the U.S. Capitol went viral.313
That man was Doug Jensen, a QAnon believer.314 After
Jensen’s arrest, FBI agents asked him why he traveled from
Iowa to Washington, DC in the first place. “Trump posted
make sure you’re there, January 6 for the rally in
Washington, D.C.,” Jensen responded. 315
Jensen was not the only QAnon believer to attack the U.S.
Capitol on January 6th. The letter “Q” and related slogans,
such as “Where We Go One, We Go All,” were ubiquitous among
the rioters. They were visible on shirts, signs, and flags
throughout the crowd. What was once a marginal digital
movement had become a bricks-and-mortar force powerful
enough to help obstruct a joint session of Congress.
QAnon is a bizarre and dangerous cult that gained popularity
in 2017, when a person known only as “Q” began posting on
4chan, an anonymous message board.316 The poster supposedly
held a “Q” security clearance at the Department of Energy.
QAnon adherents believe that President Trump is a messianic
figure battling the forces of the “deep state” and a Satanic
pedophile ring operated by leading Democrats and the
American elite.317 Q’s first post in October 2017 predicted
that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be
arrested in short order.318 Although that prophecy did not
come to pass, the conspiracy theory evolved and grew over
time, spreading across social media platforms and eventually
finding a home in 8kun, another anonymous message board
known for trafficking in conspiracy theories and hate.319
President Trump was given multiple opportunities to disavow
QAnon. Instead, he essentially endorsed its core tenets.
During an August 19, 2020, press briefing, President Trump
was asked what he thought about the QAnon belief that he was
fighting a Satanic cabal. “I mean, you know, if I can help
save the world from problems, I’m willing to do it. I’m
willing to put myself out there,” he replied.320 During a
townhall on NBC News two weeks prior to the election,
President Trump first claimed he “knew nothing” about QAnon,
but he then praised its believers for being “very strongly
against pedophilia.” The President emphasized: “And I agree
with that. I mean, I do agree with that.” 321
In 2020, QAnon played a significant role in spreading
various election conspiracy theories. After the election,
QAnon accounts amplified the claim that Dominion Voting
System’s software had altered votes.322 On November 19th,
President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on
One America News Network (OAN) that was captioned,
“Dominion-izing the Vote.” 323 The segment claimed that
Dominion had switched votes from President Trump to former
Vice President Biden. OAN featured a supposed cyber expert,
Ron Watkins, a key figure in the QAnon conspiracy
movement.324 Watkins’s father, Jim, owned the 8kun site that
“Q” called home, and Ron helped oversee its message
boards.325
After promoting the OAN segment, President Trump retweeted
Ron Watkins’s account on several other occasions. On
December 15, 2020, President Trump retweeted a post in which
Watkins spread false claims of foreign influence in the
election.326 Then, on January 3rd, President Trump retweeted
Ron Watkins’s account four more times.327
QAnon’s adherents were clearly paying attention to President
Trump’s words — and tweets. The President’s “be wild” tweet
was widely heard as a clarion call. Jim Watkins told the
Select Committee that “thousands and thousands of people
probably” agreed that the President’s December 19th tweet
was a call for them to come to Washington, DC.328 Jim
Watkins himself marched in Washington, DC on January 6th
because of the President’s call, but he has not been charged
with any crime.329
Other QAnon adherents flocked to Washington, DC in response
to the President’s call to action. “POTUS HAS REQUESTED YOUR
ATTENDANCE Washington DC JANUARY 6TH 2021,” Thomas Munn, a
QAnon believer, posted on Facebook. Munn added: “Our
President has only asked two things from us, so far…#1 Vote
#2 January 6, 2021.” 330 Jacob Chansley, better known as the
QAnon Shaman, told the FBI that he traveled from Arizona
because President Trump had requested that all “patriots”
come to Washington, DC on January 6th.331
During the investigation, the Select Committee learned that
the QAnon conspiracy theory often overlaps with other
extremist beliefs. Stewart Rhodes of the Oath Keepers
testified to the Select Committee that he’s “not a Q-tard”
and “not a follower of Q at all.” 332 However, Rhodes
cynically exploited QAnon for his own purposes. The Oath
Keepers’ website and text messages were littered with QAnon
phrases.333 Nick Quested, a filmmaker who shadowed the Proud
Boys, often heard QAnon themes in the Proud Boys’ private
discussions.334
As January 6th drew closer, multiple posts on the
QAnon-linked website 8kun indicated that violence was
imminent. “You can go to Washington on Jan 6 and help storm
the Capitol,” one user wrote. This same user continued: “As
many Patriots as can be. We will storm the government
buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal
employees and agents, and demand a recount.” 335 Other posts
on 8kun debated the politicians that users should target
once they got inside the Capitol.336
A QAnon-inspired banner was also widely shared by groups
planning events for January 5th and 6th. The top of the
image read: “Operation Occupy the Capitol.” The central
image showed the U.S. Capitol being torn in two. In the
lower left corner, there appeared a QAnon phrase:
“#WeAreTheStorm.” 337
6.10 TheDonald.win: “Occupy the Capitol”
Within three minutes of President Trump’s tweet, a user on
TheDonald.win message board posted: “Trump Tweet. Daddy Says
Be In DC on Jan. 6th.” 338 Moderators pinned the post to the
top of the board from December 19th until January 6th. It
garnered nearly 6,000 comments and more than 24,000 upvotes
during that time.339 Many of the site’s users quickly
interpreted President Trump’s tweet as a call for violence.
For example, one user wrote, “[Trump] can’t exactly openly
tell you to revolt. This is the closest he’ll ever get.” 340
Jody Williams, the site’s then-owner, testified that while
users had been talking about traveling to Washington, DC
since the election, after the tweet “anything else was kind
of shut out, and it just was going to be the 6th.” 341
In the days that followed, users on TheDonald.win discussed:
surrounding and occupying the U.S. Capitol; cutting off
access tunnels used by Members of Congress; the types of
weapons they should bring; and even how to build a hangman’s
gallows.342 The parallels to what transpired on January 6th
are obvious.
TheDonald.win and its predecessor site was a website for
some of its namesake’s most ardent fans. Even before
President Trump was elected, his social media team monitored
and interacted with the site’s users. In the summer of 2016,
then-candidate Trump himself engaged in a written question
and answer session on TheDonald, which at the time was a
forum on Reddit.343 This online community, which had upwards
of 790,000 users, was banned by Reddit in mid-2020.344
However, the site’s users migrated to another online
location, becoming TheDonald.win.345
Dan Scavino, the President’s social media guru, amplified
content from this website. During the 2016 presidential
campaign, “a team in the war room at Trump Tower was
monitoring social media trends, including TheDonald
subreddit . . . and privately communicating with the most
active users to seed new trends.” 346 “Campaign staffers
monitored Twitter and TheDonald subreddit, and pushed any
promising trends up to social media director Dan Scavino,
who might give them a boost with a tweet.” 347 In 2017,
President Trump tweeted a video of himself attacking CNN.348
The video had appeared on The Donald four days earlier.349
In 2019, Politico reported that Scavino “regularly monitors
Reddit, with a particular focus on the pro-Trump
/r/The_Donald channel.” 350
White House social media director Dan Scavino Jr.
White House social media director Dan Scavino Jr.
Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
The Select Committee sought to question Scavino about how he
and others on President Trump’s social media team interacted
with The Donald subreddit and then TheDonald.win. But
Scavino refused to cooperate with the committee’s
subpoena.351
After President Trump’s December 19th tweet, users on the
site posted simple maps of the U.S. Capitol and telegraphed
their intent to invade the building.352 “If we occupy the
capitol building, there will be no vote,” one user wrote.353
“The media will call us evil if we have to occupy the
Capitol Building on January 6th. Let them,” another post
read.354 One user argued the goal should be to “surround the
enemy” and “create [a] perimeter” around the Capitol on
January 6th, such that no one was allowed to leave until
President Trump was “re-admitted for another 4 years.” 355
This same user posted a diagram of the U.S. Capitol’s
perimeter with arrows indicating where the “Capitol Access
Tunnels” were located.
On January 5th, another user on TheDonald.win encouraged
President Trump’s supporters to “be prepared to secure the
capitol building,” claiming that “there will be plenty of ex
military to guide you.” 356 Multiple other posts made it
clear that the U.S. Capitol was the target on January 6th,
with one poster writing that people should bring “handcuffs
and zip ties to DC,” so they could enact “citizen’s arrests”
of those officials who certified the election’s results.357
Another post highlighted the “most important map for January
6th. Form a TRUE LINE around the Capitol and the
tunnels.” 358 That “post included a detailed schematic of
Capitol Hill with the tunnels surrounding the complex
highlighted.” 359
Other posts on TheDonald.win included specific plans to
build gallows outside the U.S. Capitol. “Gallows are simpler
and more cost effective, plus they’re an American old west
tradition too,” one user wrote on December 22, 2020.360 A
week later, another wrote: “Let’s construct a Gallows
outside the Capitol building next Wednesday so the
Congressmen watching from their office windows shit their
pants.” 361 Another said that “building a hanging platform
in front of Congress on the 6 should send a strong
message.” 362 The site hosted a diagram showing how to tie a
hangman’s knot,363 with one site member writing that they
should build gallows “so the traitors know the stakes.” 364
On January 5, 2021, hours before the attack began, a user
posted an image of gallows and titled it, “Election Fraud
Repair Kit.” 365
Text messages between Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason
Miller and White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows show that
these kinds of posts reached deep into the President’s inner
circle. Miller sent Meadows a text on December 30th,
declaring, “I got the base FIRED UP.” 366 The thread
contained a link to a TheDonald.win comment thread filled
with reactions to a post by Miller promoting January 6th.367
Users in the thread made comments such as “gallows don’t
require electricity,” and that millions will “bust in
through the doors if they try to stop Pence from declaring
Trump the winner,” all in response to Miller.368
On December 19, 2020, the same day President Trump posted
his inflammatory “be wild” tweet, he also tweeted a
noteworthy video. The short clip was titled, “FIGHT FOR
TRUMP! - SAVE AMERICA - SAVE THE WORLD.” 369 The video
reportedly appeared on TheDonald.win two days earlier.370 As
with so much else on TheDonald.win, this refrain featured
prominently on the day of the attack on the Capitol. During
his speech at the Ellipse south of the White House on
January 6th, the crowd broke out into a chant of “Fight for
Trump! Fight for Trump!” President Trump thanked those in
attendance.371
In the two and a half weeks since he first announced the
January 6th “protest,” extremists and conspiracy theorists
plotted to make the unprecedented, presidentially announced
protest against the peaceful transfer of power “wild”
indeed. Meanwhile, event organizers and White House staffers
prepared for the final rally of President Trump’s term.
6.11 How the White House and Rally Organizers Prepared for
January 6th
In the days following President Trump’s tweet, rally
organizers secured permits for about one dozen events in
Washington, DC on January 5th and 6th.372 At 7:12 a.m., not
even 6 hours after President Trump’s tweet, Cindy Chafian,
an executive at Women for America First (WFAF), emailed the
National Park Service (NPS) about an event that had been
planned to coincide with President-elect Biden’s
inauguration on January 20, 2021.373 Chafian’s ask was
simple: “Can I change the date to January 6th?” 374
WFAF was founded in 2019 by Amy and Kylie Kremer, a
mother-daughter pair who were longtime supporters of the
President.375 WFAF became a significant player in the “Stop
the Steal” movement.376 The Kremers started a “Stop the
Steal” Facebook group that gathered some 365,000 members in
less than 24 hours.377 Their online organizing coincided
with their on-the-ground mobilization activities. The
Kremers organized a bus tour to promote the Big Lie, in
addition to events in Washington, DC on November 14, 2020,
and December 12, 2020.378 After President Trump’s December
19th tweet, the Kremers focused on January 6th. Kylie Kremer
proudly declared their support on Twitter: “The calvary
[sic] is coming, President! JANUARY 6th | Washington, DC
TrumpMarch.com #MarchForTrump #StopTheSteal.” 379 After the
date of their permit was revised, WFAF ultimately provided
President Trump the stage on the Ellipse where he would
direct the crowd to march on the Capitol.380
The Kremers were not alone in responding quickly to the
President’s tweet. Ali Alexander, the founder of Stop the
Steal, LLC,381 was eager to get ahead of other organizers.
On the morning of December 19th, Alexander told his event
planner, “Everyone is trying to get the jump on us so I’d
like to get the court side of the capitol (lawn) and I’d
like to get capitol steps and court.” 382 Alexander told his
event planner to “grab whatever we can. All of it.” 383
Alexander’s team did just that: they registered and launched
a new website, WildProtest.com,384 which advertised planned
events for January 6th under a banner that read: “President
Trump Wants You in DC January 6.” 385
Still other organizers were quick to seize on the
President’s tweet. Arina Grossu and Robert Weaver,
co-founders of the self-proclaimed “Judeo-Christian” Jericho
March organization,386 held a rally in Washington, DC on
December 12, 2020. Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes,
Flynn, Jones, Alexander, and others shared a stage at that
event.387 Grossu and Weaver exchanged emails just a few
hours after President Trump’s first mention of January 6th.
In an email on the morning of December 19th, Weaver told
Grossu to “enjoy the peace before the storm” and said,
“Trump has called for a protest on 1/6, FYI.” 388 The
Jericho March’s website used President Trump’s “Be there,
will be wild!” language to advertise additional events
between January 2nd and January 6, 2021.389
Marsha Lessard, the leader of a vaccine-skeptic group,
Virginia Freedom Keepers, worked to stage an event with
Bianca Gracia, the leader of Latinos for Trump on January
6th.390 The women had ties to the Oath Keepers391 and Proud
Boys,392 respectively—two groups central to the violence on
January 6. Latinos for Trump reportedly advertised their
January 6th event with the same QAnon-inspired banner,
“Operation Occupy the Capitol.” 393 Another conservative
group, Moms for America, worked with Alexander before
securing a permit for an event on January 5th.394
6.12 “He’s Calling on You, He Needs Your Help”
As discussed above, Alex Jones was one of the loudest
supporters of the “Stop the Steal” movement. Jones dedicated
much of the December 20th episode of his InfoWars show to
President Trump’s “be wild” tweet, telling his listeners
that nothing less than the fate of the American Republic was
at stake. “He’s calling you, he needs your help, we need
your help,” Jones told his audience.395 The Select Committee
has learned that, between the time of the President’s tweet
and Jones’s December 20th show, Jones’s staff had several
calls with Chafian, who had just procured a new permit for
WFAF’s event on the Ellipse.396 The two parties apparently
discussed whether this newly hatched January 6th event was
an opportunity to work together.397
Jones’s broadcast also led to an influx of funds for the
January 6th event at the Ellipse. Julie Fancelli is the
billionaire heiress to the Publix supermarket fortune and a
longtime supporter of President Trump.398 Fancelli had
recently become a donor to Jones’s InfoWars site.399 She
listened to Jones’s December 20th show,400 and decided she
wanted to back the cause.
Inspired by Jones and the fervor that continued to surround
the President’s tweet, Fancelli called Caroline Wren, a
Republican fundraiser linked to the Trump Campaign, the next
day.401 According to Wren, Fancelli said that “she wanted to
see a lot of people there in DC, so how much would that
cost?” 402 Fancelli spoke with Jones’s staff and they
recommended that she connect with Chafian, who was
organizing the Ellipse rally.403 In the waning days of 2020,
Fancelli and Jones spoke several times.404
Fancelli worked with Wren to create a multimillion-dollar
budget to convene as many supporters of President Trump as
possible.405 To ensure that Fancelli’s dollars made maximum
impact, Wren contacted some of the major players who were
rallying supporters for January 6th. Wren emailed Kylie
Kremer406 and exchanged texts with Jones407 and Chafian.408
Fancelli’s goal was clear: she wanted to spend $3 million to
“get as many people there as possible.” 409 The resulting
budget allocated $500,000 to a busing program and a
centralized ad campaign by the Tea Party Express to promote
the event.410 Another $500,000 went to assisting WFAF and
Jones in their organizational efforts.411
Caroline Wren also connected with Ali Alexander. On December
29th, Wren told the Stop the Steal leader, “I can pay for
the buses and I have my team looking for available
companies, so let me know what cities you need them in!” 412
Wren’s offer came in response to a tweet from Alexander
earlier that day: “Coalition of us working on 25 new charter
buses to bring people FOR FREE to #JAN6 #STOPTHESTEAL for
President Trump. If you have money for more buses or have a
company, let me know. We will list our buses sometime in the
next 72 hours. STAND BACK & STAND BY!” 413
The final words of Alexander’s tweet directly echoed
President Trump’s command to the Proud Boys during the
September 29, 2020, presidential debate.414 Alexander’s word
choice was apt. The Proud Boys were already planning to show
up in force, and to ensure that the crowd would be “wild.”
6.13 “Trump is Supposed to Order Us to the Capitol”
On the evening of December 27th, President Trump boosted the
upcoming event on Twitter: “See you in Washington, DC, on
January 6th. Don’t miss it. Information to follow!” 415 The
Select Committee learned that this tweet came after the
White House spoke with a former Trump staffer, Justin
Caporale, who was asked to help produce the Ellipse
rally.416 That same evening, the President had dinner with
Donald Trump, Jr., and his girlfriend Kimberly Guilfoyle,417
who spoke with rally organizer Caroline Wren during the
meal.418 Wren also texted Guilfoyle talking points that
described her ambitions for the event, saying that “buses of
people are coming in from all over the country to support
you. It’s going to be huge, we are also adding in
programming the night of January 5th.” 419
After Guilfoyle’s call with Wren, there was a series of
calls among the senior White House staff,420 likely
underscoring the seriousness of the White House’s interest
in the event.
Within a few days, the White House began to take a more
direct role in coordinating the rally at the Ellipse.421 In
a December 29th text to Wren, Caporale wrote that after the
President’s planned speech there “maybe [sic] a call to
action to march to the [C]apitol and make noise.” 422
This is the earliest indication uncovered by the Select
Committee that the President planned to call on his
supporters to march on the U.S. Capitol. But it wasn’t the
last. On January 2nd, rally organizer Katrina Pierson
informed Wren that President Trump’s Chief of Staff, Mark
Meadows, had said the President was going to “call on
everyone to march to the [C]apitol.” 423
Inside the White House, the President’s intent was
well-known. Cassidy Hutchinson, an aide to Meadows, recalled
in her testimony that she overheard discussions to this
effect toward the end of December or early January. One such
discussion included an exchange between Meadows and Rudolph
Giuliani that occurred on January 2nd.424 Hutchinson
understood that President Trump wanted to have a crowd at
the Capitol in connection with what was happening inside—the
certification of the electoral count.425 Hutchinson also
recalled that President Trump’s allies in Congress were
aware of the plan. During a call with members of the House
Freedom Caucus, the idea of telling people to go to the
Capitol was discussed as a way to encourage Congress to
delay the electoral college certification and send it back
to the States.426
On January 4th, WFAF’s Kylie Kremer informed Mike Lindell,
the CEO of MyPillow and an ally of President Trump, that
“POTUS is going to have us march there [the Supreme
Court]/the Capitol” but emphasized that the plan “stays only
between us.” 427
The “Stop the Steal” coalition was aware of the President’s
intent. On January 5th, Ali Alexander sent a text to a
journalist saying: “Ellipse then US capitol [sic]. Trump is
supposed to order us to the capitol [sic] at the end of his
speech but we will see.” 428
6.14 “Well, I Should Walk With the People.”
President Trump wanted to personally accompany his
supporters on the march from the Ellipse to the U.S.
Capitol. During a January 4th meeting with staffers and
event organizer Katrina Pierson, President Trump emphasized
his desire to march with his supporters.429 “Well, I should
walk with the people,” Pierson recalled President Trump
saying.430 Though Pierson said that she did not take him
“seriously,” she knew that “he would absolutely want to be
with the people.” 431 Pierson pointed out that President
Trump “did the drive-by the first time and the flyover the
second time” — a reference to the November and December 2020
protests in Washington, DC.432 During these previous events,
President Trump made cameo appearances to fire up his
supporters. Now, as January 6th approached, the President
again wanted to be there, on the ground, as his supporters
marched on the U.S. Capitol.
The President’s advisors tried to talk him out of it. White
House Senior Advisor Max Miller “shot it down immediately”
because of concerns about the President’s safety.433 Pierson
agreed.434 But President Trump was persistent, and he
floated the idea of having 10,000 National Guardsmen
deployed to protect him and his supporters from any supposed
threats by leftwing counter-protestors.435 Miller again
rejected the President’s idea, saying that the National
Guard was not necessary for the event. Miller testified that
there was no further conversation on the matter.436 After
the meeting, Miller texted Pierson, “Just glad we killed the
national guard and a procession.” 437 That is, President
Trump briefly considered having the National Guard oversee
his procession to the U.S. Capitol. The President did not
order the National Guard to protect the U.S. Capitol, or to
secure the joint session proceedings.
Although his advisors tried to talk the President out of
personally going, they understood that his supporters would
be marching.438 Pierson’s agenda for the meeting reflected
the President’s plan for protestors to go to the U.S.
Capitol after the rally.439 But President Trump did not give
up on the idea of personally joining his supporters on their
march, as discussed further in Chapter 7.
6.15 “POTUS…Likes the Crazies.”
As Katrina Pierson helped plan the Ellipse rally, she faced
another complication. The “Stop the Steal” movement played
an outsized role in promoting January 6th. And now, as the
day approached, its leading voices wanted prime speaking
gigs — perhaps even on the same stage as President Trump.
Roger Stone, Alex Jones and Ali Alexander were all angling
for significant stage time. Pierson knew they were trouble.
Photos of Roger Stone, Alex Jones and Ali Alexander appear
on a screen during a Select Committee hearing on July 12,
2022.
Photos of Roger Stone, Alex Jones and Ali Alexander appear
on a screen during a Select Committee hearing on July 12,
2022.
Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images
In her testimony before the Select Committee, Pierson cited
several concerns, including that Jones and Alexander had
played a prominent role in the November 2020 protest in
Atlanta, Georgia. This was no ordinary protest. Jones and
Alexander “had gone into the Georgia Capitol with some
inflammatory rhetoric,” Pierson explained.440 When Pierson
was asked if Jones and Alexander “surrounding the governor’s
mansion” and “going into the Capitol” were the “kind of
thing” that gave her pause, she responded: “Absolutely.” 441
After the Georgia protest, Pierson explained, the Kremers —
who had helped organize “Stop the Steal” activities —
distanced themselves from Jones and Alexander.442
But there was an additional problem. President Trump wanted
to include the “Stop the Steal” leaders in the January 6th
event. As Pierson put it in a text message to Kylie Kremer:
“POTUS . . . likes the crazies.” 443 Pierson said that she
believed this was the case because President Trump “loved
people who viciously defended him in public.” 444 But their
“vicious” defenses of the President clearly troubled
Pierson.
Pierson tried to trim the speaker lineup — which still
included the “Stop the Steal” trio of Stone, Jones, and
Alexander. She was initially vetoed by the White House after
Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications Dan Scavino,445 who
had approved the “original psycho list.” 446 At one point,
she texted Scavino’s boss, Mark Meadows, saying: “Things
have gotten crazy and I desperately need some
direction.” 447 She was concerned by the possibility of
“crazy people” being included in the event, their incendiary
role in Georgia, and the fact that people coming to
Washington, DC were planning to protest at the U.S.
Capitol.448
Meadows told Pierson that she should take control of the
situation and remove the possibility of controversial
speakers.449 Pierson agreed to do so.450 But the President
remained an obstacle. During their January 4th meeting,
Pierson tried to convince President Trump to minimize the
role of these potentially explosive figures at the Ellipse.
She offered to place them at a planned event the night
before in Freedom Plaza or on other stages in DC on January
6th. She told the President to “[k]eep the fringe on the
fringe” 451 and advised him to “[e]liminate convicted felons
that could damage other speakers.” 452
President Trump was still unwilling to remove them from the
lineup entirely. The President instructed Pierson to give
Stone a speaking slot on January 5th and asked for more
information about Ali Alexander.453 After discussing the
matter with Scavino, President Trump also requested that
Alexander be given a speaking slot. President Trump “brought
up Ali [Alexander] . . . just keep him on stage not
associated with POTUS or main event,” Scavino wrote.454
In the end, the “Stop the Steal” leaders — Stone, Jones and
Alexander — did not appear on the stage at the Ellipse on
January 6th, although they did speak at other planned
events, consistent with the President’s request about
Alexander. “POTUS expectations are [to have something]
intimate and then send everyone over to the Capitol,”
Pierson explained in a text message to Justin Caporale and
Taylor Budowich.455 Caporale redacted this text and others
in his early production of documents to the Select
Committee, and he only revealed them after they had already
been produced by other witnesses.456
However, other incendiary voices — in addition to President
Trump’s — were given time on the Ellipse stage. The Select
Committee learned that President Trump’s aides warned him
against the inclusion of figures like John Eastman457 and
Rudolph Giuliani,458 given their false claims about election
fraud.459 Both men, of course, ended up sharing a stage with
him on January 6th.460 Meadows himself directed that they be
allowed to speak.461
6.16 January 5, 2021: “Fort Trump”
While the “Stop the Steal” coalition was not given speaking
slots on the Ellipse stage on January 6th, its leaders had
plenty of opportunities to speak the day before. And they
used their platforms to rile up the crowd in Washington, DC
in advance of the joint session.
Ali Alexander spoke at an event sponsored by Moms for
America in front of the U.S. Capitol. Alexander claimed that
he was honored to be sharing the same stage with President
Trump the following day, even though behind the scenes his
appearance had been nixed.462
“We must rebel,” Alexander told rallygoers. “I’m not even
sure if I’m going to leave D.C. We might make this ‘Fort
Trump,’ right?” Alexander said, while standing in front of
the U.S. Capitol. “We’re going to keep fighting for you, Mr.
President.” 463 On his Twitter account, Alexander also
spread the idea that President Trump’s supporters should
occupy areas of Washington, DC, using the phrases and
hashtags such as “Fort Trump” and “#OccupyDC”.464
Alex Jones and Roger Stone spoke at a separate event hosted
by Virginia Women for Trump in front of the Supreme
Court.465 The event, named the “One Nation Under God” prayer
rally, was cohosted by the American Phoenix Project — the
Three Percenter-linked group run by Alan Hostetter and
Russel Taylor, discussed above, which is charged with
conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding. 466
Jones repeated his claims about the election being stolen,
claiming that those in attendance stood against a “Satanic
world government.” 467 Stone led a “Stop the Steal” chant,
claiming the “evidence of election fraud is not only
growing, it is overwhelming, and it is compelling.”
President Trump “won the majority of the legal votes cast”
and President Trump “won this election,” Stone said. Nothing
less than the fate of Western Civilization was at stake,
according to Stone:
Let’s be very clear. This is not fight between Republicans
and Democrats. This is not a fight between liberals and
conservatives. This is a fight for the future the United
States of America. It is a fight for the future of Western
Civilization as we know it. It’s a fight between dark and
light. It’s a fight between the godly and the godless. It’s
a fight between good and evil. And we dare not fail, or we
will step out into one thousand years of darkness. 468
Stone claimed that they “renounce violence” and those on
“the left . . . are the violent ones.” But he insisted that
“nothing is over until we say it is,” and “Victory will be
ours.” 469
Both Taylor and Hostetter spoke as well. Hostetter told the
crowd, “We are at war.” 470 Taylor promised to “fight” and
“bleed,” vowing that “Patriot[s]” would “not return to our
peaceful way of life until this election is made right.” 471
A long rally was also hosted at Freedom Plaza, an open-air
space on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. It is a
symbolic protest site, standing in the direct line between
the White House and the U.S. Capitol. Stone, Jones and
Alexander all appeared at Freedom Plaza on the evening of
January 5th. Their remarks were incendiary.
Stone repeated his apocalyptic language from earlier in the
day, claiming that rallygoers were embroiled in “an epic
struggle for the future of this country between dark and
light.” 472 “I want them to know that 1776 is always an
option,” Ali Alexander said. “These degenerates in the deep
state are going to give us what we want, or we are going to
shut this country down.” 473 When Alex Jones took to the
stage, he screamed at the crowd: “It’s 1776!” 474
Another speaker that evening was Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn
(ret.). “Tomorrow, tomorrow, trust me, the American people
that are standing on the soil that we are standing on
tonight, and they’re going to be standing on this soil
tomorrow, this is soil that we have fought over, fought for,
and we will fight for in the future,” Flynn also told the
crowd. Flynn addressed Members of Congress, saying “those of
you who are feeling weak tonight, those of you that don’t
have the moral fiber in your body, get some tonight because
tomorrow, we the people are going to be here, and we want
you to know that we will not stand for a lie. We will not
stand for a lie.” 475
6.17 “Together, We Will STOP THE STEAL.”
On the evening of January 5th, the President edited the
speech he would deliver the next day at the Ellipse. The
President’s speechwriting team had only started working on
his remarks the day before.476 Despite concerns from the
speechwriting team, unfounded claims coming from Giuliani
and others made their way into the draft. 477
The initial draft circulated on January 5th emphasized that
the crowd would march to the U.S. Capitol.478 Based on what
they had heard from others in the White House, the
speechwriting team expected President Trump to use his
address to tell people to go to the Capitol.479
That evening, President Trump convened an impromptu
gathering in the Oval Office with members of his staff,
primarily his press team480 and White House Deputy Chief of
Staff Dan Scavino, who was in charge of President Trump’s
personal Twitter account.481 Despite the bitter cold, the
President ordered his staff to keep the door to the Rose
Garden open so he could hear the music and cheering from his
supporters at Freedom Plaza.482 The music playing at Freedom
Plaza was so loud “you could feel it shaking in the
Oval.” 483
President Trump and members of his staff in the Oval Office
on the evening of January 5, 2021.
President Trump and members of his staff in the Oval Office
on the evening of January 5, 2021.
Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
As President Trump listened, he was tweeting, at one point
telling his supporters he could hear them from the Oval
Office.484 His speechwriters incorporated those tweets into
a second draft of the speech that was circulated later that
evening.485 The following appeared in both tweet form486 and
was adapted into the speech:
“All of us here today do not want to see our election
victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our
Country has had enough, they won’t take it anymore!
Together, we will STOP THE STEAL.” 487
In speaking with staff, he still seemed optimistic that
“Congress would take some sort of action in his favor.” 488
The White House photographer, who was also in attendance,
recalled that President Trump again remarked that he should
go to the Capitol the next day, and even asked about the
best route to get there.489 The President peppered staff for
ideas concerning how “we could make the RINOs do the right
thing” and make the next day “big.” 490 Deputy Press
Secretary Sarah Matthews, who was present in the Oval Office
that evening, understood that President Trump wanted to get
Republican Members of Congress to send the electoral votes
back to the States, rather than certify the election.491
Matthews recalled that initially no one spoke up in
response, since they were trying to “process” what he had
said.492
Eventually, Deere suggested that President Trump should
focus his speech on his administration’s accomplishments,
rather than on his claim that the election had been
stolen.493 But the President told Deere that while they had
accomplished a lot, the crowd was going to be “fired up” and
“angry” the next day because they believed the election had
been stolen and was rigged.494 President Trump knew the
crowd was angry because he could hear them.495 Of course,
President Trump was responsible, more than any other party,
for ginning up their anger.
President Trump ended the evening by asking an aide how many
people were going to be at the rally. The aide responded
that he was not sure but told President Trump that he saw
videos on Twitter of “pro-trump people chanting on planes
heading to DC,” which he asked to be shared with Scavino.496
“We will not let them silence your voices,” the President
told the crowd from the podium at the Ellipse. “We’re not
going to let it happen, I’m not going to let it happen.” 497
His supporters started chanting, “fight for Trump!” The
President thanked them.498
President Trump knew not only that his supporters were
angry, but also that some of them were armed.499 At times,
he ad-libbed, deliberately stoking their rage even more. At
one point he said: “And we fight. We fight like hell. And if
you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a
country anymore.” 500 The word “fight,” or a variation
thereof, appeared only twice in the prepared text.501
President Trump would go on to utter the word twenty times
during his speech at the Ellipse.502
President Trump had summoned a mob, including armed
extremists and conspiracy theorists, to Washington, DC on
the day the joint session of Congress was to meet. He then
told that same mob to march on the U.S. Capitol and “fight.”
They clearly got the message.
ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 62.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 27,62; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Pompeo, (Aug. 9,
2022), p. 30; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eugene Scalia, (June 30, 2022), p. 11.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eugene
Scalia, (June 30, 2022), p. 11. Others throughout the White
House similarly recognized that December 14 was a milestone
in America’s constitutional process, and it was time for the
President to move on. But it was not just members of
President Trump’s Cabinet who viewed that the election was
over, and that President Trump had lost by December
14—President Trump’s top advisors at the White House came to
similar conclusions. For example, White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone agreed with Senator McConnell’s December 15th
comments on the Senate floor and viewed the process for
challenging the election as “done.” See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat”
Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 73. White House Deputy Press
Secretary and Deputy Assistant to the President Judd Deere
also recognized the significance of the electoral college
vote in determining the president and vice president and
conveyed this to President Trump. He also advised him to
concede. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P.
Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25. White House Advisor Ivanka
Trump viewed the electoral college vote as important and had
already started planning for leaving the administration
prior to then. See Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 193. White
House Advisor Jared Kushner similarly viewed that day as
“significant.” Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 107.
4. President Trump’s full tweet read: “Peter Navarro
releases 36-page report alleging election fraud ‘more than
sufficient’ to swing victory to Trump
https://t.co/D8KrMHnFdK. A great report by Peter.
Statistically impossible to have lost the 2020 Election. Big
protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!”
President Donald J. Trump: Tweets of December 19, 2020, The
American Presidency Project, available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-december-19-2020.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Smith, (May 9,
2022), p. 79. Navaroli appeared for two deposition session
with the Select Committee, the first of which was conducted
anonymously to protect her identity. In this deposition
session, she was called “J. Smith.” She later agreed to put
her name in the record and sat for another round of
questioning. Testimony from that second session is referred
to as “Deposition of Anika Navaroli.”
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Anika Navaroli,
(Sept. 1, 2022), pp. 66-67. She went on to characterize the
tweet as an “RSVP card” that became a “rallying point” for
the President’s supporters, one that prompted violent
responses from users that were highly suggestive of the
coming violence targeting DC on January 6th. Id., at p. 64.
Another former Twitter employee, whose deposition was also
conducted anonymously, testified that the tweet “in many
ways kind of crystallized the plans” for violence and that,
after that point, supporters of President Trump began
tweeting about movements to D.C. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of J. Johnson, (Sept. 7, 2022), p. 55.
7. The President’s call to action quickly reverberated
beyond Twitter and spread across the internet. On one social
networking site, Discord, a forum called “DonaldsArmy.US”
erupted in the hours after the tweet, with users seeing it
as a “call to action” and beginning to organize travel plans
to D.C., including by discussing how and whether to evade DC
gun restrictions and bring firearms into the city. See
Summary Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. Briefing
with Discord, (July 29, 2022); see also Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Discord Production),
JAN6C_DIS_000269 (Memo from Discord titled “DonaldsArmy.US
and BASEDMedia.”).
8. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 28, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
9. See, e.g., Ian Ward, “How a D.C. Bar Became the ‘Haven’
for the Proud Boys,” Politico, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/14/harrys-bar-proud-boys-washington-dc-445015.
10. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶37, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305 (citing Tarrio’s message to the Proud Boys on
December 29, 2020, that they would "not be wearing our
traditional Black and Yellow" on January 6th; they would "be
incognito.").
11. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 50, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
12. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 100, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 83-84.
14. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 107, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
15. See, e.g., Mike Levine, “How A Standoff in Nevada Years
Ago Set The Militia Movement on A Crash Course with The US
Capitol,” ABC News, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/standoff-nevada-years-ago-set-militia-movement-crash/story?id=82051940.
16. Indictment at ¶¶ 67, 68, United States v. Rhodes, III,
et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
17. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer
Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 132,134; Stewart Rhodes
and Kellye SoRelle, “Open Letter to President Trump: You
Must Use the Insurrection Act to ‘Stop the Steal’ and Defeat
the Coup,” Oathkeepers.org, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/
(archived). Jason Van Tatenhove, the former spokesman of the
Oath Keepers described how he suspected that Rhodes saw the
Insurrection Act as a blank check: “He could pretty much do
whatever he wanted, and [President Trump] could install
Stewart and the Oath Keepers as some sort of security force
that would bring them real legitimacy and political power.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jason
Van Tatenhove, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 73.
18. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v.
Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF
No. 127.
19. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 95-99, United States
v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF
No. 127.
20. Trial Transcript at 10502-508, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); Alan Feuer
and Zach Montague, “Oath Keepers Leader Convicted of
Sedition in Landmark Jan. 6 Case,” New York Times, (Nov. 29,
2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2384.
22. For example, one Proud Boy, Jeremy Bertino, pleaded
guilty to “seditious conspiracy” and other crimes in October
2022. Bertino admitted to authorities that the Proud Boys
traveled to Washington on January 6, 2021, “to stop the
certification of the Electoral College Vote.” They “were
willing to do whatever it would take, including using force
against police and others, to achieve that objective.” See
“Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious
Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following
2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6,
2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
23. Criminal Complaint at 10-11, United States v. Hazard,
No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
24. See, e.g., Indictment at ¶¶ 34-37, United States v.
Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
25. Malachi Barrett, “Far-Right Activist Who Encouraged U.S.
Capitol Occupation Also Organized ‘Stop the Steal’ Rally in
Michigan,” Mlive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at
https://www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html.
26. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7,
2021 10:56 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107185745/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1347255833516765185
(archived).
27. Ken Dilanian and Ben Collins, “There Are Hundreds of
Posts About Plans to Attack the Capitol. Why Hasn’t This
Evidence Been Used in Court?,” NBC News, (Apr. 20, 2021),
available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/we-found-hundreds-posts-about-plans-attack-capitol-why-aren-n1264291.
28. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at pp.
3-6.
29. See, “NCRI Assessment of The Capitol Riots,” Rutgers
Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience,”
Network Contagion Research Institute, (Jan. 9, 2021)
available at
https://millercenter.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NCRI-Assessment-of-the-Capitol-Riots-1.pdf.
30. “Breaking: Trump Calls for Americans to March on DC
January 6 to Stop Foreign Takeover,” InfoWars, (Dec. 19,
2020), (archived) available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201219175757/https://www.infowars.com/posts/breaking-trump-calls-for-americans-to-march-on-dc-january-6-to-stop-foreign-takeover/.
31. Jacob Knutson, “Jury Orders Alex Jones to Pay Nearly $1
Billion in Sandy Hook Defamation Trial,” Axios, (Oct. 12,
2022), available at
https://www.axios.com/2022/10/12/alex-jones-sandy-hook-defamation-trial.
32. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, at 21:53, Dec.
20, 2020, available at
http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
33. Jones’s promotion of the January 6th event began almost
immediately after the President’s tweet. See The Alex Jones
Show, “January 6th Will Be a Turning Point in American
History,” Banned.Video, at 16:29, Dec. 31, 2020, available
at https://banned.video/watch?id=5fee715284a7b6210e12a2f7.
34. See, Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and
Maya Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the
Capitol,” Pro Publica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=5OCkdwJRD0a3
(showing Alex Jones marching down Pennsylvania Avenue at
1:10 p.m.).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 50, 70-71.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), p. 86.
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-108, 135.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 70-71.
39. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th
Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6”
(Staff Report), (June 8, 2021), p. B-22.
40. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin,
“Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected
to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,” CNN Business, (Nov. 14,
2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.
41. Charles Homans, “How ‘Stop the Steal’ Captured the
American Right,” New York Times, (July 19, 2022), available
at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/19/magazine/stop-the-steal.html.
(“During his time as a Trump campaign adviser, Stone urged
the candidate to run on immigration, and now he linked these
views to the plots that he claimed were afoot to deny Trump
the nomination. In the Republican primaries, Trump was ‘a
nationalist in a field of globalists,’ Stone said in an
interview that April with Stefan Molyneux, a Canadian
alt-right podcaster. If the globalists failed to steal the
primaries outright, there would be a ‘naked attempt to steal
this from Donald Trump’ at the Republican National
Convention in Cleveland, Stone declared. ‘The fix is in.’ ”)
42. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin,
“Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected
to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,” CNN Business, (Nov. 14,
2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.
43. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin,
“Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected
to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,” CNN Business, (Nov. 14,
2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.
44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file
201105.
45. See, Hugo Lowell, “Film Offers Inside Look at Roger
Stone’s ‘Stop the Steal’ Efforts before January 6,” The
Guardian, (July 8, 2022), available at
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/jul/07/roger-stone-ali-alexander-film-jan-6-stop-the-steal.
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander,
(Jan. 9, 2021), p. 18.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander,
(Dec. 9, 2021), pp. 199-200.
48. See, e.g., WillfulWarrior, “Hispanic Proud Boys Leader:
‘We Fought Off Antifa Terrorists for 12 Hrs’,” BitChute,
Nov. 19, 2020, available at
https://www.bitchute.com/video/if5u7EuD7NU3/; Infowars: War
Room, “Enrique Tarrio Spat on While Flying to Austin Texas,”
BitChute, Dec. 2, 2020, available at
https://www.bitchute.com/video/yKijHk6m25RL/; BNN, “Full
Show: Witnesses Testify on Michigan Voter Fraud; Thousands
of Illegal Votes Counted for Biden,” BitChute, Dec. 2, 2020,
available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/74N0WNHOjiRy/;
Jan 6th Protest and Save America March (2020-2H), “Patriots
Plot Their Recapture of America in D.C. This Weekend,”
Banned.Video, Nov. 9, 2020, available at
https://archive.org/details/banned.video_-_jan_6th_protest_and_save_america_march_2020-2h/2020-11-11T02%3A07.148Z+-+Patriots+Plot+Their+Recapture+Of+America+In+D.C.+This+Weekend/2020-11-11T02%3A19%3A07.148Z+-+%20Patriots+Plot+Their+Recapture+Of+America+In+D.C.+This+Weekend.mp4
(archived); The Alex Jones Show, “Oathkeepers Founder:
Americans Need to Overcome Their Fears And Join The March on
DC,” Banned.Video, Nov. 10, 2020, available at
https://freeworldnews.tv/watch?id=5fab1b880ad7422090a8242f.
49. Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the Oath Keepers, described
Stone (along with Alexander) as among the key players who
were the “midpoint,” “the ones who tr[ied] to orchestrate”
joint efforts in the post-election period. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr.
13, 2022), pp. 60-66.
50. Frontline, “Alex Jones and Donald Trump: How the
Candidate Echoed the Conspiracy Theorist on the Campaign
Trail,” PBS, (July 28, 2020), available at
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/alex-jones-and-donald-trump-how-the-candidate-echoed-the-conspiracy-theorist-on-the-campaign-trail/.
51. Eric Bradner, “Trump Praises 9/11 Truther’s ‘Amazing’
Reputation,” CNN, (Dec. 2, 2015), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-praises-9-11-truther-alex-jones.
52. See Elizabeth Williamson, “Alex Jones and Donald Trump:
A Fateful Alliance Draws Scrutiny,” New York Times, (Mar. 7,
2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/us/politics/alex-jones-jan-6-trump.html
(“Infowars grossed more than $50 million annually during the
Trump presidency by selling diet supplements, body armor,
and other products on its website.”).
53. See, e.g., Joshua Zitser, “Roger Stone Makes Donation
Plea for Alex Jones After Verdict Says He Must Pay $49m for
Sandy Hook ‘Hoax’ Claims,” Business Insider, (Aug. 7, 2022),
available at
https://www.businessinsider.com/video-roger-stone-asks-donations-infowars-alex-jones-sandy-hook-2022-8.
54. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
55. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
56. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
57. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, “Images of State Protests before January 6, 2021.”
58. Jonathan Oosting, “FBI arrests Ryan Kelley, Michigan GOP
Governor Candidate, over Capitol Riots,” Bridge Michigan,
(June 9, 2022), available at
https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/fbi-arrests-ryan-kelley-michigan-gop-governor-candidate-over-capitol-riots.
59. James Dawson, “Unmasked Protesters Push Past Police into
Idaho Lawmakers’ Session,” NPR, (Apr. 25, 2022), available
at
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/25/905785548/unmasked-protesters-push-past-police-into-idaho-lawmakers-session;
Jeremy Stiles, “Boise Woman Sentenced for Role in U.S.
Capitol Riot,” KTVB, (May 24, 2022), available at
https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/crime/boise-woman-sentenced-for-role-in-us-capitol-riot-pamela-hemphill-january-6-2021/277-3aa12194-5a54-4abe-88a2-d644cf5043aa.
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Sergeant at Arms for the Arizona House of
Representatives Production), CTRL0000930907, CTRL0000930908
(December 4, 2020, surveillance footage from the Arizona
House of Representatives). available at
https://house.app.box.com/folder/183317506767.
61. Sergio Olmos and Conrad Wilson, “At Least 3 Men from
Oregon Protest Appear to Have Joined Insurrection at U.S.
Capitol,” Oregon Public Broadcasting, (Jan. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.opb.org/article/2021/01/10/oregon-washington-protest-insurrection-david-anthony-medina-tim-davis/.
62. Brendan Guttenschwager (@BGOnTheScene), Twitter, Nov.
19, 2020 1:03 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/BGOnTheScene/status/1329485442165706752.
63. Justwanna Grill, “Oathkeepers leader GROYPED in
Atlanta,” YouTube, Nov. 4, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_rDOm5oKu0.
64. Timothy Johnson, “Alex Jones Calls on Supporters to
‘Surround’ the Georgia Governor’s Mansion to Prevent
Election Results from Being Certified,” Media Matters, (Nov.
17, 2020), available at
https://www.mediamatters.org/alex-jones/alex-jones-calls-supporters-surround-georgia-governors-mansion-prevent-election-results.
65. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Nov. 17,
2020, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201120061341/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes
(archived).
66. See, e.g., Aquarium Groyper, “Nick Fuentes Georgia State
Capitol 11/20/2020,” YouTube, Nov. 20, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS1f--Tkn1M.
67. Jacqueline Alemany et al., “Red Flags,” Washington Post,
(Oct. 31, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.
68. Derrick Mullins, “‘Stop the Steal’ Connected 2 Roger
Stone-Roger Stone Calls Ali Anderson in Front of Atlanta GA
Crowd,” YouTube Nov. 24, 2020, available at
https://perma.cc/MWS3-HNGD.
69. Brendan Gutenschwager (@BGOnTheScene), Twitter, Nov. 20,
2022 12:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/BGOnTheScene/status/1329841457377800198.
70. Zach D. Roberts (@zdroberts), Twitter, Jan. 14, 2022
11:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/zdroberts/status/1482210446769807360.
71. Alexandra Hurtzler, “Alex Jones Leads ‘Stop the Steal’
Rally at Georgia’s Capitol to Protest Election Results,”
Newsweek, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/alex-jones-leads-stop-steal-rally-georgias-capitol-protest-election-results-1548533.
72. Jacqueline Alemany et al., “Red Flags,” Washington Post,
(Oct. 31, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.
73. Statement of Andrew Seidel, (Mar. 18, 2022), at p. 9.
74. Mike Giglio, “The Oath Keepers’ Radical Legal Defense of
January 6th,” New Yorker, (Oct. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-oath-keepers-radical-legal-defense-of-january-6th.
75. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into
Violence,” Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020),
available at
https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
Despite this, one of the organizers of the Jericho March
maintained that the “tone” of the rally was supposed to be
“prayerful, spirit-filled, peaceful, joyful, and vibrant, a
unified celebration.” See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Arina Grossu, (Apr. 29, 2022), p.
40.
76. See President Donald J. Trump: Tweets of December 12,
2020, The American Presidency Project, available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-december-19-2020.
77. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into
Violence,” Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020),
available at
http://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-DC-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
78. Grace Segers, “Trump’s Motorcade Passes Supporters
Gathered for ‘Million MAGA March’,” CBS News, (Nov. 14,
2020), available at
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/million-maga-march-washington-dc-trumps-motorcade-passes-supporters/.
79. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 12,
2020 9:59 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Wow%21+Thousands+of+people+forming%22
(archived).
80. Ashraf Khalil, “Marine One Buzzes Trump Supporters
Rallying for President’s Bid to Stay in Office in
Washington,” Chicago Tribune, (Dec. 12, 2020), available at
https://www.chicagotribune.com/election-2020/ct-trump-election-20201212-z4zwtovupzhsppphzrlfhj3i3a-story.html.
81. “Breaking: Trump Calls for Americans to March on DC
January 6 to Stop Foreign Takeover,” InfoWars, (Dec. 19,
2020), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201219175757/https://www.infowars.com/posts/breaking-trump-calls-for-americans-to-march-on-dc-january-6-to-stop-foreign-takeover/
(archived).
82. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, Dec. 20, 2020,
available at http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
83. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, Dec. 20, 2020,
at 1:27:13, available at
http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
84. The Alex Jones Show, “January 6th Will Be a Turning
Point in American History,” Banned.Video, at 16:29, Dec. 31,
2020, available at
https://banned.video/watch?id=5fee715284a7b6210e12a2f7.
85. “Proud Boys,” Anti-Defamation League, (Jan. 23, 2020),
available at https://www.adl.org/proudboys.
86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Proud Boys International Production), PBI 12 (The
Constitution and Bylaws of Proud Boys International L.L.C.,
revised November 24, 2018).
87. “Proud Boys,” Stanford University Center for
International Security and Cooperation, (January 2022),
available at
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.
88. “Proud Boys,” Stanford University Center for
International Security and Cooperation, (January 2022),
available at
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.
89. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December
27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages
from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.); “Proud Boys,” Stanford University
Center for International Security and Cooperation, (January
2022), available at
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.
90. See, e.g., Jason Wilson, “Portland Rally: Proud Boys Vow
to March Each Month after Biggest Protest of Trump Era,” The
Guardian, (Aug. 17, 2019), available at
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/17/portland-oregon-far-right-rally-proud-boys-antifa.
91. See Statement of Heidi L. Beirich, Ph.D., (Mar. 22,
2022), at p.1.
92. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 155.
93. See, e.g., Cleve R. Wootson Jr., “Thousands of Proud
Boys Plan to Rally in Portland, Setting Up Another Clash in
a Combustible City,” Washington Post, (Sept. 25, 2020),
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/25/portland-oregon-proud-boys-rally/;
see also, Aaron Wolfson and Hampton Stall, “Actor Profile:
Proud Boys,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project,
(Apr. 22, 2021), available at
https://acleddata.com/2021/04/22/actor-profile-proud-boys/
(noting the “percentage of events with counter-demonstrators
in which Proud Boys members participated was more than 10
times the rate at which others engaged with
counter-demonstrators.”).
94. Nick Quested, a filmmaker who followed the Proud Boys
through January 6th, described how Proud Boys couldn’t
define Black Lives Matter or Antifa—and that, in person,
Proud Boys simply identified them as “people of color and
people with progressive values.” Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5,
2022), p. 78.
95. Kathleen Ronayne and Michael Kunzelman, “Trump to
Far-Right Extremists: ‘Stand Back and Stand By’,” Associated
Press, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 117.
97. Emails obtained by the Select Committee show that Parler
featured alarmingly violent and specific posts that in some
cases advocated for civil war. See, e.g., Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Parler Production),
PARLER_00000006 (December 24, 2020, email forwarded to the
FBI, “We need to mass an armed force of American Patriots
150,000 on the Virginia side of the Potomac prepared to
react to the congressional events of January 6th”). In a
January 2, 2021, email, a Parler employee wrote that they
were “concerned about Wednesday,” which would be January
6th. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000009 (January 2,
2021, email forwarded to the FBI, “One more from same
account. More where came from. Concerned about
Wednesday...”).
98. Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, “#StopTheSteal: Timeline of
Social Media and Extremist Activities Leading to 1/6
Insurrection,” Just Security, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), p. 38; see also “Former Leader of Proud
Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to
Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential
Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.mer-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 50-51, 221-22; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), pp.
21-22.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), p. 221.
102. Tom Dreisbach, “Conspiracy Charges Bring Proud Boys’
History Of Violence into Spotlight,” NPR, (Apr. 9, 2021),
available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/985104612/conspiracy-charges-bring-proud-boys-history-of-violence-into-spotlight.
103. Tom Dreisbach, “Conspiracy Charges Bring Proud Boys’
History Of Violence into Spotlight,” NPR, (Apr. 9, 2021),
available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/985104612/conspiracy-charges-bring-proud-boys-history-of-violence-into-spotlight.
104. “Day of the Rope,” Anti-Defamation League, available at
https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/day-rope.
105. “Contested States,” #StopTheSteal, (Nov. 7, 2020),
available at http://archive.ph/C9lwN (archived).
106. Christopher Mathias, “After Trump’s Defeat, His
Supporters Held a Heavily Armed Pity Party,” Huff Post,
(Nov. 7, 2020), available at
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/harrisburg-trump-rally-defeat-extremists-proud-boys-armed-militias_n_5fa756ddc5b67c3259afbc42.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 10.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 10.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Simmons,
(Feb. 10, 2022), p. 71; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of George Douglas Smith, Jr., (Apr. 28, 2022), p. 47.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 81-82; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p.
19; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 26.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Patrick Byrne, (July 15, 2022), pp. 151-52.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 107-09; Luke O’Brien, “How Republican
Politics (And Twitter) Created Ali Alexander, The Man Behind
‘Stop the Steal’,” Huff Post, (Mar. 7, 2021), available at
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/republicans-twitter-ali-alexander-stop-the-steal_n_6026fb26c5b6f88289fbab57.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 107-09.
114. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Shroyer, No.
1:21-mj-572 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1428181/download.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 17-19; Ryan Goodman, Justin
Hendrix, Just Security, “Exclusive: New Video of Roger Stone
with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol
Attack,” (Feb. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
116. Ryan Goodman & Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video of
Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for
Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
117. Will Carless, “How a Trump Booster Group Helped the
Head of Extremist Proud Boys Gain Access to the White
House,” USA Today, (Dec. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/12/19/latinos-trump-group-tied-proud-boys-leader-enrique-tarrio/3931868001/.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), p. 117.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 125-27; Affidavit in Support of Arrest
Warrant, United States v. Tarrio, No. 2020 CRWSLD 5553,
(D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2020).
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), p. 127.
121. Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United States
v. Tarrio, No. 2020 CRWSLD 5553, (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30,
2020).
122. Peter Herman and Martin Weil, “Proud Boys Leader
Arrested in the Burning of Church’s Black Lives Matter
Banner, D.C. Police Say,” Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021),
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/proud-boys-enrique-tarrio-arrest/2021/01/04/8642a76a-4edf-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html;
Laura Wamsley, “Proud Boys Leader Released from Police
Custody and Ordered to Leave D.C.,” NPR, (Jan. 5, 2021),
available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/05/953685035/proud-boys-leader-released-from-police-custody-and-ordered-to-leave-d-c.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 16.
124. Elizabeth Elizalde, “Proud Boys Surround Man with Knife
at Violent DC Trump Rally,” New York Post, (Dec. 13, 2020),
available at
https://nypost.com/2020/12/13/one-person-stabbed-during-massive-proud-boys-brawl-in-dc/.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 128-29.
126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), p. 129.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 130-131.
128. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 30, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
129. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 32, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305; see also Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production),
CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self
Defense,” Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).
130. See, Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December
27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages
from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).
131. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 55, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
132. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 38, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December
27-28, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram messages
from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).
133. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 33, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
134. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 31, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305; see also Carter Walker, “Carlisle Proud Boy Member
Targeted in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,” Lancaster
Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at
https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html
(identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding
Indictment).
135. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December
29, 2020, “Ministry of Self Defense,” Telegram message at
11:09 a.m.).
136. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 41, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022) ECF
No. 305.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Samuel Armes, (July 18, 2022), p. 10-14 (describing Armes’
role in drafting a prior version of the document, which he
then shared with Eryka Gemma Flores, another cryptocurrency
investor who shared the document with Tarrio); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Eryka Gemma
Flores, (July 1, 2022).
138. Zachary Rehl’s Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and
Request for a Hearing, Exhibit 1: “1776 Returns,” United
States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 15,
2022) ECF No. 401-1, available at
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22060615/1776-returns.pdf.
139. Zachary Rehl’s Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and
Request for a Hearing, Exhibit 1: “1776 Returns,” United
States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 15,
2022) ECF No. 401-1, available at
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22060615/1776-returns.pdf.
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Thomas
Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), pp. 70-71; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Christopher Barcenas, (Mar. 10,
2022), p. 98; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p.
23.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Samuel Armes, (July 18, 2022), p. 14.
142. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 41, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
143. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey,
“Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to Washington, Helped Lead
Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021),
available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.
144. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 49, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305; Carter Walker, “Carlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted
in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,” Lancaster Online
(Mar. 12, 2022), available at
https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html
(identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding
Indictment).
145. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 49, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305; Carter Walker, “Carlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted
in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,” Lancaster Online
(Mar. 12, 2022), available at
https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html
(identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding
Indictment).
146. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 50, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022) ECF
No. 305.
147. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Donohoe, No.
1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 335.
148. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe,
No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).
149. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe,
No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).
150. Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe,
No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).
151. Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe,
No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).
152. Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Donohoe,
No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).
153. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious
Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following
2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6,
2022), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
154. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious
Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following
2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct.
22, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), p. 156.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino,
(Apr. 26, 2022), p. 156.
157. Statement of Sam Jackson, Ph.D., (Mar. 30, 2022), at p.
2.
158. Zachary Cohen, “Oath Keepers Leader Spewed
Anti-government Hate for More than a Decade. Alex Jones Gave
Him the Audience,” CNN, (Jan. 14, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/oath-keepers-stewart-rhodes-alex-jones-invs/index.html.
159. The Select Committee found that the idea that violence
loomed from the left was a powerful draw for people to join
the Oath Keepers. Richard Dockery, a former Oath Keepers
member from Florida, decried “all the riots and stuff I was
seeing on the news all over the country” and expressed
concern about Antifa and Black Lives Matter activity in his
area of Florida, a prospect that he called “nerve-wracking.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery,
(Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 10, 31. Because of this, he said that
the Oath Keepers “seemed like a really good organization to
support” in order to keep communities safe. Id., at p. 9.
Similarly, Jeff Morelock told the Select Committee that
joining the Oath Keepers “would give me a chance to do
something to help instead of just sitting on the couch,”
referring to watching protests on television. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Lawrence
Morelock, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 87-88. Jason Van Tatenhove, a
former spokesman for the Oath Keepers and confidant to
Rhodes who has since publicly denounced the group, described
how the Oath Keepers tried to deliberately leverage this
dynamic to increase their clout. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jason Van Tatenhove, (Mar.
9, 2022), pp. 54-55.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart
Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 103-104.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 9-10.
162. Stewart Rhodes, “Call to Action! March on DC, Stop the
Steal, Defend the President, & Defeat the Deep State,” Oath
Keepers, (Nov. 10, 2020), available at
https://oathkeepers.org/2020/11/call-to-action-march-on-dc-stop-the-steal-defend-the-president-defeat-the-deep-state/.
163. Stewart Rhodes, “Call to Action! March on DC, Stop the
Steal, Defend the President, & Defeat the Deep State,” Oath
Keepers, (Nov. 10, 2020), available at
https://oathkeepers.org/2020/11/call-to-action-march-on-dc-stop-the-steal-defend-the-president-defeat-the-deep-state/.
164. Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, “Open Letter to
President Trump: You Must Use the Insurrection Act to ‘Stop
the Steal’ and Defeat the Coup,” Oath Keepers, (Dec. 14,
2020), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/.
165. Michael S. Schmidt and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Aides
Prepared Insurrection Act Order During Debate Over
Protests,” New York Times, (June 25, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/25/us/politics/trump-insurrection-act-protests.html.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart
Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 131.
167. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt
into Violence,” Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020),
available at
https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
168. In texts between Rhodes and Rob Weaver, one of the
organizers of the Jericho March, Weaver instructed his
associate to work with Rhodes “on extra security.” Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Weaver
Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S. Rhodes)0001 (December 11,
2020, text from Rob Weaver at 1:39 p.m.).
169. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Thomas Speciale Production), CTRL0000050180, pp.
1-6, 26-28 (Signal Chat Titled Dec 12 DC
Security/Leadership); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6
Production) Prod. (S. Rhodes)0039 (Signal Chat Titled Dec 12
DC Security/Leadership).; Superseding Indictment at 12,
United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167 (noting that on December 11, 2020,
Rhodes “sent a message to an invitation-only Signal group
chat titled, ‘Dec 12 DC Security/Leadership,’ which included
James, MINUTA, and others. RHODES stated that if
President-Elect Biden were to assume the presidency, ‘It
will be a bloody and desperate fight. We are going to have a
fight. That can’t be avoided.’ ”).
170. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S.
Rhodes) 0045 (December 10, 2020, Stewart Rhodes chat with
Dec. 12 DC Security/Leadership at 10:17p.m.).
171. Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, “Open Letter to
President Trump: You Must Use the Insurrection Act to ‘Stop
the Steal’ and Defeat the Coup,” Oath Keepers, (Dec. 14,
2020), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart
Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 132, 134.
173. Trial Exhibit 6748, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022); Kyle Cheney, “Prosecutors
Detail Oath Keepers’ Mounting Frustration with Trump as Jan.
6 Approached,” Politico, (Oct. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/20/oath-keepers-trump-jan-6-00062779.
174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alondra Propes Production), CTRL0000029585, p.1
(Stewart Rhodes writing in ‘OKFL Hangout’ chat).
175. Stewart Rhodes and Alondra Propes characterized the
Proud Boys as street brawlers in contrast to the Oath
Keepers’ discipline. See Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 40, 43; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alondra
Propes, (Jan. 31, 2022), pp. 42-43, 136. Kellye SoRelle
described the Proud Boys as extreme white supremacists. See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 63-64. Enrique Tarrio characterized the
Oath Keepers as “oath breakers” and embarrassing. See Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4,
2022), pp. 77, 193-94.
176. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
177. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Request
for Pretrial Release at 7, United States v. Meggs, No.
1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021). Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 125.
178. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 28, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-25 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
179. “Leader of Oath Keepers and 10 Other Individuals
Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other
Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of
Justice, (Jan. 13, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-10-other-individuals-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy.
180. See Superseding Indictment at ¶ 17, United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-25 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF
No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Landon Bentley, (May 12, 2022), p. 11 (discussing use of
Signal as an encrypted chat).
181. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 29, United States v.
Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF
No. 167.
182. Superseding Indictment at ¶¶ 38, 39, United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF
No. 167.
183. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v.
Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF
No. 127.
184. Third Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v.
Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF
No. 127.
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery,
(Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 48-52.
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery,
(Feb. 2, 2022), p. 49.
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery,
(Feb. 2, 2022), p. 51.
188. Infowars Army, “Alex Jones Show — DOJ Launches National
Probe of Election Fraud,” BitChute, Nov. 10, 2020, available
at https://www.bitchute.com/video/NoELuXs06RzX/.
189. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S.
Rhodes) 0011 (January 1, 2021, Stewart Rhodes chat with Jan
5/6 DC OK Security/VIP Chat at 7:58-8:00 pm).
190. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 45, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank
Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 34.
191. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 44, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
192. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 68, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
Documents filed with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hilton
Garden Inn Production), MHG000049-103 (January 2-8, 2021,
Hilton Garden Inn invoices).
193. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
194. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 47, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022) ECF No. 167.
195. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 57, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
196. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 61, United States v.
Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF
No. 167.
197. Superseding Indictment at ¶ 70, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank
Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 39.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 196.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank
Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 196.
202. Select Comittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank
Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), pp. 40-42.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank
Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), pp. 45-47.
204. Macias had traveled to DC after his arrest for bringing
weapons to a vote-counting center in Philadelphia while
votes were being counted in November 2020. Claudia Lauer,
“Philly DA Seeks Contempt Charge for Vets for Trump
Cofounder,” AP News, (June 13, 2022), available at
https://apnews.com/article/capitol-siege-pennsylvania-riots-philadelphia-virginia-d74b05c01aebde1ca26a9c080a5022d8.
205. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Frank Marchisealla Production), CTRL0000040442
(January 5, 2021, Frank Marchisella video of Facebook live
stream).
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Frank Marchisealla Production), CTRL0000040442,
(January 5, 2021, Frank Marchisella video of Facebook live
stream) at 0:36.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 207-08.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.
210. Second Superseding Indictment at ¶ 23, United States v.
Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF
No. 305.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.
212. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1859.mov, at 0:50 (Jan. 5, 2021).
213. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1859.mov, at 1:31 (Jan. 5, 2021).
214. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1859.mov, at 1:00 (Jan. 5, 2021).
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle,
(Apr. 13, 2022), p. 202.
216. Spencer S. Hsu, “Video Released of Garage Meeting of
Proud Boys, Oath Keepers Leaders,” Washington Post, embedded
video at 3:20, (May 24, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/05/24/tarrio-rhodes-video/.
217. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1864.mov, at 0:14 (Jan. 5, 2021).
218. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5,
2021).
219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5,
2021).
220. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5,
2021).
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio,
(Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 83-84.
222. See In re Stone, 940 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2019);
United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C.
2019).
223. David Freedlander, “An Oral History of Donald Trump’s
Almost-Run for President in 2000,” Intelligencer, (Oct. 11,
2018), available at
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/trumps-almost-run-for-president-in-2000-an-oral-history.html.
224. See Trial Transcript at 3806, United States v. Rhodes
et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2022) (testimony and
exhibits showing Kelly Meggs and Jessica Watkins discussed
providing security for Roger Stone); Dalton Bennett and Jon
Swaine, “The Roger Stone Tapes,” Washington Post, available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/;
Matthew Mosk, Olivia Rubin, Ali Dukakis, and Fergal
Gallagher, “Video Surfaces Showing Trump Ally Roger Stone
Flanked by Oath Keepers on Morning of Jan. 6,” ABC News,
(Feb. 5, 2021), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/video-surfaces-showing-trump-ally-roger-stone-flanked/story?id=75706765;
Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc), Twitter, Feb. 19, 2021 4:35
p.m., available at
https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1362878609334165505 (Kelly
Meggs with Roger Stone); Spencer S. Hsu, Manuel
Roig-Franzia, and Devlin Barrett, “Roger Stone Keeps
Appearing in Capitol Breach Investigation Court Filings,”
Washington Post, (Mar. 22, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/roger-stone-court-filings-capitol-riot/2021/03/22/c689a77c-87f8-11eb-82bc-e58213caa38e_story.html
(Mark Grods with Roger Stone); Andrew Smrecek
(@combat_art_training), Instagram, Dec. 15, 2020, available
at https://www.instagram.com/p/CI0g8dlhEyG/ (Connie Meggs
and Jason Dolan with Roger Stone) (last accessed Dec. 11,
2022).
225. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 76, 90, 96, 98, United
States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Jan. 12,
2022), ECF No. 102-1.
226. Christiaan Triebert, Ben Decker, Derek Watkins, Arielle
Ray, and Stella Cooper, “First They Guarded Roger Stone.
Then They Joined the Capitol Attack,” New York Times, (Feb.
14, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/14/us/roger-stone-capitol-riot.html.
227. Matthew Mosk, Olivia Rubin, Ali Dukakis, and Fergal
Gallagher, “Video Surfaces Showing Trump Ally Roger Stone
Flanked by Oath Keepers on Morning of Jan. 6,” ABC News,
(Feb. 5, 2021), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/video-surfaces-showing-trump-ally-roger-stone-flanked/story?id=75706765.
228. “Leader of Alabama Chapter of Oath Keepers Pleads
Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy and Obstruction of Congress
for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020
Presidential Election,” Department of Justice Office of
Public Affairs, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-alabama-chapter-oath-keepers-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-obstruction.
229. Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, “The Roger Stone Tapes,”
Washington Post, (Mar. 4, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/.
230. Kelly Weill, “How the Proud Boys Became Roger Stone’s
Personal Army,” Daily Beast, (Jan. 29, 2019), available at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-proud-boys-became-roger-stones-personal-army-6.
231. See, e.g., Andy Campbell, “EXCLUSIVE: Roger Stone
Admits He’s Been Advising The Proud Boys For Years,” Huff
Post, (Sept. 22, 2022), available at
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/roger-stone-we-are-proud-boys_n_632c57ebe4b09d8701bd02e2.
232. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video files
190926 I bil + fondraiser, 191003 Stone dag 3 backstage
fundraiser 2 onstage, 200220.
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file
190926 i bil + fondraiser.
234. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video
of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned
for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
235. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video
of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned
for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
236. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “EXCLUSIVE: New Video
of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned
for Capitol Attack,” Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.
237. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “
Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to Washington, Helped Lead
Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021),
available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.
238. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “
Proud Boys, Seizing Trump’s Call to Washington, Helped Lead
Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021),
available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.
239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kellye SoRelle Production), CTRL0000060762 -
CTRL0000060858 (screenshotting messages in the Friends of
Stone chat); Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, “The Roger Stone
Tapes,” Washington Post, available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 200705.
240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file
201105.
241. Hugo Lowell, “Film Offers Inside Look at Roger Stone’s
‘Stop the Steal’ Efforts Before January 6,” The Guardian,
(July 8, 2022), available at
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/jul/07/roger-stone-ali-alexander-film-jan-6-stop-the-steal.
242. Document on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kellye SoRelle Production), CTRL0000060802,
CTRL0000060798 (screenshots from the Friends of Stone chat).
243. “Executive Grant of Clemency for Roger Jason Stone,
Jr.,” Department of Justice, (July 10, 2020), available at
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1293796/download.
244. Amita Kelly, Ryan Lucas, and Vanessa Romo, “Trump
Pardons Roger Stone, Paul Manafort And Charles Kushner,”
NPR, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/23/949820820/trump-pardons-roger-stone-paul-manafort-and-charles-kushner.
245. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter,
Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336.
246. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter,
Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336;
See also Ali Dukakis, “Roger Stone Thanks President Trump
for Pardon in Person,” ABC News, (Dec. 28, 2020), available
at
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/roger-stone-president-trump-pardon-person/story?id=74940512.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Kristin Davis, (August 2, 2022), p. 41; Documents on file
with Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, (Kristin Davis Production),
CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020, text message from
Kristin Davis to Chris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.).
248. Documents on file with Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kristin
Davis Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020,
text message from Kristin Davis to Chris Lippe at 6:05
p.m.).
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone,
(Dec. 17, 2021).
250. Will Steakin, Matthew Mosk, James Gordon Meek, and Ali
Dukakis, “Longtime Trump Advisers Connected to Groups Behind
Rally that Led to Capitol Attack,” ABC News, (Jan. 15,
2021), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/longtime-trump-advisers-connected-groups-rally-led-capitol/story?id=75261028.
251. “Nicholas J. Fuentes: Five Things to Know,”
Anti-Defamation League, (July 9, 2021, updated Nov. 30,
2022), available at
https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/nicholas-j-fuentes-five-things-know?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI4ITXgYH6-wIVaUpyCh08sgxaEAAYASAAEgLGNPD_BwE;
Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Dec. 18, 2020
11:26 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201219072617/https:/twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1340196694571540490
(archived). As noted in the Executive Summary, this tweet,
like others, was likely sent from or archived in a separate
time zone, which explains why it shows a sent date of
December 18, 2020, while President Trump issued his tweet at
1:42 a.m. on December 19, 2020.
252. “California Man Sentenced to 42 Months in Prison for
Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of
Justice, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/california-man-sentenced-prison-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach;
Tom Dreisbach, Allison Mollenkamp, “A Former UCLA Student
Was Sentenced to over Three Years in Prison for Capitol
Riot,” NPR, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at
https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/1129912913/a-former-ucla-student-was-sentenced-to-over-three-years-in-prison-for-capitol-ri.
253. “Student Who Attended Charlottesville White Supremacist
Rally Leaves Boston University After Backlash,” Time, (Aug.
17, 2017),
https://time.com/4905939/nicholas-fuentes-white-supremacist-rally-charlottesville/;
“Neo-Nazi Hipsters Identity Evropa Exposed In Discord Chat
Leak,” Unicorn Riot, (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/neo-nazi-hipsters-identity-evropa-exposed-in-discord-chat-leak/.
254. See Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo and Morgan
Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022); “Groypers Army and ‘America First’,”
Anti-Defamation League, (Mar. 17, 2020), available at
https://www.adl.org/reources/backgrounders/groyper-army-and-america-first.
255. See, e.g., Malachi Barrett, “Far-right Activist Who
Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation also Organized ‘Stop the
Steal’ Rally in Michigan,” MLive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available
at
https://www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html;
Studio IKN, “Nick Fuentes at Stop the Steal Phoenix,”
YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_vjzjMDenk.
256. Megan Squire (@MeganSquire0), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/MeganSquire0/status/1346478478523125767?s=20.
257. Fuentes personally earned $50,000 from his livestreams
between November 3, 2020, and January 19, 2021. He raised
his highest-ever total the day after the 2020 election, and
he raised similarly high figures on January 5, 2021. Some of
Fuentes’ proceeds were refunded to customers following
Fuentes’ ban from DLive. See Statement of Michael Edison
Hayden, Megan Squire, Ph.D., Hannah Gais, and Susan Corke,
(Apr. 7, 2022), at 6-7.
258. See, Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan
Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 12.
259. Malachi Barrett, “Far-Right Activist Who Encouraged
U.S. Capitol Occupation Also Organized ‘Stop the Steal’
Rally in Michigan,” MLive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at
https://www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html.
260. Chuck Tanner, “Deciphering Nick Fuentes’ ‘Stop the
Steal’ Speeches,” Institute for Research and Education on
Human Rights, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.
261. “#StopTheSteal: Timeline of Social Media and Extremist
Activities Leading to 1/6 Insurrection,” Just Security (Feb.
10, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.
262. Chuck Tanner, “White Nationalists Prominent at ‘Stop
the Steal’ Mobilization in Georgia,” Institute for Research
and Education on Human Rights,” (Nov. 24, 2020), available
at
https://www.irehr.org/2020/11/24/white-nationalists-prominent-at-stop-the-steal-mobilization-in-georgia/.
263. Aquarium Groyper, “Nick Fuentes Georgia State Capitol
11/20/2020,” YouTube, at 1:38, Nov. 20, 2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS1f--Tkn1M.
264. Peter White, “MAGA Protestors Chant ‘Destroy the GOP’
at Pro-Trump Rally,” Rolling Stone, (Dec. 12, 2020),
available at
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/protesters-chant-destroy-the-gop-at-pro-trump-rally-1102967/.
265. “Pro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt
into Violence,” Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020),
available at
https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.
266. Megan Squire (@MeganSquire0), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/MeganSquire0/status/1346478478523125767?s=20.
267. Patrick Casey (@Patrickcaseyusa), Telegram, Jan. 5,
2021 6:20 p.m.; Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000930909 - CTRL0000930912
(collection of Patrick Casey telegram posts).
268. Mallory Simon and Sara Sidner, “Decoding the Extremist
Symbols and Groups at the Capitol Hill Insurrection,” CNN,
(Jan. 11, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-hill-insurrection-extremist-flags-soh/index.html.
269. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7,
2021 10:56 a.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107185745/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1347255833516765185
(archived).
270. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7,
2021 1:03 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107210736/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1347287851629764610
(archived).
271. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas
J. Fuentes, (Feb. 16, 2022).
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Lee
Wells, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 72.
273. Alejandro J. Beutel, Daryl Johnson, “The Three
Percenters: A Look Inside an Anti-Government Militia,”
Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, (Feb. 2021), at
8, available at
https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20210225-Three-Percenter-PR-NISAP-rev051021.pdf;
“Three Percenters,” Southern Poverty Law Center, available
at
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/three-percenters.
274. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon,
(Mar. 31, 2022), at 12-13.
275. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon,
(Mar. 31, 2022), at 13.
276. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon,
(Mar. 31, 2022), at 13.
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett,
(May 17, 2022), pp. 6-7.
278. “Two Texas Men Charged with Assault on Law Enforcement
During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Dec.
14, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-texas-men-charged-assault-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
279. “Texas Man Sentenced to 52 Months in Prison For
Assaulting Law Enforcement Officers During Jan. 6 Capitol
Breach,” Department of Justice, (Sept. 28, 2022), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/texas-man-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-officers-during-jan-6-capitol.
280. Criminal Complaint at 9, 13, United States v. Hazard,
No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
281. Criminal Complaint at 8-12, United States. v. Hazard,
No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1. For
example, Denney told Hazard that they “will need linking up
with the proud boys.” Id., at 8. Denney described the hotel
he booked as “the same place everyone else is getting in the
Proud Boys crew and other militia’s until it gets full.”
Id., at 9. In a separate post on Facebook, Denney stated
that the Patriot Boys of North Texas were “allied with the
Patriot Prayer and the Proud Boys.” Id., at 9. In another
Facebook message on December 29, Denney wrote: “We are
linking up with thousands of Proud Boys and other militia
that will be there. This is going to be huge. And it’s going
to be a fight.” Id., at 10. Similarly, Hazard wrote on
Facebook: “I belong to a militia group that’s affiliated
with the proud boys” and “We’re affiliated with the proud
boys which have folks of all races as there’s several
thousand members.” Id., at 12.
282. Criminal Complaint at 8, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
283. Criminal Complaint at 10, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
284. Criminal Complaint at 11, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1. Hazard also
echoed this idea. Id., at 14.
285. Criminal Complaint at 10-11, United States. v. Hazard,
No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
286. Criminal Complaint at 10, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
287. Criminal Complaint at 12, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
288. Criminal Complaint at 12, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
289. Criminal Complaint at 16, United States. v. Hazard, No.
1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.
290. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184-RMM (D.D.C. Aug, 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
291. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
292. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
293. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
294. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
295. Statement of Facts at 28, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
296. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.
297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett,
(May 17, 2022), pp. 50-51.
298. Statement of Facts at 28, United States v. Cole et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1;
#SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021
2:11 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
299. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et
al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1;
#SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021
2:11 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
300. “Five Florida Men Arrested on Charges for Actions
During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” United States Department of
Justice, (Aug. 24, 2022) available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/five-florida-men-arrested-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
301. Indictment Dated June 9, 2021 at 1, United States v.
Hostetter et. al., No. 1:1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021);
Michael Kunzelman, “Capitol Rioter Used Charity to Promote
Violence, Feds Say,” Associated Press, (June 16, 2021),
available at
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-joe-biden-riots-health-coronavirus-pandemic-71a7b8121b6f70016f7cab601021a989.
302. Indictment at ¶ 38, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
303. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No.
1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
304. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No.
1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
305. Indictment at 8, United States v. Hostetter et al., No.
1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
306. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No.
1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
307. Indictment at 8-11, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
308. Indictment at 8-11, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
309. Indictment at 12, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
310. The National Council and The Three Percenters -
Original, “TTPO Stance on Election Fraud,” Dec. 16, 2020,
available at http://archive.ph/YemCC (archived).
311. See post by username @hatdonuts2, patriots.win,
December 29, 2020, 7:56 p.m. ET, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s; Statement
of Facts at 7-8, United States v. Buxton, No. 1:21-cr-739
(D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Josh Ellis, (May
19, 2022), p. 38.
313. “Lone Capitol Police Officer Eugene Goodman Diverts
Capitol Rioters,” Washington Post, (Jan. 11, 2021).
available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/lone-capitol-police-officer-eugene-goodman-diverts-capitol-rioters/2021/01/11/ba67a5e8-5f9b-4a9a-a7b7-93549f6a81b3_video.html.
314. Scott MacFarlane and Gillian Morley, “QAnon Follower
Doug Jensen Convicted on All Jan. 6 Charges,” CBS News,
(Sept. 23, 2022), available at
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qanon-follower-doug-jensen-convicted-on-all-jan-6-charges/.
315. Interview of: Douglas Austin Jensen Dated Jan. 8, 2021
at 19, United States v. Jensen, No. 1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C., Apr.
8, 2022), ECF No. 69-1.
316. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at 12.
317. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at 2-3.
318. “QAnon,” Anti-Defamation League, (May 4, 2020),
available at
https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/qanon.
319. Kelly Weill, “QAnon’s Home 8kun is Imploding - and Q
Has Gone Silent,” Daily Beast, (Nov. 13, 2020), available at
https://www.thedailybeast.com/qanons-home-8kun-is-implodingand-q-has-gone-silent?ref=scroll.
320. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White
House, (Aug. 19, 2020), available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-august-19-2020/.
321. NBC News, “Trump Denounces White Supremacy, Sidesteps
Question on QAnon,” YouTube, at 1:32, 2:34, Oct. 15, 2020,
available at https://youtu.be/3hybkzCWb_w.
322. Ben Collins, “QAnon’s Dominion Voter Fraud Conspiracy
Theory Reaches the President,” NBC News, (Nov. 13, 2020),
available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/q-fades-qanon-s-dominion-voter-fraud-conspiracy-theory-reaches-n1247780;
National Contagion Research Institute, “The QAnon
Conspiracy: Destroying Families, Dividing Communities,
Undermining Democracy,” p. 20, available at
https://networkcontagion.us/wp-content/uploads/NCRI-%E2%80%93-The-QAnon-Conspiracy-FINAL.pdf.
323. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Nov. 19,
2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Dominion-izing+the+Vote%22
(archived).
324. One America News Network, “Cyber Analyst on Dominion
Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,” YouTube, at 0:45, Nov.
15, 2020, available at https://youtu.be/eKcPoCNW8AA.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of James Watkins,
(June 6, 2022), p. 11. Watkins denied under oath that either
he or his son Ron are “Q.” Id., at 38, 122.
326. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 15,
2020 12:32 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Soon-to-be+AG+Rosen+recently+wrote+an+essay+on+foreign+influence+in+US+elections.+foreign+actors+are+covertly+trying+to%22
(archived).
327. President Donald J. Trump, “Tweets of January 3, 2021,”
The American Presidency Project, available at, available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-3-2021
(archived).
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of James Watkins,
(June 6, 2022), p. 77; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), p. 67 (noting, as the
then-owner of TheDonald.win, that President Trump’s December
19th tweet was “everywhere,” including with “Q people.”).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of James Watkins,
(June 6, 2022), pp. 74, 76.
330. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Munn, No.
1:21-cr-474 (D.D.C. May 13, 2022), ECF No. 78.
331. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Chansley, No.
1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
332. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart
Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 162.
333. See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9257), United
States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
2022) (Rhodes messaging an Oath Keepers chat that “Let’s
adopt the Q slogan of WWG1WGA. Where We Go One, We Go All.
We nullify TOGETHER We defy TOGETHER. We resist TOGETHER We
defend TOGETHER. They come for one of us, they come for all
of us. When they come for us, we go for them. When they
strike at our leaders, we strike at their leaders. This is
the path of the Founders. It’s what they did.”); Trial
Exhibit 4064, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022) (printout of December 23, 2020, open
letter to President Trump posted by Stewart Rhodes on the
Oath Keeper website, imploring the President to invoke the
Insurrection Act to prevent a communist takeover of the
United States through the inauguration of Joe Biden).
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 53.
335. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, “Extremists Made
Little Secret of Ambitions to ‘Occupy’ Capitol in Weeks
Before Attack,” NBC News, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-weeks-attack-n1253499.
336. Kari Paul, Luke Harding and Severin Carrell, “Far-Right
Website 8kun Again Loses Internet Service Protection
Following Capitol Attack,” The Guardian, (Jan. 15, 2021),
available at
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jan/15/8kun-8chan-capitol-breach-violence-isp.
337. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, “Extremists Made
Little Secret of Ambitions to ‘Occupy’ Capitol in Weeks
Before Attack,” NBC News, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-weeks-attack-n1253499.
338. Post by username r3deleven, “Trump Tweet. Daddy Says Be
In DC On Jan. 6th,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 19, 2020, available
at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210105024826/https://thedonald.win/p/11R4q2aptJ/trump-tweet-daddy-says-be-in-dc-/c/
(archived).
339. “How a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to
‘Storm and Occupy’ Capitol with ‘Handcuffs and Zip Ties’,”
SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at
https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.
340. “How a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to
‘Storm and Occupy’ Capitol with ‘Handcuffs and Zip Ties’,”
SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at
https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.
341. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jody Williams,
(June 7, 2022), p. 72.
342. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, “The Absence of ‘The
Donald’,” Just Security, (Dec. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/79446/the-absence-of-the-donald/.
343. Amrita Khalid, “Donald Trump Participated in a Reddit
AMA, but not Much of Anything was Revealed,” Daily Dot,
(July 27, 2016), available at
https://www.dailydot.com/debug/donald-trump-reddit-ama-fail/.
344. Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Briefing
with Reddit, (May 19, 2022); Mike Isaac, “Reddit, Acting
Against Hate Speech, Bans ‘The_Donald’ Subreddit,” New York
Times, (Jan. 29, 2020, Updated Jan. 27, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/technology/reddit-hate-speech.html.
345. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jody Williams,
(June 7, 2022), pp. 31-32. In fact, Williams testified that
he and other moderators had the opportunity to advertise the
new website on Reddit for months. See id., at 32-33. This
gave TheDonald.win “immediate” access to “hundreds of
thousands of people” who used the Reddit forum. See id., at
33.
346. Ben Schreckinger, “World War Meme: How a Group of
Anonymous Keyboard Commandos Conquered the Internet for
Donald Trump and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,”
Politico Magazine, (Mar./Apr. 2017), available at
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856/.
347. Ben Schreckinger, “World War Meme: How a Group of
Anonymous Keyboard Commandos Conquered the Internet for
Donald Trump and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,”
Politico Magazine, (Mar./Apr. 2017), available at
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856/.
348. Daniella Silva, “President Trump Tweets Wrestling Video
of Himself Attacking ‘CNN’,” NBC News, (July 2, 2017),
available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/president-trump-tweets-wwe-video-himself-attacking-cnn-n779031.
349. Justin Hendrix, “TheDonald.win and President Trump’s
Foreknowledge of the Attack on the Capitol,” Just Security,
(Jan. 12, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.
350. Andrew Restuccia, Daniel Lippman, and Eliana Johnson,
“‘Get Scavino in Here’: Trump’s Twitter Guru is the Ultimate
Insider,” Politico, (May 16, 2019), available at
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/16/trump-scavino-1327921.
351. H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the
House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel
Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply
with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
352. Justin Hendrix, “TheDonald.win and President Trump’s
Foreknowledge of the Attack on the Capitol,” Just Security,
(Jan. 12, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.
353. Post, “If we occupy the capitol building, there will be
no vote,” Patriots.Win, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11Rh1RiP9l/if-we-occupy-the-capitol-buildin/.
354. Post by username REDMARAUDER, “The media will call us
evil if we have to occupy the Capitol Building on January
6th. Let them,” Patriots.Win, Jan. 2, 2021, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11ROC9U7EM/the-media-will-call-us-evil-if-w/.
355. Post by username Sharker, “THIS IS NOT A RALLY OR
PROTEST. We are all here for the sole purpose of correcting
this ILLEGAL election. Surround the enemy and do NOT LET
THEM LEAVE until this mess is cleaned up with Trump being
re-admitted for 4 more years. SACK UP PATRIOTS.”
Patriots.Win, Jan. 5, 2021, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11Rh1WGo3K/this-is-not-a-rally-or-protest-w/c/.
356. Ben Schreckinger, “World War Meme: How a Group of
Anonymous Keyboard Commandos Conquered the Internet for
Donald Trump — and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far
Right,” Politico Magazine, (March/April 2017) available at
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856.
357. “How a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to
‘Storm and Occupy’ Capitol with ‘Handcuffs and Zip Ties’,”
SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at
https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.
358. Alex Thomas, “Team Trump Was in Bed With Online
Insurrectionists before He Was Even Elected,” Daily Dot,
(Jan. 15, 2021), available at
https://www.dailydot.com/debug/dan-scavino-reddit-donald-trump-disinformation/.
359. Alex Jones, “Team Trump Was in Bed With Online
Insurrectionists before He Was Even Elected,” Daily Dot,
(Jan. 15, 2021), available at
https://www.dailydot.com/debug/dan-scavino-reddit-donald-trump-disinformation/.
360. Post by username wartooth6, “Gallows are simpler and
more cost effective, plus they’re an American old west
tradition too,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 22, 2020, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RNfN5v3p/gallows-are-simpler-and-more-cos/c/.
361. Post by username psybrnaut, “Builder Pedes...Let’s
construct a Gallows outside the Capitol Building next
Wednesday so the Congressmen watching from their office
windows shit their Pants...,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 30, 2020,
available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RO2pYG2P/builder-pedes-lets-construct-a-g/c/.
362. Post by username TacticalGeorge, “Building a hanging
platform in front of Congress on the 6 should send a strong
message,” Patriots.Win, Dec. 30, 2020, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RO2oQy77/building-a-hanging-platform-in-f/.
363. Post by username Krunchi, “The One Thing You Must Know
Before Going To DC on The 6th...,” Patriots.Win, Jan. 3,
2021, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210105080829/https://thedonald.win/p/11ROGmlHG5/the-one-thing-you-must-know-befo/
(archived).
364. Post by username Badradness, “We will be building a
gallows right in front of the Capitol so the traitors know
the stakes. I’m driving up in a sedan but if a patriot with
a pickup will assist I’m down to spend from my credit line
at Home Depot for all of the supplies needed for this.
Driving up Monday night or early Tuesday.,” Patriots.Win,
Jan. 3, 2021, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11ROGrJPVQ/we-will-be-building-a-gallows-ri/c/.
365. Post by username AFLP, “Gallows on the Capitol Lawn,”
Patriots.Win, Jan. 5, 2021, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RhArKEQ3/gallows-on-the-capitol-lawn/.
366. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3,
2022), pp. 209.
367. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason
Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. In his
testimony to the Select Committee, Miller denied reading
such comments and claimed not to recall whether Meadows had
followed up with him about the thread. However, Miller did
say that “sometimes” he would “click and see what people are
saying” on sites like TheDonald.win, if he received a Google
alert about himself. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 209, 212, 214.
368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 209, Exhibit
47.
369. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19,
2020 1:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340362336390004737.
370. Justin Hendrix, “TheDonald.win and President Trumps
Foreknowledge of the Attack on the Capitol,” Just Security,
(Jan. 12, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.
371. Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
Pro Publica, at 12:05 p.m. ET at 0:30, Jan. 17, 2021,
available,
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/;
Statement of Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022),
at 5.
372. Through review of public records, the Select Committee
identified organizers for about a dozen events scheduled for
January 5th or 6th secured permits from either the U.S.
Capitol Police (USCP) or National Park Service (NPS). Except
for two events—one unrelated to January 6th and the other
put on by a group that regularly held demonstrations around
D.C.—all of the applications were submitted after President
Trump’s December 19th tweet. The three most important events
were: Cindy Chafian’s January 5th event at Freedom Plaza
(using the group name “The Eighty Percent Coalition”);
WFAF’s January 6th event at the Ellipse; and Ali Alexander’s
January 6th event on the Capitol grounds (under the “One
Nation Under God” moniker). In addition to the permits
issued to WFAF, Cindy Chafian, and Ali Alexander (under the
“One Nation Under God” moniker), at least nine additional
permits were issued by USCP or NPS for events in Washington,
D.C., on January 5, 2021 or January 6, 2021.
373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of the Interior Production),
DOI_46000428_00005162 (Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email
Re: Status of application - Women for America First at 7:12
AM).
374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of the Interior Production),
DOI_46000428_00005162 (Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email
Re: Status of application - Women for America First at 7:12
AM).
375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kylie
Kremer, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 5.
376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Amy
Kremer, (Feb. 18, 2022), pp. 8-10.
377. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Amy
Kremer, (Feb. 18, 2022), pp. 8-10.
378. Women for America First, “March for Trump Bus Tour,”
trumpmarch.com, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201226001527/https://trumpmarch.com/.
379. Kylie Jane Kremer (@KylieJaneKremer), Twitter, Dec. 19,
2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/kyliejanekremer/status/1340399063875895296?lang=en.
380. Women For America First Ellipse Public Gathering
Permit, National Park Service, available at
https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/21-0278-Women-for-America-First-Ellispse-permit_REDACTED.pdf.
381. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander,
(Dec. 9, 2021), p. 15.
382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010113 (Dec.
19, 2020, Ali Alexandra text message to Stephen Brown at
10:49 a.m.).
383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010113 (Dec.
19, 2020, Ali Alexandra text message to Stephen Brown at
10:49 a.m.).
384. “Valuation and Analysis,” WildProtest.com, (Jan. 14,
2021 (last updated)), available at
https://wildprotest.com.siteindices.com/.
385. “President Trump Wants You in DC January 6,”
WildProtest.com, (Dec 19.2020), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20201223062953/http://wildprotest.com/
(archived).
386. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Arina
Grossu, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.
387. Statement of Andrew J. Seidel, (Mar. 18, 2022), at 11,
13.
388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Arina Grossu Production), Grossu_01_002721 (Dec.
19, 2020, Rob Weaver email message to Arina Grossu at 8:20
a.m. CT).
389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Arina Grossu Production), Arina Grossu Exhibit 20
(Jericho March Rally registration page).
390. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Marsha
Lessard, (Dec. 10, 2021); see also Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production),
CTRL0000001834 (Permit Relating to Demonstration Activities
on United States Capitol Grounds for Virginia Freedom
Keepers, No. 20-12-25).
391. See Superseding Indictment at ¶ 37, United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022) (noting
that Stewart Rhodes, President of the Oath Keepers, shipped
weapons to Lessard’s home in Virginia before his arrival in
DC for January 6th); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
392. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry
Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2021), p. 117 (testifying that Gracia
arranged a White House tour for him in December 2020).
393. Latinos for Trump (@Officiallft2021), Twitter, Dec. 27,
2020 7:58 p.m., available at
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1343360740313321474.
394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Nathan Martin Production), NMartin0318 (December
30, 2020, email from Kimberly Fletcher of Moms for America
to Ali Alexander and Nathan Martin re: MFA VIP list for
White House); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010100
(December 27, 2020, text messages between Nathan Martin,
Stephen Martin, Kimberly Fletcher, and Ali Alexander
discussing permitting); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production),
CTRL0000000086, CTRL0000000086.0001 (December 23, 2020,
Special Event Assessment identifying Fletcher as a speaker
at the “Wild Protest” event during the same time as MFA’s
permitted event in a different area).
395. “The Alex Jones Show,” Prison Planet TV, at 10:07, Dec.
20, 2020, available at
http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.
396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (T-Mobile Production, Nov. 19, 2021).
397. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Cynthia
“Cindy” Chafian (Nov. 1-2, 2021).
398. See, Beth Reinhard, Jaqueline Alemany, and Josh Dawsey,
“Low-Profile Heiress Who ‘Played a Strong Role’ in Financing
Jan. 6 Rally is Thrust Into Spotlight,” Washington Post,
(Dec. 8, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/publix-heiress-capitol-insurrection-fancelli/2021/12/08/5144fe1c-5219-11ec-8ad5-b5c50c1fb4d9_story.html.
399. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Julia Fancelli Production), REL0000000994, (Bank
Statements for Julia Fancelli at the Bank of Central Florida
from December 10, 2020, to January 10, 2021).
400. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), p. 58.
401. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
402. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 45-46.
403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), p. 71.
404. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 -
6, 2021, Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan).
406. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000005 (December
27, 2020, Kylie Kremer e-mail to Caroline Wren at 11:25 am).
407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000468 (December
27, 2020, Caroline Wren text message thread with Alex
Jones).
408. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000550 (Dec. 27,
2020, Caroline Wren text messages with Cindy Chafian).
409. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 50, 70-71.
410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 -
6, 2021, Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan.
411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 -
6, 2021, Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan.
412. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000482 (December
29, 2020, Caroline Wren text message to Ali Alexander at
4:19 p.m.).
413. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000482 (December
29, 2020, Caroline Wren text message to Ali Alexander at
4:19 pm).
414. Kathleen Ronayne and Michael Kunzelman, “Trump to
Far-Right Extremists: `Stand Back and Stand By,’ ”
Associated Press, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f.
415. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27,
2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived).
416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Justin Caporale,
(Mar. 1, 2022), pp. 20-21.
417. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Donald Trump, Jr., (May 3, 2022), p.30; Anthony Man, “At
Trump Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Roger Stone Thanks
President for Pardon,” Orlando Sun Sentinel, (Dec. 28,
2020), available at
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/elections/fl-ne-roger-stone-thanks-trump-pardon-20201228-2ejqzv6e7vhyvf26cxz6e6jysa-story.html.
418. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (AT&T Production, Dec. 17, 2021).
419. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000444, pp. 1-3
(December 27, 2020, text message from Caroline Wren to
Kimberly Guilfoyle at 7:10 p.m.).
420. As revealed in the phone records for the personal cell
phones of Max Miller and Anthony Ornato. See Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon
Production, Dec. 17, 2021); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Sep. 23,
2022). The Select Committee also subpoenaed the phone
records for the personal cell phones of Robert Peede, Mark
Meadows, Dan Scavino, and Justin Caporale. They each filed
lawsuits to block the respective phone companies’ production
of the phone records, which were still pending at the time
of writing. Thus, there may have been additional relevant
phone calls among or involving these four of which the
Select Committee is not aware.
421. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller,
(Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 36-37.
422. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Justin Caporale,
(Mar. 1, 2020), p. 44; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_0644
(December 29, 2020, text messages with Justin Caporale).
423. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 79-82; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren
Production), REVU_0181 (January 2nd email from Katrina
Pierson to Caroline Wren and Taylor Budowich).
424. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-08, 135.
425. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 42.
426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 44-45, 47, 52-54;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 87.
427. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5447, p. 3
(January 4, 2021, text message from Kylie Kremer to Mike
Lindell at 9:32 a.m.).
428. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017718, p. 41
(January 5, 2021 text message with Liz Willis at 7:19 a.m.).
429. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 120-21.
430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller,
(Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 91-92.
434. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 123.
435. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 121-26.
436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller,
(Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 98-99.
437. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Max Miller Production) Miller Production 0001, p.
1 (January 4, 2021, text message from Max Miller to Katrina
Pierson).
438. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.
439. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 95; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson0180, at 180, 196-97 (January 4, 2021,
President Trump Meeting Agenda).
440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 41.
441. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 42.
442. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 42-43.
443. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0374 (December
30, 2020, Katrina Pierson text message to Kylie Kremer);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina
Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 4.
444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 86.
445. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 62-63.
446. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 84; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson0924 (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson
text message to Mark Meadows at 1:39 p.m. and 1:40 p.m.)
447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (March 25, 2022), p. 74; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson0921, (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson
text message to Mark Meadows at 5:16 p.m.).
448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 76-77, 80-81.
449. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 75-77.
450. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0924 (January
2, 2021 Katrina Pierson text message to Mark Meadows at 5:49
p.m.).
451. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 108; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson180 (January 4, 2021, agenda for
meeting with President Trump at 1:21 p.m.).
452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 107-08; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson0196 (Document titled: “Meeting w/
POTUS - January 4th 2021 at 3:30pm ET”).
453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 116-18.
454. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0906 (January
5, 2021, text message from Dan Scavino to Katrina Pierson at
4:23 a.m.).
455. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Justin Caporale Production), Caporale_05_003987,
(Jan. 3, 2021, Katrina Pierson text message to Justin
Caporale and Taylor Budowich); see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25,
2022), p. 79; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Taylor Budowich Production), Budo-00714 (January 2,
2021, Katrina Pierson email to Caroline Wren and Taylor
Budowich at 10:49 p.m.).
456. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Justin Caporale Production), Caporale_02_000673-88,
(Jan. 3, 2021, Justin Caporale text message to Katrina
Pierson, redacted).
457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller,
(Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 81-83. Miller testified that he had not
been involved in or paying attention to the conversation
until the President directly addressed him about Giuliani.
Miller’s testimony was not credible on this point. Miller
said he did not take notes, yet in communications with
people after the fact he recounted details about the
President’s decision regarding speakers other than Giuliani,
Eastman, Powell, Wood, and Flynn. See Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 85
(stating that neither he nor Peede took notes); id. at p.
107 (confirming that he told Megan Powers on January 5th
that President Trump cut Paxton from the list).
458. In the January 4 meeting with Pierson and Miller,
President Trump initially indicated that Giuliani would not
be able to speak at the Ellipse because he needed to be
working on lobbying Members of Congress to block
certification of the electoral college vote, yet another
sign that the President intended January 6th to be a
full-fledged effort to stay in power. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25,
2022), p. 117.
459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller,
(Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 81-83, 129-30.
460. User-Generated Clip, “John Eastman at January 6 Rally,”
CSPAN, Mar. 24, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4953961/user-clip-john-eastman-january-6-rally.
461. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller,
(Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 115-116.
462. It appears that Alexander was given front row seating
for the Ellipse rally. He tweeted a picture in front of the
Ellipse stage, writing: “Nice seats! Thank you
@realdonaldtrump!” Ali [Orange Square] #StopTheSteal (@Ali),
Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107094927/https:/twitter.com/ali
(archived).
463. Moms for America, “Save the Republic: Ali Alexander,”
Rumble, at 2:24, Jan. 29, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vdepmx-save-the-republic-ali-alexander.html.
464. Ali [Orange Square] #StopTheSteal (@Ali), Twitter, Jan.
5, 2021, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107094927/https:/twitter.com/ali
(archived).
465. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at
Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, Jan. 5, 2021, available at
https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.
466. Radley Balko, “Meet the Police Chief Turned Yoga
Instructor Prodding Wealthy Suburbanites to Civil War,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 27, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/27/alan-hostetter-capitol-riot-police-chief-yoga-instructor/.
467. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at
Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, at 20:10, Jan. 5, 2021,
available at
https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.
468. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at
Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, at 1:44:14 -1:45:54, Jan. 5,
2021, available at
https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.
469. NTD Television, “‘Virginia Women for Trump’ Rally at
Supreme Court,” Facebook Live, at1:46:04 – 1:49:40, Jan. 5,
2021, available at
https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.
470. Radley Balko, “Meet the Police Chief Turned Yoga
Instructor Prodding Wealthy Suburbanites to Civil War,”
Washington Post, (Jan. 27, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/27/alan-hostetter-capitol-riot-police-chief-yoga-instructor/.
471. Indictment at ¶ 56, United States v. Hostetter et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C., June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
472. EpiqEpoch, “Roger Stone January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,”
Rumble, at 8:09, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vchgtl-roger-stone-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.
473. Project Truth Beam, “Jan 5th Freedom Plaza: Ali
Alexander,” Rumble, at 1:58-2:21, Jan.16, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vcx1mt-jan-5th-freedom-plaza-ali-alexander.html.
474. EpiqEpoch, “Alex Jones January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,”
Rumble, at 1:24, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vchguz-alex-jones-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.
475. EpiqEpoch, “Gen. Michael Flynn, January 5, 2021 Freedom
Plaza,” Rumble, at 5:28, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://rumble.com/vchisz-gen.-michael-flynn-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.
476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross
Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112.
477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Bock IV, (Apr. 15, 2022), pp. 23, 32; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000002884_00001, (January 5, 2021, email
from Worthington to Staff Secretary at 7:46 p.m., attaching
a draft speech). In the final hours before the speech, White
House lawyers would insist that the speech needed
fact-checking and were most worried about the claims about
Dominion Voting. See Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production)
076P-R000007308_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from
Worthington to Staff Secretary at 7:46 p.m.). But President
Trump would deliver the speech with the allegations intact.
See Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th
Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6”
(Staff Report), p. B-18, (June 8, 2021).
478. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002701-02 (Draft
Speech, “Stop the Steal Rally”).
479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller
(Apr. 14, 2022), p. 125-26; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Ross Worthington (Feb. 15, 2022),
p. 124.
480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 15-16.
481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 16; see also Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives
Production), Photo files 69c1_x032_555c_7, 0d9d_x039_557d_7
(January 5, 2021, photos of the meeting).
482. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 76-77; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp.
17, 19-20; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P.
Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Madison Fox Porter, (May
5, 2022), p. 19.
483. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 16-17; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp.
83-84.
484. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5,
2021 5:05 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Washington+is+being+inundated%22
(archived). (“Washington is being inundated with people who
don’t want to see an election victory stolen by emboldened
Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they
won’t take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the
Oval Office. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!”).
485. The Select Committee has obtained two drafts of the
speech from January 5th, one of which was circulated at
approximately 3:30 p.m. and another at 7:40 p.m. See
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent
Haley Production), VMH-00002700, VMH-00002708 (January 5,
2021, email from Ross Worthington to Stephen Miller
circulating draft speech at 3:30 p.m.); Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000002878_00001, 076P-R000002879_00001,
(January 5, 2021, email from Ross Worthington to Stephen
Miller circulating draft speech at 7:40 p.m.).
486. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5,
2021 5:05 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived). (“Washington is
being inundated with people who don’t want to see an
election victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left
Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they won’t take it
anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office.
MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!”).
487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000002879_00001 (Draft of Jan. 6, 2021 speech by
President Donald Trump).
488. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 91-92.
489. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah
Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 32-33. Craighead believed
that she later shared this with Ornato. See id., at 33.
490. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p.
99.
491. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17. Deere did not recall this
specific question nor responding to it, but did remember
advising President Trump that he should focus on his
administration’s accomplishments during his January 6th
Ellipse rally speech rather than his stolen election claims.
Deere recalled President Trump asking about which Members of
Congress would be with him the next day and vote against
certifying the election. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 88-90, 92, 99-100.
492. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17.
493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp.
85-86.
494. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 86-87, 99.
495. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), p. 86.
496. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, 076P-R000007361_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from
Austin Ferrer to Dan Scavino at 10:16 p.m.).
497. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th
Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6”
(Staff Report), p. B-2, (June 8, 2021); Statement of
Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.
498. Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
Pro Publica, at 12:05 p.m. ET at 0:30, Jan. 17, 2021,
available,
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/;
Statement of Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022),
at 5.
499. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11-19.
500. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th
Congress, “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of
the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6”
(Staff Report), pp. B-22, 23, (June 8, 2021).
501. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000002911_00001, 076P-R000002912_00001 (January 6,
2021, email from Robert Gabriel Jr. to Dan Scavino at 1:25
p.m. re: Final draft attached with attachment ‘210106 Save
America March.doc’); Statement of Jennifer Mercieca, (Mar.
31, 2022), at 18.
502. Statement of Jennifer Mercieca, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 18.
President Trump speaks at the January 6th Ellipse rally.
President Trump speaks at the January 6th Ellipse rally.
(Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images)
7
187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION
At 1:10 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump concluded his
speech at the Ellipse. By that time, the attack on the U.S.
Capitol had already begun. But it was about to get much
worse. The President told thousands of people in attendance
to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. He told
them to “fight like hell” because if they didn’t, they were
“not going to have a country anymore.” Not everyone who left
the Ellipse did as the Commander-in-Chief ordered, but many
of them did. The fighting intensified during the hours that
followed.1
By 1:21 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol
was under attack. He could have interceded immediately. But
the President chose not to do so. It was not until 4:17 p.m.
that President Trump finally tweeted a video in which he
told the rioters to go home.
The 187 minutes between the end of President Trump’s speech
and when he finally told the mob to leave the U.S. Capitol
was a dereliction of duty. In the U.S. military, a service
member is deemed to be “derelict in the performance of
duties when that person willfully or negligently fails to
perform that person’s duties or when that person performs
them in a culpably inefficient manner.” 2 As
Commander-in-Chief, President Trump had the power—more than
any other American—to muster the U.S. Government’s resources
and end the attack on the U.S. Capitol. He willfully
remained idle even as others, including his own Vice
President, acted.
President Trump could have called top officials at the
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Defense, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police
Department, or the DC Mayor’s Office to ensure that they
quelled the violence. He made no such calls. Instead,
President Trump reached out to Rudolph Giuliani and friendly
Members of Congress, seeking their assistance in delaying
the joint session of Congress. And the President tweeted at
2:24 p.m., at the height of the violence, that his own Vice
President lacked the “courage” to act—a statement that could
only further enrage the mob. Meanwhile, Vice President
Michael Pence assumed the duties of the President,
requesting the assistance of top officials, even though he
was not in the chain of command and had no constitutional
power to issue orders.
In testimony before the Select Committee, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley explained that
President Trump did “[n]othing,” “[z]ero” to marshal the
Government’s resources during the assault on the U.S.
Capitol.3 In contrast, Vice President Pence had “two or
three calls” with General Milley and other military
officials—even as the mob hunted him. During those calls,
Vice President Pence was “very animated” and “issued very
explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders.” The Vice
President told Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller to
“get the military down here, get the [National] [G]uard down
here,” and “put down this situation.” 4 President Trump
could have made those same demands. He chose not to do so—a
damning fact that President Trump’s own Chief of Staff, Mark
Meadows, quickly tried to cover up.
“We have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is
making all the decisions,” General Milley recalled Meadows
as saying. “We need to establish the narrative, you know,
that the President is still in charge and that things are
steady or stable,” Meadows said, which General Milley
described as a “[r]ed flag.” 5 In his testimony, General
Milley also reflected on what it meant for a President not
to be taking action in a time of crisis:
You know, you’re the Commander in Chief. You’ve got an
assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of
America, and there’s nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero? And
it’s not my place to, you know, pass judgment or—I’m the,
you know—but no attempt to call the Secretary of Defense? No
attempt to call the Vice President of the United States of
America, who’s down on the scene? To my knowledge, it
wasn’t—I just noted it.6
President Trump’s closest advisors—both inside and out of
the White House—implored him to act sooner. Earlier in the
week, two of the President’s most trusted aides, Eric
Herschmann and Hope Hicks, both wanted President Trump to
emphasize that January 6th would be a peaceful protest.
President Trump refused.7
On the 6th, as the riot began to escalate, a colleague
texted Hicks and wrote, “Hey, I know you’re seeing this. But
he really should tweet something about Being NON-violent.” 8
“I’m not there,” Hicks replied. “I suggested it several
times Monday and Tuesday and he refused.” 9
Once the attack was underway, President Trump initially
ignored the counsel of his own family, members of his
administration, Republican elected officials, and friendly
Fox News personalities. Both Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump,
Jr. wanted their father to tell the rioters to go home
sooner. The President delayed. At 2:38 p.m., President Trump
sent this tweet: “Please support our Capitol Police and Law
Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay
peaceful!” 10 Sarah Matthews, the White House Deputy Press
Secretary, told the Select Committee that President Trump
resisted using the word “peaceful.” The President added the
words “Stay peaceful!” only after Ivanka Trump suggested the
phrase.11 Trump, Jr. quickly recognized that his father’s
tweet was insufficient. “He’s got to condem [sic] this shit.
Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough,” Trump,
Jr. wrote in a text to White House Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows.12 President Trump did not tell the rioters to
disperse in either his 2:38 p.m. tweet, or another tweet at
3:13 p.m.13
Multiple witnesses told the Select Committee that Minority
Leader Kevin McCarthy contacted the President and others
around him, desperately trying to get him to act. McCarthy’s
entreaties led nowhere. “I guess they’re just more upset
about the election theft than you are,” President Trump told
McCarthy.14 Top lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office
attempted to intercede. Two Fox News primetime
personalities, always so obsequious, begged those around the
President to get him to do more. But President Trump was
unmoved.
There’s no question that President Trump had the power to
end the insurrection. He was not only the Commander-in-Chief
of the U.S. military, but also of the rioters.
One member of the mob, Stephen Ayres, told the Select
Committee that he and others quickly complied as soon as
President Trump finally told them to go home. “[W]e
literally left right after [President Trump’s 4:17 p.m.
video] come out. You know, to me if he would have done that
earlier in the day, 1:30 [p.m.] . . . maybe we wouldn’t be
in this bad of a situation or something,” Ayres said.15
Another rioter, Jacob Chansley, commonly referred to as the
“QAnon Shaman,” was one of the first 30 rioters to enter the
U.S. Capitol. Chansley told a reporter that he left the
building because “Trump asked everybody to go home.” 16 At
4:25 p.m., just eight minutes after President Trump tweeted
his video, an Oath Keeper named Ed Vallejo messaged other
members of his group, a fair number of whom were at the
Capitol: “Gentleman [sic], Our Commander-in-Chief has just
ordered us to go home. Comments?” 17
President Trump appears on a monitor in the White House
briefing room depicting a video he released instructing
rioters to go home.
President Trump appears on a monitor in the White House
briefing room depicting a video he released instructing
rioters to go home.
(Photo by Joshua Roberts/Getty Images)
Even then, President Trump did not disavow the rioters. He
endorsed their cause, openly sympathized with them, and
repeated his Big Lie once again. “I know your pain, I know
you’re hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us,”
President Trump said at the beginning of his 4:17 p.m.
video. “It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it,
especially the other side. But you have to go home now. We
have to have peace. We have to have law and order. We have
to respect our great people in law and order. We don’t want
anybody hurt.” The President portrayed the violence as
something his political foes would use against him, saying:
“This was a fraudulent election, but we can’t play into the
hands of these people.” 18
The President concluded his short video by again praising
the men and women who had overrun the U.S. Capitol. “We have
to have peace. So go home. We love you. You’re very
special,” President Trump said. “You’ve seen what happens.
You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so
evil. I know how you feel, but go home, and go home in
peace.” 19
Just after 6:00 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump issued
his final tweet of the day, again lauding the rioters and
justifying their cause. President Trump made excuses for the
riot, saying this is what happens “when a sacred landslide
election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped
away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly
treated for so long.” The President added: “Go home with
love & in peace. Remember this day forever!” 20
The following day, President Trump’s advisors encouraged him
to deliver a short speech denouncing the attack on the U.S.
Capitol. The President struggled to deliver his prepared
remarks. According to Cassidy Hutchinson, President Trump
wanted to say that he would pardon the rioters. Lawyers in
the White House Counsel’s Office objected, so this language
was not included.21 John McEntee, the Director of the White
House Presidential Personnel Office, also testified that in
the days following the attack, he heard President Trump
mention the possibility of a “blanket pardon” for all those
involved in the events of January 6th.22
President Trump never did give up on the prospect. Since
leaving office, the now former President has said he would
consider “full pardons with an apology to many” of the
January 6th defendants if he is reelected.23
7.1 “Reinsert the Mike Pence Lines”
President Trump tweeted three times on the morning of
January 6th, repeating a false claim of election fraud at
8:06 a.m.,24 pressuring Vice President Pence to delay the
electoral count at 8:17 a.m.,25 and urging Republican party
officials to do the same at 8:22 a.m.26 He made calls to his
Republican allies in Congress, many of whom were already
committed to objecting to the electoral count.27 And he
dialed his lawyers and advisors—including Steve Bannon and
Rudolph Giuliani (twice), both of whom had been counseling
the President on how to stay in power.28
There was one person—critical to his plan—whom President
Trump tried to reach but couldn’t. At 9:02 a.m., he asked
the switchboard operator to call his Vice President. Vice
President Pence did not answer the call.29
President Trump speaks with speechwriter Stephen Miller
about his Ellipse speech in the Oval Office on the morning
of January 6, 2021.
President Trump speaks with speechwriter Stephen Miller
about his Ellipse speech in the Oval Office on the morning
of January 6, 2021.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration)
Instead, between 9:52 a.m. and 10:18 a.m., the President
spoke with his speechwriter, Stephen Miller, about the words
he would deliver at the Save America Rally just hours
later.30 The former President’s speech had come together
over the course of 36 hours, going from a screed aimed at
encouraging congressional objections to one that would
ultimately incite mob violence.31
Only four minutes after the call concluded, at 10:22 a.m.,
Miller emailed revisions to the speechwriters, instructing
them to “[s]tart inputting these changes asap” that included
“red highlights marking POTUS edits.” 32 The President had
made some cosmetic additions, like peppering in the word
“corrupt” throughout,33 but there was one substantive edit—a
new target—that would focus the crowd’s anger on one man.
None of the preceding drafts mentioned Vice President Pence
whatsoever. But now, at the very last minute, President
Trump slipped in the following sentences calling the Vice
President out by name:
Today, we will see whether Republicans stand strong for the
integrity of our elections. And we will see whether Mike
Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader.
All he has to do is refer the illegally-submitted electoral
votes back to the states that were given false and
fraudulent information where they want to recertify. With
only 3 of the 7 states in question we win and become
President and have the power of the veto.34
No one on the speechwriting team could explain why President
Trump added these lines just 30 minutes before he was
originally scheduled to speak at 11:00 a.m.35 But by 10:49
a.m., Vincent Haley, a speechwriter who was helping load the
teleprompter at the Ellipse, was told to hold off and delete
the mention of the Vice President—for now.36 Miller said
that Eric Herschmann, a lawyer who was one of the
President’s senior advisors, asked him in a “brief sidebar”
that morning to omit reference to the Vice President and his
role in the certification process because he “didn’t concur
with the legal analysis” and that it “wouldn’t advance the
ball” but would be “counterproductive” instead.37 As
detailed in Chapter 5, Herschmann and others in the White
House were vocal critics of Dr. John Eastman’s theory, which
claimed that the Vice President had the unilateral power to
reject electors during the joint session of Congress.
President Trump repeatedly pressured Pence to either reject
certified electors, or delay the electoral count based on
Eastman’s unconstitutional and illegal theory. Vice
President Pence would not budge. The Vice President
consistently rejected President Trump’s demands.
After tweeting four more times that morning—all of them
spreading lies about the election38—the President apparently
thought he had one last chance to convince his number two to
overrule the will of the American people.
President Trump on a phone call with Vice President Mike
Pence in the Oval Office on the morning of January 6, 2021.
President Trump on a phone call with Vice President Mike
Pence in the Oval Office on the morning of January 6, 2021.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration)
As recounted in Chapter 5, President Trump called Vice
President Pence at 11:17 a.m.39 The call between the two
men—during which the President soon grew “frustrat[ed] or
heated,” 40 visibly upset,41 and “angry” 42—lasted nearly 20
minutes.43 And President Trump insulted Vice President Pence
when he refused to obstruct or delay the joint session.
After that call, General Keith Kellogg said that the people
in the room immediately went back to editing the Ellipse
speech.44 At 11:30 a.m., Miller emailed his assistant,
Robert Gabriel, with no text in the body but the subject
line: “insert—stand by for phone call.” 45 At 11:33 a.m.,
Gabriel emailed the speechwriting team: “REINSERT THE MIKE
PENCE LINES. Confirm receipt.” 46 One minute later,
speechwriter Ross Worthington confirmed that he had reached
Vincent Haley by phone.47 Haley corroborated that he added
one “tough sentence about the Vice President” while he was
at the teleprompter.48
The final written draft had the following Pence reference:
“And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a
truly great and courageous leader.” 49 Haley wasn’t
confident that line was what he reinserted, but email
traffic and teleprompter drafts produced by the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) indicate that he
was mistaken.50
After defying President Trump’s pressure, Vice President
Pence—and the ire of the President he inspired—was back in
the speech.
After the heated call, President Trump’s personal assistant
Nicholas Luna handed him a message on White House card stock
and the President departed for the Ellipse to give his
speech.51 Preserved by NARA, the message read: “THEY ARE
READY FOR YOU WHEN YOU ARE.” 52 When it finally came time
for him to speak, President Trump repeatedly directed his
anger at Vice President Pence—often ad-libbing lines that
were not included in the draft text.
7.2 “I’ll Be There With You”
President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the
Ellipse.
President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the
Ellipse.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration)
From a tent backstage at the Ellipse, President Trump looked
out at the crowd of approximately 53,000 supporters and
became enraged. Just under half of those gathered—a sizeable
stretch of about 25,000 people53—refused to walk through the
magnetometers and be screened for weapons,54 leaving the
venue looking half-empty to the television audience at home.
According to testimony received by the Committee, earlier
that morning at the White House, the President was told that
the onlookers were unwilling to pass through the
magnetometers because they were armed. “We have enough
space, sir. They don’t want to come in right now,” Deputy
Chief of Staff Tony Ornato reportedly told President Trump.
“They have weapons that they don’t want confiscated by the
Secret Service.” 55
So, when President Trump got to the rally site and could see
the crowd for himself, “[h]e was fucking furious,” as
Cassidy Hutchinson later texted Ornato.56 Hutchinson
testified that just minutes before addressing the crowd,
President Trump shouted to his advance team: “I don’t
[fucking] care that they have weapons. They’re not here to
hurt me. Take the [fucking] mags away. Let my people in.
They can march to the Capitol from here. Take the [fucking]
mags away.” 57
By noon, President Trump took to the stage at the Ellipse.58
The President wanted all of those in attendance, including
those who hadn’t passed through the magnetometers, to come
closer to the stage. “And I’d love to have if those tens of
thousands of people would be allowed,” President Trump said.
“But I’d love it if they could be allowed to come up here
with us. Is that possible? Can you just let [them] come up,
please?” 59
President Trump repeatedly made it clear to those around him
in the days before January 6th that he wanted to march to
the Capitol alongside his supporters. That is, President
Trump wanted to join his supporters in what the Secret
Service refers to as an “off-the-record” movement (OTR).
While the President spoke, Hutchinson texted Ornato, “He
also kept mentioning OTR to Capitol before he took the
stage.” 60 Minutes before the President stepped out, Chief
of Staff Mark Meadows assured the President he was working
on it.61
President Trump’s plan to march appeared once in an early
draft of the script, then a later revision was made to add
the word “building” after “Capitol,” making it clear exactly
where the crowd should go.62 And the President repeatedly
told the crowd that he would join them.
“[A]fter this, we’re going to walk down, and I’ll be there
with you, we’re going to walk down, we’re going to walk
down,” he said to the crowd. “[W]e’re going to walk down to
the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators
and congressmen and women, and we’re probably not going to
be cheering so much for some of them.” 63
President Trump used the phrase scripted for him by his
White House speechwriters, “peacefully and patriotically”
once, about 20 minutes into his speech.64 Then he spent the
next 50-or-so minutes amping up his crowd with lies about
the election, attacking his own Vice President and
Republican Members of Congress, and exhorting the crowd to
fight. “And we fight. We fight like hell” the President said
to a crowd that had already spent the day chanting, “Fight
for Trump! Fight for Trump!,” and that would keep up the
chorus when storming the Capitol.65
Finally, he told the crowd where to go to “take back our
country”: “So we’re going to, we’re going to walk down
Pennsylvania Avenue. I love Pennsylvania Avenue. And we’re
going to the Capitol, and we’re going to try and give . . .
we’re going to try and give our Republicans, the weak ones
because the strong ones don’t need any of our help. We’re
going to try and give them the kind of pride and boldness
that they need to take back our country. So let’s walk down
Pennsylvania Avenue.” 66
When the President announced his intentions from the
microphone, people listened.
House Republican Leader Representative. Kevin McCarthy
called Hutchinson mid-speech:67
“Do you guys think you’re coming to my office[?]” he asked
her.68 She assured him that they weren’t coming at all.69
“Figure it out. Don’t come up here,” he replied.70
The announcement from the stage put the Secret Service on
alert, prompting agents to designate over email a
last-minute response team “to filter in with the crowds” on
the President’s “walk/motorcade over” to the Capitol and
establish an emergency plan “if things go south.” 71 White
House security officials were monitoring the situation in
real time, remarking that President Trump was “going to the
Capitol” and that “they are finding the best route now.” 72
Nonetheless, these staffers were in “a state of shock,” 73
because they knew—particularly if the President joined—this
would “no longer [be] a rally.” 74
“[W]e all knew . . . that this was going to move to
something else if he physically walked to the Capitol,” an
employee said. “I don’t know if you want to use the word
‘insurrection,’ ‘coup,’ whatever. We all knew that this
would move from a normal democratic . . . public event into
something else.” 75
But the logistics made the move all but impossible.
It was complicated for the Secret Service to coordinate a
presidential movement even on a normal day. But today was
not a normal day. Tens of thousands of President Trump’s
supporters had flooded into downtown DC in the days before
the rally, and the Secret Service would have to account for
that unpredictability. By the end of the President’s speech,
it was clear that the crowd at the Capitol was growing
violent.
At 1:19 p.m., a Secret Service agent wrote to Bobby Engel,
the head of President Trump’s Secret Service detail: “FYSA .
. . [Capitol Police] having serious challenges securing [the
Capitol]. Nine priority breach attempts at this time. OTR to
anywhere near there is not advisable. Give me a call when
free. Front Office concerned about OTR to [the Capitol].” 76
7.3 The President’s Anger When He Could Not March to the
Capitol
President Trump concluded his remarks at 1:10 p.m. Luna
heard the President mention his intention to join the march
to the Capitol “after he finished his remarks.” 77 Just
before the President got into his vehicle, Meadows told him,
“We’re going to work on it, sir.” 78 President Trump was
seated in his motorcade vehicle by 1:17 p.m.79
The Committee received information informally from current
and former members of the Secret Service and former White
House staff relevant to what happened next—what a number of
witnesses have described as an “angry,” “irate,” or
“furious” interaction in the Presidential vehicle between
the President and the Secret Service.80 That initial
information, received informally, shaped the Committee’s
questioning of witnesses. The Committee’s principal concern
was that the President actually intended to participate
personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol,
leading the effort to overturn the election either from
inside the Chamber or from a stage outside the Capitol. The
Committee regarded those facts as important because they are
relevant to President Trump’s intent on January 6th. But a
book published by Mark Meadows in November 2021 made the
categorical claim that the President never intended to
travel to the Capitol that day.81 Because the Meadows book
conflicted sharply with information that was being received
by the Committee, the Committee became increasingly wary
that witnesses might intentionally conceal what happened.
In our initial informal discussion with the lead of the
President’s detail, Robert Engel confirmed that President
Trump did wish to travel to the Capitol from the Ellipse,
but stated that he did not recall many other details.82 But
the Committee also received information from Kayleigh
McEnany and Cassidy Hutchinson which also directly
contradicted Mark Meadows’s book and provided considerably
more detail. McEnany testified that President Trump did
indeed wish to travel to the Capitol on January 6th, and
continued to have that goal even after returning from the
Ellipse to the White House.83 McEnany, who spoke with
President Trump shortly after he returned to the White
House, recalls him expressing a desire to go to the Capitol:
“I recall him . . . saying that he wanted to physically walk
and be a part of the march and then saying that he would
ride the Beast if he needed to, ride in the Presidential
limo.” 84 When asked, McEnany confirmed that “yes, he did
seem sincere about wanting to do that.” 85 Hutchinson’s
testimony was generally consistent with the information the
Select Committee was receiving informally. Like McEnany,
Hutchinson confirmed that the President did ask to be
transported to Capitol Hill.86 Many other White House
witnesses would ultimately confirm that President Trump
wished to travel to the Capitol on January 6th,
comprehensively rebutting the false statements in Meadows’s
book.87
Part of Hutchinson’s account was a secondhand description of
what occurred in the Presidential vehicle, which built upon
and was consistent with information the Committee has
received informally.
Hutchinson testified that, when she returned from the
Ellipse, Ornato was standing outside his office door when he
“waved me down,” Hutchinson said. The two of them walked
into Ornato’s office, and he shut the door behind them.88
Engel was already there, sitting in a chair “looking down,
kind of looking a little lost and kind of
discombobulated.” 89
Cassidy Hutchinson describes a story relayed to her by Tony
Ornato about President Trump’s desire to go to the Capitol
after the Ellipse speech on January 6th during a January 6th
Select Committee hearing.
Cassidy Hutchinson describes a story relayed to her by Tony
Ornato about President Trump’s desire to go to the Capitol
after the Ellipse speech on January 6th during a January 6th
Select Committee hearing.
(Photo by Brandon Bell/Getty Images)
According to Hutchinson, Ornato then recounted a struggle in
the President’s car.90 At no point during Ornato’s
telling—or at any point thereafter—did Engel indicate that
what Ornato relayed was untrue.91
Another witness, a White House employee with national
security responsibilities, provided the Committee with a
similar description: Ornato related the “irate” interaction
in the presidential vehicle to this individual in Ornato’s
White House office with Engel present.92 And just as
Hutchinson testified, this employee told the Select
Committee that Engel listened to Ornato’s retelling of the
episode and did not dispute it: “I don’t remember his
specific body language, but . . . [h]e did not deny the fact
that the President was irate.” 93 Engel testified that he
does not recall either the conversation with Hutchinson or
the similar conversation with the White House employee with
national security responsibilities.94
The Committee regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating
testimony by the White House employee with national security
responsibilities national security official as earnest and
has no reason to conclude that either had a reason to invent
their accounts. A different Secret Service agent, who served
on a protective detail at the White House and was present in
the presidential motorcade at the Ellipse, provided this
view:
Committee Staff: Just a couple of additional questions. Ms.
Hutchinson has suggested to the Committee that you
sympathized with her after her testimony, and believed her
account. Is that accurate?
Witness: I have no—yeah, that’s accurate. I have no reason—I
mean, we—we became friends. We worked—I worked every day
with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We
had a good working relationship. I have no reason—she’s
never done me wrong. She’s never lied that I know of. I
don’t have any reason—I don’t—I don’t distrust Ms.
Hutchinson.95
Also, the White House employee with national security
responsibilities indicated that knowledge of the angry
altercation in the Presidential vehicle was known within the
White House—and was “[water] cooler talk.” 96 In addition,
Hutchinson has provided testimony to the Committee about
efforts by her prior counsel, who was apparently paid by a
Trump-funded organization, to suggest that Hutchinson did
not need to testify about the issue in the presidential
vehicle, could suggest that she “did not recall” it, or
should downplay it.97
To further corroborate the accounts received of President
Trump’s intent to travel to the Capitol, the Committee
interviewed a member of the Metropolitan Police who was also
present in the motorcade, Officer Mark Robinson. Officer
Robinson confirmed that he was aware contemporaneously of
the “heated discussion” that took place in the Presidential
vehicle:
Committee Staff: And was there any description of what was
occurring in the car?
Mr. Robinson: No. Only that—the only description I received
was that the President was upset and that he was adamant
about going to the Capitol, and there was a heated
discussion about that.
Committee Staff: When you say “heated,” is that your word,
or is that the word that was described by the TS agent?
Mr. Robinson: No. The word described by the TS agent meaning
that the President was upset, and he was saying there was a
heated argument or discussion about going to the Capitol.
. . . .
Mr. Schiff: So about how many times would you say you’ve
been part of that motorcade with the President?
Mr. Robinson: Probably over a hundred times.
Mr. Schiff: And, in that hundred times, have you ever
witnessed another discussion of an argument or a heated
discussion with the President where the President was
contradicting where he was supposed to go or what the Secret
Service believed was safe?
Mr. Robinson: No.98
The Committee also interviewed the Secret Service agent who
was in the same car as Officer Robinson. That person shared
a similar account, and confirmed that he did not take issue
with Officer Robinson’s testimony: “[The driver of the
Presidential car] said something to the effect of, ‘The
President is pretty adamant that he wants to go to the
Capitol,’” the agent said, recalling what he had heard on
the 6th.99
In addition, the Committee interviewed the USSS Press
Secretary, who communicated with both Engel and with the
driver in the presidential vehicle after Hutchinson appeared
publicly. That witness indicated that Engel’s account of the
events confirmed that the President was indeed angry, or
furious.100 In fact, when asked about a reporter’s tweet
indicating that sources within the Secret Service confirmed
that “Trump was furious about not being [able] to go to
[the] Capitol with his supporters,” the Press Secretary said
he “certainly corroborated it” with the reporter because
“that’s what I had been told, you know, that [the President]
was upset, he was agitated, about not being able to
go[.]” 101
In addition to the testimony above, the Committee has
reviewed hundreds of thousands of new Secret Service
documents, including many demonstrating that the Secret
Service had been informed of potential violence at the
Capitol before the Ellipse rally on January 6th. (These
documents were critical to our understanding of what the
Secret Service and White House knew about the threat to the
Capitol on January 6th.) The Committee has also more
recently conducted additional interviews with Engel and
Ornato, and has also interviewed the driver of the
Presidential vehicle.
Both Engel and the driver102 testified that, within 30
seconds of getting into the vehicle, the President asked if
he could travel to the Capitol.103 This again is directly
inconsistent with the account of events in Meadows’s book.
According to Engel, he told the President immediately that
the move wasn’t happening.104 The President was unhappy with
Engel’s response and began “pushing pretty hard to go.” 105
The President repeatedly asked why he could not go to the
Capitol.106 Engel replied that the Secret Service “didn’t
have any people at the Capitol” to provide the President
with appropriate security.107 The President responded
angrily, telling Engel and the driver “I’m the President and
I’ll decide where I get to go.” 108 He reassured Engel that
“it would essentially be fine and that the people there
[meaning the people who were marching from the Ellipse to
the Capitol at President Trump’s instruction] were [Trump]
supporters or something to that effect,” 109 According to
the Secret Service agent driving the vehicle, the President
was “animated and irritated” about not going to the
Capitol.110
According to Mr. Engel, he ultimately told the President
that they would “assess what our options were and wait until
we can get a plan in place before we went down there.” 111
We note that the driver’s account acknowledged President
Trump’s anger to a greater degree than either Engel’s
initial account in Spring 2022, or his more recent account
in November 2022. Engel did not characterize the exchange in
the vehicle the way Hutchinson described the account she
heard from Ornato, and indicated that he did not recall
President Trump gesturing toward him.112 Engel did not
recall being present when Ornato gave either Hutchinson or
the White House employee with national security
responsibilities an accounting of the events.113 The driver
testified that he did not recall seeing what President Trump
was doing and did not recall whether there was movement.114
The Select Committee has great respect for the men and women
of the Secret Service. That said, it is difficult to fully
reconcile the accounts of several of the witnesses who
provided information with what we heard from Engel and
Ornato.115 But the principal factual point here is clear and
undisputed: President Trump specifically and repeatedly
requested to be taken to the Capitol. He was insistent and
angry, and continued to push to travel to the Capitol even
after returning to the White House.
The motorcade didn’t disband upon arriving to the White
House, as they usually do. Instead, they were instructed to
stand by in case the President’s move to the Capitol did
indeed happen.116 The Select Committee received a document
from the Secret Service that reflects that at 1:25 p.m.,
“PPD IS ADVISING THAT [THE PRESIDENT] IS PLANNING ON HOLDING
AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE NEXT APPROXIMATE TWO HOURS, THEN
MOVING TO THE CAPITOL.” 117 “They had not made a decision
whether or not we were going to transport the President to
the Capitol,” Robinson was told.118
Engel testified that he went to Ornato’s office when he
returned to the West Wing in order to discuss a possible
move to the Capitol by President Trump.119 Given the
deteriorating security conditions at the Capitol, it was
quickly determined that they could not safely transport the
President there.120 The motorcade waited on West Executive
Drive approximately 40 minutes before finally receiving word
from the Secret Service that the move had been officially
nixed. Internal Secret Service communications bear this out:
Not until 1:55 p.m. did Engel notify other agents via email
that “[w]e are not doing an OTR to [the Capitol].” 121
7.4 “We’re Going to Try to Get the President to Put Out a
Statement”
Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the
President ran into a member of the White House staff and
asked whether he or she watched his speech on television.122
“Sir, they cut it off because they’re rioting down at the
Capitol,” the employee said.
The President asked what he or she meant by that.
“[T]hey’re rioting down there at the Capitol,” the employee
repeated.
“Oh really?” the President asked. “All right, let’s go
see.” 123
A photograph taken by the White House photographer—the last
one permitted until later in the day—captures the moment the
President heard the news from the employee at 1:21 p.m.124
By that time, if not sooner, he had been made aware of the
violent riot at the Capitol.
President Trump walked through the corridor from the Oval
Office into the Presidential Dining Room and sat down at the
table with the television remote and a Diet Coke close at
hand.125 For the rest of the afternoon—as his country faced
an hours-long attack—he hunkered down in or around the
dining room, watching television.126 He left only for a few
minutes—from 4:03 p.m. to 4:07 p.m.—to film a video in the
Rose Garden, only a few steps away, after hours of
arm-twisting.127 But otherwise, the President remained in
the dining room until 6:27 p.m., when he returned to his
private residence.128
What happened during the 187 minutes from 1:10 p.m. to 4:17
p.m., when President Trump finally told the rioters to go
home, is—from an official standpoint—undocumented.
For instance, the Presidential Daily Diary—the schedule that
tracks every meeting and phone call in which the President
partakes—is inexplicably blank between 1:21 p.m. and 4:03
p.m.129 When asked to explain the gap in record-keeping on
and around January 6th, White House officials in charge of
its maintenance provided no credible explanation, including:
“I don’t recall a specific reason.” 130
The men who spent most of the afternoon in that room with
the President, Mark Meadows and Dan Scavino, both refused to
comply with lawful subpoenas from the Select Committee.131
Others in the dining room appeared before the Select
Committee but cited executive privilege to avoid answering
questions about their direct communications with President
Trump.132 Others who worked just outside of the Oval Office,
like the President’s personal secretaries Molly Michael and
Austin Ferrer Piran Basauldo, claimed not to remember nearly
anything from one of the most memorable days in recent
American history.133
The White House photographer, Shealah Craighead, had been
granted access to photograph the President during his
January 6th speech, but once she got to the White House—and
it became clear that an attack was unfolding on the
Capitol’s steps—she was turned away.134
“The President [didn’t] want any photos,” she was told.135
Here’s what President Trump did during the 187 minutes
between the end of his speech and when he finally told
rioters to go home: For hours, he watched the attack from
his TV screen.136 His channel of choice was Fox News.137 He
issued a few tweets, some on his own inclination and some
only at the repeated behest of his daughter and other
trusted advisors.138 He made several phone calls, some to
his personal lawyer Rudolph Giuliani, some to Members of
Congress about continuing their objections to the electoral
certification, even though the attack was well underway.139
Here’s what President Trump did not do: He did not call any
relevant law enforcement agency to ensure they were working
to quell the violence. He did not call the Secretary of
Defense; he did not call the Attorney General; he did not
call the Secretary of Homeland Security.140 And for hours on
end, he refused the repeated requests—from nearly everyone
who talked to him—to simply tell the mob to go home.141
Throughout the afternoon, senior staff regularly entered the
room to give him updates on what was happening at the
Capitol.142 And, of course, President Trump used Twitter,
where information is shared on an instantaneous basis.
Shortly after President Trump entered the dining room, White
House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany swung by to “check in
with him” about the letter Vice President Pence released
around 1:00 p.m. announcing that he would not, in fact,
overturn the will of the voters.
The President, once again, brought up going to the
Capitol.143 McEnany recorded what he said in her notes,
certain of which she later produced to the Select Committee:
“POTUS wanted to walk to [sic] capital. Physically walk. He
said fine ride beast,” referring to the nickname for the
presidential vehicle. “Meadows said not safe enough[.]” 144
Meadows told Hutchinson at some point in the day that “the
President wasn’t happy that Bobby [Engel] didn’t pull it off
for him,” meaning the trip to the Capitol, “and that Mark
didn’t work hard enough to get the movement on the
books.” 145
Despite the turmoil just outside its walls, the proceedings
in the joint session—which had begun at 1:00 p.m.—were still
ongoing, and the President was watching them on the
television.146 He was eager to know which senators were
lodging objections on his behalf.147 “Back there and he
wants list of senators,” McEnany’s notes read. “Who [sic]
objecting to what. He’s calling them one by one.” 148
The Select Committee subpoenaed several Members of Congress
who reportedly spoke with President Trump during the
afternoon.149 None of them complied.150
Cellular records obtained by the Select Committee suggest
that President Trump was on the phone with his lawyer
Rudolph Giuliani at least twice during this period.
Giuliani’s phone connected with the White House switchboard
for 3 minutes and 53 seconds at 1:39 p.m. and again for more
than 8 minutes at 2:03 p.m.151 Between the two calls, at
1:49 p.m., President Trump tweeted a link to a video of his
speech from the Ellipse.152
Before 1:57 p.m., Herschmann phoned Senior Advisor to the
President Jared Kushner—who was on a plane travelling home
from overseas—advising him that “people are trying to break
into the Capitol” and that “this is getting pretty
ugly.” 153
“We’re going to see what we can do here,” Herschmann said.
“We’re going to try to get the President to put out a
statement.” 154
7.5 “He Doesn’t Want to Do Anything”
Throughout the afternoon, the President’s advisors tried to
get him to tell the mob to leave the Capitol, but to no
avail.
Ben Williamson, the White House Acting Director of
Communications, watched on the news as officers and rioters
pepper sprayed each other and crowds used bicycle barricades
to push against officers holding the line.155 He and Sarah
Matthews, the Deputy Press Secretary, devised a plan: He
would go to Meadows and she would go to McEnany to urge that
the President issue a statement.156 Williamson first texted
Meadows:
“Would recommend POTUS put out a tweet about respecting the
police over at the Capitol.” 157
Minutes later, around 2:05 p.m., Hutchinson found Meadows
seated in his office on the couch, absorbed by his cell
phone screen.158
“Are you watching the TV, chief?” she asked. He indicated he
was.
“Have you talked to the President?” she asked.
“No,” he replied. “He wants to be alone right now.” 159
Rioters broke into the west side of the Capitol building
around 2:13 p.m.160 Just a few minutes later, Hutchinson saw
Cipollone “barreling down the hallway” and—after looking at
Hutchinson and shaking his head—opened the door to Meadows’s
office unannounced.161 Meadows was right where she left him,
“still sitting on his phone.” 162
“The rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go
down and see the President now,” she heard Cipollone say.163
Cipollone would not confirm or deny any of this exchange,
citing executive privilege.164
“He doesn’t want to do anything, Pat,” Meadows said, peering
up from his phone.165
“Mark something needs to be done, or people are going to die
and the blood’s gonna be on your [fucking] hands,” Cipollone
said. “This is getting out of control. I’m going down
there.” 166
Meadows finally stood up from the couch and walked with
Cipollone toward the dining room to meet with the
President.167
7.6 “He Thinks Mike Deserves It”
At exactly 2:24 p.m., President Trump made his first public
statement during the attack on the Capitol by tweet. It read
nothing like the statement his advisors had envisioned. It
read:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have
been done to protect our Country and our Constitution,
giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts,
not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked
to previously certify. USA demands the truth!168
Minutes later, Meadows and Cipollone returned from their
talk with the President.169 No statement was forthcoming.
“Mark, we need to do something more. They’re literally
calling for the Vice President to be [fucking] hung,”
Hutchinson heard Cipollone say.170
“You heard him, Pat,” Meadows replied. “He thinks Mike
deserves it. He doesn’t think they’re doing anything
wrong.” 171
“This is [fucking] crazy. We need to be doing something
more,” Cipollone said.172
Cipollone told the Select Committee that “there needed to be
an immediate and forceful response, statement, public
statement, that people need to leave the Capitol now.” 173
He said he was “pretty clear” about his view in the White
House that day, and he made that view known as soon as he
became aware of the unrest.174 He would not comment on how
the President responded, or on this conversation with
Meadows, citing executive privilege.175 He did indicate that
everyone in the White House—except President Trump—agreed
that people needed to leave the Capitol:
Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people
to leave the Capitol?
Mr. Cipollone: On the staff?
Vice Chair Cheney: In the White House.
Mr. Cipollone: I can’t think of anybody on that day who
didn’t want people to get out of the Capitol once
the—particularly once the violence started. No. I mean—
Mr. Schiff: What about the President?
Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.
Mr. Cipollone: Well, she said the staff. So I answered.
Vice Chair Cheney: No. I said in the White House.
Mr. Cipollone: Oh, I’m sorry. I apologize. I thought you
said who else on the staff. [Pauses to confer with counsel]
Yeah. I can’t reveal communications. But obviously I think,
you know—yeah.176
Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
What the President did tweet—a broadside at his Vice
President—enlarged the target on Vice President Pence’s
back. A Secret Service agent in the Protective Intelligence
Division, tasked with monitoring threats against protectees
in part by scouring social media, told his colleagues the
tweet was “probably not going to be good for Pence.” 177
A second agent in reply noted that it had garnered “[o]ver
24K likes in under 2 mins.” 178
7.7 “I Guess They’re Just More Upset About the Election
Theft Than You Are”
Minutes after drawing increased attention to his besieged
Vice President, the President called newly elected Senator
Tommy Tuberville of Alabama at 2:26 p.m.179 He misdialed,
calling Senator Mike Lee of Utah instead, but one passed the
phone to the other in short order.180
President Trump wanted to talk objections to the electoral
count. But Senator Tuberville—along with every other elected
official trapped and surrounded in the building—had other
things on his mind.181
“I said, ‘Mr. President, they’ve taken the Vice President
out. They want me to get off the phone, I gotta go,’”
Senator Tuberville told reporters.182 “‘[W]e’re not doing
much work here right now.’” 183
In the next half hour, between 2:26 p.m. and 3:06 p.m.,
President Trump spoke with House Leader Kevin McCarthy.184
Leader McCarthy told the public in a live interview with CBS
News, while he and his colleagues were sheltering at a
secure location,185 that he was “very clear” in telling
President Trump “to talk to the nation to tell them to stop
this.” 186
Leader McCarthy later recounted his conversation to a number
of people, including Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler, a
Republican congresswoman from Washington State.187 “You have
got to get on TV, you’ve got to get on Twitter, you’ve got
to call these people off,” he said he told the President.188
“[These] aren’t my people, you know, these are—these are
Antifa,” President Trump insisted, against all evidence.189
“They’re your people. They literally just came through my
office windows, and my staff are running for cover. I mean,
they’re running for their lives. You need to call them off,”
Leader McCarthy told him.190
What President Trump said next was “chilling,” in
Representative Herrera Beutler’s words.191
“Well, Kevin, I guess they’re just more upset about the
election theft than you are,” the President said.192
The call then devolved into a swearing match.193
Mick Mulvaney, former Chief of Staff to President Trump, had
a similar call with Leader McCarthy in the days after the
attack. McCarthy told Mulvaney that he urged the President
to get the rioters to stop, and the President replied,
“Kevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this
than you are.” 194
Marc Short, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff, spoke with
Leader McCarthy later that afternoon.195 Leader McCarthy
told Short that he had spoken with President Trump and that
he was “frustrat[ed]” that the White House was “not taking
the circumstance as seriously as they should at that
moment.” 196 The administration was demonstrating a “lack of
response or lack of responsibility,” Leader McCarthy told
Short.197
At 2:49 p.m.—as the violence escalated—President Trump’s
speechwriter Gabriel Robert texted someone: “Potus im sure
is loving this.” 198
7.8 “Stay Peaceful!”
No one was getting through to the President.
So Herschmann went to Ivanka Trump’s office, hoping she
would come to the dining room and be “a calming influence”
on her father.199 Herschmann “just sort of barged in” and
told her to turn on the television.200 After taking in a few
of the violent scenes together, Herschmann and Ivanka Trump
left the room and walked to the dining room, where her
father was holed up.201
At 2:38 p.m., the President issued a tweet:202
Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They
are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!203
Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee that the President
“did not push back on [her] suggestion” to issue the tweet,
and that it was either she or President Trump himself who
suggested the last line, “Stay peaceful!” 204 She confirmed
there may have been some tweaking of the wording.205
McEnany, who was in the room at the time, wrote in her notes
that “I say add ‘we support PEACEFUL protest.’ Ivanka add
stay peaceful! Instead.” 206 To the Select Committee,
McEnany echoed Ivanka Trump that the President wasn’t
resistant in any way to putting out the message.207
Sarah Matthews testifies at a January 6th Select Committee
hearing.
Sarah Matthews testifies at a January 6th Select Committee
hearing.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
But in private, McEnany told a different story to her deputy
Sarah Matthews.
Testimony footage of former White House Press Secretary
Kayleigh McEnany is played during a January 6th Select
Committee hearing.
Testimony footage of former White House Press Secretary
Kayleigh McEnany is played during a January 6th Select
Committee hearing.
(Photo by Pool/Getty Images)
Back in the White House press office, Matthews told McEnany
that the tweet did not go far enough in condemning the
violence.208 McEnany—noting that other staffers in the room
were distracted—said “in a hushed tone . . . that the
President did not want to include any sort of mention of
peace in that tweet.” 209
That took “some convincing on their part,” McEnany said, and
“it wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase ‘Stay
peaceful!’ that he finally agreed to include it.” 210
Ivanka Trump repeatedly returned to the dining room to
counsel her father throughout the day. It has been reported
that each time Ivanka Trump “thought she had made headway”
with her father, Meadows would call her “to say the
[P]resident still needed more persuading”—a cycle that
repeated itself over “several hours” that afternoon.211
After one such trip, Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee
she went to her husband’s office next door because she
needed to “regroup” and collect herself.212
Several witnesses corroborated pieces of this account.
General Kellogg said he saw Ivanka Trump coming and going
from the dining room at least twice that afternoon.213
Hutchinson said that it was “several times.” 214 Once,
Ivanka Trump reportedly left her father with a look on her
face as if “[s]he had just had a tough conversation.” 215
Radford, Ivanka Trump’s Chief of Staff, saw that she was
“[v]isibly upset” but continued going “down there when
people were asking her to be down there and trying to get
action taken.” 216
Radford told the Select Committee that Ivanka Trump believed
that “[s]omething should be said or put out that was even
stronger.” 217
Hutchinson, too, recalled Ivanka Trump dropping by Meadows’s
office alongside Cipollone and talking about trying to
convince her father to say something “more direct than he
had wanted to at that time and throughout the
afternoon.” 218
“I remember her saying at various points,” Hutchinson said,
“she wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad to
tell them to go home peacefully, and she wanted to include
language that he necessarily wasn’t on board with at the
time.” 219
7.9 “The President Needs to Stop This ASAP”
President Trump’s 2:38 p.m. tweet did not condemn the
violence at the Capitol. It did not tell rioters to leave
the building.
In the minutes before the tweet, Fox News—on the President’s
screen—relayed that the Capitol was on lockdown;220 that
Capitol police officers were injured; that rioters were in
the building and “just feet from the House chamber.” 221 In
the minutes afterward, networks would report there was tear
gas in the Capitol, forcing Members of Congress to evacuate
in protective masks.222 At 2:39 p.m., Secret Service agents
reported that “[m]ore just got in.” 223
“I don’t know how they’re gonna retake the Capitol building
back at this point,” one agent wrote to others two minutes
later.224
At 2:44 p.m., a Capitol police officer shot a rioter named
Ashli Babbitt.225 A handwritten note—dashed off onto a White
House pocket card and preserved by the National
Archives—read: “1x civilian gunshot wound to chest @ door of
House cha[m]ber.” 226 One White House employee saw the note
on the dining table in front of President Trump.227
A barrage of text messages inundated Meadows’s phone with a
consistent plea.228 Everyone from conservative media
personalities to Republican allies in Congress—and even the
President’s own family—urged the President to do more:
Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, 2:28 p.m.: “Mark I
was just told there is an active shooter on the first floor
of the Capitol Please tell the President to calm people[.]
This isn’t the way to solve anything.” 229
Laura Ingraham, 2:32 p.m.: “Hey Mark, The [sic] president
needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home.” “This is
hurting all of us.” “He is destroying his legacy and playing
into every stereotype . . . we lose all credibility against
the BLM/Antifa crowd if things go South.” “You can tell him
I said this.” 230
Mick Mulvaney, 2:35 p.m.: “Mark: he needs to stop this, now.
Can I do anything to help?” 231
Representative Barry Loudermilk, 2:44 p.m.: “It’s really bad
up here on the hill.” “They have breached the Capitol.” 232
At 2:48 p.m., Meadows responded: “POTUS is engaging.” 233 At
2:49 p.m., Loudermilk responded: “Thanks. This doesn’t help
our cause.” 234
Representative William Timmons, 2:46 p.m.: “The president
needs to stop this ASAP.” 235 At 2:49 p.m., Meadows
responded: “We are doing it.” 236
Donald Trump, Jr., 2:53 p.m.: “He’s got to condem [sic] this
shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not
enough.” 237 Meadows responded: “I am pushing it hard. I
agree.” 238 Later, Trump, Jr., continued: “This his [sic]
one you go to the mattresses on. They will try to fuck his
entire legacy on this if it gets worse.” 239
White House staff discussed issuing yet another, stronger
statement to address the ongoing—and escalating—violence.
Around 3:00 p.m., one proposal was written in block capital
letters on a pocket card from the chief of staff’s office:
ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT PROPER
AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY[.]240
The handwriting appears to have been scrawled quickly and
somewhat messily. Hutchinson recalled Meadows returning from
the dining room with the note in hand and placing it on her
desk.241 The word “illegally” had been newly crossed out.242
But there would be no further action, Meadows told her.243
At 3:13 p.m., 35 minutes after his last tweet, the President
issued another tweet. Rather than coming out with a stronger
statement, the 3:13 p.m. tweet largely parroted the one
preceding it:
I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain
peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law &
Order—respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue.
Thank you!244
Ivanka Trump—who was in the room when her father published
the message—told the Select Committee that “the gravity of
the situation” made her feel “that it would be helpful to
tweet again.” 245 “The [earlier] tweet didn’t stop the
violence,” Herschmann said.246
This tweet—like the last one—didn’t tell the rioters to go
home. It suggested that they “remain” at the Capitol, albeit
peacefully.
7.10 “We Love You. You’re Very Special”
Guns are drawn in the House Chamber on January 6th as
rioters attempt to break in.
Guns are drawn in the House Chamber on January 6th as
rioters attempt to break in.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
The President’s tweets were not tamping down on the
violence, and White House staff knew it.247 By 3:17 p.m.,
Fox News was reporting gunshots on Capitol Hill. Law
enforcement officers could be seen in the House chamber,
pointing guns over the barricaded door: The chyron blared
“Guns Drawn on House Floor.” 248 Between 3:29 p.m. and 3:42
p.m., the network was flashing images of a protestor in the
presiding officer’s chair, right where Vice President Pence
had been sitting 90 minutes earlier.249 Other images showed
Members of Congress trapped in the House gallery, crouching
below the balcony for cover.250
Allies continued to text Meadows, begging the President to
order the mob to go home and indicating that it was time the
American people hear from the President directly:
Unknown, 3:04 p.m.: “Are you with potus right now? Hearing
he is in the dining room watching this on TV . . .” “Is he
going to say anything to de-escalate apart from that
Tweet?” 251
Reince Priebus, 3:09 p.m.: “TELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!” 252
Unknown, 3:13 p.m.: “POTUS should go on air and defuse this.
Extremely important.” 253
Alyssa Farah, 3:13 p.m.: “Potus has to come out firmly and
tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed
. . .” 254
Representative Chip Roy, 3:25 p.m.: “Fix this now.” 255
Meadows responded: “We are.” 256
Sean Hannity (Fox News), 3:31 p.m.: “Can he make a
statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave
the capital [sic].” 257 Meadows responded: “On it.” 258
Katrina Pierson, 3:40 p.m.: “Note: I was able to keep the
crazies off the stage. I stripped all branding of those
nutty groups and removed videos of all of the psychos. Glad
it [sic] fought it.” 259
Unknown, 3:42 p.m.: “Pls have POTUS call this off at the
Capitol. Urge rioters to disperse. I pray to you.” 260
Unknown, 3:57 p.m.: “Is he coming out?” “He has to
right?” 261
Brian Kilmeade, 3:58 p.m. (Fox News): “Please get him on tv.
Destroying every thing you guys have accomplished.” 262
Donald Trump, Jr., 4:05 p.m.: “We need an oval address. He
has to lead now. It’s gone too far and gotten out of
hand.” 263
At any moment in the afternoon, it would have been easy for
President Trump to get before cameras and call off the
attack. The White House Press Briefing Room is just down the
hallway from the Oval Office, past the Cabinet Room and
around the corner to the right. It would have taken less
than 60 seconds for the President to get there.264 The
space, moreover, is outfitted with cameras that are
constantly “hot,” meaning that they are on and ready to go
live at a moment’s notice.265 The White House press corps is
also situated in the West Wing, right by the briefing
room.266 The whole affair could have been assembled in
minutes.267
However, it was not until nearly 3 hours after the violence
began that President Trump finally agreed to tell the mob to
go home.268
The Presidential Daily Diary notes that President Trump left
the dining room to shoot the video at 4:03 p.m.269 By this
point—per Fox News coverage playing continually in the
dining room—more law enforcement officers had arrived at the
Capitol to resist the violent mob.270
The video shoot took place in the Rose Garden, the outdoor
space that borders the Oval Office and the West Wing.271 The
setup was not ornate, just a camera and a microphone. Luna
made sure that the background and lighting looked good, and
that President Trump’s hair and tie were in place.272
President Trump delivered his remarks in one take, more or
less, although he stopped and restarted at one point.273 In
all, the video took less than 4 minutes to shoot, and the
President was back in the dining room by 4:07 p.m.274
President Trump huddles with aides, watching a completed
take of a video through the monitor of the video camera.
President Trump huddles with aides, watching a completed
take of a video through the monitor of the video camera.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National
Archives and Records Administration)
“I would stick to this script . . . ,” McEnany told
President Trump before he stepped out to film.275
He didn’t.
Kushner and others had drafted a statement, but President
Trump spoke entirely off the cuff.276 Here’s what he said:
I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election
that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election and
everyone knows it, especially the other side. But you have
to go home now. We have to have peace. We have to have law
and order. We have to respect our great people in law and
order. We don’t want anybody hurt. It’s a very tough period
of time. There’s never been a time like this where such a
thing happened where they could take it away from all of us,
from me, from you, from our country. This was a fraudulent
election. But we can’t play into the hands of these people.
We have to have peace. So go home, we love you. You’re very
special. You’ve seen what happens. You see the way others
are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you
feel, but go home and go home in peace.277
A photo obtained from the National Archives shows President
Trump and Herschmann huddled next to each other, watching a
completed take through the monitor on the video camera.278
“There needs to be a more direct statement” telling the
rioters to leave the Capitol, Luna heard Herschmann—yet
again—tell the President.279 Herschmann testified that he
did not recall this exchange.280
But according to Luna, President Trump rejected the note.
“These people are in pain,” he said in reply.281
Down at the Capitol, the video began streaming onto rioters’
phones, and by all accounts including video footage taken by
other rioters, they listened to President Trump’s command.
“Donald Trump has asked everybody to go home,” one rioter
shouted as he “deliver[ed] the President’s message.” “That’s
our order,” another rioter responded. Others watching the
video responded: “He says, go home.” 282
The crowd afterward began to disperse.283 The video made
clear what had been evident to many, including those closest
to him: The President could have called off the rioters far
earlier and at any point that day.284 But he chose not to do
so.285
It was not until it was obvious that the riot would fail to
stop the certification of the vote that the President
finally relented and released a video statement made public
at 4:17 p.m.286
7.11 “Remember This Day Forever!”
After leaving the Rose Garden, the President returned to the
dining room. At 6:01 p.m., he issued another tweet, the last
of the day:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred
landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously
stripped away from great patriots who have been badly &
unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace.
Remember this day forever!287
He retired to his residence for the evening at 6:27 p.m.288
A White House photographer captured the President walking
back to the residence with an employee in tow, carrying
personal items President Trump wished to bring home with him
for the night.289 In the employee’s hands are the gloves the
President was wearing while addressing the crowd at the
Ellipse.290
The President had one parting comment to the employee—the
thing that was evidently occupying his mind even after an
afternoon of violence—before he retired to his home.
“Mike Pence let me down,” the President concluded.291
7.12 President Trump Still Sought to Delay the Joint Session
Even after President Trump finally told the rioters to go
home, he and his lead attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, continued
to seek to delay the joint session of Congress.
Giuliani began frantically calling the White House line the
very minute that the President’s video went up on
Twitter.292 Failing to get through, he called back, once
every minute—4:17 p.m., 4:18 p.m., 4:19 p.m., 4:20 p.m.293
He managed to get through, briefly, to Mark Meadows at 4:21
p.m., and then kept calling the White House line: at 4:22
p.m., three times on two different phones at 4:23 p.m., 4:24
p.m., and once more at 5:05 p.m.294 He finally managed to
speak with President Trump at 5:07 p.m., and the two spoke
for almost 12 minutes.295
After he spoke with President Trump, Giuliani’s phone calls
went nearly without fail to Members of Congress: Senator
Marsha Blackburn, and then Senator Mike Lee.296 He made
three calls to Senator Bill Hagerty, then two to
Representative Jim Jordan.297 He called Senator Lindsey
Graham,298 Senator Josh Hawley,299 and Senator Ted Cruz.300
Giuliani had two calls with Senator Dan Sullivan over the
course of the evening.301 There were another three calls to
Representative Jordan, none of which connected.302 After
8:06 p.m., when the joint session resumed, the calls to
Members of Congress finally stopped.303 Shortly afterward,
at 8:39 p.m., Giuliani had one final call of 9 minutes with
the President.304
When asked about these calls during his deposition before
the Select Committee, Giuliani initially refused to answer.
Giuliani insisted his calls to Members of Congress—none of
whom were his client—were all attorney-client privileged.305
But Giuliani eventually relented.
“I was probably calling to see any—if anything could be
done,” he said. “About the vote—the vote.” 306
We know definitively what Giuliani was up to because he left
a voice message for Senator Tuberville—inadvertently on
Senator Lee’s phone—recording his request.307 He wanted for
“you, our Republican friends to try to just slow it down,”
referring to the electoral count, and delay the joint
session.308 Here are his own words:
The only strategy we can follow is to object to numerous
States and raise issues so that we get ourselves into
tomorrow—ideally until the end of tomorrow. So if you could
object to every State and, along with a congressman, get a
hearing for every State, I know we would delay you a lot,
but it would give us the opportunity to get the legislators
who are very, very close to pulling their vote.309
The President, too, was at home, but he remained focused on
his goal. Between 6:54 p.m. and 11:23 p.m., he spoke with 13
people, some more than once.310 Of the 13, six ignored or
expressly refused to comply with Select Committee requests
for their testimony.311 Two agreed to appear but refused to
answer questions about their phone calls with the President,
citing executive privilege.312 Two more refused to answer
questions, claiming attorney-client privilege.313
Mike Pence reopens the joint session of Congress and resumes
counting electoral votes.
Mike Pence reopens the joint session of Congress and resumes
counting electoral votes.
(Photo by Will McNamee/Getty Images)
Of the 13, five were President Trump’s attorneys or lawyers
who worked with him on efforts to reverse the outcome of the
election. With one exception, each of these calls took place
before 8:06 p.m., when Vice President Pence reopened the
joint session of Congress and resumed counting the electoral
votes.314 The President spoke with White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone for 7 minutes at 7:01 p.m.315 He spoke with Kurt
Olsen and Mark Martin, lawyers who both advised him on the
Vice President’s role in the joint session:316 He spoke with
Martin for 9 minutes at 7:30 p.m., and Olsen twice, for 11
minutes at 7:17 p.m. and for another 10 minutes at 7:40
p.m.317 He spoke with Cleta Mitchell, the lawyer leading his
election challenges in Georgia, for 2 minutes at 7:53
p.m.318 The President spoke with Herschmann for 5 minutes at
10:50 p.m.319
Another five of the people who spoke with President Trump
that night were employees or outside advisors who counseled
him on communications issues. These calls, by contrast,
predominantly took place after the joint session resumed.320
He spoke with his communications director, Scavino, twice:
for 7 minutes at 7:08 p.m. and for 15 minutes at 9:55
p.m.321 He spoke with McEnany for 11 minutes at 9:42 p.m.322
He took calls from Steve Bannon, for 7 minutes at 10:19
p.m., and Sean Hannity, for 8 minutes at 11:08 p.m.323
At 9:23 p.m., President Trump spoke with Jason Miller, his
Campaign Communications Director, for 18 minutes.324
Of his own initiative, Miller had drafted a statement for
the President assuring the nation that the transfer of
power—despite the day’s events—would, indeed, take place.325
On their call, the President pushed back on the phrasing.
The President wanted the statement to promise a “peaceful
transition” of power, rather than just an “orderly” one.326
Miller rejected the change and told him why rather bluntly.
“[T]hat ship’s kind of already sailed,” he said, “so we’re
going to say ‘orderly transition.’” 327
7.13 He “Just Didn’t Want to Talk About It Anymore”
The President did not, by any account, express grief or
regret for what happened at the Capitol. Neither did he
appear to grasp the gravity of what he had set in motion.
In his last phone call of the night, the President spoke
with Johnny McEntee, his Director of Personnel.328
“[T]his is a crazy day,” the President told him. McEntee
said his tone was one of “[l]ike, wow, can you believe this
shit . . .?” 329
Did he express sadness over the violence visited upon the
Capitol?
“No,” McEntee said. “I mean, I think he was shocked by, you
know, it getting a little out of control, but I don’t
remember sadness, specifically.” 330
President Trump didn’t make any other phone calls for the
rest of the night.331 The President didn’t call Vice
President Pence. In fact, President Trump never called to
check on his Vice President’s safety that day. He didn’t
call the heads of any of the Federal law enforcement
agencies. He didn’t call the leadership—neither Republican
nor Democrat—of the legislative branch of government that
had just been overrun by a mob.332
Only two days after the riot, by January 8th, the President
was over the whole thing.
He “just didn’t want to talk about it anymore,” he told his
press aides. “[H]e was tired of talking about it.” 333
Ivanka Trump claimed to the Select Committee that her father
was “disappointed and surprised” by the attack, but she
could not name a specific instance of him expressly saying
it.
“He—I just felt that,” she said. “I know him really
well.” 334
Here’s what she could definitively say:
Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed to you any sentiment
that he did or did not do the right thing in how he
responded on the day of the 6th?
Ms. Trump: No.
Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed any sentiment about
something that he wished he had done on the day of the 6th?
Ms. Trump: No.
Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about the
people who were injured or who died that day?
Ms. Trump: No.
Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about
whether he should or should not continue to talk about the
2020 Presidential election after the events on the 6th?
Ms. Trump: No.335
7.14 President Trump’s “Rhetoric Killed Someone”
The President may not have expressed regret over his
behavior, but some of his most loyal supporters made the
connection between his words and the violence.
A member of the speechwriting team, Patrick MacDonnell,
conceded the next day in a text that “maybe the rhetoric
could have been better.” 336 As the riot was in full
throttle, even steadfast supporter Ali Alexander of “Stop
the Steal” texted, “POTUS is not ignorant of what his words
will do.” 337
“We all look like domestic terrorists now,” Hope Hicks
texted Julie Radford.338
Separately, Hicks texted Herschmann, “So predictable and so
sad.”
“I know,” he replied. “Tragic.”
“I’m so upset. Everything we worked for wiped away,” she
continued.
“I agree. Totally self-inflicted,” he wrote.339
Brad Parscale, Trump’s Former Campaign Manager, texted
Katrina Pierson at 7:21 p.m. on January 6th, saying the
day’s events were the result of a “sitting president asking
for civil war.” 340
“This week I feel guilty for helping him win . . . a woman
is dead,” Parscale added.
“You do realize this was going to happen,” Pierson answered.
“Yeah. If I was trump [sic] and knew my rhetoric killed
someone,” he said.
“It wasn’t the rhetoric,” she said.
Parscale’s reply: “Yes it was.” 341
ENDNOTES
1. As explained in Chapter 8, the Proud Boys and other
extremists initiated the attack shortly before the joint
session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m. The
rioters who streamed down Pennsylvania to the U.S. Capitol
from the Ellipse then provided crucial momentum for the
attack.
2. “Manual for Courts-Martial United States,” Department of
Defense, (2019), at 334, available at
https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope
Hicks, (October 25, 2022), pp. 108-110; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production),
SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope
Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).
10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg
(archived).
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39–41.
12. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925 (January 6,
2021, Donald Trump Jr. text message to Mark Meadows at 2:53
p.m. ET).
13. At 3:13 p.m., President Trump tweeted: “I am asking for
everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No
violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect
the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!”
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
3:13 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg
(archived).
14. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
16. “New Video of Capitol Rioter: ‘Trump is Still Our
President,’” CNN Business, at 0:37, Feb. 6, 2021, available
at
https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2021/02/06/qanon-capitol-rioter-video-trump-still-president-sot-nr-vpx.cnn.
17. Trial Exhibit 6732 (1.S.159.1165-67, 84), United States
v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C Nov. 1, 2022).
Vallejo was manning the quick reaction force at a hotel in
Arlington, Virginia, awaiting word to bring in a cache of
weaponry; he was not at the Capitol on January 6th. Trial
Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (Vallejo messaged his group in the
afternoon “QRF standing by at hotel. Just say the word”);
Trial Transcript at 2728, United States v. Rhodes et al.,
No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2022) (Oath Keeper Terry
Cummings testified that “I had not seen that many weapons in
one location since I was in the military” when he arrived at
the Arlington hotel).
18. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to
Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
19. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to
Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
20. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 6:01 ET, available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-6-2021
(archived).
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 125.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), p. 157.
23. Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardon, Government Apology
to Capitol Rioters if Elected,” Washington Post, (Sept. 1,
2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
24. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 8:06 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Sleepy+Eyes+Chuck+Todd+is+so+happy%22
(archived).
25. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22All+Mike+Pence+has+to+do+is%22
(archived).
26. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1 (archived).
27. Documents with file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January
6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at
8:23 a.m. ET).
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January
6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at
8:23 a.m. ET). The Select Committee issued subpoenas to
Bannon, Olson, and Giuliani in order to learn more about
these telephone conversations, among other things. Bannon
refused to comply with his subpoena, leading to his referral
and ultimate conviction for criminal contempt of Congress.
Olson sued to block the Select Committee from enforcing his
subpoena. Giuliani spoke with the Select Committee but
asserted attorney-client privilege with respect to all of
his telephone conversations with President Trump on January
6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 198.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January
6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at
9:02 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc
Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 12.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller,
(Apr. 14, 2022), p. 145.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross
Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production),
RW_0002633 (Jan. 4, 2021, email at 10:00 p.m. from Ross
Worthington to Patrick MacDonnell asking for research
related to the January 6th speech).
32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–RW_0002351
(Jan. 6, 2021, Stephen Miller emails to Ross Worthington,
Vincent Haley and Robert Gabriel, Jr. at 10:22 and 10:23
a.m. ET, attaching draft speech).
33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States
Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–2344 (Jan.
6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington,
Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching
draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States
Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–2343 (Jan.
6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington,
Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching
draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross
Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 164. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (April 12, 2022), pp.
88–89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Sarah Miller, (April 14, 2022), p. 148.
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007430_0001
(Jan. 6, 2021, Ross Worthington email to Vincent M. Haley at
10:49 a.m. ET).
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller,
(Apr. 14, 2022), p. 154.
38. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
9:00 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+just+happened+to+find%22
(archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan.
6, 2021 9:15 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+states+want+to+redo%22
(archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan.
6, 2021 9:16 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22even+Mexico%22
(archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan.
6, 2021 10:44 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22these+scoundrels+are+only+toying%22
(archived).
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the Capitol, (National
Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6, 2021, Schedule
marked private with handwritten notes at 11:22 a.m. ET);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr.,
(Dec. 14, 2021) pp. 90–93; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2021), p. 126.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 48–49; see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House
Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 22 (“I could just tell in his
voice when he was talking to the Vice President that he was
disappointed and frustrated.”).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 4.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford,
(May 24, 2020), p. 18.
43. Compare Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January
6, 2021, schedule with handwritten notes about the meeting);
with Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000100198
(communication noting “Mogul” en route to the Ellipse at
11:39 a.m.).
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg,
Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 93.
45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P_R000007558_0001
(Jan. 6, 2021, Stephen Miller email to Robert Gabriel Jr.).
46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001
(Jan. 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel Jr. email to Ross Worthington
at 11:33 a.m. ET).
47. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P_R000007531_0001
(Jan. 6, 2021, Ross Worthington email to Robert Gabriel Jr.
at 11:34 a.m. ET).
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley,
(Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95.
49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States
Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341–2343
(January 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross
Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS,
attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and
comments).
50. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent
Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95; Document on file with the
Select Committee (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007557_0001, 076P-R000007557_0034,
076P-R000002896_00001, 076P-R000002896_00025,
076P-R000002984_0001, 076P-R000002984_00304 (various drafts,
including teleprompter inputs, of the speech).
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 126.
52. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000286 (January
6, 2021, note from Nicholas Luna to President Trump).
53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000111236
(January. 6, 2021, Email Re: CSD Activity Log #2 at 2:49
p.m. ET).
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87–88; Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000005179_0001–0002 (January 6, 2021
email reporting on the status of people going through the
magnetometers and noting “[s]everal thousand on the mall
watching but not in line.”).
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
56. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069,
(January 6, 2021, Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony
Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 15–16; see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (“[W]e
were standing towards the front of the tent with the TVs
really close to where he would walk out to go on to the
stage. The—these conversations happened two to three minutes
before he took the stage that morning”).
58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 11:55 a.m.
ET).
59. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript
January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6
(time-stamping the speech).
60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069
(January 6, 2021, Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony
Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000002879_00001 (“Save America March” speech early
draft); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross
Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 157.
63. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of
Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
64. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript
January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6
(timestamping the speech).
65. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript
January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6
(time-stamping the speech); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Alex Holder Production) Video
file Clip 45DAY32CAMB0050.mov at 3:10–3:40 (capturing ”fight
for Trump” chants during Donald Trump, Jr.’s speech); Lena
V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou,
“What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, at 12:01 pm at 3:33 and at 12:05 pm at 0:30
(Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/
(capturing “fight for Trump” chants droning out the
President after he told the crowd “we will not let them
silence your voices”); FORMER WAGIE, “FULL FOOTAGE: Patriots
STORM U.S. Capitol,” YouTube, at 59:00, Jan. 6, 2021, posted
Jan. 8, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNFcdpZdkh0.
66. Brian Naylor, “Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of
Impeachment Trial,” NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. But see
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 129 (“It wasn’t—he didn’t
give me an impressions that he was frustrated or angry at
the prospect of what the President had said on the stage. It
was more of him trying to rush to get insight on what our
plans were and wanted to have insight and be read in on that
in case we had been planning to go up to the Capitol.”).
68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp.128–29; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th .
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000176702.
72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001005-1026
(January 6, 2021, National Security Council staff chat
logs); See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 47
(discussing clearing a route to the Capitol for “Mogul”).
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Security Official , (July 11, 2022), p. 45.
76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January
6, 2021, email to Robert Engel at 1:19 p.m. ET). Despite the
fact that the prospect of an OTR to the Capitol was raised
at the highest levels within the Secret Service, some of its
highest-ranking agents insisted to the Select Committee that
they did not recall any such discussions on the day of
January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4. 2022), p. 77. When presented with
his text messages with Cassidy Hutchinson in which she
referred to an “OTR to Capitol,” Tony Ornato insisted that
he didn’t “recall ever talking about this with her.” Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Anthony
Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 62.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 117.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257 (January
6, 2021, Presidential Daily Diary).
80. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press
Secretary,” (October 31, 2022), pp. 49–51 (the word
“furious” was “consistent with what was described to me that
occurred—you know, agitated, furious, upset, angry, whatever
adjective”).
81. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief, (St. Petersburg: All
Seasons Press, 2021), at p. 250 (“When he got offstage,
President Trump let me know that he had been speaking
metaphorically about the walk to the Capitol. . . . It was
clear the whole time that he didn’t actually intent to walk
down Pennsylvania Avenue with the crowd.”).
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert
Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 158–62.
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 160.
86. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview
of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 5–8.
87. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max
Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 90; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p.
71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022) p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022)
pp. 35–36.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 6–7.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee with National Security Responsibilities,
(July 19, 2022), pp. 69–71.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee with National Security Responsibilities,
(July 19, 2022), p. 71.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143–44, 147–48.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp.
92–93.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee with National Security Responsibilities (July
19, 2022), p. 73 (“In the days following that, I do
remember, you know, again, hearing again how angry the
President was when, you know, they were in the limo.”)
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (Sep. 14, 2022), pp. 34, 36, 37–38, 55.
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18, 23.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 4, 2022), pp.
99–100.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,”
(Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee “Press Secretary,”
(Oct. 31, 2022), p. 50; see also Carol Leonnig
(@CarolLeonnig), Twitter, June 28, 2022 7:46 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/CarolLeonnig/status/1541931078184845312.
The press secretary confirmed that he or she confirmed this
information to the reporter because “that’s what I had been
told.” “[Engel] did indicate—you know, kind of outlined . .
. that the President did want to go to the Capitol, and Mr.
Engel advised that we cannot go,” the press secretary
testified. “And you know, [President Trump] was agitated,
but Mr. Engel advised that—you know, it was kind of a
non-issue. It was agitated verbally, and they proceeded to
the White House.” Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of United States Secret Service Employee “Press
Secretary,” (Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.
102. The Select Committee has agreed not to name the Secret
Service agent who was driving the vehicle to protect his
privacy. We will refer to him in this report as “the
driver.”
103. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100–01.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100–01.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 79.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.
This recollection of the President’s phrasing seems very
similar to Hutchinson’s testimony about President Trump’s
statement before he took the stage at the Ellipse: “I’m the
President. Take the F’ing mags away. They’re not here to
hurt me.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11–12.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp.
78, 92.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p.
78.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 102. Mr. Engel also did not
recall another occasion where testimony indicates that the
incident in the presidential vehicle was mentioned. Mr.
Engel’s counsel has asked the Committee not to make certain
evidence relating to that occasion public.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143–44, 147–48.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Secret Service Employee “Driver,” (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 80.
115. The Justice Department will have all of the relevant
information and can make decisions about whether and how to
proceed based upon this evidence.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.
117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 at p. 4
(January 6, 2021, PID update at 1:25 p.m.).
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18–19.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert
Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 125.
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January
6 2021, email from Robert Engel at 1:55 p.m.).
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file
40a8_hi_j0087_0bea.
125. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 27–28.
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump). See also
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), P-R000028 (Memorandum from
White House Diarist confirming that “[t]he Oval Log for
January 6, 2021 was not received”).
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael,
(Mar. 24, 2022), p 29 (“Why did that change, that you were
not taking any records?” “I don’t recall a specific
reason.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 111–12 (attributing
the lack of recordkeeping to Michael’s absence in the White
House, though she was present in the Outer Oval during the
afternoon); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Austin
Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 86.
131. H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the
House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in
Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena
Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th
Cong., 1st Ssess. (2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf;
H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino,
Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a
Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th
Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
132. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 155–57.
133. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly
Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 136 (“The phones were ringing.
A lot was happening. I don’t recall.”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr.
8, 2022), pp. 109–10 (“I don’t remember where I was that
afternoon.” “Do you remember being at the White House that
afternoon, even if you don’t remember where exactly you were
in the White House?” “No, I do not.” “Do you remember being
home, wherever home is for you, on the afternoon of January
6th, as opposed to being at the White House?” “No, I don’t.”
“So you don’t remember whether you were at home or at the
White House in the afternoon of January 6th, 2021?” “Again,
that day was very blurry.”).
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah
Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46.
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah
Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46. It is the standard
practice of the White House photographers to cover the
President from the moment he steps out of the residence
until he returns there at the end of the day. Id. at 7.
Craighead pushed back, telling Michael that the White House
would want to document the day for historical purposes, but
Michael did not relent. Id. at p. 28.
136. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith
Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 115 (“Well, I saw the
President watching TV.”).
137. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 23.
138. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (“I recall
walking in and saying, ‘You have to put out a strong
statement condemning violence and asking for peace to be
restored.”).
139. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022); See also Jonathan
Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York:
Dutton, 2021), p. 287.
140. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8,
2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith
Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 129.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 169–70.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 159–60.
144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724 (Jan.
6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany notes).
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724 (Jan.
6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany notes).
149. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to
Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim
Jordan, (May 12, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to
Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim
Jordan, (May 12, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf.
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
152. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2020 1:49 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FizItBeFE6G%22
(archived).
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 144.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 145.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Benjamin
Williamson, (Jan. 25, 2022) p. 60. Live feeds of the Capitol
began showing pepper spray exchanges between officers and
rioters around 1:29 p.m. See Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production),
CTRL0000094153; Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the Attack on the United States Capitol
(Secret Service Production), CTRL0000094192; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
40:00, available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah
Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 36–37.
157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Benjamin Williamson Production), CTRL0000034784
(Jan. 6, 2021, Benjamin Williamson text message to Mark
Meadows at 2:02 p.m. EST); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Benjamin Williamson (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24 (“I saw that he was
sitting on his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning,
where he was just kind of scrolling and typing.”).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24.
160. The Select Committee’s review of U.S. Capitol Police
surveillance footage showed that Proud Boy Dominic Pezzola
smashed a Senate Wing window at 2:13 p.m. and rioters
entered through that window, as well as an adjacent door,
shortly thereafter. See also Third Superseding Indictment at
21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola
“used [a] riot shield … to break a window of the Capitol” at
“2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first members of the mob entered
the Capitol through this broken window”); 167 Cong. Rec.
S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 25. Cipollone confirmed that
he first went to the dining room when he saw that “people
had breached the Capitol, they had gotten into the Capitol.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26. Cipollone did not
elaborate but testified generally that he was “very upset
about what was happening” at the Capitol and wanted “action
to be taken related to that.” Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat”
Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.
168. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Mike+Pence+didn%E2%80%99t+have+%22
(archived).
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. President Trump himself
has defended publicly the rioters who chanted “Hang Mike
Pence!” In an interview, journalist Jonathan Karl asked
President Trump about the chants. “Well, the people were
very angry,” he responded. The President continued: “Because
it’s common sense . . . . How can you—if you know a vote is
fraudulent, how can you pass a fraudulent vote to Congress?
How can you do it?” Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act
of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), p. 340.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. Hutchinson recalled one
other thing that Meadows said, referring to the tweet
attacking Vice President Pence: “[T]his is the best we’re
going to get for now.” Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued
Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 17.
Hutchinson believes that this conversation took place after
the 2:24 p.m. tweet, but the context suggests that it may
have taken place after the 2:38 p.m. or 3:13 p.m. tweets.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.
175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:29:45–1:31:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095185.
178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095247.
179. Lauren Fox and Clare Foran, “GOP Sen. Mike Lee Hands
Over Phone Records to House Impeachment Managers,” CNN,
(Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/13/politics/mike-lee-phone-records-impeachment-trial/index.html.
180. Mike Lillis, “Tuberville Defends Account of Trump Call
During Capitol Riot,” The Hill, (Feb. 12, 2021), available
at
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/538704-tuberville-defends-account-of-trump-call-during-capitol-riot/.
Sen. Tuberville stated publicly that the originating number
was identified as “White House” on Sen. Lee’s phone,
suggesting that the call came through the White House
Switchboard. Id.
181. Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump
Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p. 287.
182. Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump
Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p. 287.
183. Eddie Burkhalter, “Tuberville Says He Attended Jan. 5
Fundraiser at Trump’s Washington Hotel,” Alabama Political
Reporter, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at
https://www.alreporter.com/2021/02/19/tuberville-says-he-attended-jan-5-fundraiser-at-trumps-washington-hotel/.
184. The call likely happened after the evacuation of the
House chamber starting at approximately 2:38 p.m., and Rep.
McCarthy spoke about it to CBS News’s Norah O’Donnell by
phone between approximately 3:00 to 3:15 p.m. CBS News,
“House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: I Completely Condemn
the Violence in the Capitol,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU.
Molly Michael testified that she recalls receiving the
incoming call from Leader McCarthy on Dan Scavino’s landline
and transferring it to a landline in the dining room. She
does not recall when the call took place, nor did she hear
anything about what was discussed. Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp.
131–32.
185. “House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: ‘I Completely
Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,’” CBS News, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x.
186. “House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: ‘I Completely
Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,’” CBS News, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x.
187. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
188. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
189. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
190. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
191. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
192. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
193. Tommy Christopher, “WATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of
Trump’s Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off
Capitol Rioters,” Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John
Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short,
(Jan. 26, 2022), p. 47.
198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002307 (Jan. 6,
2021, Gabriel Roberts text message at 2:49 p.m.).
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 72.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 68; see also Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68–69.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 70.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 69 (“And she was in there for
a few minutes, and then came out and he had issued a
tweet.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (“Within, I believe,
a few minutes he had issued that—he put out that tweet, a
version of that tweet.”).
203. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22please+support+our%22
(archived).
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 87–89.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 88.
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724,
(January 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany Notes); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p.
185.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 88–89; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p.
185.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
211. Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, I Alone Can Fix It:
Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year (New York:
Penguin, 2021), p. 474.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 91.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg,
Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p 141.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 170.
215. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, Peril, (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2021), p. 248.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford,
(May 24, 2022), p. 32.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford,
(May 24, 2022), p. 30.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 37; Hutchinson recalls that
Meadows, Herschmann, Ivanka Trump, and others would come and
go from the Chief of Staff’s office at intervals throughout
the afternoon. “I don’t know if it was for a breather or to
have a conversation away from the dining room,” she said.
Id., at 31.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 38.
220. Fox News, “U.S. Capitol on Lockdown as Protests
Threaten Security,” YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFWGBnJ0rQA.
221. Fox News, “Breaking News: Protestors Now inside U.S.
Capitol,” YouTube, at 2:40, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.fox29.com/video/887421.
222. Fox News, “Pro-Trump Protestors Storm U.S. Capitol,”
YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVPSYr-xG6s.
223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095389.
224. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095393 (Jan. 6,
2021, text between Secret Service agents at 2:41 p.m. EST).
225. Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz, “The January 6
Insurrection: Minute-by-Minute,” CNN, (July 29, 2022),
available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-timeline/index.html.
226. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000241 (Jan. 6,
2021, note to President Trump).
227. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46–47.
228. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921, MM014923,
MM014926.
229. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906. Recently,
Representative Greene has qualified her stance on armed
rioters at the Capitol. At a Young Republicans event in New
York, she said: “I got to tell you something, if Steve
Bannon and I had oganized [January 6th], we would have won.
Not to mention, it would’ve been armed.” She claims she was
joking. Aaron Blake, “Analysis: Marjorie Taylor Greene’s
Jan. 6 ‘Joke’ Has Been Building for a Long Time,” Washington
Post, (Dec. 12, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/12/greene-january-6-punchline/.
230. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907, MM014908,
MM014909, (Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark
Meadows at 2:32 pm); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014911
(Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Meadows
at 2:32 p.m.).
231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.
232. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014914, MM014915.
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921.
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014922.
235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.
236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014923.
237. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
238. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014926.
239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014928.
240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000240 (January
6, 2021 proposed statement).
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
244. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
3:13 p.m. EST, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22remain+peaceful%22
(archived).
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 119.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88.
247. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan.
12, 2022), p. 172; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8,
2022), p. 155.
248. “Pergram: Most Significant Breach of Government
Institution Since 1814,” Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021, available
at
https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220760122001#sp=show-clips.
249. Fox News, “Individual Shot in U.S. Capitol,” YouTube,
at 1:59, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oL-M0LuE3Hk.
250. “Andy McCarthy Blasts Pro-Trump Protesters after Breach
at Capitol,” Fox News, at 1:28, Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220757649001#sp=show-clips.
251. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014932, MM014934.
252. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935. This was sent
from a phone number associated with Priebus’s family member.
253. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014936.
254. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.
255. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.
256. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014943.
257. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
258. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014947.
259. Documents on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014948.
260. Document on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014949.
261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014956, MM014957.
262. Document on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.
263. Document on File with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014964.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also
CBS News, “House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: ‘I
completely condemn the violence in the Capitol,’” YouTube,
Jan. 6, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 22, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.
268. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
4:17 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FPm2PKV0Fp3%22
(archived).
269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
270. ”Bill Hemmer Reports,” Fox News, at 3:56 p.m. ET,
available at
https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/3360/end/3420
(archived).
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 162–63.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 162.
273. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), Video file 40983.
274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh
McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 234. President Trump did not
react to her suggestion, McEnany said. See id.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 97–99.
277. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
4:17 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FPm2PKV0Fp3%22
(archived).
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file
4243_hi_j0233_61ae.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 182. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp.
49–50 (remembering that someone in the Rose Garden told the
President something along the lines “that he needed to use
stronger, more forceful” language in the video).
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 99.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna,
(Mar. 21, 2022), p. 181.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at
1:58:30, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (“[A]s
soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it
and that’s—it seemed like it started to disperse.”).
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6h
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
(“Basically, when President Trump put his tweet out. We
literally left right after that [had] come out.”).
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (“[I]f
he would have done that earlier in the day, 1:30, I—you
know, we wouldn’t be in this—maybe we wouldn’t be in this
bad of a situation or something.”).
286. “Bill Hemmer Reports,” Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at
https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/780/end/840.
287. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6,
2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
288.
289. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.
290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives production), Photo file
364c_hi_j0246_2fa8.
291. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White
House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.
292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T
Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
299. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
300. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
301. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).
302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T
Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production,
Feb. 9, 2022).
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206. (“You were leaving
messages or having phone calls with United States Senators
about the joint session of Congress. How could that possibly
be [a] privileged conversation?” “Because the conversation
is about the theory of the case, and my representation of
the client.”).
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 207.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph
Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Robert O’Brien Production), NSA
0040 (January 6, 2021, text message from Sen. Mike Lee to
Robert O’Brien at 10:55 p.m. EST reading, “You can’t make
this up. I just got this voice message [from] Rudy Giuliani,
who apparently thought he was calling Senator Tuberville.”
“You’ve got to listen to that message. Rudy is walking
malpractice.”).
308. Steve Hayes, “Giuliani to Senator: ‘Try to Just Slow it
Down,’” The Dispatch, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow.
309. Steve Hayes, “Giuliani to Senator: ‘Try to Just Slow it
Down,’” The Dispatch, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow.
310. Those 13 people are Pat Cipollone, Dan Scavino, Kurt
Olsen, Mark Martin, Cleta Mitchell, Rudy Giuliani, Kayleigh
McEnany, Jason Miller, Mark Meadows, Steve Bannon, Eric
Herschmann, Sean Hannity, and John McEntee. See Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of
President Donald J. Trump); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
P-R000261 (Jan. 6, 2021, the Presidential Call Log).
311. H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the
House of Representatives Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt
of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly
Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st
sess. (2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf;
H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of
Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued
by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess.
(2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf;
H. Rept. 117–284, Resolution Recommending that the House of
Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino,
Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a
Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th
Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf;
Erik Larson, “Lawyer Who Talked to Trump on Day of Capitol
Riot Sues over Subpoena,” Bloomberg, (Mar. 25, 2022),
available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-25/lawyer-who-talked-to-trump-on-day-of-mob-riot-sues-over-subpoena
(discussing Kurt Olsen); Caleb Ecarma, “Sean Hannity Wants
the January 6 Committee to Believe He’s a Journalist,”
Vanity Fair, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/01/sean-hannity-january-6-committee-journalist.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat”
Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 195.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell,
(May 18, 2022), p. 131; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition
of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 211.
314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); “WATCH:
‘Let’s Get Back to Work,’ Pence Urges Senate,” PBS, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-work-pence-urges-senate.
315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
316. Olsen authored a memo urging Vice President Pence to
adjourn the joint session of Congress without counting
electoral votes. See Documents on file with the Select
Committee on the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production) Chapman004979 (Jan.
2, 2021, Kurt Olsen Draft Memorandum Entitled, “The Role of
the Vice President in Receiving Votes from the Electoral
College.”) Martin advised President Trump that Vice
President Pence possessed the constitutional authority to
impede the electoral count. See Nicholas Fandos, Peter
Baker, and Maggie Haberman, “House Moves to Force Trump Out,
Vowing Impeachment if Pence Won’t Act,” New York Times,
(Jan. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html.
Both corresponded with John Eastman and others regarding
plans to convene alternate electors in states won by Joe
Biden. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023998 (Dec.
6, 2020, Michael Farris email forwarding an email concerning
the “Importance of Republican Electors in AZ, GA, MI, NV, PA
and WI Voting on Dec 14” at 1:54 p.m. ET). President Trump
asked to speak with Mr. Olsen and Mr. Martin before he left
the dining room. See Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007401_00001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Molly Michael email to
MBX WHO MA Joint White House Switchboard at 11:28 p.m. ET).
317. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
318. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump). Mitchell
declined to discuss her conversations with President Trump
on attorney-client privilege grounds. She did, however,
acknowledge that following the phone call, she took steps to
dismiss the President’s pending election suit in Georgia.
See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell,
(May 18, 2022), p. 131.
319. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6,
2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118 (Herschmann refused to
answer questions about the phone call, citing executive
privilege).
320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259
(Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259
(Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
322. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259
(Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259
(Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255–P-R000259
(Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 258–59.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee
(Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 160–61; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),
P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald
J. Trump).
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.
330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee,
(Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.
331. Insert: Documents on file with the Select Committee
(National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021,
Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).
332. Documents with file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6,
2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).
333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere,
(Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 42–43.
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 179–80.
335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 180.
336. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Patrick MacDonnell Production), PM000158 (Jan. 7,
2021, Patrick MacDonnell text message to personal contact at
9:46 p.m. EST).
337. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017719, p. 3;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander,
(Dec. 9, 2021), p. 57.
338. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_042.
339. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_040.
340. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0717 (Jan. 6,
2021, Brad Parscale text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:14
p.m. ET).
341. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production),
KPierson0718–KPierson20 (Jan. 6, 2021, Brad Parscale text
message to Katrina Pierson at 7:22 p.m. ET).
8
ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK
Late in the evening on January 6, 2021, Henry “Enrique”
Tarrio, the head of the Proud Boys, posted a video on his
Parler account. The brief footage showed a masked man,
wearing a black cape, standing in front of the U.S. Capitol
Building. Tarrio titled the 18-second video, set to ominous
music, “Premonition.” He offered no further explanation. The
clear implication of the brief footage, recorded sometime
prior to January 6th, was that Tarrio had foreknowledge of
the events that transpired earlier that same day.1
Indeed, Tarrio cheered on his fellow Proud Boys as they
attacked the U.S. Capitol. He had been arrested and ordered
to leave Washington, DC two days earlier. Although Tarrio
was not physically present, he continued to monitor and
communicate with his men via encrypted chats and social
media. At 2:36 p.m. on January 6th, Tarrio wrote on Parler
that he was “enjoying the show,” adding: “Do what must be
done” and “#WeThePeople.” 2 Two minutes later, Tarrio wrote:
“Don’t fucking leave.” Several minutes after that, Tarrio
messaged his Proud Boys: “Make no mistake…” and “We did
this…” 3
Law enforcement officials subsequently uncovered significant
evidence showing that Tarrio and his lieutenants planned to
storm the U.S. Capitol. In June 2022, Tarrio and four other
Proud Boys were charged with seditious conspiracy and other
crimes related to their alleged responsibility for the
assault.4 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has alleged
that they “conspired to prevent, hinder and delay the
certification of the Electoral College vote, and to oppose
by force the authority of the government of the United
States.” 5 On January 6, 2021, the Proud Boys “directed,
mobilized and led members of the crowd onto the Capitol
grounds and into the Capitol, leading to dismantling of
metal barricades, destruction of property, breaching of the
Capitol building, and assaults on law enforcement.” 6
The Select Committee’s analysis corroborates the DOJ’s
findings and allegations. The Select Committee reviewed
extensive footage of the attack, including that recorded by
the U.S. Capitol Police’s (USCP) surveillance cameras, the
Metropolitan Police Department’s (MPD) body-worn cameras,
publicly available videos, as well as on-the-ground film
produced by an embedded documentarian. The Select Committee
interviewed rioters, law enforcement officers, and witnesses
that were present on January 6th, while also consulting
thousands of court filings. Using these sources of
information, the Select Committee developed a timeline of
events to understand how the unprecedented attack on the
U.S. Capitol unfolded.
As explained below, the Proud Boys marched from the
Washington Monument to the U.S. Capitol on the morning of
January 6th. While tens of thousands of President Trump’s
supporters gathered at a rally at the Ellipse near the White
House, the Proud Boys prepared to attack. Shortly before the
joint session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m., the
Proud Boys instigated an assault on outmanned law
enforcement at the Peace Circle, a key location. They
quickly overran security barriers and made their way onto
the U.S. Capitol’s restricted grounds. Throughout the next
several hours, members of the Proud Boys led the attack at
key breach points, preventing law enforcement from gaining
crowd control and inciting others to press forward.
President Trump finished his speech at the Ellipse at
approximately 1:10 p.m. Toward the end of his remarks, the
President directed his supporters to march down Pennsylvania
Avenue to the Capitol. Their natural path took them through
the Peace Circle, which had already been cleared out by the
Proud Boys and their associates. Thousands of rioters and
protestors streamed onto the Capitol’s restricted grounds in
short order.
The Proud Boys were not solely responsible for attacking the
U.S. Capitol. As explained in Chapter 6, other far-right
extremists and conspiracy theorists prepared for violence
after President Trump summoned them to Washington for a
“wild” protest on January 6th. And they joined in the
assault as well. Three Percenters, QAnon adherents, and
other radicals were on the frontlines, pressing the charge.
The Oath Keepers attacked the Capitol, forming two
military-style “stacks” to push their way into the building.
The white nationalist Groypers were present as their leader
gave an inflammatory speech from the same Peace Circle where
the attack was launched. Like members of the Proud Boys,
Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters, some of the Groypers
have been charged for their actions on January 6th.
Unaffiliated Americans enraged by President Trump’s lies
rioted as well. The January 6th, attack has often been
described as a riot—and that is partly true. Some of those
who trespassed on the Capitol’s grounds or entered the
building did not plan to do so beforehand. But it is also
true that extremists, conspiracy theorists and others were
prepared to fight. That is an insurrection. They answered
President Trump’s call to action. Some, like the Proud Boys,
deliberately harnessed the mob’s anger to overrun the
Capitol.
8.1 The Mob Assembles in Washington
Trump supporters from around the country gather at the
Washington Monument on the morning of January 6, 2021.
Trump supporters from around the country gather at the
Washington Monument on the morning of January 6, 2021.
Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images
During the early morning hours of January 6th, tens of
thousands of Americans from around the country began to
gather at the Ellipse and the Washington Monument. They had
come to hear President Trump speak and, more importantly,
for his “wild” protest.
Nick Quested, a documentary filmmaker, captured the mood
that morning. Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the QAnon Shaman)
proclaimed “this is our 1776,” vowing “Joe Biden is never
getting in.” 7 An unnamed woman from Georgia, who said she
hosted a podcast dedicated to a new so-called Patriot Party,
also proclaimed January 6th to be the new 1776. She added an
ominous warning. “I’m not allowed to say what’s going to
happen today because everyone’s just going to have to watch.
Something’s gonna happen, one way or the other.” 8
The Secret Service set up magnetometers to screen for
weapons and other contraband, but many rally-goers chose to
avoid the screening altogether.
At 6:29 a.m., Stewart Rhodes, the leader of the Oath
Keepers, reminded his group’s members that DC prohibited
blades over “3 inches” and encouraged them to “[k]eep [the
knives] low profile.” 9 Others were thinking along the same
lines. At 7:25 a.m., the National Park Service reported that
a significant number of attendees ditched their bags in
trees, rather than have them inspected.10 Cassidy Hutchinson
told the Select Committee she heard that thousands of people
refused to walk through magnetometers to enter the Ellipse
because they did not want to be screened for weapons.11
According to Hutchinson, the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations whose responsibilities included security-related
issues, Tony Ornato, told the President that the onlookers
“don’t want to come in right now. They—they have weapons
that they don’t want confiscated by the Secret Service.” 12
When he arrived at the Ellipse that morning, President Trump
angrily said: “I don’t [fucking] care that they have
weapons. They’re not here to hurt me. They can march to the
Capitol from here.” 13
Approximately 28,000 rally-goers did pass through the
magnetometers. The Secret Service confiscated a significant
number of prohibited items from these people, including: 269
knives or blades, 242 cannisters of pepper spray, 18 brass
knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3 gas masks, 30
batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like
scissors, needles, or screwdrivers.14
At 8:07 a.m., Secret Service countersurveillance agents
reported that “members of the crowd are wearing ballistic
helmets, body armor and carrying radio equipment and
military grade backpacks.” 15 By 9:45 a.m., the Secret
Service noted people openly carrying pepper spray as they
strolled the streets.16
President Trump’s mob was itching for a fight. National Park
Service officers arrested a man who had entered the
restricted area around the Washington Monument. Immediately,
about 100 people started forming a circle around the
officer, “threaten[ing] law enforcement,” as the officer
later recounted.17 The officer retreated into the Washington
Monument with the man in custody.18 The crowd responded
angrily, punching the Monument’s glass windows and
continuing to threaten officers.19 Law enforcement around
the Washington Monument felt so unsafe that they “locked
themselves in a security box by the mall.” 20 Rioters
nevertheless “scaled the sides of the security box and
climbed on top of the structure.” 21 It was a harbinger of
things to come.
MPD monitored and responded to a stream of threats that
morning. Three men in fatigues from Broward County, Florida
brandished AR-15s in front of MPD officers on 14th Street
and Independence Avenue.22 MPD advised over the radio that
one individual was possibly armed with a “Glock” at
Fourteenth Street and Constitution Avenue, and another was
possibly armed with a “rifle” at Fifteenth Street and
Constitution Avenue around 11:23 a.m.23 The National Park
Service detained an individual with a rifle between 12:00
and 1:00 p.m.24
Far-right extremists brought guns into Washington or the
surrounding area. Christopher Kuehne, a member of the Proud
Boys, met up with friends on January 5th to discuss their
plans for the following day. One person in attendance said
he did not travel to Washington just to “march around” and
asked, “do we have patriots here willing to take it by
force?” 25 Kuehne told them he had guns, and he was ready to
go.26 During the attack, Kuehne helped prop open Capitol
blast doors as besieged law enforcement retreated inside.27
Guy Reffitt, a Three Percenter from Texas, attended the
rally at the Ellipse, and then carried a loaded firearm onto
Capitol grounds.28 Jerod Thomas Bargar lost his gun—that
he’d carried from the Ellipse in a ‘We the People’
holster29—while scuffling with police on the west side of
the Capitol around 2:30 p.m.30 Bargar wanted to be armed, he
said, when he went into the “belly of the beast.” 31
Mark Andre Mazza drove from Indiana, bringing a Taurus
revolver, a .45-caliber weapon that he loaded with both
shotgun and hollow-point rounds.32 After assaulting a police
officer, he lost the weapon,33 dropping it or losing it on
the steps of the lower West Plaza leading to the Capitol’s
West Front Terrace.34 The Select Committee reviewed Mazza’s
social media accounts before they were taken down, finding
that he shared multiple conspiracy theories, including QAnon
material.35 Mazza later indicated that he intended to target
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, telling authorities that “you’d
be here for another reason” if he had found the Speaker
inside the Capitol.36
Lonnie Leroy Coffman from Falkville, Alabama, parked by the
Capitol building before walking nearly 2 miles to the
Ellipse to hear the President speak.37 In his car, he had
stocked a handgun, a rifle, a shotgun, hundreds of rounds of
ammunition, large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices,
machetes, camouflage smoke devices, a bow and arrow, and 11
Mason jars filled with gasoline and styrofoam, as well as
rags and a lighter (tools needed to make Molotov
cocktails).38 Police found two more handguns on Coffman when
he was arrested later that day.39
Many in attendance were aware of Washington’s prohibition on
carrying a concealed weapon and made plans accordingly. The
Oath Keepers left their guns stowed away in their cars or
across State lines for easy access should they be needed.40
The group staged a “quick reaction force” across the river
in Virginia, amassing an arsenal to come to DC “by land” or
“by sea,” as Florida State-chapter lead—and defendant
convicted of seditious conspiracy—Kelly Meggs said.41 Oath
Keeper Jason Dolan testified at the seditious conspiracy
trial that the “quick reaction force [was] ready to go get
our firearms in order to stop the election from being
certified within Congress.” 42 Dolan further testified that
the Oath Keepers came to Washington, DC “to stop the
certification of the election. . . . [b]y any means
necessary. That’s why we brought our firearms.” 43
Garret Miller—a January 6th defendant who traveled from
Richardson, Texas—posted on Facebook that “he was bringing
guns with him but ‘might just keep 1 hidden one and store
the rest in Virginia’” after learning about the DC law.44 He
also threatened to assassinate Congresswoman Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez and predicted a “civil war could start.” 45
Many members of the crowd decided against bringing firearms
into the nation’s capital, and armed themselves in other
ways. Alex Kirk Harkrider from Carthage, Texas, and his
co-defendant, Ryan Nichols, left guns in a parked car just
outside the district before attending the rally.46 Harkrider
still brought a tomahawk axe.47 During the march to the
Capitol, he yelled “[c]ut their fucking heads off!” 48 One
rioter told the Select Committee he saw another carrying a
“pitchfork.” 49
Members of the mob carried flags and turned the flagpoles
into weapons. Michael Foy, from Wixom, Michigan, carried a
hockey stick to the Ellipse—he draped a Trump flag over
it.50 Just hours later, Foy used that hockey stick to
repeatedly beat police officers at the inaugural tunnel.51
Former New York City police officer Thomas Webster carried a
Marine flag, which he later used to attack an officer
holding the rioters back at the lower West Plaza.52 Another
individual, Danny Hamilton, carried a flag with a sharpened
tip, which he said was “for a certain person,” to which
Trevor Hallgren (who had traveled with Hamilton to
Washington, DC) responded: “it has begun.” Later, Hallgren
commented that “[t]here’s no escape Pelosi, Schumer, Nadler.
We’re coming for you. . . . Even you AOC. We’re coming to
take you out. To pull you out by your hairs.” On January
5th, Hallgren took a tour of the Capitol with Representative
Barry Loudermilk, during which he took pictures of hallways
and staircases.53
The mob President Trump summoned to Washington, DC, on
January 6th, was prepared to fight.
8.2 March of the Proud Boys
While tens of thousands of President Trump’s supporters
attended the rally at the Ellipse, the Proud Boys had other
plans. On the morning of January 6th, they gathered at the
Washington Monument. At 10:30 a.m., the Proud Boys started
their march down the National Mall towards the U.S. Capitol.
In total, there were approximately 200–300 Proud Boys, as
well as their associates, in the group.54
Enrique Tarrio, the chairman of the Proud Boys, was not in
attendance. As explained in Chapter 6, Tarrio had been
arrested two days earlier and ordered to leave Washington.
However, Tarrio continued to monitor events remotely from
Baltimore, communicating with his men throughout the day.
With Tarrio offsite, the Proud Boys were led by three other
senior members of the group: Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs,
and Zachary Rehl.
Ethan Nordean (a.k.a. “Rufio Panman”) was a member of the
Proud Boys’ Elders chapter and president of his local
chapter in Seattle, Washington.55 Nordean was regarded as
the leader for January 6th after Tarrio was arrested.56 In
the days leading up to January 6th, Nordean made ominous
comments on social media. In conversations with his fellow
Proud Boys, he argued that the Presidential election was
tainted by fraud and violence was a necessary remedy. For
example, on January 4th, Nordean posted a video on social
media with the title: “Let them remember the day they
decided to make war with us.” 57 In another social media
post on January 5th, Nordean warned “we are coming for
them.” 58 He added a telling line: “You’ve chosen your side,
black and yellow teamed with red, white and blue against
everyone else.” 59 The “black and yellow” is a reference to
the Proud Boys. And when Nordean wrote the “red, white and
blue,” he likely meant the Trump supporters who would be in
attendance for January 6th.
Joseph Biggs (a.k.a. “Sergeant Biggs”) was a senior Proud
Boys member and served as an event “organizer” for the
group.60 Biggs previously worked with Alex Jones and
InfoWars.61 In late December 2020, Biggs posted a message on
Parler in which he explained that the Proud Boys “will not
be attending DC in colors.” 62 That is, unlike at previous
events, the Proud Boys would not wear their branded, black
and yellow clothing, but instead seek to be inconspicuous.
Biggs continued:
We will be blending in as one of you. You won’t see us.
You’ll even think we are you . . .We are going to smell like
you, move like you, and look like you. The only thing we’ll
do that’s us is think like us! Jan 6th is gonna be epic.63
Tarrio posted a similar message, saying the Proud Boys would
go “incognito” on January 6th. 64 Consistent with this
decision, Biggs was dressed in a plaid shirt, glasses, and
dark hat as he led the march from the Washington Monument.65
Other Proud Boys dressed in a similar fashion.
Zachary Rehl (a.k.a. “Captain Trump”) was president of the
local Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Proud Boys chapter.66 Like
his comrades, Rehl believed President Trump’s Big Lie about
the 2020 Presidential election.67 He raised more than $5,500
in funds for January 6th. Like Nordean, Biggs and others,
Rehl was dressed “incognito” as he helped lead the group
from the Washington Monument.68
Protestors, including a group of Proud Boys, gather at the
Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Protestors, including a group of Proud Boys, gather at the
Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Photo by Jon Cherry/Getty Images
Shortly after 11:00 a.m., the Proud Boys arrived at the west
side of the Capitol, near a reflecting pool. From there,
they marched to the east front of the Capitol. Surveillance
footage shows the Proud Boys passing Garfield Circle on the
southwest corner of the Capitol at 11:15 a.m.69 They walked
north towards the Peace Circle next, and surveillance
cameras captured them on video there at approximately 11:21
a.m.70 There was just one USCP officer standing guard at the
Peace Circle fence at the time.71
As the Proud Boys paraded around the Capitol grounds, Nick
Quested, a documentary filmmaker who spent time with the
group, recalled them taunting USCP officers. One Proud Boy
told the officers to “[r]emember your oath,” “[c]hoose a
side,” and “[b]e on the right side of history.” 72 By 11:41
a.m., the Proud Boys made their way around to the east side
of the Capitol, crossing along Constitution Avenue.73 While
on the east front, they posed for pictures with members of
their Arizona delegation, who were clearly identifiable by
their orange caps.74 They then walked back across the north
side of the Capitol towards the National Mall, where they
stopped to eat at food trucks.75 The Proud Boys stayed by
the food trucks until they returned to the Peace Circle at
approximately 12:49 p.m.76
8.3 The Initial Attack
Within minutes of arriving at the Peace Circle, the Proud
Boys and their associates launched the attack on the U.S.
Capitol. The circle is the site of the Peace Monument, a
statue erected from 1877 to 1878 to commemorate naval deaths
at sea during the Civil War with “two classically robed”
women—one woman representing “grief,” covering her face, and
the other woman representing “history.” The woman standing
in for “history” holds a tablet that reads, “They died that
their country might live.” 77
The Peace Circle’s geographical location is crucially
important for understanding how the January 6th, attack
unfolded. It sits at the end of Pennsylvania Avenue, just in
front of the U.S. Capitol. At the conclusion of his speech
at the Ellipse, President Trump directed rally attendees to
march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the U.S. Capitol. Their
shortest natural path would lead them right to the Peace
Circle and to the northwest side of the Capitol grounds,
also known as the West Plaza. By the time rally-goers
arrived, the Proud Boys and their allies had already removed
the fencing that stood in the crowd’s way. As a result,
thousands of people streamed into the restricted Capitol
grounds with relative ease.
When the Proud Boys arrived back at the Peace Circle at
12:49 p.m., they still had about 200 to 300 members and many
other protestors had joined them.78 Shortly after arriving,
the Proud Boys incited the crowd with antagonistic chants
such as “1776.” 79 Officer Caroline Edwards, who was
standing guard, explained to the Select Committee that the
Proud Boys asked her and the other USCP officers if they
could walk past the fencing and talk to the officers. “No,”
she replied. The Proud Boys and others immediately turned on
Edwards and her fellow officers, referring to them as “Nancy
Pelosi’s dogs” and shouting.80
At approximately 12:51 p.m., Quested captured a rioter named
Ryan Samsel with his arm around Proud Boys leader Joe Biggs,
who led the chants.81 Samsel subsequently claimed that Biggs
encouraged him to push through the barricades and, when
Samsel hesitated to follow through, Biggs “flashed a gun,
questioned his manhood and repeated his demand” to move to
the front and “challenge the police.” 82 Biggs has contested
Samsel’s version of events.83 After speaking with Biggs,
Samsel breached the outer fencing of the Peace Circle at
12:53 p.m.84 The first set of fencing at the Peace Circle
was staged on 1st Street Northwest, with the second set of
fencing not far behind. Once Samsel breached the outer
fencing, USCP officers, including Officer Edwards, moved
from their posts to meet Samsel and other rioters.85
In less than a minute, at 12:54 p.m., the rioters pushed
USCP officers to the ground, removed the fencing, and
quickly stormed east towards the U.S. Capitol building.86
Officer Edwards was thrown to the ground, causing her to hit
her head on concrete steps.87
Two Proud Boys from New York, Dominic Pezzola and William
Pepe, were among those leading the march to the next line of
security barriers.88 Pepe, an employee of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority in upstate New York, took sick
leave to travel to Washington for the January 6th events.89
Pepe dragged part of the fence away at the next security
barrier, ensuring that USCP officers were left
defenseless.90 The Proud Boys’ actions were not spontaneous.
Jeffrey Finley, a Proud Boys leader from West Virginia,
later admitted “there appeared to be a coordinated effort to
pull the barricades apart.” 91 Proud Boy Jeremy Bertino
admitted to similar facts when pleading guilty to seditious
conspiracy, stating stated that he “believed . . . that the
purpose of traveling to Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021,
was to stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote,
and that the MOSD leaders were willing to do whatever it
would take, including using force against police and others,
to achieve that objective.” Based on discussions he and
other Proud Boys leaders had in the leadup to January 6th,
he “believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the
group’s goal of stopping Congress from certifying the
Electoral College Vote. Bertino understood that storming the
Capitol or its grounds would be illegal and would require
using force against police or other government
officials.” 92
Parallel to the Peace Circle, at the Garfield Circle walkway
located at the southeast corner of the Capitol grounds,
rioters breached the fencing at 12:55 p.m. and began rushing
the West Plaza where they would converge with others from
the Peace Circle.93
By 12:58 p.m., the crowd filled the lower West Plaza of the
Capitol just below the inauguration stage that had been
built for the ceremony scheduled two weeks later. After the
initial breaches, the USCP was able to deploy enough
officers to stop the rioters from advancing past the base of
the inauguration stage. More importantly, rioter momentum
was further halted when the first group of MPD officers
arrived on scene at 1:11 p.m.,94 almost precisely as
President Trump finished his Ellipse speech. The MPD
officers initially pushed back the rioters on the West
Plaza, slowing them down before they would later breach the
Capitol.95
A stalemate ensued on the West Plaza before rioters were
able to make any further progress. Rally-goers arriving from
the Ellipse provided crucial momentum.
8.4 President Trump’s Mob Descends on the U.S. Capitol
Toward the end of his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump
made sure an already angry crowd of his supporters stayed
enraged. “We fight like hell[,] and if you don’t fight like
hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore,” the
President told the tens of thousands of people who had
assembled at the Ellipse, or in the vicinity. About one
minute later, President Trump directed those in attendance
“to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue . . . to the Capitol.” The
President told the people they were “going to try and give”
Republicans, including his own Vice President, “the kind of
pride and boldness that they need to take back our
country.” 96
“There’s enough people here to storm the Capitol,” a member
of the crowd said at 1:06 p.m., just as the President was
concluding his remarks.97 Ronald Sandlin, who pleaded guilty
to and has been sentenced for felonies committed on January
6th, including telling officers in the Capitol that
“[y]ou’re going to die,” watched the President’s speech from
a nearby restaurant and live-streamed a video in which he
encouraged “other patriots” to “take the Capitol.” 98
Sandlin repeated the phrase “freedom is paid for with blood”
several times during his video.99
“We’re getting ready to go march on Capitol Hill. We’re
gonna go fuck some shit up,” Cody Mattice, another January
6th defendant who pleaded guilty and has been sentenced,100
said while walking to the Capitol. Mattice later added:
“We’re getting up front, and we’re taking this shit.” 101
Ryan Nichols, who was charged with eight felonies,
livestreamed a diatribe as he marched towards the Capitol at
1:40 p.m. Nichols echoed the President’s unconstitutional
claim that Vice President Pence had the power to decide the
election himself. “I’m hearing that Pence just caved . . .
I’m telling you if Pence caved, we’re gonna drag
motherfuckers through the streets,” Nichols said.102 “Cut
their heads off!” Nichols yelled with his codefendant
Harkrider, before encouraging others to join “Republican
protestors [who] are trying to enter the House right
now.” 103
On the way to the Capitol, Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins
chatted with others in a Zello group named “Stop the Steal
J6.” Watkins said that “100%” of the Ellipse crowd was
“marching on the Capitol,” because “it has spread like
wildfire that Pence has betrayed us.” 104 As she approached
the Capitol with a contingent of Oath Keepers, Watkins said:
“I’m probably gonna go silent when I get there ’cause I’m a
be a little busy.105 Donald Hazard, a Three Percenter from
Texas who claimed to be allied with Proud Boys on January
6th, told a Washington Post reporter that he wanted his face
recorded on video as he marched to the Capitol. “I want the
enemy to know exactly who is coming after them,” Hazard
explained.106
Leaders of the “Stop the Steal” movement continued to incite
the crowd during the march as well. Alex Jones of InfoWars
arrived at the Ellipse shortly before 9:00 a.m. on the
morning of January 6th.107 After some initial difficulty
gaining access to the event area, Jones was seated in the
VIP section.108 While Jones stayed to listen to a portion of
President Trump’s speech, planning for the crowd’s march to
the Capitol was already underway and Jones intended to leave
the Ellipse early to lead the march. The origins of the plan
to have Jones lead the march are unclear. Jones has publicly
stated that “the White House told me three days before, we
are going to have you lead the March.” 109 Stop the Steal’s
Ali Alexander also believed “the White House” wanted him to
lead a march to the Capitol.110 It is likely that both got
that idea from Caroline Wren, a Republican fundraiser who
helped organize the Ellipse event.111 Jones texted Wren at
12:27 p.m., asking when he should leave the Ellipse and
begin the march.112
While Wren originally expected Jones, Roger Stone, and
retired Lt. Gen. Flynn to march to the Capitol, Stone did
not attend the Ellipse rally and so he was not present to
accompany Jones on the march as planned.113 Additionally,
while President Trump was delivering his speech, Wren asked
Flynn if he was going to march with Jones. Flynn responded,
“Hell, no. It’s freezing.” 114
Alex Jones uses a bullhorn to speak to crowd on January 6,
2021.
Alex Jones uses a bullhorn to speak to crowd on January 6,
2021.
Photo by Jon Cherry/Getty Images
While Stone and Flynn did not march, Jones and Alexander led
others to the Capitol, though it is not clear how many
people followed them.115 Jones and Alexander gathered with
Jones’s camera and security crew just outside the event
perimeter, near Freedom Plaza, to discuss their plans.116
The discussion, recorded by Alex Jones’s film crew, sheds
some light on what Jones and Alexander knew about the
President’s plans and what they intended for the march. The
group, which included InfoWars host Owen Shroyer, huddled
outside the Ellipse security perimeter to discuss how best
to proceed. They tried to predict the Presidential
motorcade’s route to the Capitol. The video shows Alex Jones
telling his crew, “I think the Wren lady, where’s she at?
She knows what they said they were going to do. Everything
she’s said has been accurate, so we need to call her real
quick.” 117 They then decided to walk down Pennsylvania
Avenue, as the President had directed in his speech.
Shroyer recommended the group wait for President Trump to
finish speaking, and they agreed to at least delay their
departure from Freedom Plaza to allow Jones to gather a
crowd. 118 Jones began speaking from his bullhorn, imploring
people to gather and walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.119 While
using the bullhorn, Jones told the crowd that they were
experiencing “the second American revolution,” 120 and
stated, “[l]et’s go take our country back. Trump is only
minutes away. Let’s start marching to the Capitol,
peacefully.” 121
Proud Boys were among the crowd Jones gathered during his
march. Matthew Walter, president of a Tennessee chapter of
the organization,122 was near the National Mall with two
other Proud Boys from Tennessee and decided to join
Jones.123 Other, more prominent members of the Proud Boys
appear to have been in contact with Jones and Shroyer about
the events of January 6th and on that day. Records for
Enrique Tarrio’s phone show that while the attack on the
Capitol was ongoing, he texted with Jones three times and
Shroyer five times.124 Ethan Nordean’s phone records reflect
that he exchanged 23 text messages with Shroyer between
January 4th and 5th, and that he had one call with him on
each of those days.125 Records of Joseph Biggs’s
communications show that he texted with Shroyer eight times
on January 4th and called him at approximately 11:15 a.m. on
January 6th, while Biggs and his fellow Proud Boys were
marching at and around the Capitol.126
Once they had marched the length of Pennsylvania Avenue and
reached the west side of the Capitol, Jones and Alexander
used a bullhorn to continue directing those around them to
the east side, making further references to President
Trump’s alleged imminent arrival. A video recorded by a
rallygoer at 1:51 p.m. shows Jones and Alexander standing
together as Jones encourages the crowd to proceed to the
east side of the Capitol. He tells those listening that
“we’ve got a permit on the other side, it’s great that this
happened, but Trump’s not going to come when we’ve taken
this over. We are not Antifa, we are not BLM.” 127
Jones has repeatedly claimed that he tried to calm the
crowd, but his actions also coincided with two police line
breaches and one breach of the Capitol building itself. At
1:57 p.m., minutes after Jones encouraged rally goers to
move east, newly arrived protestors breached the bike rack
fencing used to keep the crowd away from the east side
steps.128 After the breach, police retreated to the base of
the large set of steps behind them and the crowd moved
forward to meet the newly established police line.129
Jones followed shortly behind the crowd that led the initial
east fence breach, and his arrival coincided with the next
breach up the east stairs. Publicly available video shows
Jones already departed from the west side, rounding the
north side of the Capitol on the way to the east side at
2:00 p.m.130 As he was walking, Jones told his group, “those
fucking cops need to fucking back off man.” 131 He was then
asked about Vice President Pence, to which Jones responded:
“he floundered and was neutral, he passed the ball.” 132 At
the conclusion of the video, one of Jones’s camera crew can
be heard saying, “let’s take a break here. Let me talk to
this cop to see if I can get Alex up there to deescalate the
situation.” Other video released by Jones shows one of his
camera crew interacting with USCP officers and asking how
Jones can help deescalate the situation.133 The Select
Committee’s review of the evidence showed that Jones
simultaneously called on the crowd to “fight” and start a
“revolution,” while occasionally peppering his rhetoric with
the word “peacefully.”
Minutes after Jones’s arrival on the scene, at approximately
2:06 p.m., rioters breached the new police line and stormed
up the stairs towards the Columbus Doors (also known as the
Rotunda Doors).134 The crowd’s cheers and celebration as
they move up the steps can be heard while Jones’s camera
crew negotiates with USCP officers nearby. 135 As explained
below, the rioters broke through another key breach point
with Jones and Alexander on the scene just minutes later.
8.5 The Mob Surges
Far-right extremists continued to lead the charge as
protestors streamed onto the U.S. Capitol’s restricted
grounds. On the north side of the West Plaza, there was a
scaffold with stairs used by construction workers to build
the inauguration stage. Law enforcement officers were
stationed at the base of the stairs, preventing rioters from
climbing to the upper West Plaza, where doors to the Capitol
building itself were located. At 1:49 p.m., MPD declared a
riot at the Capitol.136
Rioters clash with police at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Rioters clash with police at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images
Shortly before 1:50 p.m., rioters gathered in front of this
scaffold on the northwest corner of the Capitol. The rioters
included Proud Boys and other extremists. One rioter, Guy
Reffitt, belonged to a Three Percenter group from Texas.137
By approximately 1:50 p.m., he stood at the front of the
pack near the scaffold, carrying a pistol and flexicuffs.138
He wore body armor under a blue jacket and a helmet with a
mounted body camera.139
Reffitt advanced on the police line, absorbing rubber
bullets and pushing through chemical spray.140 As he
recounted shortly after the attack, Reffitt got “everything
started moving forward.” 141 He “started the fire” and the
presence of law enforcement was not going to prevent
Reffitt’s advance.142 According to Reffitt:
[T]here was no reason for me to give up because I had come
so far to do what I wanted, what we wanted and needed to do.
And I had a mindset. I didn’t mean to actually be the first
guy up there. I didn’t even mean to do that. I just, the
adrenaline and knowing that I can’t let my country fall.143
Reffitt had indeed planned for violence on January 6th,
noting on December 28, 2020, that he would “be in full
battle rattle.” 144 While driving to Washington, DC on
January 5th, Reffitt expressed his desire to “drag[] those
people out of the Capitol by their ankles” and “install[] a
new government.” 145 On the morning of January 6th, Reffitt
clarified the target, telling “other members of his militia
group and those gathered around him” at the Ellipse that
“I’m taking the Capitol with everybody fucking else” and
that “[w]e’re all going to drag them mother fuckers out
kicking and screaming . . . . I just want to see Pelosi’s
head hit every fucking stair on the way out . . . And Mitch
McConnell too. Fuck ’em all.” 146 Reffitt was convicted and
ultimately sentenced to 7 years in prison for his
conduct.147
A member of the Proud Boys, Daniel Scott, helped lead the
charge up the scaffolding stairs.148 Scott, also known as
Milkshake, had marched with the Proud Boys from the
Washington Monument to the Capitol. During the march, Scott
was recorded in a video yelling, “Let’s take the fucking
Capitol!” 149 Someone else responded, “Let’s not fucking
yell that, alright?” And then Nordean added: “It was
Milkshake, man, you know . . . idiot.” Scott had apparently
blurted out the Proud Boys’ plan. At the scaffolding, Scott
then helped others “take” the U.S. Capitol. While wearing a
blue cap with white lettering that read, “Gods, Guns &
Trump,” he pushed police officers backwards, clearing a path
for the rioters. Another Proud Boy, Chris Worrell, was also
nearby.150 As rioters massed under the scaffold, Worrell
sprayed officers with OC (or pepper) spray. 151 Other Proud
Boys were present at the scaffold, including Micajah
Jackson152 and Matthew Greene.153
The attack at and in the vicinity of the scaffolding cleared
a path for a wave of rioters who forced their way up the
stairs and to the U.S. Capitol building itself.154 As the
rioters rushed up the stairs, another January 6th defendant,
Ryan Kelley, climbed up the scaffolding around 1:51 p.m.155
In the ensuing minutes he waved people on, encouraging them
to follow.156 Kelley—who ran in the Republican primary to be
the governor of Michigan in 2022—denied to the Select
Committee that he had climbed the scaffolding to wave people
on.157 The FBI arrested Kelley a few months after his
deposition.158
By 2:00 p.m., rioters at the top of the scaffolding stairs
were only feet away from Capitol building doors and windows.
8.6 The United States Capitol is Breached
Incited by President Trump, over the course of the next
hour, extremists, conspiracy theorists and others breached
the U.S. Capitol building at several locations. They probed
for weaknesses in the building’s defenses, battling law
enforcement personnel who stood in their way. Once again,
the Proud Boys and other extremists played conspicuous
roles.
The Senate Wing is Breached at 2:13 p.m.
At 2:13 p.m., Dominic Pezzola, a Proud Boy from New York,
smashed a window on the Senate wing.159 This was the first
breach of the Capitol building. Pezzola used a riot shield
he stole from a law enforcement officer to break through the
window. After climbing through, rioters were able to easily
open a nearby Senate wing door from the inside—giving them
unfettered passage into the building at 2:14 p.m. Two
minutes later, at approximately 2:16 p.m., rioters pushed
opened a second door, the Senate fire door, from the
inside.160 Just as the building was being breached, Vice
President Pence and Speaker Pelosi were ushered off the
Senate and House floors, respectively.161
The first person to enter the Capitol building was a
Kentucky native named Michael Sparks. Sparks had expressed
his desire to kill people after watching protests in the
summer of 2020.162 Following one of President Trump’s calls
to Washington, DC on December 30, 2020, Sparks answered that
he would “be there.” 163
As Pezzola entered the building, he was joined by other
noteworthy extremists and conspiracy theorists. Robert
Gieswein, an individual from Colorado affiliated with Three
Percenters who espoused conspiracy beliefs, climbed through
the Senate wing window.164 Doug Jensen, a QAnon adherent,
was part of this first cadre of people to enter the Capitol
as well.165 Jensen wore a brazen “Q” shirt. Jensen later
told authorities that he “intentionally positioned himself
to be among the first people inside the United States
Capitol because . . . he wanted to have his t-shirt seen on
video so that ‘Q’ could ‘get the credit.’” 166 Another
prominent QAnon believer, Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the “QAnon
Shaman”), also entered through the Senate wing door at
approximately 2:14 p.m.167
Doug Jensen and rioters confront police after storming the
Capitol.
Doug Jensen and rioters confront police after storming the
Capitol.
(Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)
White supremacists and Confederate sympathizers were among
the first rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Kevin Seefried
and his son, Hunter, entered the building at approximately
2:13 p.m. through the Senate wing window smashed by Proud
Boy Dominic Pezzola.168 Kevin Seefried carried a Confederate
Battle Flag with him and unfurled it inside the building.
According to some historians, while the Confederate Flag has
appeared in the building before, it was the first time that
an insurrectionist ever carried the banner inside the U.S.
Capitol.169 According to court filings, Hunter Seefried
helped punch out the Senate wing window and then clear the
broken glass before he, his father and others entered the
Capitol.170 Kevin Seefried was found guilty of obstructing
an official proceeding, which is a felony offense, as well
as four misdemeanors.171 The Department of Justice has
alleged that at 2:16 p.m., just 3 minutes after the Senate
wing was first breached, five individuals associated with
the Nick Fuentes’s white nationalist “America First”
movement entered the U.S. Capitol.172 The five, all of whom
are in their 20s, have been identified as: Joseph Brody,
Thomas Carey, Gabriel Chase, Jon Lizak, and Paul Lovley.173
Four of the five “initially met at an America First event
and attended subsequent events together.” 174 Nick Fuentes
and other America First leaders espouse “a belief that they
are defending against the demographic and cultural changes
in America.” 175 Online researchers say that Brody is the
masked man seen in a photo wearing a MAGA hat and holding a
rifle in front of a Nazi flag.176 (The photo was not taken
on January 6th.) As discussed in Chapter 6, members of the
America First movement, commonly known as “Groypers,” were
well-represented at “Stop the Steal” events in late 2020 and
these rallies helped pave the road to January 6th. Indeed,
at least three members of the group—Lovley, Lizak and
Chase—attended the “Stop the Steal, March for Trump” rally
in Washington, DC on November 14, 2020.177
On January 6th, Brody and his America First associates made
their way to various points inside and outside of the
Capitol after the initial breach, including House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi’s conference room and office, as well as the
U.S. Senate Chamber. 178 After exiting the Capitol, the
group went to the north side of the building. One of the
five, Brody, and another rioter allegedly used a “metal
barricade” to assault a law enforcement officer who was
defending the North Door.179 (The attack on the North Door
is discussed below.) Brody and Chase also allegedly helped
others destroy media equipment.180 Still another America
First associate, Riley Williams, directed rioters up a
staircase to Speaker Pelosi’s office and was accused of
aiding and abetting the theft of a laptop found
there.181Other white supremacists were among the first
rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Timothy Hale-Cusanelli,
an Army Reservist from New Jersey who was identified by a
confidential source to law enforcement as an “an avowed
white supremacist and Nazi sympathizer,” entered through the
Senate wing breach around 2:14 p.m.182 Hale-Cusanelli
“[u]sed tactical hand signals” to direct other members of
the mob, and he commanded them to “‘advance’ on the
Capitol.” 183 Afterwards, he bragged to a friend that
January 6th was “exhilarating,” that he hoped “for a ‘civil
war,’ and that the ‘tree of liberty must be refreshed with
the blood of patriots and tyrants.’” 184 Robert Packer was
also among the first rioters to enter the Capitol, and he
made his way into the Crypt by 2:25 p.m.185 Packer was
wearing a “Camp Auschwitz” sweatshirt, a “symbol of Nazi
hate ideology,” at the time.186
After breaking in, some of the first rioters headed north
toward the Senate chambers.187 Officer Eugene Goodman, a
USCP officer, intercepted them before they headed up the
stairs leading to the chambers. Immediately after entering,
a rioter asked Officer Goodman, “Where are the [M]embers
at?” and “where are they counting the votes?” 188 Jensen,
Gieswein, Sparks, and others stalked Officer Goodman through
the halls of the Senate.189 Jensen demanded that Officer
Goodman and other USCP officers arrest Vice President
Pence.190 Sparks chanted, “This is our America!” 191 Other
rioters who entered through the Senate wing door clashed
with police offices at the Senate carriage door located on
the northeast side of the Capitol.192 When the rioters
followed Officer Goodman up the stairs to the Senate
Chamber, they were stopped by a line of USCP officers
outside the Ohio Clock Tower.193
Joe Biggs of the Proud Boys entered the Capitol shortly
after the first breach. At 2:14 p.m., Biggs walked through
the senate wing door and moved north. Part of his route was
captured in videos posted on Parler, a right-wing social
media site.194 Someone recorded the Proud Boys leader
shortly after he entered the Capitol and asked him, “Hey
Biggs what do you gotta say?” 195 Smiling, Biggs replied:
“this is awesome!” 196 Other Proud Boys were seen with
Biggs, or near him, as he entered the Capitol. One of them
is Paul Rae, a Proud Boys member from Florida, who appears
to have communicated directly with Biggs after they entered
through the door.197 Another Proud Boy from Florida, Arthur
Jackman, was seen with his hand on Biggs’s right shoulder.
Jackman “became involved in the Proud Boys to support Donald
Trump,” was in Washington on January 6th “to support
President Trump and to stop the steal” and “believe[d] the
election was stolen.”195 Still another, Joshua Pruitt, who
was clad in a Punisher shirt, entered the Capitol through
the Senate wing door around this time.198 At approximately
2:17 p.m., 3 minutes after entering the U.S. Capitol for the
first time, Biggs exited through another door.199
At 2:43 p.m., law enforcement was able to regain control of
the Senate wing door, forcing all the rioters out. But their
success lasted for only 5 minutes. At 2:48 p.m., rioters
again breached the Senate wing door, pushing law enforcement
out of the way.200 The second breach was one of the more
violent breaches of the day, with the mob forcefully pushing
law enforcement backwards until the pathway was clear for
them to enter.
The Columbus Doors (East Rotunda Doors) are breached at 2:24
p.m. and 2:38 p.m.
While the Proud Boys and other extremists were overwhelming
law enforcement at the West Plaza scaffolding, another group
led the attack on security barriers on the East Plaza. At
2:06 p.m., a crowd broke through security barriers and
charged a set of doors just outside the Rotunda.201 The
mob’s surge occurred just minutes after Alex Jones arrived
on the scene.202 The crowd’s cheers and celebration as they
move up the steps can be heard while Jones’s camera crew
negotiates with USCP officers nearby.203
Once rioters had filled the Rotunda stairs, Jones and his
team, along with the Proud Boy Walter, ascended the stairs.
They moved into the thick of the crowd at the top of the
stairs, where Jones began calling for peace but also
revolution, leading the crowd in chants of “1776” and other
bellicose rhetoric.204 Publicly available video shows that
Jones reached the top of the stairs at 2:18 p.m.205 Walter
told the Select Committee that he thought Jones was
successful in getting some people down, “but I also think
that may have created enough space for people to be able to
move, whereas before you couldn’t move.” 206 Apparently,
Jones’s security team also realized he was not successfully
controlling the crowd, as one of his security guards
reportedly told him, “Alex, they’re going to blame this all
on you, we got to get out of here as fast as possible.” 207
By approximately 2:21 p.m., Jones began descending the
stairs.208 Despite claiming to make attempts to calm the
crowd, Jones further incited the mob as he departed, loudly
proclaiming “we will never submit to the new world order”
and then leading the crowd in the chant “fight for
Trump.” 209
At 2:24 p.m., rioters gained entrance to the Capitol through
the doors leading into the Rotunda,210 an entrance that was
only a few feet directly behind Jones as he was speaking. As
the Rotunda was breached by rioters, Jones and Alexander
left the area and decided to leave the Capitol complex area
altogether.211
Law enforcement officials were able to thwart the initial
breach of the doors leading into the Rotunda. By 2:28 p.m.,
they temporarily regained control and stopped rioters from
entering.212 But their success was short-lived. Within ten
minutes, the doors were breached once again.213 And two
members of the Proud Boys—Ronald Loehrke and James
Haffner—helped lead the attack.214
Loehrke was allegedly recruited by Nordean, the Proud Boys
leader, for January 6th. In late December 2020, Nordean
asked Loehrke via text message if he was coming to “DC.” 215
After Loehrke indicated he was, Nordean said he wanted
Loehrke “on the front line” with him.216 Loehrke replied,
“Sounds good man.” 217 Loehrke and Haffner marched with the
Proud Boys from the Washington Monument to the Capitol
grounds and were present during the breach at the Peace
Circle.218 The pair made their way to the east side of the
Capitol, where they began removing the security barriers and
resisting USCP officers. 219 Other members of the crowd
joined. Eventually, the rioters breached these barriers too,
allowing them to reach the doors of the Rotunda.
When the rioters reached the Columbus Doors, they were again
stopped by USCP officers. But as the officers explained to
the Select Committee, the rioters pushed them against the
doors and sprayed them with OC spray (commonly known as
pepper spray), making it impossible to defend the Capitol.
220 James Haffner was one of the rioters who allegedly
sprayed the officers.221
Shortly after Haffner and others assaulted the USCP
officers, they were able to breach the Columbus Doors at
approximately 2:38 p.m. A Proud Boys contingent—including
Haffner, Loehrke, and Joe Biggs—then entered the Capitol.222
It was the second time that Biggs entered the U.S. Capitol
that day.
A military-style “stack” of Oath Keepers entered through the
Columbus Doors as well. The Oath Keeper members attended the
Ellipse rally, where they were provided personal security
details for VIPs in attendance.223 Afterwards, they marched
to the Capitol, as directed by President Trump.
Stewart Rhodes, the leader of the Oath Keepers, monitored
the attack on the Capitol from just outside, including
during the assault on the Columbus Doors. At 2:28 p.m.,
Rhodes texted members of the F.O.S., or Friends of Stone,
(FOS) Signal chat—which included Roger Stone, the Proud
Boys’ Enrique Tarrio, Ali Alexander, Alex Jones, and
others224—that he was at the “Back door of the US
Capitol.” 225 Rhodes followed up at 2:30 p.m. by texting
members of another chat that there was “Pounding on the
doors” of the Capitol.226
At 2:32 p.m., Rhodes held a three-way call with two other
Oath Keepers, Kelly Meggs and Michael Green.227 Three
minutes later, Meggs’s group (“Stack 1”) started pushing
through the rioters amassed on the East Plaza steps in a
military-stack formation, with each person placing a hand on
the shoulder of the person in front.228 This stack entered
the Capitol around 2:40 p.m.229
One minute later, Rhodes was caught on camera on the Upper
West Terrace responding to a rioter who said the Members of
Congress must be “shitting their pants inside.” Rhodes
replied: “Amen They need to shit their fucking pants. Sic
semper tyrannis.” 230
Once inside, Stack 1 moved through the Rotunda. At 2:44
p.m., Stack 1 pushed into the Senate hallway, which was
filled with officers blocking the way. “Push, push, push.
Get in there. They can’t hold us,” Watkins implored the
others. However, the officers repelled their attack, pushing
them back into the Rotunda.231
Other Oath Keepers made their way to the Capitol as Stack 1
tried to advance. Joshua James and another group of Oath
Keepers (“Stack 2”) pushed through the Columbus Doors at
approximately 3:15 p.m. 232 “This is my fucking Capitol.
This is not yours. This is my building,” James shouted at
officers inside the Rotunda who were trying to push the
rioters out of the Capitol.233
Additional Breach Points
In addition to the breaches discussed above, rioters opened
other entry points into the U.S. Capitol. The Upper West
Terrace door, which leads directly into the Rotunda, was
breached at 2:33 p.m. when rioters opened it from the
inside.234
Inside the Capitol, rioters broke through the police lines,
such as in the Crypt, a space located directly underneath
the Rotunda. The Crypt is anchored by a marble “compass
stone,” marking the center of the building, and is lined
with 13 statues representing the original American
colonies.235 The rioters quickly moved towards the House
Chambers and, by 2:40 p.m., started to crowd the main doors
outside the Chambers, moving to the east side near the
Speaker’s lobby. As they moved to the east side, rioters
opened the east House doors from the inside at 2:41 p.m.,
allowing rioters from the northeast side of the Capitol to
enter.236
The north doors were the last Capitol doors breached. At
3:10 p.m., rioters entered through the north doors where
they were quickly met by USCP.237 Within a minute, the
hallway just inside the doors was filled with rioters. At
3:12 p.m., a combination of USCP and MPD officers forcefully
pushed the rioters out of the doors.238 However, rioters
continued to attack just outside the north doors throughout
the afternoon and evening.
The north doors have an outer entranceway that is separated
by a vestibule from a set of inner doors that lead directly
into the Capitol. Rioters threw bricks at the doors and
forcefully tried to stop police officers from clearing the
area.239 Law enforcement officers briefly opened the inner
doors to spray a chemical irritant that was intended to
disperse the mob.240 But the rioters continued to fight. For
instance, as the crowd held the outer doors open, John
Thomas Gordon of West Virginia repeatedly threw a heavy
projectile at the inner doors, while swearing at the
officers.241 Another rioter gave Gordon, who came to
Washington to attend the “Stop the Steal” rally, a pair of
goggles so he would withstand the chemical spray. Gordon
kicked the inner doors as he and others desperately tried to
enter the Capitol. 242 Law enforcement held the doors,
withstanding the mob’s best efforts to break in.
As law enforcement officers started to clear the building,
rioters continued to fight police officers at the tunnel on
the West Plaza. Rioters violently struck officers, including
MPD Officer Daniel Hodges, and sprayed them with OC spray.
Although rioters did not break through the police line at
the tunnel, they were able to successfully break a window
just north of it. There is no surveillance coverage for this
area, so Select Committee staff was unable to determine the
precise time of the breach. According to open-source videos,
however, the breach appears to occur at approximately 4:15
p.m.243
8.7 President Trump Pours Fuel on the Fire
After Dominic Pezzola and others breached the Capitol at
2:13 p.m., a mob quickly entered and headed towards the
Senate and House Chambers, where Members were meeting.244 As
the crowd moved through the Capitol, they chanted “Fight for
Trump” and “Stop the Steal!” They also chanted “Nancy,
Nancy” as they searched for Speaker Pelosi.245 At 2:18 p.m.,
the House went into recess as hundreds of rioters confronted
USCP officers inside the Crypt, which is a short distance
from the first breach point.246
USCP officers formed a line across the Crypt in an attempt
to stop the mob’s advance.247 By 2:21 p.m., the rioters had
tried to break through police lines, but they were
temporarily unsuccessful.248
As USCP officers held the line inside the Crypt, President
Trump poured fuel on the fire, tweeting at 2:24 p.m.:
“Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have
been done to protect our Country and our Constitution,
giving states a chance to certify a corrected set of facts,
not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked
to previously certify. USA demands the truth!” 249
One minute later, the mob violently pushed through the USCP
officers in the Crypt and continued moving south towards the
House Chamber.250 Joshua Pruitt, the Proud Boy dressed in a
Punisher shirt, was at the front of the line as rioters
broke through in the Crypt.251 Officer David Millard told
the Select Committee that rioters in the Crypt claimed they
were in the Capitol because their “boss” told them to be
there—meaning President Trump.252 Officer Millard also
recalled members of the mob telling him they were there to
stop the steal.253
After breaking through the police line in the Crypt, the mob
pursued USCP officers as they retreated to the U.S. Capitol
Visitor’s Center (CVC). Pruitt was among the rioters who
advanced into the CVC, where he came close to Senator Chuck
Schumer.254 When the USCP officers attempted to lower metal
barriers to halt the crowd’s momentum, another small group
of Proud Boys immediately interceded to prevent the
barricades from coming down.255 The Proud Boy contingent
included three men from the Kansas City, Kansas area:
William Chrestman,256 Chris Kuehne,257 and Louis Colon.258
Felicia Konold and Cory Konold, two Proud Boy associates
from Arizona, joined the Kansas City group while marching
from the Washington Monument to the Capitol earlier in the
day and were on the scene.259 Two other Proud Boys, Nicholas
Ochs and Nicholas DeCarlo, filmed the incident.260
Surveillance footage shows Chrestman using a wooden club, or
modified axe handle, to prevent the barrier from being
lowered to the floor.261 Colon later admitted to authorities
that he purchased and modified an axe handle “to be used as
both a walking stick and an improvised weapon” on January
6th.262 Colon also told authorities that he attended a
meeting with Chrestman and others on the night of January
5th, during which someone asked, “do we have patriots here
willing to take it by force?” Colon understood that the
individual meant that they should use “force against the
government.” This same individual commented that they should
“go in there and take over.” 263
Rioters enter the Senate Chamber.
Rioters enter the Senate Chamber.
Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images
At 2:36 p.m., the mob pushed through a line of USCP officers
guarding the House Chamber.264 Rioters also entered the
Senate Chamber.265 Within minutes, Jacob Chansley (a.k.a.
the QAnon Shaman) entered the Senate Chamber, making his way
to the Senate dais, where Vice President Pence had been
presiding over the joint session. An officer asked Chansley
to vacate the dais, but instead he shouted, “Mike Pence is a
fucking traitor.” Chansley also left a note that read: “It’s
Only a Matter of Time. Justice is Coming!” 266 Surrounded by
others, Chansley held a conspiracy-laden prayer session,
saying: “Thank you for allowing the United States of America
to be reborn. Thank you for allowing us to get rid of the
communists, the globalists, and the traitors within our
government.” 267 Other extremists, including at least one
associate of the white nationalist “America First” movement,
also sat in the Vice President’s seat.268
While law enforcement fought to contain the mob inside the
Capitol, the fighting raged outside as well. Key agitators
continued to fire up the crowd. Nick Fuentes, the leader of
the “America First” movement, amplified President Trump’s
rhetoric aimed at Vice President Pence, including the
President’s 2:24 p.m. tweet.269 Speaking through a bullhorn
while standing on the Peace Monument, Fuentes shouted:
We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any
fraudulent elector votes! That’s right, you heard it here
first: Mike Pence has betrayed the United States of America.
Mike Pence has betrayed the President and he has betrayed
the people of the United States of America—and we will never
ever forget!270
As rioters flowed through the halls and offices inside the
Capitol, others broke through the defensive lines of USCP
and MPD officers on the lower West Plaza at 2:28 p.m.,
allowing them to take over the inauguration stage.271
According to MPD Officer Michael Fanone, MPD officers were
then forced to conduct the “first fighting withdrawal” in
the history of the force, with law enforcement seeking to
“reestablish defensive lines” to prevent the “crowd that had
swelled to approximately 20,000 from storming the U.S.
Capitol.” 272
After surging through the West Plaza, rioters quickly headed
towards the West Plaza tunnel. The violence that escalated
at 2:28 p.m. on the lower West Plaza continued as rioters
reached the tunnel. By 2:41 p.m., law enforcement retreated
inside the tunnel, allowing rioters to slowly fill in.273
Just ten minutes later, the mob jammed the tunnel,
desperately trying to break through the police lines.274 The
fighting in and immediately outside of the tunnel raged for
over two hours.275
Throughout the afternoon, members of the mob struck officers
with weapons, shot them with OC (or pepper) spray, and
dragged officers from the tunnel into the crowd. Lucas
Denney, a Three Percenter from Texas who carried a baton on
January 6th, pushed a riot shield into and on top of police
officers at the tunnel. The crowd chanted “heave-ho!” as
Denney did so.276 Jeffrey Scott Brown sprayed a chemical or
pepper spray at officers and pushed the front of the line in
the tunnel.277 Kyle Young, a January 6th defendant with a
long prior criminal history, participated in multiple
assaults and violence at the tunnel, including using a pole
to jab at police officers.
Rioters assault police officers at a tunnel to the Capitol.
Rioters assault police officers at a tunnel to the Capitol.
Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images
Young’s 16-year-old son was present during the fighting.278
Robert Morss, a former Army Ranger who wore a military-style
vest, participated in a heave-ho effort in the tunnel where
he and rioters had created a shield wall.279 Peter Schwartz
and another rioter passed a large cannister of spray back
and forth before Schwartz’s companion sprayed officers and
then the two joined in the heave-ho.280
One of the most brutal attacks of the day occurred outside
the tunnel when rioters dragged MPD Officer Michael Fanone
into the crowd, and then tased, beat, and robbed him while a
Blue Lives Matter flag fluttered above him. Albuquerque
Head, a rioter from Tennessee, grabbed Officer Fanone around
the neck and pulled him into the mob.281 “I got one!” Head
shouted.282 Lucas Denney, the Three Percenter, “swung his
arm and fist” at Officer Fanone, grabbed him, and pulled him
down the stairs.283 Daniel Rodriguez then tased him in the
neck. Kyle Young lunged towards Officer Fanone, restraining
the officer’s wrist.284 While Young held him, still another
rioter, Thomas Sibick, reached towards him and forcibly
removed his police badge and radio.285 Officer Fanone feared
they were after his gun. Members of the crowd yelled: “Kill
him!,” “Get his gun!” and “Kill him with his own gun!” 286
In an interview with FBI agents, Daniel Rodriguez admitted
his role in the attack on Officer Fanone.287 During that
same interview, Rodriguez discussed the influences that led
him down the path to January 6th. Rodriguez was a fan of
Alex Jones’s InfoWars and told FBI agents that he became
active at rallies after watching the conspiracy show.288
Rodriguez was motivated by Jones’s decision to support then
candidate Trump in 2015. 289 He also began to affiliate
himself with the Three Percenter movement, which he learned
about by watching InfoWars.290 And when President Trump
called for a “wild” protest in Washington on January 6th,
Rodriguez thought it was necessary to respond. “Trump called
us. Trump called us to DC,” Rodriguez told interviewing
agents.291 “If he’s the commander in chief and the leader of
our country, and he’s calling for help –I thought he was
calling for help,” Rodriguez explained. “I thought he was—I
thought we were doing the right thing.” 292
Rodriguez and another January 6th defendant, Edward
Badalian, began preparing for violence after President
Trump’s December 19th tweet. They gathered weapons and
tactical gear293 and discussed their plans in a Signal chat
named, “Patriots 45 MAGA Gang.”
“Congress can hang. I’ll do it,” Rodriguez posted to the
chat. Please let us get these people dear God.” 294
Badalian also posted a flyer titled “MAGA_CAVALRY,” which
showed rally points for “patriot caravans” to connect with
the “Stop The Steal” movement in DC.295 The same flyer was
popular among Three Percenters and other self-described
“patriot” groups. It also garnered the attention of law
enforcement. The FBI’s Norfolk, Virginia division noted in a
January 5th intelligence assessment that the flyer was
accompanied by another image, titled “Create Perimeter,”
which depicted the U.S. Capitol and other buildings being
surrounded by the same caravans.296
8.8 The Evacuation
When rioters surrounded the perimeter of the Capitol, and
reached the Senate and House Chambers, Members were forced
to evacuate for safety. USCP officers responded to both
Chambers and served as escorts. By the time the Capitol was
breached, the Senate and House had split from the joint
session, with Senators returning to their Chamber to debate
the objection to Arizona’s electoral vote. The House
remained in its Chamber to debate the objection.297
Starting in the Senate, Vice President Pence was escorted
off the floor at 2:12 p.m. and was taken to his Senate
office. Between 2:12 p.m. and 2:25 p.m., Secret Service
agents worked to identify potential threats and a route that
could be used to transport Vice President Pence.298 One of
the issues for Vice President Pence’s evacuation was that
the rioters were outside the Ohio Clock Tower, which was
just feet away from the staircase that Vice President Pence
could descend to evacuate.299 Eventually, after the mob
started filling the entire Capitol, the Secret Service made
the decision to move Vice President Pence, and he was
escorted from the Senate at 2:25 p.m.300 By 2:27 p.m., the
Vice President can be seen moving toward a secure location
connected to the Capitol. The Vice President arrived at the
secure location at 2:29 p.m.301 Following the Vice
President’s evacuation, Senators were evacuated at 2:30
p.m.302
On the House side, Speaker Pelosi, House Majority Leader
Steny Hoyer, and House Majority Whip James Clyburn were
removed from the House floor at the same time as Vice
President Pence. By 2:18 p.m., USCP surveillance showed
Speaker Pelosi in the basement hallway headed towards the
garage.303 The surveillance footage also showed Leader Hoyer
and Whip Clyburn in the same basement as Speaker Pelosi. At
2:23 p.m., Speaker Pelosi and Whip Clyburn were moved to an
undisclosed location.304
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy was evacuated just after
Speaker Pelosi left the Capitol. At 2:25 p.m., as rioters
were moving through the Crypt and breaking through the east
Rotunda door, Leader McCarthy and his staff hurriedly
evacuated his office.305 At approximately 2:38 p.m., the
Members of Congress on the House floor began their
evacuation.306 Members of Congress can be seen evacuating
through the Speaker’s Lobby when a USCP officer fatally shot
Ashli Babbitt at 2:44 p.m. 307 Members and staffers were
just feet away when Babbitt attempted to climb through a
shattered glass door. USCP officers had barricaded the door
with furniture to prevent the rioters from gaining direct
access to elected officials.
Members of Congress are evacuated from the House Chamber.
Members of Congress are evacuated from the House Chamber.
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
The congressional Members in the House Gallery were
evacuated after the Members on the House floor.
Congressional Members in the Gallery had to wait to be
evacuated because rioters were still roaming the hallways
right outside the Chamber. At 2:49 p.m., as Members were
trying to evacuate the House Gallery, the USCP emergency
response team cleared the hallways with long rifles so that
the Members could be escorted to safety.308 USCP
surveillance footage shows several rioters lying on the
ground, with long rifles pointed at them, as Members
evacuate in the background.309 By 3:00 p.m., the area had
been cleared and Members were evacuated from the House
gallery to a secure location. 310
8.9 Clearing the U.S. Capitol Building and Restricted
Grounds
Shortly after law enforcement officers evacuated the House
and Senate Members, they started to clear rioters out of the
Capitol and off the grounds. Starting before 3:00 p.m., law
enforcement spent approximately three hours pushing rioters
out of the Capitol building and off the East and West
Plazas. In general, law enforcement cleared rioters out of
the Capitol through three doors: (1) the House side door
located on the northeast side of the Capitol; (2) the
Columbus Doors (East Rotunda Doors); and (3) the Senate wing
door, which was next to the first breach point. As discussed
above, the Proud Boys and other extremists led the charge at
the latter two locations during the early stages of the
attack.
Outside the Capitol, law enforcement pushed the mob from the
upper West Plaza towards the East Plaza, crossing the north
doors. Eventually, these rioters were forced to exit the
Capitol grounds on the east side. The last point where
rioters were removed was the lower West Plaza—the scene of
some of the most intense hand-to-hand fighting that day.
After law enforcement cleared the tunnel, where violence had
raged for hours, police officers corralled rioters to the
west and away from the Capitol building.311
After rioters first breached the Senate wing door on the
first floor, they immediately moved south towards the House
Chamber. This route took them to the Crypt—with the mob
filling this room by 2:24 p.m. This was also one of the
first rooms that law enforcement cleared as they started to
secure the building. By 2:49 p.m., law enforcement officers
cleared the Crypt by pushing towards the Senate wing door
and up the stairs to the Rotunda.312
Around the same time that police officers cleared the Crypt,
they also removed rioters from hallways immediately adjacent
to the House and Senate Chambers. On the House side, rioters
were pushed out shortly before 3:00 p.m. The House hallway
immediately in front of the House Chamber’s door was cleared
at 2:56 p.m.313 The mob outside of the Speaker’s lobby was
pushed out of the House side door at 2:57 p.m.314
USCP officers were able to quickly clear out the Senate
Chamber, which was initially breached at 2:42 p.m.315
Rioters were cleared from the hallways outside the Senate by
3:09 p.m.316 Surveillance shows officers checking the Senate
Gallery and hallways for rioters; there are no people on
camera by this time.317
The Rotunda served as a key point where the mob settled
during the Capitol attack. For example, at 2:45 p.m.,
hundreds of people can be seen standing in the Rotunda.318
It appears law enforcement officers funneled rioters from
other parts of the Capitol into the Rotunda. Once they had
President Trump’s supporters herded there, law enforcement
started to push them towards the east doors shortly after
3:00 p.m. At 3:25 p.m., law enforcement successfully pushed
rioters out of the Rotunda and closed the doors so that the
room could remain secure.319 By 3:43 p.m., just 18 minutes
after the Rotunda doors were closed, law enforcement
successfully pushed the rioters out of the east doors of the
Capitol.320
The last rioters in the Capitol building were cleared out of
the Senate wing door—the same location where rioters first
breached the building at 2:13 p.m. Like the other locations
inside the Capitol, law enforcement began forcing rioters
out of the Senate wing door after 3:00 p.m. By 3:40 p.m.,
law enforcement had successfully pushed many of the rioters
out of the door and onto the upper West Plaza.321 However,
officers were unable to close the doors because some rioters
remained in the doorway and attempted to re-enter the
building. At 4:23 p.m., a combination of USCP and MPD
officers forced these people out of the doorway and
successfully secured the door.322
After clearing the inside of the Capitol, law enforcement
officers proceeded to sweep the perimeter adjacent to the
building, starting with the upper West Plaza. After pushing
the last rioter out of the Senate wing door, officers
started to clear the upper West Plaza, which is located just
outside this same doorway. Law enforcement officers in riot
gear formed a line and marshalled the crowd north from the
upper West Plaza. By 4:31 p.m., 8 minutes after closing the
Senate wing door, rioters were cleared from the upper West
Plaza.323
Many of these same officers started to secure the north side
of the Capitol as they pushed rioters from the upper West
Plaza towards the East Plaza. By approximately 4:32 p.m.,
law enforcement officers walked out of the North Doors,
forming additional lines to push rioters eastward. As
discussed earlier, the North Doors had been the location of
violent fighting throughout much of the afternoon. By 4:46
p.m., law enforcement had successfully pushed the rioters
from the north side of the Capitol to the East Plaza.324
Law enforcement cleared the East Plaza next. By 4:59 p.m.,
officers had swept all the remaining rioters from the east
stairs of the Capitol.325 At this point, the mob that had
overrun the upper West Plaza, the north side of the Capitol,
and the East Plaza had been moved off the grounds adjacent
to the Capitol.
The last areas of the Capitol grounds to get cleared were
the tunnel and the lower West Plaza. Thousands of rioters
had packed into the West Plaza just after the initial
invasion, led by the Proud Boys and their associates. The
tunnel was the location of the day’s most violent fighting
and the conflict extended until late in the day.
After 5:00 p.m., it appears that law enforcement directed
their attention to clearing the lower West Plaza, including
the tunnel. At 5:04 p.m., police officers in the tunnel shot
smoke bombs to get the remaining rioters to back away from
the doors.326 By 5:05 p.m., the rioters had all retreated
and the police officers inside the tunnel moved out and
started clearing out the area.327
At 5:13 p.m., on the opposite side of the lower West Plaza,
officers pushed the mob down the scaffold stairs and to the
lower West Plaza.328 These are the same stairs that rioters,
led by the Proud Boys and other extremists, had previously
climbed before reaching the Senate wing door.
Police officers form line to push rioters away from the
Capitol building.
Police officers form line to push rioters away from the
Capitol building.
(Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)
Once the rioters from the tunnel and the scaffold were all
situated on the lower West Plaza, officers formed another
line and started walking the mob back towards the
grass—which was away from the actual Capitol building. The
line appears to have been fully formed at 5:19 p.m., and the
officers started their sweep at 5:30 p.m.329 By 5:37 p.m.,
police officers pushed rioters back to the grassy area away
from the Capitol. It was at this time that no rioters
appeared to be in or around the Capitol building.330 At 6:56
p.m., a little more than an hour after the Capitol grounds
were cleared, Vice President Pence returned to the Capitol
from the loading dock.331 Vice President Pence walked up the
stairs in the basement of the Capitol to his office in the
Senate at 7:00 p.m.332
Vice President Pence and Speaker Pelosi preside over the
joint session of Congress.
Vice President Pence and Speaker Pelosi preside over the
joint session of Congress.
Photo by Erin Schaff—Pool/Getty Images
Shortly after 8:00 p.m., the joint session of Congress
resumed, with Vice President Pence saying: “Let’s get back
to work.” 333 At 3:32 a.m., the Congress completed the
counting of the votes and certified the election of Joseph
R. Biden, Jr. as the 46th President of the United States.
ENDNOTES
1. Enrique Tarrio (@NobleLead), Parler, Jan. 6, 2021 11:16
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1533921251743391745
(Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, June 6, 2022 5:18
p.m. ET (retweeting the Premonition video)).
2. Third Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380.
3. Third Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380.
4. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in
Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses
Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
5. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in
Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses
Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
6. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in
Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses
Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
7. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS5_Clip0065_1, at 0:04 and 1:14 (Jacob
Chansley being interviewed the morning of the 6th).
8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS5_Clip0067_1, at 11:43 (an unnamed
woman being interviewed the morning of the 6th).
9. Trial Transcript at 4542 and Trial Exhibit No. 6370,
United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
20, 2022).
10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478, p. 1
(event summary of January 6th rally).
11. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87–88;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12–13.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11–12.
14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000086772,
(Coordinated Response to a Request for Information from the
Select Committee, Nov. 18, 2021).
15. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Event
summary of January 6th rally).
16. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Event
summary of January 6th rally).
17. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Production),
DOI_46003146_00005053, (general arrest report at the
Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Production),
DOI_46003146_00005053, (general arrest report at the
Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Production),
DOI_46003146_00005053, (general arrest report at the
Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of National
Parks Service Staff, (Oct. 27–28, 2021), p. 6.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of National
Parks Service Staff, (Oct. 27–28, 2021), p. 6.
22. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu,
“Evidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd Grows as Arrests and
Trials Mount,” Washington Post, (July 8, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (event
summary of Jan 6 rally).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73–78
(District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department,
Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of
Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of
Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, audio file of
radio traffic from Jan. 6, 2021, from 12:00–13:00).
25. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF 143.
26. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF 143.
27. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 21–23, United States v. Kuehne, No. 1:21-cr-160,
(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366446/download.
28. See Spencer S. Hsu and Tom Jackman, “First Jan. 6
Defendant Convicted at Trial Receives Longest Sentence of 7
Years,” Washington Post, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/08/01/reffitt-sentence-jan6/.
29. Statement of Facts at 3, 5, United States v. Bargar, No.
1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1. See
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(District of Columbia Production, Axon Body 3 X6039BLAL, at
14:30:03 (MPD body camera footage).
30. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Bargar, No.
1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.
31. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Bargar, No.
1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.
32. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Mazza, No.
1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. June 17, 2022), ECF No. 25.
33. Statement of Offense at 3-4, United States v. Mazza, No.
1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. June 17, 2022), ECF No. 25; Statement
of Facts at 2, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736,
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
34. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 9–10, United
States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2022),
ECF No. 30.
35. For example, on November 13, 2020, Mazza
(@MarkNunzios64) tweeted at President Trump: “Can you unseal
obama’s birth certificate and college transcripts?” On
Facebook, Mazza shared a Q “drop” titled “The Armor of God,”
a 9/11 Truther video, and multiple posts dedicated to lies
about the 2020 Presidential election. Screenshots on file
with the Select Committee.
36. Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, “Armed US Capitol
Rioter Tells Investigators if He Had Found Pelosi, ‘You’d be
Here for Another Reason,’” CNN, (Nov. 23, 2021), available
at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/22/politics/loaded-firearm-january-6-charged-mark-mazza/index.html.
37. Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 3,
United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF
28.
38. Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 3,
United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF
28.
39. Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 4,
United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF
28.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Lawrence
Morelock, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 81.
41. Trial Exhibit 1.S.159.524, United States v. Rhodes et
al., No. 1:22-cr-15, (D.D.C Oct. 4, 2022); Trial Transcript
at 10502-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022).
42. Trial Transcript at 4109, United States v. Rhodes et
al., No. 1:22-cr-15, (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022).
43. Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States v. Rhodes et
al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022).
44. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Revoke
Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order at 4, United States v.
Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119, (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No. 16.
45. Statement of Facts at 2, 9, United States v. Miller, No.
1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
46. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Modify
Release Conditions at 3, United States v. Harkrider, No.
1:21-cr-117, (D.D.C. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 40.
47. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Modify
Release Conditions at 3, United States v. Harkrider, No.
1:21-cr-117, (D.D.C. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 40.
48. Dylan Stableford, “New Video Shows Alleged Jan. 6
Capitol Rioters Threatening Pence,” Yahoo! News (Feb. 7,
2022), available at
https://news.yahoo.com/new-video-jan-6-capitol-riot-pence-threat-drag-through-streets-195249884.html.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric
Barber, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 41.
50. Statement of Facts at 3–4, United States v. Foy, No.
1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
51. Statement of Facts at 3–4, United States v. Foy, No.
1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1-1;
Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Emergency Bond Review
Motion at 5 n.3, United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108
(D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021), ECF No. 11.
52. Statement of Facts at 2–4, United States v. Webster, No.
1:21-cr-208 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1-1. See also
Holmes Lybrand, “Former NYPD Officer Sentenced to 10 Years
in Prison for Assaulting a Police Officer on January 6,” CNN
(Sept. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/01/politics/nypd-officer-january-6-sentencing/index.html.
53. January 6th Committee, “Loudermilk Footage,” YouTube,
June 5, 2022, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9RNJ1tx4zw.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 123–25.
55. First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF
No. 26; “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged
with Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges
Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb.
3, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
56. Third Superseding Indictment at 16, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 21-cr-175 (TJK) (D.D.C. June 6, 2022),
ECF No. 380, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510971/download;
Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Finley, No.
1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. March 8, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1492396/download.
57. “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with
Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to
the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
58. “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with
Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to
the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
59. “Auburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with
Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to
the Jan. 6 Riots,” Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.
60. Third Superseding Indictment at 16, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510971/download.
61. See “War Room - 2019-AUG 09, Friday - Joe Biggs and Owen
Shroyer Talk Internet Censorship and Democrat Party
Terrorism,” Spreaker.com, (Aug. 9, 2019), available at
https://www.spreaker.com/user/realalexjones/08-09-19-warroom;
Alexandra Garrett, “Joe Biggs, Proud Boys Leader and Former
Infowars Staffer, Arrested Over Capitol Riot,” Newsweek,
(Jan. 20, 2021), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/joe-biggs-proud-boys-leader-former-infowars-staffer-arrested-over-capitol-riot-1563181.
62. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United
States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.
63. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United
States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.
64. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United
States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.
65. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United
States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.
66. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Finley, No.
1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2022), ECF No. 38, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1492396/download;
First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean
et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1377586/download.
67. First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF
No. 26, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1377586/download.
68. First Superseding Indictment at 8–9, 12, United States
v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021),
ECF No. 26, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1377586/download.
69. U.S. Capitol Police Camera U.S. Capitol Police Camera
9004.
70. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 3187.
71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1081_1_1.mov, at 0:14; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 139–40.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 138.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 130–31.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video
file M_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0486.mov.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick
Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 132, 143.
76. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 946.
77. “Peace Monument,” Architect of the Capitol, available at
https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/art/peace-monument.
78. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 946, 3187.
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0498.mov, at 0:00–0:30.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 33–38;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick
Quested Production), Video file
ML_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0498 2022-05-15 15.00.38 at 1:15.
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1116_1.mov.
82. Alan Feuer, “Dispute over Claim that Proud Boys Leader
Urged Attack at Capitol,” New York Times, (Oct. 7, 2021),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/proud-boys-capitol-riot.html.
83. Alan Feuer, “Dispute over Claim that Proud Boys Leader
Urged Attack at Capitol,” New York Times, (Oct. 7, 2021),
available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/proud-boys-capitol-riot.html.
84. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 946.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 41–42.
86. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 945, 946, and 3187;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick
Quested Production), Video files
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127_1.mov,
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127 2_1.mov; Elijah Schaffer
(@ElijahSchaffer), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:46 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1346966514990149639.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 44; Video
files Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127_1.mov,
Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127 2_1.mov; Elijah Schaffer
(@ElijahSchaffer), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:46 p.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1346966514990149639.
88. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 6–8, United States v. Jackman, No. 1:21-cr-378
(D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
89. Statement of Facts at 1–2, United States v. Pepe, No.
1:21-cr-52 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
90. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 7, United States v. Jackman, No. 1:21-cr-378
(D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
91. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Finley, No.
1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2022), ECF No. 38.
92. Statement of Offense at 2–5, United States v. Bertino,
No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.
93. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 908.
94. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
95. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944; Trial Exhibit 1515.1,
United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
18, 2022); Trial Exhibit 6757, United States v. Rhodes et
al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2022) (showing timelapse
of security footage outside the Capitol).
96. “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript
January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6.
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alex Holder Production), Video file
45DAY32CAMB0059.mov, at 2:11 (using audio track 4 to hear
the statement clearly from someone off camera).
98. “Tennessee Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges for
Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of
Justice, (Sep. 30, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-pleads-guilty-felony-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
99. “Tennessee Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges for
Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of
Justice, (Sep. 30, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-pleads-guilty-felony-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
100. “Two Men Sentenced to 44 Months in Prison for
Assaulting Law Enforcement Officers During Jan. 6 Capitol
Breach,” Department of Justice, (July 15, 2022), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-officers-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
101. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Mattice,
No. 1:21-cr-657 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2022), ECF No. 44.
102. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Release from Pretrial Detention at 10–11, United States v.
Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61;
Tom Dreisbach (@TomDreisbach), Twitter, Feb. 4, 2022, 7:40
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TomDreisbach/status/1489763508459687937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1489763508459687937%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Public Hearing, (June 16, 2022),
at 0:14:11–0:15:00, https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851;
Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit
07 at 7:43–8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117
(D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021). Nichols had made similarly violent
statements since the November 2020 election, with increasing
references to fighting on January 6th following President
Trump’s December 19th tweet. See Government’s Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at
4-8, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov.
29, 2021), ECF No. 61 (documenting the many communications
Nichols had with his codefendant planning for violence).
103. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Release from Pretrial Detention at 10–11, United States v.
Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61;
Tom Dreisbach (@TomDreisbach), Twitter, Feb. 4, 2022, 7:40
p.m. ET, available at:
https://twitter.com/TomDreisbach/status/1489763508459687937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1489763508459687937%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Public Hearing, (June 16, 2022),
at 0:14:11–0:15:00, https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851;
Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit
07 at 7:43–8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117
(D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021).
104. On the Media, “Jessica Watkins on ‘Stop The Steal J6’
Zello Channel (Unedited),” SoundCloud, at 4:00–4:12, Mar. 8,
2021, available at
https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.
105. On the Media, “Jessica Watkins on ‘Stop The Steal J6’
Zello Channel (Unedited),” SoundCloud, at 5:30–5:34, Mar. 8,
2021, available at
https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.
106. Statement of Facts at 13, United States v. Hazard, No.
1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Joy Sharon Yi
and Kate Woodsome, “How the Capitol Attack Unfolded, from
Inside Trump’s Rally to the Riot | Opinion,” The Washington
Post, at 1:32–1:42, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/opinions/how-the-capitol-attack-unfolded-from-inside-trumps-rally-to-the-riot-opinion/2021/01/12/a7146251-b076-426e-a2e3-8b503692c89d_video.html.
107. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000474 (Jan. 6,
2021, Alex Jones text message to Caroline Wren).
108. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000474 (Jan. 6,
2021, Alex Jones text message to Caroline Wren).
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Alexander Jones,
(Jan. 24, 2022), Exhibit 13 at 0:29 (excerpt from The Alex
Jones Show on Jan. 7, 2022).
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 260–61.
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 260–61; See generally The Alex Jones
Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against
Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,” Banned.Video,
at 37:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Alexander Jones,
(Jan. 24, 2022), Ex. 13 at 0:29 (Excerpt from The Alex Jones
Show on Jan. 7, 2022); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production),
REVU_000475 (Jan. 6, 2021, Alex Jones text message to
Caroline Wren); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000484 (Jan. 5,
2021, Tim Enlow text message to Caroline Wren).
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren,
(Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.
116. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own
Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available
at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
117. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own
Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:44, Jan. 24, 2022, available
at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
118. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own
Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:26, Jan. 24, 2022, available
at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
119. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own
Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 37:58, Jan. 24, 2022, available
at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
120. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own
Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 38:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available
at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.
121. The Alex Jones Show, “Humanity is Carrying Out its Own
Great Reset Against Planet’s Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW
1/24/22,” Banned.Video, at 38:16, Jan. 24, 2022, available
at
https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580
.
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Walter,
(Mar. 9, 2022), p. 78.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Walter,
(Mar. 9, 2022), p. 75.
124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Verizon Production, Nov. 19, 2021).
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (AT&T Production, Nov. 24, 2021).
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Alexander Jones,
(Jan. 24, 2022), Exhibit 12 at 0:20.
128. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=HS34fpbzqg2b.
129. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=Qo3hom0Qb1at.
130. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.
131. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.
132. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.
133. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, “Raw BodyCam:
Watch As Alex Jones Works With Capitol Police To Try And
Quell The Riot,” Banned.Video, at 8:45, Jan. 12, 2021,
available at
https://banned.video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.
134. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=a8lp9oooOT3m.
135. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, “Raw BodyCam:
Watch as Alex Jones Works with Capitol Police To Try And
Quell The Riot,” Banned.Video, at 15:10, Jan. 12, 2021,
available at
https://Banned.Video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.
136. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 125–MPD 126
(District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department,
Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021).
137. Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
138. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4–5, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
139. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4–5, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
140. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 5, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
141. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 5, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
142. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 5, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
143. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 6, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
144. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 12, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
145. See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Pretrial
Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4, United
States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021),
ECF No. 10.
146. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v.
Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. July 15, 2022), ECF No. 158.
147. See Spencer S. Hsu and Tom Jackman, “First Jan. 6
Defendant Convicted at Trial Receives Longest Sentence of 7
Years,” Washington Post, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/08/01/reffitt-sentence-jan6/.
148. See Statement of Facts at ¶¶ 14, 20, United States v.
Scott, No. 1:21-mj-411 (D.D.C. April 29, 2021), ECF No. 1-1,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1395876/download.
149. See Statement of Facts at ¶ 16, United States v. Scott,
No. 1:21-mj-411 (D.D.C. April 29, 2021), ECF No. 1-1,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1395876/download.
150. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Worrell, No.
1:21-mj-296 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available
at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1379556/download.
151. Statement of Facts at 10–11, United States v. Worrell,
No. 1:21-mj-296 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1-1,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1379556/download.
152. Statement of Offense at ¶ 9, United States v. Jackson,
No. 1:21-cr-484 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2021), ECF No. 19,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1452291/download.
153. Statement of Offense at ¶¶ 1, 25, United States v.
Greene, No. 1:21-cr-52-33 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2021), ECF No.
105, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1458266/download.
154. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=zOZ8CgfNU1SY.
155. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Kelley, No.
1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 8, 2022), ECF No. 1.
156. Statement of Facts at 6, United States v. Kelley, No.
1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 8, 2022), ECF No. 1.
157. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ryan
Kelley, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 7, 70–71, 79–80, and Exhibit
15.
158. Arrest Warrant at 1, United States v. Kelley, No.
1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 9, 2022), ECF No. 5.
159. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102; Third Superseding
Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No.
1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that
Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield . . . to break a
window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first
members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken
window”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
160. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 689; Third Superseding
Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No.
1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that
Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield . . . to break a
window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first
members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken
window.”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
161. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v.
Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF
No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield .
. . to break a window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and
that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol
through this broken window”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed.
Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
See also Ashley Parker, Carol D. Leonnig, Paul Kane, and
Emma Brown, “How the Rioters Who Stormed the Capitol Came
Dangerously Close to Pence,” Washington Post, (Jan. 15,
2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pence-rioters-capitol-attack/2021/01/15/ab62e434-567c-11eb-a08b-f1381ef3d207_story.html;
Kat Lonsdorf, Courtney Dorning, Amy Isackson, Mary Louise
Kelly, and Aeilsa Chang, “A Timeline of How The Jan. 6
Attack Unfolded—Including Who Said What and When,” NPR,
(June 9, 2022), available at
https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when.
162. Peter Manseau, “His Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away
from Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,”
Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/.
163. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Sparks, No.
1:21-cr-87 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1.
164. Complaint and Affidavit at 9–10, United States v.
Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1.
As an example of his conspiracy beliefs, Gieswein claimed
that American politicians “have completely destroyed our
country and sold them to the Rothschilds and Rockefellers.”
This is a standard anti-Semitic trope. See Complaint and
Affidavit at 11, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24
(D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1. Gieswein also denied that
he was a Three Percenter as of January 6, 2021, even though
he affiliated with an apparent Three Percenter group at
previous times. See Mr. Gieswein’s Motion for Hearing &
Revocation of Detention Order at 2–3, 18–19, 25, United
States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021),
ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein, the criminal
complaint noted that he “appears to be affiliated with the
radical militia group known as the Three Percenters.”
Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v. Gieswein, No.
1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/download. See
also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021 9:13
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315
(highlighting photos of Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter
symbol).
165. Statement of Facts at 1–2, United States v. Jensen, No.
1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1.
166. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Jensen, No.
1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1.
167. “Arizona Man Sentenced to 41 Months in Prison On Felony
Charge in Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(Nov. 17, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/arizona-man-sentenced-41-months-prison-felony-charge-jan-6-capitol-breach.
168. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Seefried, No.
1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download.
169. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Seefried, No.
1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download;
Maria Cramer, “Confederate Flag an Unnerving Sight in the
Capitol,” New York Times, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/politics/confederate-flag-capitol.html.
170. Statement of Facts at 2, 5, United States v. Seefried,
No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download.
171. “Delaware Man Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for
Actions Related to Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(Oct. 24, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/delaware-man-sentenced-24-months-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.
172. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor
Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach;
Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
173. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor
Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
174. Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et
al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
175. Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et
al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
176. Neil Vigdor and Alan Feuer, “A Jan. 6 Defendant
Coordinated Volunteers to Help Youngkin’s Campaign,” New
York Times, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/us/politics/joseph-brody-jan-6-youngkin.html.
177. Statement of Facts at 43, United States v. Brody, et
al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
178. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor
Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
179. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor
Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
180. “Virginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor
Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice (Sep. 20, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach;
Statement of Facts at 40–43, United States v. Brody, et al.,
No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available a:
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.
181. Statement of Facts at 2–3, 6–7, United States v.
Williams, No. 1:21-cr-618 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2021), available
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357051/download. A
jury found Williams guilty of certain felony and misdemeanor
charges, but could not reach a verdict on other charges,
including the aiding and abetting charge. See “Pennsylvania
Woman Found Guilty of Felony and Misdemeanor Charges Related
to Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 21, 2022),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/pennsylvania-woman-found-guilty-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-related-capitol-breach.
182. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States
v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37 (D.D.C. Sep. 15, 2022),
ECF No. 110; “New Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in
Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,” Department of
Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach;
Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Hale-Cusanelli,
No. 1:21-cr-37, (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1356066/download.
Pictures available online depict Hale-Cusanelli with a
Hitler-style mustache. See Holmes Lybrand and Andrew
Millman, “U.S. Capitol Rioter and Alleged Nazi Sympathizer
Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison,” CNN, (Sep. 22, 2022),
available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/22/politics/timothy-hale-cusanelli-stephen-ayres-capitol-riot/index.html.
183. “New Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for
Actions Related to Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(Sep. 22, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.
184. “New Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for
Actions Related to Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(Sep. 22, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.
185. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Packer, No.
1:21-cr-103 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1469561/download.
186. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 4–5, United States v. Packer, No. 1:21-cr-103,
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1353201/download.
187. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 102, 123.
188. Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594;
Spencer S. Hsu, “Officer Describes How Jan. 6 Rioters
Pursued Him through Capitol,” Washington Post, (June 15,
2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/06/13/eugene-goodman-capitol-police-testimony/.
189. Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594;
Peter Manseau, “His Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away from
Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,”
Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/;
Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Hearing &
Revocation of Detention Order at 8, United States v. Robert
Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (EGS) (D.D.C. June 15, 2021),
available at
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Robert%20Gieswein%20Government%20Opposition%20to%20Motion%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Revocation%20of%20Detention%20Order.pdf.
190. “Iowa Man Found Guilty of Felony and Misdemeanor
Charges Related to Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(Sep. 23, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/iowa-man-found-guilty-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-related-capitol-breach.
191. Peter Manseau, “His Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away
from Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,”
Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/.
192. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 113, 114.
193. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 213; Igor Bobic
(@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET, available
at https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594.
194. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.
195. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.
196. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.
197. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest
Warrant at 12, United States v. Rae, No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C.
Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1.
198. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Pruitt, No.
1:21-cr-23 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022), ECF No. 61, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510401/download.
199. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 113, 114.
200. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
201. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 932, 933.
202. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=a8lp9oooOT3m.
203. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, “Raw BodyCam:
Watch as Alex Jones Works with Capitol Police to Try and
Quell the Riot,” Banned.Video, at 15:10, posted Jan. 12,
2021, available at
https://banned.video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.
204. CNN Business, “Alex Jones’ Influence on January 6,”
CNN, Feb. 26, 2022, available at
https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2022/02/26/alex-jones-influence-january-6-documentary.cnnbusiness.
205. Hunting Insurrectionists, “East Main ‘Columbus’ Doors
1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th Capitol Attack
Footage,” YouTube, at 31:53, Mar. 12, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Thomas
Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 79.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Thomas
Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 79.
208. Hunting Insurrectionists, “East Main ‘Columbus’ Doors
1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th Capitol Attack
Footage,” YouTube, at 36:15, Mar. 12, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.
209. CNN Business, “Alex Jones’ Influence on January 6,”
CNN, at 2:20–2:28, Feb. 26, 2022, available at
https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2022/02/26/alex-jones-influence-january-6-documentary.cnnbusiness.
210. Hunting Insurrectionists, “East Main ‘Columbus’ Doors
1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th Capitol Attack
Footage,” YouTube, at 39:19, Mar. 12, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander,
(Dec. 9, 2021), pp. 64–66.
212. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 7029, 7216.
213. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.
214. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 16–19, United States
v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No.
1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.
215. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v.
Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.
216. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v.
Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.
217. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v.
Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1,
available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.
218. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 14–19, United States
v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No.
1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download;
“Two Men Charged with Obstructing Law Enforcement During
Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Dec. 3,
2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-charged-obstructing-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
219. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 24–29, United States
v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No.
1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.
220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Brian
Adams and Marc Carrion, (Apr. 20, 2022).
221. “Two Men Charged with Obstructing Law Enforcement
During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Dec.
3, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-charged-obstructing-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.
222. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.
223. See Chapter 6.
224. Trial Transcript at 4532:20–4534:9, United States v.
Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
225. Trial Transcript at 4642:24–4643:6 and Trial Exhibit
6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
Oct. 20, 2022).
226. Trial Transcript at 4643:22–4644:4 and Trial Exhibit
6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
Oct. 20, 2022).
227. Trial Transcript at 4520:9–4521:5, 4744:20–4745:21,
Trial Exhibits 1503, 6740, United States v. Rhodes et al.,
No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
228. Seventh Superseding Indictment at 21–22, United States
v. Crowl et al., No. 21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022),
available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1462476/download.
229. Seventh Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v.
Crowl et al., No. 21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1462476/download.
230. Trial Transcript at 4724:8–15 and Trial Exhibit 1500 at
13:02–13:25, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
231. Trial Transcript at 4779:1–4790:3 and Trial Exhibit
1505, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
Oct. 20, 2022).
232. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029; “Leader of Alabama
Chapter of Oath Keepers Pleads Guilty to Seditious
Conspiracy and Obstruction of Congress for Efforts to Stop
Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,”
Department of Justice, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-alabama-chapter-oath-keepers-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-obstruction#:~:text=Joshua%20James%2C%2034%2C%20of%20Arab,with%20the%20government's%20ongoing%20investigation;
Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. James, No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF No. 60, available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1479551/download.
233. Trial Transcript at 4803:10–4804:23 and Trial Exhibit
1089.1, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).
234. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 912.
235. “Crypt,” Architect of the Capitol, available at
https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/buildings-grounds/capitol-building/crypt.
236. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 267.
237. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 123, 124.
238. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 123, 124.
239. Watchers Guild, “Rioters Fight with Police at Capitol
Building - Washington D.C. - JAN/6/2020,” YouTube, Jan. 6,
2020, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7DiLh2Pbl4; News2Share,
“January 6 United States Capitol Attack,” YouTube, June 4,
2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TshRdxXi9c.
240. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No.
1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022), ECF No. 26, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/download.
241. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No.
1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022), ECF No. 26, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/download.
242. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No.
1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022), ECF No. 26, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/download.
243. Hunting Insurrectionists, “West Terrace ‘Tunnel’ - 3:50
- 4:21 pm - Jan 6th,” YouTube, Mar. 12, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yil1JemYMM0&t=1405s.
244. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
245. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Inside
Capitol.mov at 23:01–23:35.
246. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
247. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Inside
Capitol.mov at 13:10–15:47.
248. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
249. Jake Tapper (@jaketapper), Twitter, Feb. 10, 2021 5:50
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/jaketapper/status/1359635955389509638
(screenshotting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22usa+demands+the+truth%22).
250. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
251. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.
252. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of David Millard, (Apr. 18, 2022), p. 28.
253. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of David Millard, (Apr. 18, 2022), p. 28.
254. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. Pruitt, No.
1:21-cr-23 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022), ECF No. 61.
255. Complaint at 34–38, United States v. Chrestman, No.
1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download;
Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, Nov. 26, 2022 1:00
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1596564571371749378
(showing video Proud Boy Nicholas DeCarlo filmed while
inside the Capitol).
256. Complaint at 34–38, United States v. Chrestman, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download.
257. Indictment at 5, 8–9, United States v. Kuehne et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2021), ECF No. 29.
258. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Colon, No.
1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 143.
259. Indictment at 5, 8–9, United States v. Kuehne et al.,
No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2021), ECF No. 29.
260. Complaint at 36, United States v. Chrestman, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download;
Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, Nov. 26, 2022 1:00
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1596564571371749378
(showing video Proud Boy Nicholas DeCarlo filmed while
inside the Capitol).
261. Complaint at 36, United States v. Chrestman, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download.
262. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 143.
263. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No.
1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 143.
264. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 251.
265. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya
Eliahou, “What Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,”
ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=sbGOy4rN0ue4.
266. Statement of Offense at 12–14, United States v.
Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021), ECF No. 70.
267. Statement of Offense at 15, United States v. Chansley,
No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021), ECF No. 70.
268. Christian Secor, a young Groyper, sat in the Vice
President’s seat. See “California Man Sentenced to 42 Months
in Prison for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/california-man-sentenced-prison-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach;
Complaint at 6, 14–15, United States v. Secor, No.
1:21-mj-232 (D.D.C. Feb 13, 2021), ECF No. 1.
269. Other agitators, such as Vets 4 Trump founder Joshua
Macias (who was with Stewart Rhodes and Enrique Tarrio on
January 5th), also attacked Vice President Pence outside the
Capitol. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Joshua
Macias, (May 2, 2022), pp. 27–28, and Exhibit 14;
capitolhunters (@capitolhunters), Twitter, May 27, 2021 8:36
p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/capitolhunters/status/1398075750482337792
(video of Macias calling Vice President Pence a “Benedict
Arnold” outside of the Capitol on January 6th).
270. Reagan Battalion (@ReaganBattalion), Twitter, Jan. 7,
2021 5:03 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/ReaganBattalion/status/1347121703823044608.
271. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
272. Sentencing Transcript at 19, United States v. Young,
No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170.
273. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 74.
274. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 74.
275. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 4–8, United
States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF
No. 159.
276. Statement of Facts at 5, 29–31, 39, United States v.
Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1;
Status Coup News, “UNBELIEVABLE Footage | Trump Supporters
Battle Cops Inside the Capitol,” YouTube, at 24:09, Jan. 7,
2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJOgGsC0G9U.
277. Statement of Facts at 2, 6–7, United States v. Brown,
No. 1:21-cr-178 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1-1;
Storyful Viral, “Scenes of Chaos Captures Inside US Capitol
as Crowd Challenges Police,” YouTube, at 20:05, 21:03, Jan.
7, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qc0U755-uiM.
278. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 25–28, 55, United
States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sep. 13, 2022), ECF
No. 140; Status Coup News, “UNBELIEVABLE Footage | Trump
Supporters Battle Cops Inside the Capitol,” YouTube, at
9:45–9:56, Jan. 7, 2021, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJOgGsC0G9U.
279. Statement of Facts for Stipulated Trial at 6–9, United
States v. Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2022), ECF
No. 430; Torsten Ove, “Former Army Ranger Charged with
Assaulting Cops during Capitol Riot Faces DC Bench Trial,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (Aug. 17, 2022), available at:
https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2022/08/17/robert-morss-pittsburgh-glenshaw-army-ranger-charged-assaulting-police-capitol-riot-insurrection-january-6-bench-trial/stories/202208170094.
280. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Set
Bond and Conditions of Release at 6–7, United States v.
Schwartz, No. 1:21-cr-178 (D.D.C. June 15, 2021), ECF No.
26.
281. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Head, No.
1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. May 6, 2022), ECF No. 124; Government’s
Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, 18, 25, United States v. Head,
No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 159;
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(District of Columbia Production), Axon Body 3 No.
X6039B9N0, at 15:17–15:20 (MPD body camera footage);
“Tennessee Man Sentenced to 90 Months in Prison for
Assaulting Law Enforcement Officer During Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Oct. 27, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-officer-during-capitol-breach.
282. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, 18, 25,
United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19,
2022).
283. Statement of Facts at 33–34, United States v. Denney,
No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
284. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 30–31, United
States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022),
ECF No. 140.
285. Statement of Facts at 4–11, United States v. Sibick,
No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1-1 (noting
that Sibick told the FBI he was trying to help Officer
Fanone while other rioters attempted to get the officer’s
gun).
286. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), (Axon Body 3 No.
X6039B9N0), at 15:18:51–15:21:12 (MPD body camera footage);
Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 27-28, United States
v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No.
140.
287. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at
38–39, 43–45, 70–71, United States v. Rodriguez, No.
1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
288. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at
17–18, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C.
Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
289. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at
118, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C.
Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (quoting Rodriguez saying: “And
I was already—Trump was already, like—this is 2015, and I
was already into InfoWars and Alex Jones, and he’s backing
up Trump. And I’m like, all right, man. This is it. I’m
going to—this is—I’m going to fight for this. I’m going to
do—I want to do this.”).
290. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at
131, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C.
Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
291. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at
34, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct.
25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
292. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at
34, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct.
25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
293. Indictment at 2, 5–7, United States v. Rodriguez et
al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65.
294. Indictment at 2, 5–7, United States v. Rodriguez et
al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65.
295. Indictment at 2, 5–7, United States v. Rodriguez et
al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65.
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001
(Jan. 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report); see also
Statement of Facts at 11, 39, United States v. Denney, No.
1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1 (noting that
Denney, a Three Percenter, posted similar messages about
occupying Congress on Facebook).
297. See 167 Cong. Rec. S633-38 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021),
available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf;
Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz, “The January 6 Insurrection:
Minute-by-Minute,” CNN, (July 29, 2022), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-timeline/index.html.
298. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at
14:14–14:25. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of
this radio frequency. See also U.S. Capitol Police Camera
462.
299. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 961.
300. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at
14:14–14:25. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of
this radio frequency. See also U.S. Capitol Police Camera
462.
301. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7023.
302. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 461.
303. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 077.
304. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 3062, 6059, 6146.
305. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 269.
306. Select Committee staff analyzed thousands of hours of
surveillance footage from the United States Capitol. There
is no camera that captured the evacuation because CSPAN
cameras focus on the dais (so they miss the activity on the
floor), and there are no CCTV cameras around the floor. The
staff first identified Members appearing in the basement of
the Capitol at exactly 2:40 p.m. ET. Based on knowledge of
the Capitol and judging the distance traveled, staff have
estimated that it took Members approximately 2 minutes from
leaving the floor to getting to the basement, which puts the
evacuation at approximately 2:38 p.m. This time is
consistent with informal contemporaneous accounts provided
by Members and law enforcement officers who were there. See
U.S. Capitol Police Camera 0077.
307. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 0077.
308. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.
309. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.
310. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.
311. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
312. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 403.
313. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 251.
314. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 267.
315. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 304.
316. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 202, 303, 461, 462.
317. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 202, 303, 461, 462.
318. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 960.
319. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 960.
320. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.
321. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
322. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.
323. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 926.
324. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 927, 928, 929.
325. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 933.
326. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 074, 944.
327. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 074.
328. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 924.
329. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
330. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.
331. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7032.
332. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 011.
333. “WATCH: ‘Let’s Get Back to Work,’ Pence Urges Senate,”
PBS, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-work-pence-urges-senate.
Recommendations
1. Electoral Count Act.
As our Report describes, Donald J. Trump, John Eastman, and
others corruptly attempted to violate the Electoral Count
Act of 1887 in an effort to overturn the 2020 Presidential
Election. To deter other future attempts to overturn
Presidential Elections, the House of Representatives has
passed H.R. 8873, “The Presidential Election Reform Act, ”
and the Senate should act promptly to send a bill with these
principles to the President. H.R. 8873 reaffirms that a Vice
President has no authority or discretion to reject an
official electoral slate submitted by the Governor of a
state. It also reforms Congress’s counting rules to help
ensure that objections in the joint session conform to
Congress’s narrow constitutional role under Article II and
the Twelfth Amendment. It provides that presidential
candidates may sue in federal court to ensure that Congress
receives the state’s lawful certification, and leaves no
doubt that the manner for selecting presidential electors
cannot be changed retroactively after the election is over.
2. Accountability.
The Select Committee has made criminal referrals to the
Department of Justice, and both the Department of Justice
and other prosecutorial authorities will now make their
determinations on whether to prosecute individuals involved
in the events resulting in an attack on the United States
Congress on January 6, 2021. Additional steps may also be
appropriate to ensure criminal or civil accountability for
anyone engaging in misconduct described in this Report.
Those courts and bar disciplinary bodies responsible for
overseeing the legal profession in the states and the
District of Columbia should continue to evaluate the conduct
of attorneys described in this Report. Attorneys should not
have the discretion to use their law licenses to undermine
the constitutional and statutory process for peacefully
transferring power in our government. The Department of
Justice should also take appropriate action to prevent its
attorneys from participating in campaign-related activities,
or (as described in this report) activities aimed at
subverting the rule of law and overturning a lawful
election. This report also identifies specific attorney
conflicts of interest for the Department to evaluate.
3. Violent Extremism.
Federal Agencies with intelligence and security missions,
including the Secret Service, should (a) move forward on
whole-of-government strategies to combat the threat of
violent activity posed by all extremist groups, including
white nationalist groups and violent anti-government groups
while respecting the civil rights and First Amendment civil
liberties of all citizens; and (b) review their intelligence
sharing protocols to ensure that threat intelligence is
properly prioritized and shared with other responsible
intelligence and security agencies on a timely basis in
order to combat the threat of violent activity targeting
legislative institutions, government operations, and
minority groups.
4. Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3.
Under Section 3 of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment,
an individual who previously took an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States, but who has “engaged in
an insurrection” against the same, or given “aid or comfort
to the enemies of the Constitution” can be disqualified from
holding future federal or state office. The Select Committee
has referred Donald Trump and others for possible
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 2383, including for assisting
and providing aid and comfort to an insurrection. The
Committee also notes that Donald J. Trump was impeached by a
majority of the House of Representatives for Incitement of
an Insurrection, and there were 57 votes in the Senate for
his conviction. Congressional committees of jurisdiction
should consider creating a formal mechanism for evaluating
whether to bar those individuals identified in this Report
under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment from holding future
federal or state office. The Committee believes that those
who took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and
then, on January 6th, engaged in insurrection can
appropriately be disqualified and barred from holding
government office—whether federal or state, civilian or
military--absent at least two-thirds of Congress acting to
remove the disability pursuant to Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Committee notes that Ms. Wasserman
Schultz and Mr. Raskin have introduced H. Con. Res. 93 to
declare the January 6 assault an insurrection and H.R. 7906
to establish specific procedures and standards for
disqualification under section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the United States district court for the District of
Columbia.
5. National Special Security Event.
Until January 6th, 2021, the joint session of Congress for
counting electoral votes was not understood to pose the same
types of security risks as other major events on Capitol
Hill. Both the inaugural and the State of the Union have
long been designated as National Special Security Events,
requiring specific security measures and significant advance
planning and preparation. Given what occurred in 2021,
Congress and the Executive Branch should work together to
designate the joint session of Congress occurring on January
6th as a National Special Security Event.
6. To the extent needed, consider reforming certain criminal
statutes, including to add more severe penalites.
As indicated in the Report, the Committee believes that 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)2 and other existing provisions of law can
be applied to efforts to obstruct, influence, or impede the
joint session on January 6th, including to related planning
efforts to overturn the lawful election results on that
date. To the extent that any court or any other
prosecutorial authorities ultimately reach any differing
conclusion, Congress should amend those statutes to cover
such conduct. Congress should also consider whether the
severity of penalties under those statutes is sufficient to
deter unlawful conduct threatening the peaceful transfer of
power.
7. House of Representatives Civil Subpoena Enforcement
Authority.
The current authority of the House of Representatives to
enforce its subpoenas through civil litigation is unclear.
Congressional committees of jurisdiction should develop
legislation to create a cause of action for the House of
Representatives to enforce its subpoenas in federal court,
either following the statutory authority that exists for the
Senate in 2 U.S.C. § 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365 or adopting a
broad approach to facilitate timely oversight of the
executive branch.
8. Threats to Election Workers.
Congressional committees of jurisdiction should consider
enhancing federal penalties for certain types of threats
against persons involved in the election process and
expanding protections for personally identifiable
information of election workers.
9. Capitol Police Oversight.
Congressional committees of jurisdiction should continue
regular and rigorous oversight of the United States Capitol
Police as it improves its planning, training, equipping, and
intelligence processes and practices its critical incident
response protocols, both internally and with law enforcement
partners. Joint hearings with testimony from the Capitol
Police Board should take place. Full funding for critical
security measures should be assured.1
10. Role of the Media.
The Committee’s investigation has identified many
individuals involved in January 6th who were provoked to act
by false information about the 2020 election repeatedly
reinforced by legacy and social media. The Committee agrees
that individuals remain responsible for their own actions,
including their own criminal actions. But congressional
committees of jurisdiction should continue to evaluate
policies of media companies that have had the effect of
radicalizing their consumers, including by provoking people
to attack their own country.
11. Discussion of the Insurrection Act.
The Committee has been troubled by evidence that President
Trump’s possible use of the Insurrection Act was discussed
by individuals identified in this Report. Congressional
Committees of jurisdiction should further evaluate all such
evidence, and consider risks posed for future elections.
ENDNOTE
1. The Select Committee has shared concerns about two
specific areas of security with the Committee on House
Administration.
APPENDIX 1: GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO JANUARY 6TH
Introduction
The Select Committee investigated the facts relating to law
enforcement entities’ preparation for, and response to, the
January 6th events at the Capitol, including the character
of the intelligence prior to the insurrection. This appendix
does not address the cause of the attack, which resulted
from then President Trump’s multi-pronged effort to overturn
the 2020 presidential election.
Prior to January 6th, numerous government agencies received
intelligence that those descending on The Mall for a rally
organized by the President were armed and that their target
may be the Capitol. The intelligence community and law
enforcement agencies detected the planning for potential
violence directed at the joint session of Congress.
That intelligence included information about specific
planning by the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers militia group
who ultimately led the attack on the Capitol. By contrast,
the intelligence did not support a conclusion that Antifa or
other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent
counterdemonstration, or attack President Trump’s supporters
on January 6th. Indeed, intelligence from January 5th
indicated that some left-wing groups were instructing their
members to “stay at home” and not attend on January 6th.1
As January 6th approached, some of the intelligence about
the potential for violence was shared within the executive
branch, including the Secret Service and the President’s
National Security Council. That intelligence should have
been sufficient for President Trump, or others at the White
House, to cancel the Ellipse speech, and for President Trump
to cancel plans to instruct his supporters to march to the
Capitol. Few in law enforcement predicted the full extent of
the violence at the Capitol, or that the President of the
United States would incite a mob attack on the Capitol, that
he would send them to stop the joint session knowing they
were armed and dangerous, that he would further incite them
against his own vice President while the attack was
underway, or that he would do nothing to stop the assault
for hours.
Nevertheless, as explained below, and in multiple hearings
by the Committee on House Administration, there are
additional steps that should have been taken to address the
potential for violence on that day.
Discussion
Intelligence Received by Government Agencies
On December 19, 2020, President Trump tweeted: “Big protest
in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” 2 Following
President Trump’s tweet, an analyst at the National Capital
Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC) noticed a
tenfold uptick in violent online rhetoric targeting Congress
and law enforcement.3 The analyst also noticed that violent
right-wing groups that had not previously been aligned had
begun coordinating their efforts.4 These indications reached
the head of the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Agency (HSEMA), Christopher Rodriguez, as well as
incoming Chief of D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
Robert Contee.5 Chief Contee remembered that the information
prompted the DC Police to “change the way that we were going
to deploy for January the 6th.” 6
Following President Trump’s “be there, will be wild!” tweet,
Director Rodriguez arranged a briefing to provide the DC
Mayor Muriel Bowser the latest threat intelligence about
January 6th, outline the potential for violence, and “make
operational recommendations,” including that the Mayor
request assistance from the DC National Guard.7 During the
briefing, the Mayor was told that “there is greater negative
sentiment motivating conversation than the last two events
in November and December of 2020,” and that “others are
calling to ‘peacefully’ storm the Capitol and occupy the
building to halt the vote.” 8
As early as December 30th, in its intelligence briefing
entitled, “March for Trump,” the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
highlighted the President’s “will be wild!” tweet alongside
hashtags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols,
and wrote, “President Trump supporters have proposed a
movement to occupy Capitol Hill.” 9 It added that promoters
of the January 6th rally on social media had borrowed the
President’s phrase and were marketing the January 6th rally
as the “WildProtest.” 10
Other law enforcement entities were receiving similar
indications from both government and private entities. By
December 21st, the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) had learned of
a surge in viewers of online maps of the Capitol complex’s
underground tunnels, which were attracting increased
attention on www.thedonald.win, alongside violent rhetoric
supporting the President.11 By the late afternoon of January
5, 2021, Capitol Police Assistant Chief for Intelligence
Yogananda Pittman urged Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund to
convene a “brief call” to discuss “a significant uptick in
groups wanting to block perimeter access to the Capitol
tomorrow starting as early as 0600 hours.” 12 Chief Sund
remembered discussing those indications and the preparations
Capitol Police already had “in place, and [that] everybody
seemed fine with utilizing the resources we had.” 13 Chief
Sund added that, by that time, he had already deployed “all
the available resources.” 14
The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (DHS I&A) were also aware of the increased online
interest in the Capitol tunnels. The FBI’s special agent in
charge of the intelligence division at the Washington Field
Office, Jennifer Moore, pointed out that there was nothing
illegal about discussing the tunnels. Without a very
specific discussion of violence, it was a matter of ensuring
that the appropriate law enforcement partner agencies were
aware of the uptick, ensuring that the Capitol Police were
aware.15 “People’s First Amendment rights, obviously, are
protected. We cannot troll—can[’t] just troll the internet
looking for things that’s out there,” Moore said.16 “So it
would have to be with such specificity and such planning and
such detail that we would be able to open a case,
immediately seek authority for an undercover, have enough
probable cause for that undercover off of one tip would be
tough.” 17
Other agencies were also surfacing indications and receiving
tips. On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a
tip about the Proud Boys detailing plans of having “a large
enough group to march into DC armed and will outnumber the
police so they can’t be stopped.” 18 It stressed, “Their
plan is to literally kill people . . . . Please please take
this tip seriously and investigate further.” 19 On December
24th, the Secret Service received a compilation of social
media posts from “SITE,” a private intelligence group. One
of them urged that protesters “march into the chambers.” 20
Another, referring to President Trump’s December 19th “will
be wild!” post, wrote that Trump “can’t exactly openly tell
you to revolt,” so the December 19th post was “the closest
he’ll ever get.” 21 Another understood the President’s tweet
to be urging his supporters to come to Washington
“armed.” 22 Others were to the same effect (“there is not
enough cops in DC to stop what is coming,” 23 “make sure
they know who to fear,” 24 and “waiting for Trump to say the
word” 25).
By December 28th, that compilation had reached the newly
installed head of the Capitol Police intelligence unit, Jack
Donohue.26 The same day, a self-styled “internet expert” who
had been “tracking online far right extremism for years”
sent an email to the Capitol Police public information inbox
warning of “countless tweets from Trump supporters saying
they will be armed,” and of tweets “from people organizing
to ‘storm the Capitol’ on January 6th.” 27 She added,
“January 6th will be the day most of these people realize
there’s no chance left for Trump. They’ll be pushed to what
they feel is the edge,” noting that many would be armed and
that she was, for the first time, “truly worried.” 28 Other
senior Capitol Police officers do not recall seeing that
email before the January 6th attack.29 The next day, Secret
Service agents forwarded to Capitol Police warnings that
pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to “occupy federal
building[s],” “march into the capital building [sic] and
make them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” 30
In addition, on January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the
intelligence branch of the MPD forwarded to the Capitol
Police intelligence unit a tip—later forwarded to USCP
Deputy Chief Sean Gallagher—that he had “found a website
planning terroristic behavior on Jan 6th, during the
rally.” 31 The source included a link to www.thedonald.win
site, describing a “detailed plan on [s]torming the capitol
in DC on Jan 6th.” 32 On January 2, 2021, the FBI saved in
its system a social media post stating, “This is not a rally
and it’s no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . .
many are ready to die to take back #USA . . . . And don’t be
surprised if we take the #capital building[sic].” 33 On
January 3rd, FBI and Capitol Police received a Parler post
that “after weds we are going to need a new congress,” and
“Jan 6 may actually be their last day in Congress.” 34
On January 4th, Jack Donoghue, head of USCP’s intelligence
unit, and his assistant director, Julie Farnam, briefed
Capitol Police leadership, including Chief Gallagher and
Chief Pittman (but not Chief Sund), about the January 3rd
Threat Assessment, which highlighted that Congress itself
was the target of potential violence on January 6th.
Assistant Director Farnam explicitly warned the group:
Supporters see this as the last opportunity to overturn the
election. There was disappointment and desperation amongst
the protestors, and this could be an incentive to become
violent, because they have nothing left to lose. The targets
are not the counter protestors; the target is Congress. The
protests are heavily publicized. Stop the Steal has a
propensity for attracting White supremacists, militia
groups, groups like the Proud Boys. There are multiple
social media posts saying that people are going to be coming
armed, and it's potentially a very dangerous situation.35
On January 5, 2021, at 12:19 p.m., the Architect of the
Capitol head of security, Valerie Hasberry, forwarded an
alert to Capitol Police incident command that an individual
was calling on thousands to “go to Washington Jan 6 and help
storm the Capital [sic],” adding “we will storm the
government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill
federal employees and agents.” 36 “There is now chatter on
Parler about storming the Capitol,” Ms. Hasberry wrote to
her AOC employee working at the USCP.37 “Please let me know
if there are any updates to credible threats.” 38 Within an
hour, she was advised by her staff that “[t]here is no talk
about any credible threats or storming the Capitol.” That
same day, representatives from DHS, FBI, HSEMA, Secret
Service, DC Police, and Capitol Police shared notice of a
website, Red State Secession, that urged its visitors to
post the home and work addresses of Democratic Members of
Congress and “political enemies” under the title, “Why the
Second American Revolution Starts Jan 6.” 39 It asked for
their routes to and from the January 6th congressional
certification because “the crowd will be looking for
enemies.” 40
The FBI was uploading to, and tagging in, its system
incoming information from all FBI field offices about
January 6th under the label, “CERTUNREST2021.” While the
incoming information was reviewed on a regular basis by the
Washington Field Office, “unified monitoring” of the items
in the aggregate didn’t begin until January 5th.41 That same
day, the FBI captured a January 6th-related threat that
warned a “Quick Reaction Force” of Trump supporters was
preparing for January 6th in Virginia with weapons and
prepared “to respond to ‘calls for help’” in the event that
“protesters believed the police were not doing their job,”
and a “Situation Incident Report” from FBI’s Norfolk Field
Office warned of a “war” on January 6th.42 While Capitol
Police leadership received neither warning until after the
attack,43 Assistant Director Farnam, USCP intelligence unit,
warned that Congress would be the target on January 6th. She
noted that a “sense of desperation and disappointment may
lead to more of an incentive to become violent. Unlike
previous post-election protests, Congress itself is the
target on the 6th.” 44 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Mark Milley, remembers Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Norquist expressing a similar view based on
the social media traffic in early January 2021: “Norquist
says . . . [t]he greatest threat is a direct assault on the
Capitol. I’ll never forget it.” 45
Discussion of the Potential for Violence
Federal and local agencies agreed that there was a potential
for violence on January 6th. As noted above, the
intelligence leading up to January 6th did not support a
conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would
likely engage in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack
President Trump’s supporters on January 6th. In fact, none
of these groups was involved to any material extent with the
attack on the Capitol on January 6th.
That said, certain witnesses testified that they believed
that there would be violence with Antifa or similar counter
protest groups. President Trump’s National Security Advisor,
Robert O’Brien, said the White House saw a risk of violence
from counter-protesters.46 Then Acting DHS Secretary Chad
Wolfe said that his “main concern [. . .] at the time was
what we had seen throughout the summer and throughout the
fall, which was you were going to have groups on either
side, and so you were going to have counterprotests. And
usually where those counterprotests interacted was where you
had the violence.” 47
General Milley said the potential for violence was clear to
all: “Everyone knew. I can't imagine anybody in those calls
that didn't realize that on the 6th was going to be the
certification of an intensely contested election, and there
were large crowds coming into town, and they were coming
into protest. And everybody knew there was a probability,
more than a possibility, a probability of violence.” 48 He
expected “street fights when the sun went down,” while
[Deputy Secretary] Norquist said the most dangerous thing
was assault on the Capitol.49 Director of DHS Special
Operations Christopher Tomney remembered, “[T]here was broad
discussion/acknowledgment that folks were calling for
bringing weapons into the city on that day, so there was no
surprise, there was no—you know, no one disagreed that there
was going to be the high likelihood that there could be some
violence on January 6.” 50
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue described
the discussion about the threat landscape as “generally
about left-wing, right wing, or Pro-Trump, anti-Trump groups
coming to the Capitol. It didn't really matter what they
called themselves. It was a matter of they're upset, they're
coming to the Capitol, and there's a potential for
violence.” 51 Donoghue added: “Everyone knew what everyone
else was doing. Everyone knew that there was a danger of
violence. Everyone knew that the Capitol and other
facilities were potential targets. And I think we all felt
comfortable that we were aware what the situation was, and
we had the resources in place to address it.” 52
Operationalization of January 6-Related Intelligence
Preparing for January 6th required coordination among the
several local and Federal law enforcement agencies that have
distinct authorities and jurisdiction over adjacent areas in
the Washington, DC, area. These range from the MPD, United
States Park Police (USPP), and USSS to the USCP.
DC Government Preparation
December 30, 2020, HSEMA briefing
Following the DC HSEMA’s December 30th intelligence
briefing, Mayor Bowser, anticipating that President Trump’s
December 19th “will be wild!” tweet would have a big effect
on the number of people coming into the District,53 agreed
with HSEMA Director Rodriguez, who thought “the intelligence
was showing that we needed to posture ourselves, we needed
to brace ourselves, and we needed additional resources in
the city particularly the DC National Guard.” 54 MPD Chief
Contee, who attended the December 30th briefing and was
seeing similar intelligence, concurred with the request for
the DC National Guard.55
In light of the upcoming holiday weekend, HSEMA Director
Rodriguez wanted to expedite the DC request for National
Guard assistance.56 On December 31st, Mayor Bowser requested
the assistance of the DC National Guard to assist the MPD at
traffic points within the city.57 Mayor Bowser’s request
explicitly limited National Guard assistance to “non-law
enforcement activities” so that the MPD could focus on the
civil protests and specified that Guard troops should not be
armed.58Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy approved Mayor Bowser’s
request.59 By this time, DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez had
fully activated HSEMA and coordinated with Federal, State
and local partners, to deal with “consequence
management.” 60
On January 4th, Mayor Bowser held a press conference and
invited the MPD, USCP, and USPP.61 Mayor Bowser announced
that she had activated the DC Fire and Emergency Management
Services (DC FEMS) in preparation of the January 6th event
and that the DC National Guard would assist MPD at traffic
points and with crowd control. Mayor Bowser urged DC
residents to stay out of downtown on January 5th and 6th,
acknowledging the possibility of violence. She stated that,
while “[p]eople are allowed to come into our city to
participate in First Amendment activities,” DC officials
would “not allow people to incite violence, intimidate our
residents, or cause destruction in our city.” 62
The next day, Mayor Bowser sent a letter requesting that
Federal agencies coordinate with the Mayor’s office and the
MPD in their response on January 6th.63 The letter plainly
stated that it was intended to ensure coordination among the
agencies involved. DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez testified
that there was a concern, in light of the Federal response
to the previous summer’s civil justice protests, “that in
the event that activities on the street escalated, the city
could once again become . . . militarized and that armed
military and Federal law enforcement personnel could be
brought into the District,” perhaps intimidating
residents.64
DC FEMS Preparation
Mayor Bowser also activated DC FEMS (Fire and Emergency
Medical Service Department), several days before January
6th.65 DC FEMS focused most of its attention on the event at
the Ellipse since the permits indicated it would be the
largest event of the day, with an estimated 5,000 people
attending. Other DC and Federal agencies believed the number
would likely be closer to 35,000. This led DC FEMS to
establish an area command for the Ellipse, including a
Mobile Command Unit, six ambulances, four engine companies,
and a first aid tent staffed by George Washington University
medical staff.66
MPD Preparation
After the DC HSEMA’s December 30th intelligence briefing,
MPD Chief Contee ordered full deployment of the Department,
cancelling previously scheduled days off, fully deploying
the Civil Disturbance Unit, and contacting police
departments in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties in
Maryland so that their forces would be pre-staged at certain
locations. Chief Contee also staged police at the White
House and Lafayette Park. Chief Contee said that although
the MPD “are normally not fully deployed for civil
disturbance for counting votes at the U.S. Capitol,” 67
“obviously, as we got closer from the time of the initial
[December 19th Trump] tweet leading up, with all of the
rhetoric that's out there on social media, you know, people
were going to bring guns, were going to do this and that and
so forth, that caused us obviously to change the way that we
were going to deploy for January the 6th.” 68 Because of the
numerous social media posts about guns, MPD also posted
signs on the National Mall indicating that possession of
firearms in Washington, D.C., was illegal and would be
prosecuted.69
U.S. Capitol Police Preparation
On January 3rd, the same day Capitol Police’s Intelligence
and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) issued a threat
assessment indicating that “Congress itself is a target,”
Chief Sund called House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul D. Irving to
discuss requesting the DC National Guard to assist in
policing the Capitol’s perimeter.70 Chief Sund needed
approval from the Capitol Police Board, which consisted of
Irving, Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Michael C. Stenger, and the
Architect of the Capitol J. Brett Blanton. Chief Sund
remembers that Irving responded immediately that he did not
“like the optics” and that the intelligence did not support
the request.71 Irving, however, remembers Chief Sund calling
him to say the DC National Guard had offered 125 unarmed
National Guardsmen to the USCP and MPD.72 He also remembered
that, during a conference call, Chief Sund told Stenger and
him that the National Guard would be utilized in similar
fashion to the assistance provided to the DC police, namely,
staffing intersections, and for traffic control to free up
officers, but then could be used for crowd control, although
he acknowledged that the Capitol campus does not have many
intersections in need of staffing.73
The Capitol Police Board, including Chief Sund, later agreed
that a request for the DC National Guard would not be
necessary, particularly if the USCP was in an “all hands on
deck” posture.74 Chief Sund agreed with Stenger and Irving
that the intelligence did not support a request for DC
National Guard assistance.75 According to Irving, Chief Sund
did not believe the National Guard would add much to the
USCP security plan for January 6th.76 Chief Sund briefed the
Capitol Police Board on the USCP’s enhanced security plan,
and “all hands on deck posture”—including 1,200-plus
officers, added Civil Disturbance Units (CDU), an enhanced
Containment Emergency Response Team (“CERT”), and an
expanded perimeter.77 Chief Sund did not believe, based on
the intelligence he had, that it was then necessary to
cancel officers’ days off.78
USCP leadership did not create a department-wide plan for
the January 6th event.79 In retrospect Chief Sund believed
“there should have been a plan for the joint session of
Congress inside the Capitol to reflect all the planning and
all the coordination that goes on inside the Capitol.” 80
Government Agency Preparation
Interagency Coordination
In the appendix on Deployment of the National Guard, we
describe certain reasons why the deployment of the National
Guard was delayed, highlighting the activity of Secretary of
the Army McCarthy and how he understood an order given by
Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller. In our
interviews with Department of Defense (DoD) officials, they
testified that they had asked the Department of Justice to
serve the role of “lead Federal agency,” meaning to lead the
coordination and the response on January 6th. The Justice
Department does not command National Guard units. Department
of Defense, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officials testified from each
agency’s perspective about the discussions concerning which
department would serve as a lead Federal agency. Notably,
these discussions occurred at the same time President Trump
was offering the Acting Attorney General position to Jeffrey
Clark, replacing then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen.
Had Clark ultimately been appointed, and had he been placed
in charge of the Federal security response to the violence
on January 6th, the situation could have been materially
worse.
January 3rd Coordination Call
Realizing that there had not yet been a coordination call
among the Federal agencies engaged in planning for the
January 6th events and related contingencies, Acting
Secretary Miller convened one for January 3rd, because
“nobody else was doing it.” 81 In addition to DoD officials
including General Milley, DOJ, DHS, Department of the
Interior (DOI) officials participated. Acting Secretary
Miller’s objectives were to ensure that “everyone had the
same perception of the threat and then figure out how to
synchronize, coordinate.” He also wanted to make sure that
DoD was prepared for any additional requests for support.82
Director of DHS Special Operations Tomney remembered that
participants discussed the threat outlook and estimated
crowd83 of up to 30,000—not large for the District.84 The
consensus was that 8,000 to 10,000 police officers would be
available on January 6th, a force regarded as appropriate
for up to a million protesters. General Milley asked the
police participants on the call whether they needed any
other assistance from the Department of Defense.85 General
Milley and Secretary Miller expressed concern about the
number of groups requesting permits and the attendance of
groups like the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers who, as
Secretary Miller explained, had “conducted acts of violence
in the past.” 86 General Milley asked whether requests for
permits could be declined, canceled, or permits revoked.87
Participants from the Department of the Interior responded
that “that wasn't an option.” 88
According to Director Tomney, DHS felt confident in the
United States Secret Service’s ability to protect the White
House and Vice President, the Federal Protective Service’s
(FPS) ability to protect potentially affected Federal
buildings, as well as the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection’s ability to
augment FPS, if needed.89 General Milley and the other DoD
participants left the call reassured that the law
enforcement agencies involved were prepared for January
6th.90
During the January 3rd call, the DoD also raised the issue
of a lead Federal agency. General Milley noted the
desirability of a law enforcement lead for coordinating the
interagency planning and response effort, given the
“potpourri of jurisdictions” and diversity of agency
authorities.91 Secretary Miller testified that he believed
he and Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen were in
agreement that the DOJ should lead interagency coordination
for January 6th,92 although when asked during the call,
Rosen did not confirm that the DOJ would play that role.93
The question of a lead Federal agency remained “an open,
unanswered question” at the end of the January 3rd call.94
The same day, Rosen was attempting to secure a White House
meeting with President Trump regarding the imminent
appointment of Clark in his stead.95
Deliberation on Agency Roles
On a January 4th inter-agency call with the same group,
Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue made the DOJ’s role
clear: it would take the lead in certain areas of
responsibility, although he stressed that the DOJ was never
designated lead Federal agency and could not serve in that
capacity.96 On the evening of January 4th, the FBI
established a Strategic Information Operations Center
(“SIOC”) at FBI headquarters, which became operational on
January 5th.97 Unlike the previous summer’s civil protests,
DoD did not have a representative at the SIOC. All the DoD
officials who were interviewed by the Select Committee,
however, believe that the DOJ agreed to take—and may have
been assigned by the White House—the lead coordinating
role.98 Director Tomney, however, remembered that the DOJ
participants neither agreed to, nor explicitly declined, the
lead agency role.99
During the January 3rd and 4th calls, General Milley,
according to Donoghue, noted that “[t]here should be plenty
of police forces available without using Federal military
troops,” so he was adamant that no active-duty troops would
be deployed on January 6th.100 During this call,
participants also discussed whether there was a need for a
police-based quick reaction force and concluded that the
size of the MPD and USCP police forces made that
unnecessary.101
According to Donoghue, at the end of the January 4th call,
“[i]t was clear that everyone understood what everyone
else's responsibility was, and everyone understood what was
available to them if they needed more resources to meet
their responsibilities.” 102 The calls had also given local
and Federal law enforcement entities the chance to “voice
any issues, concerns, or requests for Department of Defense
support if they felt that they were incapable of handling at
their level. So, institutionally, there was agreement on the
threat assessment and the plan going forward.” 103 The DoD’s
leading role during the January 3rd and 4th calls had, in
fact, left Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf with the
impression that DoD was the lead agency, as they were
“coordinating phone calls, they were setting agendas for
phone calls, and they were calling out different people,
okay, what do you need. . . So they were quarterbacking the
situation and the response.” 104
Agency Actions on Permitting
Three organizations in the National Capitol Region handle
permits for organized activities depending on where the
planned activity is to occur. The USSS issues permits for
the Ellipse, while the DC MPD issues permits for the area
around the Ellipse. The USCP handles permitting for
activities on the Capitol campus. All three entities, as
well as other law enforcement agencies, communicate about
applications for permits and the expected number of
attendees. They are reluctant to deny permits for what
appear to be First Amendment-protected protests.105 The USCP
received, evaluated, and approved six group permit requests
for January 5th and 6th activity on Capitol Grounds.106
On December 19th, the day of President Trump’s “will be
wild!” tweet, Cindy Chafian, spokesperson from the “Eighty
Percent Coalition,” applied to the MPD and USCP for a permit
to hold a rally.107 On December 29th, Chafian applied to
USPP for a permit for a January 5th rally in Freedom
Plaza.108 The next day, Kylie Kremer filed for a permit for
“Women for America First” to hold a rally for up to 5,000
people on the Ellipse.109 On December 31st, the National
Park Service (NPS) held two meetings with Chafian as well as
the MPD and USCP.110 Then, on January 1st, the USSS
confirmed that President Trump would attend the January 6th
rally at the Ellipse, prompting USPP to provide additional
support for the rally.111
On January 4th, “Women for America First” requested that the
NPS increase the authorized attendance at its rally to
20,000 from the 5,000 in the original application. The same
day, reacting to the USPP briefing that 5,000 people were
expected, Joseph Roth, the USSS site lead, commented that he
found it “funny that this permit says 5,000 people when they
have said 30k repeatedly.” 112 On January 5th, the NPS
issued a permit for 30,000 participants for the Ellipse
event.113 At no point was any permit granted for a march
from the Ellipse to the Capitol. The President planned to
announce that march “spontaneously.” 114
At the White House, the increased crowd estimate concerned
Bobby Peede, Director of Presidential Advance, who emailed
White House Deputy Chief of Operations Anthony Ornato,
noting that the USSS was planning on using only 12
magnetometers. Peede added that “the mag issue is a pretty
major problem if the expected crowd shows up.” Secret
Service documents reveal internal discussion of an initial
USSS assessment that 17 magnetometers would be needed. On
January 6th, only 10 magnetometers were initially assigned
to the Ellipse.115
Agency Preparations for January 6th
January 5th Congressional Briefing by Chief Sund and Paul
Irving
On January 5th, Chief Sund briefed the Chairperson of the
Committee on House Administration (CHA), Representative Zoe
Lofgren, along with numerous staff, as well as House
Sergeant-at-Arms Paul Irving. Given CHA's oversight of the
Capitol Police, this was “an opportunity for the chair of
the committee to hear from the security professionals on the
security plan.” 116 Chair Lofgren’s staff director described
it as a “topline” briefing that covered various aspects of
the security plan, including Chief Sund’s direction of “all
hands on deck,” his focus on the prospect of counter
protesters, as well as Chair Lofgren’s concern that Members
of Congress speaking at the Ellipse that day could incite
protesters.117 After the briefing, the CHA staff director
specifically asked about the availability of the National
Guard in case it was needed. “Chief Sund said that the Guard
could be activated with an emergency declaration from the
[Capitol Police] board, but they are here. They are a phone
call away, and if we need them, they are ready to go.” 118
Speaker Pelosi did not receive a similar briefing, but her
chief of staff was given a readout of Chief Sund’s briefing
to Chairperson Lofgren. On that basis, as well as the
assurances Chief Sund provided, the Speaker’s chief of staff
said, “So I believed and the Speaker believed the security
professionals were in charge of the security and they were
prepared. We were told that there was a plan.” 119
Federal Agency Response on January 6th
Although intelligence was available suggesting potential
violence at the Capitol, it was not apparent exactly what
President Trump would do to provoke the crowd at the January
6th Ellipse rally. Chief Sund, for example, drove into work
on January 6th believing that preparations for the day’s
events were sound and that there was no extraordinary risk
or threat. “You know, on my way in, I called Inspector
Glover with MPD just to get a read. He said he was actually
parked over by the Ellipse. Asked him, Hey, how are things
going over there? He said, there's big crowds, lots of
people in line, but right now he wasn't seeing any concern
with the folks that we had. So that was my initial take,”
Sund told the Select Committee.120
Throughout the morning, Robert Engel, the special agent in
charge of the President’s Secret Service detail, received
updates from the event at the Ellipse. At 10:35 a.m., an
update informed Engel that 20,000 attendees had been
processed and outside of the magnetometers, but that there
were “several thousand on the mall watching but not in
line.” 121 An hour later, Engel forwarded an update to White
House Deputy Chief of Operations Ornato, informing him that
30,000 attendees had been processed.122
Acting Attorney General Rosen met with FBI leadership for a
briefing that morning.123 He remembered this briefing,
unlike previous ones, as “more of a situational update,”
adding that the DOJ was “going to hope for the best, prepare
for the worst.” 124 At 10:43 a.m., Acting Deputy Attorney
General Donoghue received an email from Matt Blue, Acting
Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, stating “[t]here are
no credible threats as of the 10:00 brief.” 125 Twelve
minutes later, Rosen spoke to White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone via phone.126 Acting Attorney General Rosen admits
that “in hindsight” no one at the Department contemplated
“how bad that afternoon turned out to be.” 127 Nobody in the
DOJ leadership could have predicted President Trump’s
actions that day.
The President’s speech at the Ellipse began just before
noon. David Torres,128 head of the USSS’s Protective
Intelligence Division (PID), insisted that the Secret
Service was not listening to the President’s speech, however
PID agents monitored the speech throughout.129 At 12:20
p.m., Faron Paramore, assistant director of Strategic Intel
& Information (SII), sent an email to USSS leadership that
“POTUS just said that he is going up to the U.S. Capitol to
‘watch’ the vote” and asked whether this is true. Secret
Service executive Kimberly Cheatle responded “[h]e said it,
but not going, to our knowledge.” 130 Minutes later, the
USSS PIOC warned that “Mogul just mentioned in his speech
that he would accompany the protesters to the Capitol,” with
a note that “DAD Torres requested this be sent for
awareness.” 131 At 1:14 p.m., the USSS Joint Operations
Center (JOC) sent an email designating a response team to
accompany the President in his march to the Capitol, “per
[his] announcement” at the Ellipse. The JOC notes: “Multiple
reports of armed individuals with various weapons and
malicious intent. Be on your guard.” 132
At 12:24 p.m., while the President was speaking, the Vice
President, with his USSS detail, departed the Vice
President’s Residence for the Capitol.133 After being routed
to the Senate side due to the protests, the Vice President’s
detail arrived at the Capitol at 12:38 p.m. and was inside
the Senate Chamber at 12:54 p.m.134
Around 1 p.m., Chief Contee notified Mayor Bowser about the
discovery of a pipe bomb at the Republican National
Committee and of the Capitol perimeter breach.135 Within
minutes, Mayor Bowser was at the Joint Operations Center
with Chief Contee.136 They tried to contact Chief Sund and
sent command officials to Capitol Police headquarters.137 At
approximately 12:59 p.m., once the violence had begun, Chief
Sund first called Deputy Chief Jeff Carroll of the MPD,
which provided almost immediate reinforcements.138
Approximately 10 minutes later, MPD officers arrived at the
West Front balcony to assist the USCP officers. Chief Sund’s
next call was to the House and Senate Sergeants-at-Arms to
request National Guard resources.139
As the violence at the Capitol escalated, DC FEMS realized
that they were facing an “expanding incident with the
potential for mass casualties, fires, active shooter, and
hazardous materials incidents that would exceed the
resources at hand.” 140 As violence escalated at the West
Front, non-lethal grenadiers began launching chemical
munitions at the crowd.141 Around the same time, the USCP
discovered a nearby truck containing firearms and Molotov
cocktails,142 as well as a second explosive device at the
Democratic National Headquarters at 1:07 p.m., while Vice
President-elect Kamala Harris was inside. Responding to
these incidents required a commitment of significant USCP
resources for mitigation and to evacuate nearby buildings,
preventing their deployment to the Capitol to help secure
the building.
Chief Gallagher recalled that “it started to really unfold
into an investigative—heavy on the investigation of let's
pull up the cameras. Let's try to get an image of the pipe
bombs. Let's get the images to our law enforcement partners.
Let's try to play back the cameras and see if we can
identify anybody that placed these pipe bombs. Let's get the
owner of the vehicle, run the vehicle information for that
suspicious vehicle. So we were coordinating all of that type
of response that was from our Investigations Division . . .
.We also had our IICD team trying to run down as much
information, working with our Investigations Division as
they could, on the suspicious vehicle, the tags of the
vehicle, stuff of that nature.” 143 Not including those in
the command center, the incidents would require the response
of 34 USCP personnel, with additional assistance provided by
the FBI and ATF. USCP’s senior leadership at the Command
Center and in the intelligence division also divided their
time between the escalating threat to their officers at the
Capitol and the explosive devices elsewhere on campus.
The next update to the DOJ was at 1:17 p.m., after President
Trump had finished speaking at the Ellipse. After several
attempts, Acting Attorney General Rosen got in touch with
Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Michael
Sherwin, who was at the Ellipse. Rosen admits he was not
very concerned with the situation at the time, because “[i]t
was early, but at least the initial report was: Crowd size
doesn't appear to be unexpected, and the conduct so far is
okay.” 144 He had only watched the end of the President’s
speech.145 It was early afternoon before the DOJ’s senior
leadership began to realize the extent of what was
occurring. Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue
remembered hearing protesters outside the Department of
Justice “marching down Constitution, going from the Ellipse
toward the Capitol” in the late morning, early afternoon,
but wasn’t specifically monitoring the protests as “there
were a million things going on.” 146
At the same time, the President was pressing his request to
go to the Capitol. According to Robert Engel, the head of
his Secret Service detail, President Trump asked to go to
the Capitol once they had gotten into the Presidential
SUV.147 Engel denied the President’s request and returned to
the White House.148 The Committee has significant evidence
regarding this period of time.149
President Trump, nevertheless, persisted in his request to
go to the Capitol. A 1:35 p.m. entry in the USSS Civil
Disturbance Unit’s time log shows that the plan was to hold
at the White House for the next 2 hours and then move the
President to the Capitol.150 Soon after, Engel emailed USSS
leadership from the West Wing to say they were “discussing
options and setting expectations.” 151 Minutes later, after
receiving an email from USSS leadership saying that it would
not be advisable for the President to go “anywhere near” the
Capitol, Engel responded, “[w]e are not doing an OTR to
Punch Bowl.” 152
Mayor Bowser also spoke directly with Army Secretary Ryan
McCarthy who informed her that they had not gotten a request
for National Guard assistance from the USCP. Mayor Bowser
informed Secretary McCarthy that she did not have the
authority to re-direct the 340 DC National Guard troops at
traffic points across the city, but that she had already
deployed the DC MPD and FEMs to the Capitol. Because she and
Chief Sund had not connected, Mayor Bowser concluded that
the security of the Capitol was “now our responsibility” and
requested National Guard assistance. At the end of this
call, Mayor Bowser believed that Secretary McCarthy was
“running [her request] up his chain of command.” 153
USCP Chief Sund was concerned when the explosive device was
discovered near RNC Headquarters but did not then believe
there was a need to change the USCP’s operational posture.
Minutes later, when a large group of rioters approached the
outer west perimeter of the Capitol, Chief Sund raised the
alarm and began to reposition his officers: “When we looked
up, and I saw them approaching the officers that were
standing, you know, right there on the barrier, I looked
over to Chief Thomas and I said, Chad, where's our—where's
CDU? Get CDU down there now.” 154
The USCP timeline shows that at 12:55 p.m. all available
officers were directed to the West Front of the Capitol.
Then, at approximately 1:25 p.m., FBI Deputy Director David
Bowdich received a report about the pipe bombs at the RNC
and DNC.155 Bowdich testified that the FBI considered the
possibility that the DNC and RNC bombs were possible
distractions.156 At 1:28 p.m., USCP requested the AOC
deliver 400 additional bike racks to the East Front to serve
as protective barriers, even though rioters were using bike
racks as weapons. The pipe bomb discovery at the DNC
prevented the AOC from delivering them.157
Chief Gallagher was surprised that the violence had
escalated so fast. “The amount of violence that immediately
took place when that crowd of 30,000, 35,000, whatever the
number that was estimated to come was, that did catch, I
think, caught Capitol Police and all of our partners a
little off guard with how violent they were and how quick
they were.” 158 At 1:49 p.m., DC MPD Commander Glover
declared a riot on the West Front of the Capitol. “Cruiser
50, we’re going to give riot warnings. We’re going to give
riot warnings. Going to try to get compliance, but this is
now effectively a riot,” Commander Glover yelled into his
radio. “1349 hours. Declaring it a riot,” the dispatcher
responded, which allowed a change in the type of equipment
the MPD could use in responding to the violence.159
While the violence continued to escalate at the Capitol, the
USCP leadership focused on three things: (1) requesting
support from local and Federal law enforcement agencies
nearby; (2) planning for and coordinating with arriving
reinforcements; and (3) protecting congressional leadership
and other Members of Congress. Chief Sund was “still making
other calls to other agencies for support—ATF, FBI, you name
it, Secret Service.” 160
Yogananda Pittman, Gallagher’s direct supervisor, told the
Select Committee that she took roles that day beyond her
responsibility as Assistant Chief of Police for Protective
and Intelligence Operations. “So we started—so I started to
take Protective Services Bureau resources, as well as the
chief's staff, to set up operations adjacent to headquarters
building, specifically lot 16, so that we could have a
check-in procedure for those units so they could stage
vehicles,” Pittman said.161 “Because like we know now, there
were breaches on both sides of the buildings and these folks
are inside of the Capitol. So you have to deploy them with
your officers. They don't know the layout of the land. We're
telling them to respond to north barricade. They don't know
the north from the south.” 162
Just after 2 p.m., when the Capitol was breached, Assistant
Chief Pittman turned her full attention to the protection of
congressional leadership.163 Meanwhile, the USCP officers at
the West Front were overwhelmed. Commander Glover praised
the actions of his fellow law enforcement officers that day
but also noted a lack of leadership.164 He observed that the
USCP officers he encountered when walking toward the
Capitol’s West Front seemed to be “very hectic and
scattered, with no clear direction, . . . fighting for every
inch on the line,” capable, but “without a whole lot of
command and control.” 165
When it became clear to him that securing the Capitol would
require additional resources, Chief Sund requested the
assistance of the DC National Guard.166 During a 2:30 p.m.
call set up by HSEMA Director Rodriguez, the USCP specified
the support they needed from the Guard.167 Mayor Bowser also
made “two urgent requests of the President” that she
communicated to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.168 One was for
the National Guard’s assistance.169 The other was that the
President make a statement asking “people to leave, to leave
the building and to get out of the city, to stop.” 170 At
2:56 p.m., Meadows told Mayor Bowser that the President “had
approved the request” and was “going to make a
statement.” 171
At the Justice Department, it had become clear by early
afternoon that the situation was rapidly deteriorating.
Donoghue first became aware of the Capitol breach when he
walked into Rosen’s office and saw on television that the
rioters were in the Rotunda.172 Rosen turned to him and
said, “[D]o you see this, do you see what's going on, can
you believe this?” 173
At 2:14 p.m., the Vice President’s detail had alerted Secret
Service over their radio channel that the Capitol Building
had been breached and that they were holding the Vice
President in his Senate office.174 About 5 minutes later,
the detail reported that the rioters had gained access to
the second floor and that they would need to relocate the
Vice President,175 despite the Vice President’s
objection.176 Five to 7 minutes later, after confirming that
the route was safe, the lead agent on the Vice President’s
Secret Service detail reasserted the need for the Vice
President to leave his Senate office.177 (At 2:24 p.m.
President Trump tweeted, “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage
to do what should have been done.”) At 2:25 p.m., the Vice
President and his detail left for a secure location.178 Vice
President Pence refused to leave the Capitol for his
residence and remained in the secure Capitol location until
the Senate and House floors were cleared around 7 that
evening.179
At 2:29 p.m., DC MPD Commander Glover transmitted an
emergency radio message: “Cruiser 50. We lost the line.
We've lost the line. All MPD, pull back. All MPD, pull back
up to the upper deck ASAP. All MPD, pull back to the upper
deck ASAP. All MPD, come back to the upper deck. Upper deck.
Cruiser 50. We've been flanked. 10-33. I repeat, 10-33 West
Front of the Capitol. We have been flanked, and we've lost
the line.” 180 Commander Glover later told the Select
Committee that a “10-33” indicates an immediate need for
“emergency assistance for any officer, life or death at that
moment in time. That's when that line on the north side
finally just broke and we just lost it, and we kind of got
overrun behind us . . . [W]hen you hear that in general
daily activity, it's like the radio stops and you're focused
on getting to that officer, wherever they are, because you
know it's that bad, that they're fighting for their life;
something they're perceiving or seeing or realizing is that
their life is in immediate danger.” 181
Donoghue left Rosen’s office to go to the FBI’s Strategic
Information and Operations Center (SIOC) across the street
at the FBI’s Hoover Building.182 Before he left, Donoghue
remembers someone at SIOC telling him “Capitol Police say
they don't need help at this point, they've got it
covered.” 183 When Donoghue arrived at the Washington Field
Office, he found FBI Deputy Director Bowdich in a conference
room by himself on the phone with a senior FBI official.184
After a brief discussion, Donoghue and Bowdich agreed that
they should both go to the Capitol to evaluate the situation
firsthand.185 Donoghue remembered that they arrived at the
assembly area on D Street.186 Donoghue called Rosen to say
that he and Bowdich were going to the Capitol.187
Around this time, Bowdich says that he received a call from
Senator Mark Warner, who said “[t]his is a mess, and we now
have the vast majority of the Senate in one room.” 188
Bowdich recalls the number being about 87 senators,189 and
that he directed the FBI’s Baltimore team to “protect that
room, recognizing you have almost the entire Senate in one
room.” 190 Bowdich also directed a SWAT team to Senator
Mitch McConnell’s office, in response to a call from
McConnell’s staff informing him that rioters were kicking in
their door. On arriving, the SWAT team found that
McConnell’s staff had reached safety.191
At 3:25 p.m., Rosen spoke to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and
Senator Chuck Schumer about the ongoing crisis. A video of
the call shows Senator Schumer imploring Rosen, “get the
President to tell them to leave the Capitol, Mr. Attorney
General, in your law enforcement responsibility. A public
statement that they should all leave.” 192
As the day’s crisis unfolded, Mayor Bowser activated the DC
mutual assistance compact with neighboring jurisdictions for
law assistance support and spoke to the Governors of
Maryland and Virginia to solicit additional National Guard
support. At about 3:30 p.m., Mayor Bowser spoke to
congressional leadership, including Speaker Pelosi and House
Majority Leader Steny Hoyer.193 Then, around 4 p.m., Mayor
Bowser, MPD Chief Contee and Army Secretary McCarthy met in
the Joint Operations Center at MPD headquarters.194 At 4:30
p.m., Mayor Bowser held a press conference with DC HSEMA
Director Rodriguez as well as Secretary McCarthy.195 Mayor
Bowser also declared a 6 p.m. curfew for the District.196
Vice President Pence, who remained inside the Capitol,
called Acting Attorney General Rosen at 4:34 p.m. to ask
what the DOJ was doing and what more the Department could do
to help.197 Vice President Pence told Rosen that the
situation at the Capitol seemed then to be “improving.” 198
The head of his USSS security detail recalls overhearing the
Vice President asking USCP Chief Sund, over the phone,
whether it would be possible to “go back to finish the
business of the government this evening.” 199 At 4:42 p.m.,
the head of the Vice President’s detail emailed the USSS
Office of Protective Operations that the Vice President was
confirming with Chief Sund that it would “take days to sweep
and reopen” the Capitol.200
Congressional leadership continued to push to return to the
Capitol to continue certifying the electoral votes. Senior
DOJ and FBI officials—including Rosen, Bowdich, and
Donoghue—held two conference calls. Donoghue remembered that
the first, at 6 p.m., was a “law enforcement-level call”
with General Daniel R. Hokansen, chief of the National Guard
Bureau, and focused on the role of the DC National Guard.201
The second call, at approximately 7 p.m., included Speaker
Pelosi, Leader McConnell, Leader Schumer, the Vice
President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Milley, as
well as other congressional leaders.202 During that call,
FBI and other law enforcement officials on the ground
provided an updated timeline for clearing the Capitol to
“hopefully get in an hour later.” 203
At 8:05 p.m., the U.S. Capitol Police announced that the
Capitol Building was clear and that Congress could resume
counting electoral votes.204 Shortly after Members returned,
Donoghue left the Capitol.205
DC FEMS statistics help describe the scope of the January
6th riot at the Capitol. Over the course of the day, DC FEMS
reported 22 EMS responses, 14 EMS transports, including two
cardiac arrests and two critical injury transports. There
were an estimated 250 injured law enforcement officers from
numerous agencies.206 One hundred-fourteen USCP officers
reported injuries.207 Five police officers who were at the
Capitol on January 6th died in the days following the riot.
Federal and local law enforcement authorities were in
possession of multiple streams of intelligence predicting
violence directed at the Capitol prior to January 6th.
Although some of that intelligence was fragmentary, it
should have been sufficient to warrant far more vigorous
preparations for the security of the joint session. The
failure to sufficiently share and act upon that intelligence
jeopardized the lives of the police officers defending the
Capitol and everyone in it.
While the danger to the Capitol posed by an armed and angry
crowd was foreseeable, the fact that the President of the
United States would be the catalyst of their fury and
facilitate the attack was unprecedented in American history.
If we lacked the imagination to suppose that a President
would incite an attack on his own Government, urging his
supporters to “fight like hell,” we lack that insight no
more. And the best defense against that danger will not come
from law enforcement, but from an informed and active
citizenry.
ENDNOTES
1. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United
States Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division
communication noting left-wing groups telling members to
“stay at home” on January 6th).
2. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19,
2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Be+there+will+be+wild%22.
3. See Select Committee Interview of Donell Harvin on
January 24, 2022 at p. 14:9–12 (“Harvin Interview (January
24, 2022)”); see also Select Committee Informal Interview of
Donell Harvin on November 12, 2021.
4. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Donell Harvin, (Nov. 12,
2021).
5. 4 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 22; see also
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell
Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 22; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez,
(Jan. 25, 2022), p.16.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert
J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 22.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 20.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel
Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 44.
9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001
(December 30, 2020, Protective Intelligence Brief titled
“March for Trump”).
10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473
(December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT
ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C.
Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building).
11. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000436,
CTRL0000000436.0001, CTRL0000000436.0002,
CTRL0000000436.0003. CTRL0000000436.0004,
CTRL0000000436.0005 (December 21, 2020, email re: Part II:
FYSA - thread in OSINT research, attaching Donald.Win
screenshots).
12. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000091,
CTRL0000000091,0001, CTRL0000000091,0002,
CTRL0000000091,0003, CTRL0000000091,0004,
CTRL0000000091,0005, CTRL0000000091,0006,
CTRL0000000091,0007, CTRL0000000091,0008,
CTRL0000000091,0009 (January 5, 2021, Yogananda Pittman
email to Steven Sund at 4:55 p.m. re: FW: Interest in
Tunnels Leading to the US Capitol , attaching screenshots of
theDonald.win posts).
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60–61.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60–61.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), pp. 55, 57, 62.
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), p. 95.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), p. 24.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000236995
(December 26, 2021, email to PIOC, PIOC-ONDUTY re: (U//FOUO)
Disruptions to DC Metro Area 01/06/2021 (Online Tip)).
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000236995
(December 26, 2021, email to PIOC, PIOC-ONDUTY re: (U//FOUO)
Disruptions to DC Metro Area 01/06/2021 (Online Tip)).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509
(December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President”: Demonstrators Urged to Bring
Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 “Stop the Steal”
Protest in DC, with attachments).
27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087
(December 28, 2020, email re: 1/6 warning.).
28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087
(December 28, 2020, email re: 1/6 warning.).
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John
K. Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 54; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan.
13, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 42; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sean
Gallagher (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 37, 57.
30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473
(December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT
ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C.
Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.)
31. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email
from Shane Lamond to Julie Farnam re: Fwd: MPD MMS Text
Tip.).
32. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email
from Shane Lamond to Julie Farnam re: Fwd: MPD MMS Text
Tip.).
33. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (FBI Production, Jan. 31, 2022). This document is
not being released due to national security concerns.
34. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000011 -
PARLER_00000013 (January 2, 2021 email from Parler to FBI
re: Another to check out).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 33–36.
36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production),
CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January 5, 2021, email from AOC
Command Center re: Individual says “go to Washington Jan 6
and help storm the Capital” adds “we will storm the
government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill
federal employees and agents”: Blog via 8kun).
37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production),
CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January 5, 2021, email from AOC
Command Center re: Individual says “go to Washington Jan 6
and help storm the Capital” adds “we will storm the
government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill
federal employees and agents”: Blog via 8kun).
38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production),
CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January 5, 2021, email from AOC
Command Center re: Individual says “go to Washington Jan 6
and help storm the Capital” adds “we will storm the
government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill
federal employees and agents”: Blog via 8kun).
39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083 (January
5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern).
40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083 (January
5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern).
41. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Briefing by
Steve Jensen, (Nov. 18, 2021). In an email sent by the FBI
to the Select Committee on November 8, 2021, the FBI stated
that on December 27, the FBI created a system to collect
threats related to the “election certification” on January 6
by using a tag, “CERTUNREST.” Despite making multiple
requests for the number of guardians that were tagged prior
to January 6, the FBI did not provide a precise number. The
FBI identified several dozen guardians opened in advance of
January 6th that included a reference to January 6,
Washington D.C., and either the U.S. Capitol or a specific
threat of violence.
42. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (FBI Production), CTRL0000930224 p. 23, (noting
“Communication and Establishment of a Quick Reaction Force
by USPERs Related to an Identified Protest in Washington,
District of Columbia, on 6 January 2021”).
43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Yogananda Pittman, (Nov. 12, 2021).
44. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001766,
CTRL0000001766.0001 (Document from January 3, 2021, titled:
“Special Event Assessment: Joint Session of
Congress—Electoral College Vote Certification”); see also,
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp 51–52.
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 236.
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert O'Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), p. 19.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 31.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 235.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 236.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 40.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2022), pp. 169–70.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2022), pp. 169–70.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 45.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 18.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J.
Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 26.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 24.
57. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000007104
(December 31, 2020, letter from Mayor Bowser to General
William Walker).
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 30.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 78-79.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 63.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
62. See DC Mayor’s Office, “Mayor Bowers Provides
Situational Update, 1/4/21,” YouTube, Jan. 4, 2021,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbZ07wdnQ-s;
Julie Zauzmer Weil, Marissa J. Lang, and Dan Lamothe,
“National Guard Activated for D.C. Protests, with More
Restraints than in June, Officials Say,” Washington Post,
(Jan. 4, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-national-guard-protests-bowser/2021/01/04/220ced16-4e8d-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 27–28.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr.
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 28.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr.
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p.66.
66. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981
(Memo: Final January 6th After Action Quick Look Report,
Government of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency
Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 14.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 15 (emphasis
added).
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 14–15.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 114.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 9. 21–23.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p.125.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p.12.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 12–13. The result was an
estimated 923 Capitol Police officers on the Capitol campus
at 7 a.m. on January 6 (50% of strength), 1,214 officers at
2 p.m. (66%), and a total of 1,457 at some point during the
day (79% of a total of 1,840 officers).
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 76.
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 138.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 138.
81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 86. 85
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 87.
82.
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 90.
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 39, 43–44.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 237; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue,
(Oct. 1, 2021), Exhibit 38.
86. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 82–83;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 194, 281.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 81-82; See
also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 236–37.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 81–82.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 39, 43–44.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 90.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 202–04.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 88.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 206.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 41, 45–46.
95. See Chapter 4.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 157, 165–67.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 97–98; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1,
2021), p. 162.
98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), PRODUCTION 1 -
000017 (“On January 3, 2021, during an interagency meeting
hosted by the White House, the Department of Justice was
designated as the lead Federal agency for the planned First
Amendment demonstrations on January 5–6.”).
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Tomney, (April 14, 2022), p. 45; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher
Tomney, (April 14, 2022), p. 46.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 168.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 169.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 169.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 83.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad
Wolfe, (Jan 29, 2022), pp. 48–49
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 58–59.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 58–59.
107. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of the Interior Production),
DOI_46000428_00005162 (Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email
Re: Status of application - Women for America First at 7:12
AM).
108. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions),
DOI_46000114_00000246.
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions),
DOI_46000114_00000246.
112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions),
DOI_46000114_00000246.
113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.
114. See Executive Summary and Chapter 7.
115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000481288 (
January 6, 2021 email at 8:17 AM referencing 2 magnetometers
being surged); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000495699 (January
6, 2021, email at 10:46 a.m re: Mags Update referencing 12
magnetometers, which means there were 10 earlier in the
day).
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jamie
Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 24.
117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jamie
Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), pp. 25–26, 30.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jamie
Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 28.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri
McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 146.
121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service production), CTRL0000481790 (January
6, 2021, email to Robert Engel at 10:35 am).
122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service production), CTRL0000536285 (January
6, 2021, email forwarded by Robert Engel to Anthony Ornato
at 11:32 am).
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 168.
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.
125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000587 (January 6, 2021, email to Richard
Donoghue at 10:43 am).
126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000621 (January 6, 2021, Jeffrey Rosen
call list).
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.
128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Torres, (Mar. 2, 2020), p. 80.
129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000093384 (January
6, 2021, message to PID agents at 12:00 p.m.).
130. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000152321 (January
6, 2021, emails at 12:20 p.m. and 1:34 p.m.).
131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000542477 (January
6, 2021, internal email at 12:26 p.m.).
132. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000087742 (January
6, 2021, Joint Operations Center (JOC) email designating a
response team at 1:14 pm).
133. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan.
6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this
radio frequency.
134. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan.
6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this
radio frequency.
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 6–7.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 7–8.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 8–9.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 147.
139. This call, and subsequent coordination for National
Guard assistance between various entities is detailed in the
National Guard appendix.
140. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981
(Memo: Final January 6th After Action Quick Look Report,
Government of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency
Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).
141. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000056 (noting
the event at 1:06 p.m.).
142. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000056 (marking
the event at 1:03 p.m.).
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sean
Gallagher, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 19.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 171.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert
Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).
148. For further details of the SUV incident, see Chapter 7.
149. See Executive Summary and Chapter 7.
150. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478.
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000496064.
152. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 6–7.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 147.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 111–12.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 111–12.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Valerie Hasberry, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 59–61.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sean
Gallagher, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 15.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 8, 9, 22–25.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 155.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 72.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 73–74.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 73–74.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 80.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 77.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 154.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 16-17.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.
174. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan.
6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this
radio frequency.
175. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan.
6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this
radio frequency.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 54.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 54.
178. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan.
6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this
radio frequency.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), pp. 72–73.
180. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070377
(recording of Metropolitan Police Department, Radio
Transmission, from 1400–1500 hours).
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), pp. 61–62.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 179–80.
183. 171 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 180.
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 180–81.
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 111; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1,
2021), p. 181.
186. 178 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 182.
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey A. Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 176.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 113–14.
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 113–14.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 114.
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 114.
192. “Video Shows Pelosi Trying to Secure the Capitol,” New
York Times, (Oct. 13, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000008581029/jan-6-pelosi-video.html.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 15.
194. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), PRODUCTION 1 -
000017.
195. ”D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser Press Conference on Capitol
Protests Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/d-c-mayor-muriel-bowser-press-conference-on-capitol-protests-transcript-january-6.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 7.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 182.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 182–83.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 82.
200. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000512238 (January
6, 2021, email at 4:42 p.m. noting “Hoosier going to call
chief of Capital [sic] Police”).
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 190. Donoghue
memorialized this call in handwritten notes. See Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6,
2021, handwritten notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 p.m.).
202. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6, 2021, handwritten
notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 pm.).
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David
Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 116.
204. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Justice Production),
HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6, 2021, handwritten
notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 pm.)
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 191.
206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981
(Memo: Final January 6th After Action Quick Look Report,
Government of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency
Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).
207. United States Government Accountability Office, CAPITOL
ATTACK: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Capitol
Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations, 117th Cong., 2d
sess. (March 2022), available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104829.pdf.
APPENDIX 2: DC NATIONAL GUARD PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO JANUARY 6TH
Introduction
H. Res. 503 Section 4(a) directs the Select Committee to
examine the “facts, circumstances, and causes relating to
the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol,” including the
“activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement
agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and
information sharing among the branches and other
instrumentalities of government.” This appendix focuses on
the activities of the DC National Guard in the days leading
up to and on January 6, 2021.
In contrast to the National Guard units in 50 States and
three territories, where deployment authority lies with the
governor of those respective jurisdictions, the DC Guard
falls directly under the command of the United States
President. In the discussion section below, this appendix
provides a narrative of the preparations for and eventual
deployment of the DC Guard on January 6th, and the
interaction between then-President Trump and the DC Guard in
the relevant time period. It is based on the Select
Committee’s interviews of 24 witnesses and review of over
37,000 pages of documents.
Discussion
A “Gut-wrenching” Summer
The approval process for the deployment of the DC National
Guard is unique, unlike any of the 50 States or three
territories across the country where ultimate authority
rests in the hands of the governor.1 In the nation’s
capital, where no governorship exists, the Guard is
ultimately under the command of the President of the United
States when acting in its militia capacity to support civil
authorities.2 By executive order, however, President Richard
Nixon delegated the President’s day-to-day control of the DC
Guard to the Secretary of Defense and specified that its
Commanding General should report to the Secretary of Defense
or the Secretary’s designee.3 By memorandum, the Secretary
of Defense, in turn, delegated day-to-day control of the DC
Guard to the Secretary of the Army.4 The commander of the DC
Guard reported directly to the Secretary of the Army on
January 6, 2021.5
During the 2020 summer protests in response to the murder of
George Floyd,6 the approval process for Guard deployment ran
smoothly. “Very, very proactive,” then-Commanding General of
the DC Guard William Walker said.7 Secretary of the Army
Ryan McCarthy “really wanted us out there.”8 Secretary
McCarthy, with all his authorities, was physically beside
Major General Walker throughout that summer. “[H]e was with
me for all of it,” Major General Walker said.9 “He came to
the [A]rmory every day. He brought his staff with him.”10 As
has been widely reported, a number of President Trump’s
senior advisors, including Attorney General Bill Barr,
resisted President Trump’s requests to deploy the Guard or
other troops in various states and cities where violence had
occurred or was underway.11
In the summer of 2020, nothing was being written down; it
“was just all verbal back and forth.”12 That approach sped
up response times. But as the DC Guard footprint grew and
controversies began plaguing the operation, Secretary
McCarthy came away with the lesson that deliberative and by
written order beat fast and by oral command.13
“What we learned in the process was we were not capturing a
lot of the information in writing in the orders process,
which is fundamental, foundational because of the stress of
the situation and the speed of the situation,” Secretary
McCarthy said.14
While a concept of operations (“con-op”) was developed at
the lower level during the summer 2020 operations, it did
not require approval or input at the secretary level.15 That
approach came to be seen as a mistake that should not be
replicated the next time there was a civil disturbance
crisis in the nation’s capital. General Walter Piatt,
director of the Army staff, explained: “That’s where
Secretary McCarthy put that restriction to say, I want a
concept of the operation before we just send a force to do
something.”16
One of the most visible and highly criticized of the summer
2020 operations was the use of low-flying helicopters that
appeared to be bearing down on protesters with the aim of
dispersing them. On June 1st, as Guard presence tripled
overnight, the use of helicopters meant for aerial
surveillance17 “somehow got translated to a very competent
Army officer that ‘I am to fly low and loud to deter
looters,’” General Piatt said.18 “[W]hat the investigation
revealed was that we did not have good procedures in place
to provide military support to a very serious civil
disturbance ongoing. The—because—the pilot of that aircraft
believed that was his mission.”19
The “embarrass[ment]”20 of the low-flying helicopter
affected Secretary McCarthy. General Charles Flynn, then-
deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and training,
told the Select Committee, “I know the Secretary was
concerned.”21 He further explained: “I’m sure that affected
his thinking.”22
Secretary McCarthy became convinced that a concept of
operations needed to be “explicit, tailored”23 and—most
importantly—that it needed to “come from [the] top down.”24
Secretary McCarthy told his staff, “[W]hen we get a request
next time, we have to be absolutely certain that we
understand the mission clearly,”25 and that “no other civil
authority could re-mission off that support without the
approval of either the Secretary of the Army or, in certain
circumstances, the Secretary of Defense.”26
In mid-June 2020, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper,
Secretary McCarthy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Mark Milley, and Major General Walker huddled to
talk about what went wrong in the preceding weeks. Senior
defense officials then decided they would take a “more
active” role in directing the force.27 “[A]s a result, we
all took a more active interest in what was happening down
to the tactical level to make sure that we were, again,
abiding by kind of the core principles of civil-military
relations,” former Secretary Esper said.28
Major General Walker said he was not told about that shift
in perspective: “[I]f the Army thought different of how we
respond to civil unrest, civil disturbance, I would hope . .
. they would communicate that with the guy—with the person
who is going to execute that change.”29
In the words of General Milley, the summer of 2020 had been
“a pretty gut-wrenching experience.”30 The Department of
Defense was still recovering when it was faced with the
decision of the manner and degree to which the DC Guard
should provide assistance to law enforcement authorities
planning, just seven months later, for the events
anticipated in connection with Congressional certification
of the electoral votes on January 6, 2021.
A “Tailored” Request for Guard Resources
On December 19, 2020, President Trump tweeted, “Big protest
in DC on January 6th. Be there! Will be wild!” From that day
forward, a rookie DC intelligence analyst saw a tenfold
uptick in violent rhetoric targeting Congress and law
enforcement.31 Right-wing groups were sharing histories of
violence and some not traditionally aligned had begun
coordinating their efforts. 32 The analyst’s report reached
more senior DC leadership, including, eleven days later,
Mayor Bowser.33 In the course of the Committee’s
investigation, it received and reviewed a significant number
of documents indicating that certain intelligence and law
enforcement agencies understood that violence was possible
or even likely on January 6th. The Committee received many
of those materials from the U.S. Secret Service, but also
from other agencies as well.
On Thursday, December 31, 2020, the day after the briefing,
Mayor Bowser sent a letter to Major General Walker
requesting Guard assistance for January 5 and 6, 2021.34 A
second letter specified the District’s request as limited to
two forms of assistance: crowd management at Metro stations
and blocking vehicles at traffic posts. It did not request
help with potential civil disturbance.35
General Piatt viewed the “limited request”36 as a “pretty
good, tailored mission,” that was “not vague.”37 General
James McConville, chief of staff of the Army, called the
request appropriately “restricted”38 with “a very low
military signature.”39
According to testimony by Defense Department witnesses,
after a summer of perceived overreach, military leadership
was grateful for the delineated parameters set by the city
itself.
The substance of the request—limited to traffic and crowd
control “so they could have more police officers to do
police functions”40—was not seen as narrow by District
officials. “I would say it’s a specific request,” Chief of
DC Police (Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)) Robert
Contee said.41 “[L]eave the unlawful stuff, leave that to
the police to deal with.”42 Mayor Bowser said: “I don’t know
any law enforcement person who would suggest that urban
disturbances aren’t best handled by the police.”43
“Civil disturbance was not something we requested at that
time. Mostly also because the vast majority of the, if not
all, of the permitted protests were taking place on Federal
lands,” said Director of the DC Homeland Security and
Emergency Management Agency Christopher Rodriguez.44 The
District had no jurisdiction. “Mayor Bowser cannot make a
request on behalf of the White House or on behalf of the
Capitol for U.S. Capitol—for . . . DC National Guardsmen to
deploy to those two entities. She can’t,” Chief Contee
said.45 At this time, it was well known that President Trump
had planned a speech and rally on “Federal lands”—on the
Ellipse south of the White House. It was not widely known
that President Trump intended to “spontaneously” instruct
the tens of thousands of supporters at that Ellipse rally to
march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol.46
Five Days of “Tremendous Resistance”
At first, Secretary McCarthy was not sold on involving the
Guard at all. Major General Walker called Secretary McCarthy
“instantly when I got the letters” from the District on
Thursday, December 31st, and “initially I felt I must have
caught him at a bad time.”47 Secretary McCarthy recalls it
being a short conversation. “I said, ‘okay, got it. Thank
you.’ You want to immediately flip it so that Secretary of
Defense knows that we alerted his office,” he said.48
According to Major General Walker’s account of this call,
the Secretary initially stated “‘We’re not doing it,’” 49
and then left the door open for further discussion. Major
General Walker explained: “‘I said, ‘Well, sir, I think you
should look at it.’ And then he told me, ‘Well, we’ll talk
about it, but we don’t really want to do this, because the
look it would give, the military out there interfering.’ . .
. He says, ‘Well, we’ll discuss it on Monday.’”50
On Sunday, January 3rd, Secretary McCarthy called Chief
Contee, who had formally assumed the role of acting head of
MPD just the day before.51
“I thought initially that . . . he is just calling me
basically as a rubber stamp to say, . . . ‘You asked for it,
you got it.’ . . . It didn’t go that way,” Chief Contee
said.52 “[H]e had concerns about deploying National Guard
for this event. He talked about the optics of the event,
having boots on the ground. . . . And I pushed back on
that.”53
In his interview with the Select Committee, Secretary
McCarthy described evaluating the request on the evening of
January 3rd. “I sat at home. I chewed on it,” he said.54
“You know, I’m not particularly inclined to support it,
because my concern was really we didn’t have a
command-and-control architecture in place. We didn’t really
have all of the mechanisms to be successful, you know. . . .
So it was a very tough decision for me.”55
Over five days, from December 31st to January 4th, District
officials faced what Major General Walker called “tremendous
resistance.”56
Both Chief Contee and Director Rodriguez recalled that
five-day period on January 6th, when Chief Steven Sund, of
the U.S. Capitol Police, was pleading for reinforcements.57
Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller, “heard through
the grapevine that [Secretary McCarthy] was inclined—I don’t
want to say inclined to disapprove, but, you know, looking
at it carefully or whatever. So—but that’s fine. He can do
whatever he wants. I knew that I was going to honor [the
mayor’s] request . . . .”58
How close those Guard assets could go to the Capitol became
a sticking point. Colonel Craig Hunter, the highest-ranking
commander on the ground on January 6th, said the Army
“really want[ed] to go through the concept of operations to
see, okay, exactly—basically Metro stop by Metro stop,
intersection by intersection, to see where will Guardsmen be
exactly, you know, how close are you to the Capitol . . .
.”59 He said an initial request by MPD to post Guard troops
at the South Capitol Metro station—like all other Metro
stations—was denied.60 In conference calls that “went back
and forth,”61 Major General Walker was told, “There was a
concern about being too close, military uniforms too close
to the Capitol.”62
Major General Walker had a different perspective. He saw his
people as “citizen soldiers,” “your neighbors that are going
to come to your aid and rescue when you need us,”63—not
traditional boots on the ground. “[T]hat’s where, to me, the
vest came in. This was the National Guard, not the Army,” he
said.64
Military authorities determined that a geographical boundary
would have to be established as a condition of approving the
Guard’s deployment to assist MPD. No servicemember could go
east of Ninth Street. It wasn’t made explicit to District
officials, but they all knew what lay east. “[T]he Capitol
is east,” Chief Contee said.65 “[I]f you move them anywhere
east of Ninth Street, they will be close to the Capitol.
That was certainly the way I understood it.”66
Director Rodriguez worried “that it constrained our ability
to react quickly if the situation got out of hand.”67
Without the limitation, the District fully intended to post
its resources farther east: “[W]e couldn’t get as close to
the Capitol as could have been helpful,” Mayor Bowser
said.68 “[W]e would have had a broader traffic box.”69
Fears of Politicizing the Military in an Antidemocratic
Manner
Both Acting Secretary Miller and Secretary McCarthy were
sensitive to the sight of troops near the site of the
Congressional certification of electoral votes, because of
President Trump’s previous expression of interest in using
Federal troops in civilian situations. Again, Attorney
General Barr and other members of the Trump Administration
had resisted President Trump’s desire to deploy such troops.
Secretary Esper said it “tended to be the case . . . that
the President was inclined to use the military,” contrary to
longstanding principles of reserving the armed forces as a
last resort.70
According to his testimony, Acting Secretary Miller’s
express first priority—after being installed with just two
months left in the Trump administration—was “to make every
effort to return the Department of Defense to a
nonpoliticized entity,” because previously, “the Department
was being showcased too much.”71 In testimony to the U.S.
House Committee on Oversight and Reform on May 12, 2021, he
cited “fears that the President would invoke the
Insurrection Act to politicize the military in an
antidemocratic manner” as shaping his thinking.72 “No such
thing was going to occur on my watch,” he wrote,73 later
adding that “if I would have put troops on Capitol Hill”
before the attack and without a request from civil
authorities, “that would have been seen as extremely
provocative, if not supporting this crazy narrative that the
military was going to try to overturn the election.”74
Secretary McCarthy felt similar pressure. He had been taken
aback when—as he was walking down the Pentagon’s
hallways—“one of the most seasoned reporters” asked him
whether the Army was planning to seize ballot boxes.75 It
was “an incredibly tense period,” according to Secretary
McCarthy.76 As our investigation has demonstrated, President
Trump had considered proposals from Lt. General (ret.)
Michael Flynn, Sidney Powell, and others that troops be
utilized to seize ballot boxes in certain parts of the
country.
On December 18, 2020—the same day as the contentious White
House meeting with Flynn and others,—Secretary McCarthy
issued a statement, “mirror[ing] what General Milley said
about a month before,”77 reiterating that “There is no role
for the U.S. military in determining the outcome of an
American election.”78 Given the heat of the rhetoric, he
thought, “[I]f we don’t say anything, it’s going to scare
people.”79 Secretary McCarthy told the Select Committee he
thought he would be fired after publicly stating that the
military would not assist in a coup.80 General McConville,
who signed the statement alongside Secretary McCarthy’s
signature,81 linked their words directly to the Ninth Street
limitation: “[T]here was no plan to put any military
anywhere near the Capitol because of what we had said, the
military has no role in determining the outcome of
elections.”82
On January 1st, Executive Officer to Secretary McCarthy
Colonel John Lubas wrote in an internal email that the
Secretary “wants to clearly communicate that this request is
NOT from the White House.”83 The email noted that the
Secretary wanted to “aggressively message” that the request
had come from District officials, not the President.84
“We wanted everybody to know that, because it would create
confusion and even more tension of having soldiers on the
street without a request and that they be near the Capitol
with certification of an election, a contested election,”
Secretary McCarthy said.85
On January 3, 2021, 10 former Secretaries of Defense,
including the recently fired, former Secretary Esper,
published a joint op-ed warning that “[i]nvolving the
military in election disputes would cross into dangerous
territory.”86 Secretary McCarthy had himself worked for five
of the 10 secretaries.87 “I know all these [men],” he
said.88 “[T]hey were—everyone was telling us, be very
conscious of your actions and how you—you know, what you’re
going to do that day. So we wanted to know where every
soldier was by street corner.”89
Was Secretary McCarthy concerned that President Trump might
use the military to cling to power? “There was a lot of talk
in the lead-up about martial law . . . and the employment of
forces, and you know, that was something that we were all,
you know, conscious of.”90 Our investigation suggests that
those civilian and military officials who had considerable
experience working directly with President Trump had genuine
concerns about whether he would attempt to use the military
to change the election results. Again, at this time, there
is no evidence the Department of Defense understood exactly
what President Trump and his associates planned for January
6th.
“Very Strict on the Use of the Military” on January 6th
By Monday, January 4th, with Secretary McCarthy now backing
the operation, Acting Secretary Miller was briefed. He told
the Select Committee that he “made the decision right there
to honor the request.”91 That approval came with strings
attached. The role of the DC Guard would be spelled out and
tightly circumscribed in a memorandum that, as characterized
by General Milley, was “very strict on the use of the
military.”92 It decreed that without the Acting Secretary’s
“subsequent, personal authorization,” the Guard would not be
issued batons, helmets, or body armor; could not interact
physically with protestors, except in self-defense; and that
the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)—40 servicemembers staged in
case of an emergency at Joint Base Andrews in Prince
George’s County, Maryland—could be deployed only as a last
resort.93
Above the tactical level, changes in the mission of the
Guard had to be approved by the Secretary of the Army and,
in some cases—in order to “interact physically with
protestors” or be issued batons—required running further up
the chain to the Secretary of Defense.94
To District officials, that seemed new—and unnecessary.
“[The Secretary told us,] if you send them to any other kind
of mission, that has to get approval from me. And I just
think that those were unnecessary restrictions . . .” Chief
Contee said.95
What the QRF would be called upon to do, even in the case of
an emergency, is a matter of debate. The letter and
memorandum do not expressly note whether the QRF could be
used to support the original mission of the Guard—traffic
and crowd control—or a new mission helping contain sudden
and out-of-hand civil disturbance.96 The DC Guard official
put in charge of the QRF for January 5th and 6th, Lieutenant
Colonel David Reinke, said he had not been given much
guidance as to their role.97
The Army and the DC Guard appear to have had different
understandings. “[T]he intent of the quick reaction force
was really to send these troops over to help if they had a
problem at one of the traffic command posts,” General
McConville said.98 “There never was an intent for a quick
reaction force to go to the Capitol . . . . ”99 According to
Army officials, without a con-op and a formal change in
mission, the QRF could do traffic control and no more.
That was not how others imagined an emergency unit would or
should operate. According to Major General Walker, “a quick
reaction force, something’s happening; do I have time to
find you and call you and ask you?”100 He called the
preapproval language “highly unusual,”101 particularly as
their name “already implied that it’s a last resort,”102
their intended purpose was if “[u]nexpectedly, you have a
spontaneous unrest,”103 and if “I need to write a concept of
operations for a quick reaction force? They’re no longer
quick. It’s just a reaction force.”104
Capitol Police Board “Prepared” without Guard Help
It wasn’t clear to everyone involved in planning for the
events anticipated on January 6th that all agencies,
including the Capitol Police, were deploying all their
resources ahead of that day. “We had had issues
understanding, getting the full picture of U.S. Capitol
Police’s operational posture and what their planning was,”
Director Rodriguez said.105
Mayor Bowser was struck when—right before the press briefing
that Monday, January 4th—the mayor asked the Capitol Police
representative, “[W]here does your perimeter start? [And h]e
gets up out of the room, calls somebody. And the next thing
I know he can’t participate in the conference.”106 She
elaborated: “[T]hat should have been like a trigger to me.
Like these people, they don’t want to answer questions about
their preparation.”107
On the morning of January 3rd, Capitol Police Chief Steven
Sund approached two of the members of the Capitol Police
Board and purportedly requested—but concededly did not push
for—Guard resources for the Capitol.108 According to Chief
Sund, in a minutes long meeting in the office of House
Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving, Irving told Chief Sund he did
not like the optics of asking for the Guard in advance and
that the intelligence did not support it.109 Chief Sund said
he did not push back on either point.110 In fact, he agreed
that his reading of the intelligence—despite a forewarning
put out by his own intelligence unit that “Congress was
itself the target” on January 6th111—did not call for Guard
support,112 only that having more personnel on his perimeter
would make him “more comfortable.”113 Irving suggested he
talk to the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and then-chairman of
the Capitol Police Board, Michael Stenger.114 According to
Irving, Stenger, in a meeting in his office, asked Chief
Sund to reach out to the Guard and find out, if an emergency
called for it, “how many people can [the commanding general]
give us and how quickly can he give us those people?”115
Chief Sund said he took their responses to mean “no,”
despite conceding that he was never told “you cannot have
the National Guard” or anything to that effect.116 “It was
100 percent a denial,” he maintained.117
Irving recalled the matter coming up on a three-way phone
conference during which “the consensus was that we didn’t
need” the Guard.118 He did not consider it a request.119 On
the call, Chief Sund noted that the District planned to use
the servicemembers to staff intersections, but the Capitol
grounds had few of those, and it would not relieve many
officers if they were used in a similar fashion.120 “It was
a combination of operationally the chief didn’t feel that
they would add much to his plan, and the intelligence really
didn’t speak for anything that we felt would justify the
need for them,” Irving said.121 Irving doesn’t recall taking
the “optics” into consideration.122 According to Irving, the
conversation ended the same way Chief Sund said it had: “Why
don’t you just tell them to be on standby?” Stenger
suggested.123 It was never brought up again.124
The discussion about the use of the Guard remained within
the Capitol Police Board and did not reach congressional
leadership, including the Speaker of the House. That was
normal. “[F]rom a tactical perspective, we would make
decisions without the input from congressional leadership,”
Irving said.125 “I always felt that I had full authority to
implement security decisions as I deemed appropriate.”126 In
fact, when the three men briefed congressional leaders on
January 5th, Chief Sund conveyed the same optimistic outlook
as he had with Major General Walker: “[We told them] we felt
we were prepared based on the information we had, yes,” he
said.127
To keep these exchanges in perspective, we note again that
we are aware of no evidence that these individuals were
privy to President Trump’s plans to instruct tens of
thousands of his supporters to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue
to the Capitol to help “take back” their country. Nor were
they aware of how President Trump would suggest to his
followers that Vice President Pence had the authority to
change the outcome of the election, or how President Trump
would behave in the hours that followed. Certain members of
Congress, including those who met at the White House on
December 21, 2020, may have had considerably more insight
into President Trump’s planning, but the Committee has no
information suggesting that any of those members alerted the
Capitol Police or other authorities of President Trump’s
plans.
Soldiers Prepare for the Worst in Secret
Guard reinforcements could draw from a pool of three groups
already activated for the day: (1) the 40 members making up
the QRF, staged in Maryland;128 (2) the 90 members at the
traffic control points, 24 at the Metro stations, and four
as part of the command staff distributed throughout the
city—but no farther east than Ninth Street—for a total of
118 representing the first shift;129 and (3) the second
shift of another 118 members,130 preparing at the Armory in
Southeast Washington, D.C, for a 3:00 p.m. shift
takeover.131 The Armory also housed a command-and-control
squad that handled logistics at about 52 members strong, in
addition to a Civil Support Team of about 20 members.132
That gave Colonel Hunter a maximum limit of 348 activated
servicemembers, eight more than the allotted 340—nearly all
of whom reported directly to him on January 6th.133
The QRF was most prepared for responding to sudden and
escalating civil unrest. At Joint Base Andrews, they were
provisioned with full riot-control kits,134 including a
helmet with a face shield already attached, protective vest,
shin guards, knee guards, shield, and baton.135 The head of
the QRF—himself provided little guidance on the contours of
his mission—had his squad train for civil disturbance on
January 5th and the morning of the 6th as they waited.136
Not only had they trained, but they trained together, as a
unit—a benefit military officials all agreed is ideal. Army
leadership, all the way up to Secretary McCarthy,137 had no
idea that Lt. Col. Reinke had taken these initiatives.
Secretary McCarthy agreed that had he known of their civil
disturbance preparation, “it could have” affected the speed
with which approval was ultimately given for their
deployment.138
As to the second group of available resources—the
servicemembers stationed at traffic control points since the
early morning of January 6th—Army leadership held
misconceptions about what equipment was available to them.
Secretary McCarthy had agreed that some gear—expressly not
batons—could remain stowed away in vehicle trunks.139
Colonel Hunter had his troops put the gear into a white box
truck instead and designated a rally point for the truck
that would be central to all traffic control points.140 On
the night of January 5th, in anticipation of January 6th,
Colonel Hunter had his troops move the civil disturbance
gear—including the prohibited batons—into the individual
vehicles themselves.141 Captain Tarp, the head of the second
shift, agreed that they were told to load the equipment into
their vehicles “on the down low. Done so it wasn’t visible,
so it wouldn’t look like we were escalating [our] role.”142
The commanding general of the DC Guard was aware that the
troops had all they needed in their trunks and—in the case
of an emergency—would not need to return to the Armory to
get it: “They already had it,” Major General Walker said.143
But Army leadership did not know that. Although General
Piatt said “We never asked, like, what was actually—I have
no knowledge of what they [actually] had in” the
vehicles,144 the guidance from Secretary McCarthy’s letter
led him to believe that “weapons, ammunition, batons,
shields, kneepads, other protection that we may be asked to
do for civil disturbance, that was not [there]—because they
were specifically told they would not participate in that
mission . . . .”145 Secretary McCarthy said, “The only thing
I authorized General Walker to do was their ballistic
helmets and body armor in the vehicle, not their shields or
their riot batons.”146 He figured his orders had been
followed.147 When asked why he was not aware of the moves
the Guard had made, Secretary McCarthy said, “I mean, I made
a mistake. I think a local unit commander was anticipating
more than what potentially we were prepared for.”148
DC Guard leadership understood that loading this equipment
flouted direct orders. “I wasn’t going to have my soldiers
unprepared,” Major General Walker said.149 The prohibition
on batons, in particular, had been sent 54 minutes after the
Guard had already begun their traffic control shifts on the
morning of January 5th.150
The third group of available resources—the servicemembers
awaiting at the Armory to take over as the second shift at
the traffic control points—had equipment accessible to them
at headquarters. Captain Tarp did note that it took time to
ensure that the Armory equipment was in working order:
repairing straps that were broken, wiping off dirt on the
shields because “they were the same from the George Floyd
protests,” and affixing the helmet to the shields, which
took upwards of 20 to 30 minutes.151 In the three different
locations where the Guard was stationed as the Capitol was
being breached, all servicemembers had access to full civil
disturbance gear right there with them.
Outside of the QRF, which had recently returned from two
days of training together, there is debate as to how ready
the rest of the Guard was to engage in civil disturbance
response on January 6th. The notion that the military is not
primed or naturally skilled to deal with civil disturbance
appears to stand in tension with National Guard traditions,
training, and doctrine. “They were not missioned, tasked,
organized, equipped to do civil disturbance operations,”
General Flynn said.152 Although General Piatt conceded that
“[a]ll soldiers are trained in civil disturbance,” he
maintained that on “that day we were not postured to do
civil disturbance operations.”153
Major General Walker—who pointed out that the DC Guard
shield, on Guard troop uniforms, features the Capitol
building itself: “Protect the Capitol. That’s why Thomas
Jefferson created it”154—called civil disturbance
“foundational” to what they do.155
DC Ground Commander Takes Initiative
On January 5th, as he led his forces in traffic control,
Colonel Hunter did not observe activity that raised
concerns.156 But by the next morning—as thousands of
out-of-towners invited by President Trump descended on the
nation’s capital—that all changed. “I could see like the
Proud Boys,” he said.157 “I could see different people with
Kevlars on, with bulletproof vests on. You know, they’re all
kitted up and they’re wearing different patches and colors.
And I said, ‘Well, this crowd is definitely different . . .
.’”158 This, of course, was an indication of the potential
for violence in the hours that followed.
Colonel Hunter, sitting at the intersection of 15th Street
and Pennsylvania Avenue, saw crowds flowing past him and his
soldiers toward the Capitol—walking as one, chanting as one.
“Hey, is it that way to the Capitol? Where’s the Capitol?”
some asked.159 Colonel Hunter got in his car and began
writing an update report.160
He was interrupted by a soldier who had been watching CNN on
his phone: “Hey, sir, I think there’s been shots fired at
the Capitol.”161 It was then that Colonel Hunter began to
put a plan in place for the redeployment of the Guard. “So
at that point in my mind I said, ‘Okay, then they will be
requesting the DC National Guard now, so we have to
move.”162 The time was 2:12 p.m.163
The first thing he did was designate a rally point for DC
Guard reinforcements.164 Over the radio, he relayed the
rally point to all 118 members currently spread across the
city doing traffic control, and one by one, in order by
their points, they called in to acknowledge where they would
go once approval came down.165 At 2:17 p.m., he called Lt.
Col. Reinke, the head of the 40-strong QRF, and ordered his
subordinate to “have all of your guys put their gear on and
get on the bus.”166 “In my mind, this is about to happen
really fast,” he said.167 “As soon as I make one call, I
will get clearance to go and support. The United States
Capitol was breached. I mean, this is unheard of.”168
Accordingly, he advised Lt. Col. Reinke that, “[W]e will be
getting a call soon.”169
He next tried to find the incident command post. He ran into
the Assistant MPD Chief Jeffery Carroll, piled into a car
and, sirens flipped on, sped off to U.S. Capitol Police
headquarters.170
Once there, they got into the elevator, and “before the
doors even closed,” Assistant Chief Carroll asked him, “How
many do you have coming right now?”171 Colonel Hunter said,
“I’m working on it. I need to make some calls, but we
are—we’re coming . . . . And I said, as soon as I start
making these calls, I’m going to have so many National
Guardsmen just flooding this way. I just need to have the
location, have the plan set, be ready to receive them.”172
No later than 2:50 p.m., Colonel Hunter had confirmed with
Lt. Col. Reinke that the QRF was on the bus and ready.173
The highest-ranking Guard official on the ground had sorted
out all of the details and linked up with the law
enforcement agencies that would lead them in support. At
least 135 National Guard servicemembers—the 40 QRF members
already in gear and on the bus and the 90 at traffic control
posts awaiting word, with gear in their trunks to be donned
at the rally point, along with four command staff plus
Colonel Hunter himself—were ready to go. At 3:10 p.m.,
Colonel Hunter felt it was time to tell his superiors all
that he had done and hopefully get fast approval.174
3 Hours and 19 Minutes
At the Capitol, MPD Chief Contee was on the West Front,
himself inhaling chemical agents—“you can smell it before
you see it, felt it in my throat”175—as officers tried to
resist rioters beating back the perimeter, having reached
the stage built for the Inauguration set for two weeks
later. “[T]he gas stuff and the spray, the mist that’s in
the air, I mean, it’s real,” he said.176 “I’m trying to talk
to the Mayor to give her a situational update, and the city
administrator—I’ve got them both on the line. I’m coughing,
trying to explain what’s going on.”177 Chief Contee cut
through the crowds of people around the Capitol to meet the
mayor at MPD headquarters.178
Chief Sund said he reached out to House Sergeant at Arms
Irving at 12:57 or 12:58 p.m., and told him, “We are getting
overrun on the West Front by thousands. We need the National
Guard now.”179 Irving recalled the call coming before a
break in the electoral certification session just short of
1:30 p.m. and that the Chief said “that conditions were
deteriorating outside and he might be making a request for
the National Guard.”180 Although Irving was firm in his
stance that only the Capitol Police Board had the authority
to request National Guard assistance, he nonetheless sought
out the chief of staff to the Speaker to inform her of the
impending request.181 He did not need her to sign off, but
“[a]ny change in security posture, given the time, I would
give them a heads-up.”182
The Speaker’s chief of staff “immediately scribbled down a
note” and went over to inform the Speaker—who was in the
chair presiding over the floor debate on the Arizona
objections—about the request for the National Guard.183
“Absolutely. Go,” Speaker Nancy Pelosi said.184 Later, as
they were evacuating the floor to an undisclosed location,
the Speaker asked her, “Is the National Guard coming?”185
The Speaker’s chief of staff said, “Yes, we asked them.”186
Irving said the formal request for Guard assistance came in
a call after 2 p.m. from Chief Sund “and, of course, we said
absolutely.”187 Chief Sund said he had made the request in
that earlier 12:57 or 12:58 call and had been waiting for 71
minutes.188 “I hung up the phone. I yelled across the
command center, [‘M]ark the time, 2:10, I finally got
approval from the Capitol Police Board for the use of the
National Guard,’” Chief Sund said.189
At around 2:30 p.m., Director Rodriguez patched Chief
Contee—and a largely silent Mayor Bowser listening
in190—into the conference call with Chief Sund and Major
General Walker, who brought in General Piatt.191 Major
General Walker ordered his aide-de-camp on his second day on
the job, Lt. Timothy Nick, to take handwritten notes of the
call and the rest of the day.192
On the line at the Pentagon—gathered around the speaker of
the Secretary of the Army’s desk phone—were General Piatt,
General McConville, and Secretary McCarthy.193 According to
Secretary McCarthy, it was during the call that he learned
the Capitol had been breached,194 watching it unfold in real
time on television.195 He didn’t recall hearing Chief Sund’s
voice on the call, but said “we were trying to get . . .
what we call the operational sight picture. What is going
on? How big is the crowd? How violent is the crowd? . . .
They started laying out really the—just how bad it was.”196
Secretary McCarthy resolved to run to the office of Acting
Secretary of Defense Miller, leaving behind instructions to
General Piatt to “find out the requirements,” as he was
“going to get the authority.”197 “[W]e go zipping down
there,” General McConville said.198 As they were leaving,
General Flynn showed up.199
General Flynn said, “when I came by the phone,” he “heard
voices screaming on the end.”200 He called the tones of
their voices as “chaotic”201 and that “[y]ou couldn’t tell
who was talking sometimes.”202 Chief Sund was pleading for
help. “I want to say he even used the word, like, ‘I am
pleading,’” Chief Contee said.203 Col. Matthews, listening
in beside Major General Walker, said of Chief Sund: “His
voice was cracking. He was almost crying.”204
According to Chief Contee, the reaction to his pleas was
“tepid.”205 “It was a very sluggish response,” Chief Contee
said.206 “I remember just, you know, with all that was going
on, not hearing a ‘yes,’ you know, just . . . what I would
in my mind qualify as, like, excuses and not decisive
action. . . I was hearing, like, all the reasons, you know,
why we shouldn’t be doing this.”207 Director Rodriguez
called it a “kind of bureaucratic” response in the midst of
“a rapidly evolving situation where literally the Capitol
was being overrun.”208 He added: “I don’t want to use the
word disinterested, but more just, ‘let’s just hold on.
Let’s just wait. Let’s just kind of calm down for a second
while literally Rome is burning.’”209
For his part, General Flynn depicted General Piatt—the main
interlocutor—as “the calming voice in an otherwise chaotic
situation.”210 General McConville agreed: “I talked to some
of my staff, and they said that General Piatt did an
incredible job. He was like the—you know, in a very calm
[voice], just saying, ‘let’s just settle . . . .’”211
But Major General Walker said he “just couldn’t believe
nobody was saying: ‘Hey, go.’”212 He asked the generals on
the other line, “‘Aren’t you watching the news? Can’t you
see what’s going on? We need to get there.’ And [I was]
cognizant of the fact that I’m talking to senior . . .
people, but I could see what was happening . . . .”213 Chief
Sund was “perplexed” and “dumbfounded.”214 “It wasn’t what I
expected of, yeah, the cavalry’s coming. It was a bunch of,
round-the-house, oh, hey, let’s do this, let’s do that,” he
said.215 “I was borderline getting pretty pissed off.”216
Many participants on the call say General Piatt’s stated
concern was the optics of sending troops to the site of a
democratic process.
“[T]he infamous talk about optics. That came up again. There
was talk about boots on the ground again. You know, that’s
not good optics, having boots on the ground,” Chief Contee
said.217 He recalled how Secretary McCarthy had vocalized
the same hesitance during the five-day deliberation
preceding January 6th.218
Director Rodriguez believed General Piatt replied to the
request by saying, “[W]e don’t like the optics of having
military personnel at the Capitol against peaceful
protesters.”219
He recalls Chief Contee replying bluntly, “[W]ell, they’re
not peaceful anymore.”220
Major General Walker heard one of the Army generals say it
“wouldn’t be their best military advice or guidance to
suggest to the Secretary that we have uniformed presence at
the Capitol.”221 He added: “They were concerned about how it
would look, the optics.”222 Chief Sund heard the general use
the word twice.223 “General Piatt said—and I will never
forget this—‘Yeah, I don’t know. I’m concerned about the
optics of the National Guard standing a line with the
Capitol in the background,’” Chief Sund said.224 “[M]y
officers are getting beaten, and they’re worried about the
optics of the National Guard.”225
Although General Piatt denies explicitly using the word
“optics”—“I don’t recall ever saying that word on that phone
call, because at the time it just wasn’t important”226—he
agreed that he said use of the Guard was “not my best
military judgment or my best military advice.”227 He said he
“made a couple of suggestions that were not
well-received,”228 including “if there was any other
facility where we could go and relieve police. . . I think
they took that as I was saying no, because they immediately
came back and said, you’re denying our request.”229
General McConville—who wasn’t present at the time—said he
talked to people in the room about the use of the word
“optics,” and “some people said, ‘No, it wasn’t said.’ And
then some people said it was said.”230 Nonetheless, the
sentiment behind it should not be a particularly
controversial one, according to General McConville. “People
like to use optics—I’m going to stay away because that’s a
political term in my eyes. But what type of signature do you
want on the streets in Washington, DC? Do you want a police
signature? Do you want a military signature? Do you want a
Federal signature?” he said.231 “[T]hat creates a reaction
from the American people, and we need to think our way
through that . . .”232
On the call, talk of needing a plan—the so-called con-op
that had been a lesson learned from the summer—emerged.
“[A]fter the optics, . . . then it was, you know, they
wanted, like, specific information. There was something they
were talking about, like, mission and . . . what exactly
they’re going to be doing when they get there,” Chief Contee
said.233 Before running off, Secretary McCarthy had
instructed General McConville to put together a plan: “My
charter, my direction from him is to get a plan. We’re gonna
support; I just wanted to get something to support with.”234
But he acknowledged the impression nonetheless remained that
he was “denying or pushing back.”235
That impression was made explicit: “They said three times to
me clearly, ‘You’re denying my request,’” General Piatt
said.236
Chief Contee interrupted “Chief Sund mid-sentence” and said,
“Wait a minute. Hold up. Let me make sure that I understand
this correctly . . . [A]re you asking for support from the
National Guard at the U.S. Capitol?”237
Chief Sund said, “Yes.”238
Chief Contee then addressed the Army generals: “‘Are you
guys honoring his request?’ I asked them that. And they
didn’t say ‘no,’ but they also didn’t say ‘yes.’”239 Chief
Sund recalled it the same way.240
General Piatt said he was “clear in my response, ‘I don’t
have any authority to deny or approve. The Secretary is
getting approval.’”241
“[T]he third time when they said, ‘You’re denying our
request,’ they also said, ‘And we’re going to go to the
media,’” General Piatt said.242 “[W]e were desperate.
Everyone was desperate. So I’m not angry at that, but I just
knew it wasn’t helpful, so we told that to Secretary
McCarthy.”243
As for the threat to go public, Major General Walker said,
“I remember that very clearly.”244 According to him, after
the generals would not say yes or no, “Chief Contee says:
‘I’m going to call the mayor and ask her to have a press
conference saying that the Army is not going to allow the DC
Guard to come and support.’”245 General Piatt reportedly
replied, “Please don’t do that. I don’t have the authority
to authorize the National Guard to go. So please don’t do
that. Please don’t hold the press conference.”246 Chief
Contee doesn’t recall saying that.247 Mayor Bowser doesn’t
know if she was still on the line when the remark was made,
but “it was certainly going to be something that I would
do.”248
In the end, “the call sort of ended very abruptly, . . .
.”249 The DC head of homeland security and emergency
management left the call thinking “that help was not coming,
and—at least [not] from the National Guard.”250 That was
Chief Sund’s belief, too. “[I]f a general says his troops
are not coming, his troops aren’t coming,” he said.251
Before the call ended, General Flynn set up a
video-conferencing bridge. General Piatt explained to the
Select Committee that this was meant “to get the principals
and the team together to start making a plan.”252 But Major
General Walker—under whom “it was actually written . . .
would maintain control of National Guard forces”253—said he
was not privy to any planning while on the call.
“We were just told to hold,” he said.254
How long did Major General Walker hold?
“Three hours and 19 minutes,” he said.255
Major General Walker told the Select Committee regarding
what occurred during this time. “[W]e all thought, it’s in a
minute, we’re going to be told to go, in a minute. Then 5
minutes, then 10 minutes, then 15 minutes. We kept thinking,
any minute now, somebody is going to say ‘go,’” he said.256
“And then an hour went by, then more time went by . . . .
But we never thought it would take that long.”257 Col.
Matthews confirmed that there were periods on the call when
no one was talking.258 At times, there was talk of securing
buildings other than the Capitol.259 He called the open
channel essentially “a general officer chat line.”260
What did Major General Walker think was happening in those 3
hours and 19 minutes?
“Delay.”261
An Absent Commander-in-Chief
Vice President Mike Pence called several times to check in
on the delayed response of the Guard. President Trump did
not.
Vice President Pence called Acting Secretary Miller at least
two times.262 “He was very animated, and he issued very
explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders. There was no
question about that,” General Milley said.263 “And he said,
‘Get the National Guard down here. Get them down here now,
and clear the Capitol.’ You know, and this is the Vice
President of the United States. And there was other forceful
language.’”264
Acting Secretary Miller clarified that “he did not order
me,” as “he’s not in the chain of command,” but he
considered the talk with the Vice President “[h]yper
professional” and “[v]ery focused,” in which the secretary
“highlighted that District of Columbia National Guard . . .
was activated, and we were throwing every asset we could
marshal to support law enforcement.”265
In contrast, according to General Milley, Chief of Staff
Meadows called and said, “‘We have to kill the narrative
that the Vice President is making all the decisions. We need
to establish the narrative, you know, that the President is
still in charge and that things are steady or stable,’ or
words to that effect. I immediately interpreted that as
politics, politics, politics.”266
President Trump himself did not call. As reports of
Departments of Defense denials and delay were echoing in the
media, no high-level Defense official—including Secretaries
Miller267 and McCarthy268—received a call from him that
day.269 At the time, General Milley thought that was
“absolutely . . . highly unusual.”270
“[Y]ou’re the Commander in Chief. You’ve got an assault
going on on the Capitol of the United States of America, and
there’s nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero?” he said.271 “I
grew up in an organization where commanders are responsible
and take charge and they see situations unfolding and they
issue orders and take charge.”272
On January 3rd, at the end of a national security meeting
concerning a foreign threat, the President asked “in
passing” about January 6th preparations.273 Acting Secretary
Miller informed him they would be fulfilling Mayor Bowser’s
request for DC Guard support.274 From then on, if not
earlier, the secretary “felt like I had all the authorities
I needed and did not need to discuss anything with the
President regarding authorities.”275 The conversation lasted
all of 30 seconds to a minute.276 Secretary Miller testified
that he never received any order at any time from President
Trump to deploy the National Guard on January 6th. “There
was no direct—there was no order from the President,” he
said.277
On January 5th, as demonstrators rallied in support of the
President, Acting Secretary Miller received a call from the
commander-in-chief.278 The President asked him if he was
watching the events on television.279 The secretary told him
he had caught some of the coverage.280
Unprompted, President Trump then said, “You’re going to need
10,000 people” the following day, as in troops.281 An email
sent by Chief of Staff Meadows on January 5th explicitly
noted that the DC Guard would be on hand to “protect pro
Trump people.”282 The President and his staff appeared to be
aware of the likelihood of violence on the day the election
certification of his loss was slated to transpire. This
communication from President Trump contemplated that the
Guard could support and secure the safety of Trump
supporters, not protect the Capitol. At that time, Secretary
Miller apparently had no information on what President Trump
planned for January 6th.
Acting Secretary Miller thought the 10,000 number was
astronomical—“we expected 35,000 protesters . . . [and] even
if there were more protesters than expected, [we thought]
that local law enforcement could handle it”283—but, again,
this was “no order from the President,” just “President
Trump banter that you all are familiar with.”284
Parallel Plans in the Midst of Crisis
While the Army and the District engaged in the “heated”285
2:30 p.m. phone call, Secretary McCarthy was hurrying down
the Pentagon hallways to Acting Secretary Miller’s office.
General Milley had been summoned there before Secretary
McCarthy arrived with General McConville in tow,286 “running
down the hall, and he was actually winded when he showed up
. . . ”287
The next half hour was spent in “a quick, rapid fire
meeting, [with] lots of quick questions.”288 Secretary
McCarthy—out of breath—said he started by saying, “We’ve got
to go. We’ve got to get something—we’ve got to put every
capability we can up there.”289 The response he received
was, “They were all kind of, like, ‘Slow down. What’s going
on?’ They wanted to get a sense of the situation.”290
Secretary McCarthy said it took about 15 to 20 minutes to
“relay this,” “laying out what I thought we needed to
do.”291
By 3:04 p.m., Acting Secretary Miller said he approved
deployment of the DC Guard to assist law enforcement at the
Capitol at that time.292 Acting Secretary Miller did not
understand why Major General Walker—if he felt the exigency
demanded it—did not deploy troops as soon as his 3 p.m.
order allowed it. “Why didn’t he launch them? I’d love to
know,” he said.293
Secretary McCarthy agreed “that’s where we may have talked
past each other in his office,” because Secretary McCarthy
thought he “had the authority as the Secretary of the Army”
to conduct a mission analysis and send troops at his
discretion, not that of Major General Walker.294
Major General Walker himself understood he had to wait for
approval from Secretary McCarthy to deploy his forces. But
as he waited on that video call for hours, he did strongly
consider sending them anyway. He turned to his lawyer and
said, “Hey, you know what? You know, we’re going to go, and
I’m just going to shoulder the responsibility.”295 According
to Major General Walker, his lawyer responded, “What if you
get sued?”296 Colonel Mathews, that lawyer, “told him not to
do that. Just hold on.”297 The Guard officials located with
Major General Walker at the Armory all say he seriously
contemplated aloud the possibility of breaking with the
chain of command.
“Should we just deploy now and resign tomorrow?” was how
Lieutenant Nick recalled Major General Walker bluntly
putting it.298
“I would have done just that,” Major General Walker said,
“but not for those two letters”299 from his superiors
curtailing Guard redeployment.300
The man who signed one of the letters, however—himself a
former member of the DC Guard301—now says Major General
Walker should have moved forward regardless of whether he
had proper authorization.
“I’ve launched QRF without approval more than once,” Acting
Secretary Miller said.302 “If you’re the person on the
ground in the Army, and you realize that there’s something
that is unpredictable or unexpected and you have the ability
to influence it, the culture, the training, the education,
the expectation of you, the American people, is that you
will execute and do what you can, even if it costs you your
job.”303
After authorization at 3:04 p.m., Secretary McCarthy said he
gave Major General Walker a call. He told him to “[m]obilize
the entire Guard, bring everybody in. . . . And I said, you
know, move the QRF to the armory and get as many people as
you can to the armory and configure them in a minimum of
riot gear and batons. And then we’re going to do a mission
analysis of what we need to do with the police . . . .”304
Major General Walker “categorically denies” that any such
call took place.305 In fact, Major General Walker said the
two men did not talk at all until much later that night.306
“Here’s the bottom line. The Secretary was unavailable to
me, and he never called me,” Major General Walker said.307
Beginning around 3:00 p.m., 25 minutes of Secretary
McCarthy’s time was spent reassuring members of Congress
that the Guard was indeed coming,308 although he had not yet
conveyed the order. That was time unspent on facilitating
their actual coming. In addition to the alleged threat on
the 2:30 p.m. call, a media tweet had gone out at 2:55 p.m.
declaring that the Department of Defense had denied requests
for Guard support.309
By 3:45 p.m., Secretary McCarthy was done with his calls
and—after picking up some things from his office—headed down
to the MPD headquarters to draft a con-op beside law
enforcement.310 Acting Secretary Miller arrived at 4:10
p.m.311
While he was waiting, Colonel Hunter decided he would keep
the first shift handling traffic control out at their posts
in case they were needed for re-mission by the MPD, relying
instead only on the QRF and the second shift at the Armory
to respond to the Capitol.312 Those servicemembers ended up
manning their traffic control posts up to 20 hours
straight.313 Army leadership never found out that the
servicemembers at the traffic control posts didn’t end up
responding to the Capitol that night, incorrectly crediting
some of the Guard’s delay that day to their travel time.314
By 3:50 p.m., the QRF had arrived at the Armory, bringing
their own equipment, given no new information upon making
the extra pit stop there instead of the Capitol.315 They
were ready to go, steeped in “a lot of nerves.”316 The
second shift of servicemembers originally missioned for
traffic control had been told as early as 2:30 p.m. to
expect a switch in mission to handling civil disturbance.317
They rushed to gear up and prepare, but it was a lot of
“hurry up and wait.”318 Not long afterward, “we’re all
ready. Now we’re all donned. So go sit on the bleachers and
wait. . . We were in a tight holding pattern until the time
to deploy.”319
At around the same time, at 3:49 p.m., Speaker Pelosi is
heard in video footage from that day urging Acting Secretary
Miller to hurry.
“Just pretend for a moment this was the Pentagon or the
White House or some other entity that was under siege,” she
told him over the phone while she—and the rest of the
Congressional leadership—were huddled in a secure
location.320 “Just get them there!”321
When Secretary McCarthy arrived at MPD headquarters, he
joined Chief Contee, his Army Operations Director Brigadier
General Chris LaNeve, and Assistant Chief Carroll by
phone.322
In the next 20 minutes, Secretary McCarthy developed a
con-op.
As Secretary McCarthy had decided after the summer, crafting
a strategy was his job—“I was doing it with the Mayor, the
police chief, and the deputy director of the FBI, my
counterparts, and then ultimately wanted to understand what
our role would be, the conditions”—and afterward, “we turned
to [Major General Walker] to work the tactical details for
that.”323
But Major General Walker said, “If I need you to tell me how
to execute a civil disturbance mission,” he “[s]hould
relieve me. Should fire me.”324
It wasn’t until later, post-January 6th, that Major General
Walker said he found out that Secretary McCarthy, his boss,
had been putting together a con-op—without him. “Then later
they said they had to put together a plan for me to execute
. . . which I found kind of disturbing,” Major General
Walker said.325 “You’re coming up with a plan without me
being involved in the plan?”326
General McConville agreed that “usually[,] the Secretary of
Army is not developing concepts for the employment, but
because of the situation that wasn’t done,” so the secretary
had to fill in the gap.327 That, of course—given the
preparations Colonel Hunter had laid out hours earlier—was
not true. But Secretary McCarthy did not know that.328
He said Major General Walker never told him about how
Colonel Hunter had prepared and that it was his
responsibility to tell him.329 “I don’t talk to troop lead
commanders, no,” he said.330
Ultimately, no plan from Army leaders—strategic or
tactical—made it to the troops.
“[I]f they came up with a plan, they never shared it with
us,” Major General Walker said.331 “They claim they were
putting a plan together. That’s what took so long. I never
saw a plan from the Department of Defense or the Department
of the Army.”332
Colonel Hunter agreed that “[n]o one ever told me, because I
already had the plan there, and no one ever informed me that
there was a different plan or a different [con-op].”333 He
said to the extent a “hasty plan” was put into action on
January 6th, it was his: “I created the concept of
operation.”334 He added: “The [plan] that was actually used
as far as which lot they would come into, who would meet
them at the lot, and then who would lead them over to the
Capitol. That was between myself and MPD and Capitol
Police.”335
After hours of wait, Major General Walker said, “The plan
was executed just like we said it would be [from the start],
get to the Capitol, take direction from the ranking police
officers there . . . to help restore order.”336 Colonel
Hunter passed the details of his hasty plan onto Lt. Col.
Reinke—the highest ranking officer at the rally
point—letting him know, “Hey, when you pull into this lot,
they will meet you there. This is who is—you know, you’re
going with these personnel,” exactly what Secretary McCarthy
had just spent 20 minutes putting together.337
Although Lt. Col. Reinke said his QRF servicemembers were
given rules of engagement before arriving at the rally
point, he was not told more than report to Capitol Police
and supplement and assist them.338
Captain Tarp, outranked by Lt. Col. Reinke but in charge of
the second shift, was merely told by Brigadier General Ryan:
“‘You need to act like there’s a fire now. You’re going to
[the] Capitol.’ Those were his directions.”339
After an hour and a half spent in calls, travel, and making
plans, Secretary McCarthy was prepared to green light the
deployment of the Guard at 4:35 p.m. But miscommunication
led to another half-hour delay.
Secretary McCarthy relayed the “go” order to Major General
Walker—with his subordinate Brigadier General LaNeve serving
as the intermediary—in a conversation Major General Walker
said never happened.
According to Secretary McCarthy, Brigadier General LaNeve
“wasn’t a junior aide.”340 In his role, “he can speak, once
given the authority, delegated authority to speak as the Sec
Army . . . ”341 He said that the first-star officer “was
standing next to me,”342 and General Piatt said that it was
generally “not uncommon” for him to ask his staff to
“transmit [the] communication from the Secretary to General
Walker.”343
For his part, Brigadier General LaNeve denies that he
himself conveyed the “go” order.344 He said he spoke with
Major General Walker first at 4:25 p.m. to tell him that his
forces should, “Get on the bus, do not leave.”345 On a
second call at 4:35 p.m., Brigadier General LaNeve said he
overheard Secretary McCarthy himself convey the “go” order
to Major General Walker: He said something “to the effect of
‘You’re approved to provide support.’”346 Secretary
McCarthy, on his part, said he never spoke a word.347
Brigadier General LaNeve said the secretary then again
handed him the phone to convey the details of “where to go
and what officer to meet up with.”348 Those two details
would be the full extent of the “con-op” allegedly
communicated to Major General Walker.349 He even recalled
Major General Walker saying, “Roger,” to acknowledge the
plan.350 But, Brigadier General LaNeve said, there was “mass
confusion in that room,” and he agreed that “[t]here were
huge communications problems.”351
Major General Walker said there was no such call, nor any
like it.352 He said he remained on the video conference line
the whole time “with everybody else,” he said.353 He said he
would not have taken an order from Brigadier General LaNeve
anyhow. “[W]hy would I ever take directions from General
LaNeve? Anybody? Brigadier General LaNeve, one-star,” Major
General Walker said.354 “I mean, he’s not a peer, it
wouldn’t be somebody that would convey that type of message
to me. . . So my thinking wouldn’t have been that he would
have been speaking on behalf of the Secretary.”355
Although his staff confirms they didn’t see him field a call
from Secretary McCarthy or Brigadier General LaNeve,356
including never seeing him leave their conference room,357
Major General Walker’s own note taker appears to have jotted
down at 4:37 p.m. the following: “advised to sent [sic] 150
to establish D st / 1st outer perimeter, General LaNeve,”
beside what appears to be his phone number.358 That address
is the rally point Secretary McCarthy had asked General
LaNeve to convey, the same one Colonel Hunter and law
enforcement had already chosen earlier. Major General Walker
said, “the only way [Lt. Nick] could have got it was
listening to the VTC, which I was on.”359 He further said,
“I never saw General LaNeve on the [video teleconference] .
. . I didn’t hear General LaNeve’s voice.”360 Lt. Nick said
he had it penned at much later—at 5:09 p.m.—“as the time
they received the orders” to deploy.361
Major General Walker certainly did not act as if he had been
given authority until, fortuitously, General McConville—who
had heard about the 4:35 p.m. call—walked by the
teleconference screen and was “surprised” to see the
commanding general sitting idly at 5:09 p.m.362
Major General Walker agreed the first time he heard he had
the authority was from the lips of the general: “General
McConville came back into the call and said, Hey, you’re a
go.”363
Lt. Col. Reinke’s QRF and Captain Tarp’s second shift got on
the bus at 5:10 p.m.364 They left at 5:15 p.m.365 Lt. Col.
Reinke said they didn’t arrive at the Capitol Police parking
lot until 5:55 p.m.,366 although official timing from the
Army and Department of Defense put their arrival time at
5:40 p.m. and from the DC Guard at 5:20 p.m.367 At the
earliest, the troops arrived in the vicinity of the Capitol
grounds at 5:29 p.m., when Lt. Col. Reinke texted Colonel
Hunter: “Apparently we pulled into the wrong lot, trying to
reroute to LOT 16 now.”368 He said they sat around for 20
minutes once they arrived, and then were sworn in, before
relieving an entire line of officers.369 Captain Tarp said
they remained idle for 45 minutes waiting for Capitol Police
to come “bus by bus to swear-in the officers. It was a long
wait. Frustrating—we’re sitting a mile from where we[’re]
going.”370
Captain Tarp said, “By the time we got there, we were just
holding back the people who remained past the curfew.”371
The height of the riot had passed.
Colonel Hunter estimated that—had his preparations been
approved—the DC Guard could have arrived as early as an hour
and a half earlier than they did.
“Within one hour, I’d say I could’ve had 135. So the [about
40] coming from Joint Base Andrews, if they would’ve headed
directly to me at the Capitol, and then the 90 I had on the
street and the 4 that were—including myself,” he said.372
“[S]o I arrived at the Capitol at 3:10. So, if I would’ve
recalled everyone by 3:30, 3:40, we could’ve been—had gear
on and walking towards the Capitol.”373
He further stated: “I would give them another hour. So by
4:40 I should’ve had at least 250 coming from the Armory . .
. That includes the second shift as well as full-timers.”374
Presented with the plans Colonel Hunter had set in motion
and the easy accessibility of their equipment, neither of
which he had known about at the time, Secretary McCarthy
conceded “you could have shaved minutes,”375 and the speed
of deployment “could have” been pushed up, but “[i]t
depends.”376
When the Guard finally arrived at the Capitol, “pretty much
all the other fighting, per se, had stopped on the Capitol
complex,” according to Robert Glover, head of the MPD
Special Operations Division.377 Then-Inspector Glover
received the Guard troops when they arrived.378 “[T]he bus
just kind of showed up. It was my decision at that point,
looking at their numbers and their capabilities at that
moment in time and what was the most pressing activity—and
that was to make the arrests,” he said.379 He had them
create a secure “prisoner cordon” where they could stand
guard as arrested individuals waited transport to jail.380
“They were the freshest personnel that we had at that moment
in time. And, again, they didn’t have any significant
numbers to really do much else at that moment in time
either,” he said.381 “[T]heir orders were basically, support
us in whatever we told them to do . . . ”382
Secretary McCarthy said that it was possible that DOD and DC
National Guard leaders had simply not been coordinating
their planning.383 He acknowledged that “a lot of things
were probably missed. It was tremendously confusing,”384 and
“that makes for a messy response.”385
No one within the Department of Defense, Army, or Guard
leveled accusations of an intentional delay. “I didn’t see
anybody trying to throw sand in the gearbox and slow things
down,” General Milley said.386
Major General Walker said the Army’s reluctance to approve
National Guard assistance to the Mayor during the planning
for the anticipated January 6th events continued through
January 6th itself.387 “I don’t know where the decision
paralysis came from, but it was clearly there. The decision
paralysis, decision avoidance,” he said.388
Conclusion
Former President Trump’s eagerness to engage the U.S.
military to play a visible role in addressing domestic
unrest during the late spring and summer of 2020 does appear
to have prompted senior military leadership to take
precautions, in preparing for the joint session, against the
possibility that the DC Guard might be ordered to deploy for
an improper purpose. Those precautions seem to have been
prudential as much as legal in nature.
What that entailed in the unprecedented circumstances of the
January 6th attack on the Capitol is, however, harder to
accept: a 3 hour and 19 minute lag-time in making a
relatively small, but riot-trained and highly capable
military unit available to conduct one of its statutory
support missions.
While the delay seems unnecessary and unacceptable, it was
the byproduct of military processes, institutional caution,
and a revised deployment approval process. We have no
evidence that the delay was intentional. Likewise, it
appears that none of the individuals involved understood
what President Trump planned for January 6th, and how he
would behave during the violence. Imperfect inter-government
and intra-military communications as the January 6th rally
morphed, with President Trump’s active encouragement, into a
full-blown riot at the Capitol also help explain the time it
took to deploy Guard troops to the Capitol after their
assistance there was requested and approved. Post-hoc
evaluation of real-time communications during an
unprecedented and evolving crisis and limited tactical
intelligence, nevertheless, carries the risk of a precision
that was unrealistic at the time. It is also clear from
testimony provided to the Select Committee that DoD and DC
National Guard leaders have differing perspectives that are
not reconcilable regarding the timing of deployment
authorization.
Where the DC Guard’s deployment on January 6th is concerned,
then, the “lessons learned” at this juncture include:
careful evaluation on the basis of limited information may
take time; statutorily constrained intergovernmental
requests for assistance and multi-level approval processes
are complex and may be time-consuming; any visible military
presence in the domestic setting is circumscribed by law and
triggers considerable, constitutionally-driven
sensitivities; and crisis communications are often
imperfect, especially in unforeseen and rapidly evolving
situations.
ENDNOTES
1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 8.
2. DC Code § 49-409, (“The President of the United States
shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the
District of Columbia.”), available at
https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-409
(The DC National Guard is the “organized militia” of the
District of Columbia. DC Code § 49-406, available at
https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-406).
Subject to that top-level command distinction, the DC
National Guard is, when acting in its civil support or
militia capacity, comparable to the National Guard of the
various States, which act as those States’ militias. 32
U.S.C. §101(4) (“Army National Guard” statutorily defined as
“that part of the organized militia of the several States .
. . and the District of Columbia . . .”). The Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has interpreted the DC
Code provisions authorizing the DC National Guard’s use as a
militia in support of DC law enforcement activities as
within the exemptions from the Posse Comitatus Act’s
prohibitions on use of the military for domestic law
enforcement (18 U.S.C. § 1385 (“Whoever, except in cases and
under conditions expressly authorized by the Constitution or
Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the
Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .”)). See
Memorandum Opinion, “Use of the National Guard to Support
Drug Interdiction Efforts in the District of Columbia,” 13
Op. O.L.C. 91, 92, 93, 97 (Apr. 4, 1989), available at
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions-volume (Posse Comitatus
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, does not prohibit use of DC National
Guard as a militia in support of DC Metropolitan Police
Department). The President also has authority to mobilize
the National Guard, which is a reserve component of the U.S.
armed forces, to active duty (10 U.S.C. §12301 et seq.), and
may “federalize” any National Guard unit to assist in
addressing insurrection (10 U.S.C. §§251-253), invasion, or
rebellion and to give effect to Federal law (10 U.S.C.
§12406). The President did not exercise those authorities on
January 6, 2021. The DC National Guard operated that day as
the DC militia, in its civil support and law enforcement
assistance capacity under the separate authorities noted
above. See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4,
2021), p. 8.
3. Executive Order 11485, 34 F.R. 15411, § 1, (Oct. 1,
1969), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bterm%5D=34+f.r.15411#
(“The Commanding General of the [DC] National Guard shall
report to the Secretary of Defense or to an official of the
Department of Defense designated by the Secretary . . .”).
The Secretary of Defense exercises command authority over
the “military operations, including training, parades and
other duty” of the DC National Guard while in its
non-federalized militia status, through the Commanding
General of the DC National Guard. Id. Executive Order 11485
reserves appointment of the Commanding General of the DC
National Guard to the President (i.e., does not delegate
that authority to the Secretary of Defense or the
Secretary’s designee). Id., at §§ 1, 3. That Executive Order
also specifies that, “[s]ubject to the direction of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary [of Defense]
may order out the [DC] National Guard . . . to aid the civil
authorities . . . of the District of Columbia.” Id., at § 1.
Under a longstanding Congressional authorization, the Mayor
of the District of Columbia may request that the
Commander-in-Chief (now, by the President’s delegation, the
Secretary of Defense), direct the National Guard to assist
in suppressing “violence to persons or property” or “force
or violence to break and resist the laws,” including when
“tumult, riot or mob is threatened.” DC Code §49-103
(“Suppression of riots”), available at
https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-103.
See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.
4. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army
and Secretary of the Air Force, “Supervision and Control of
the National Guard of the District of Columbia,” (Oct. 10,
1969), ¶ 3. That memorandum is available as an attachment to
the Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s December 30, 2021
memorandum modifying that 1969 delegation: “Effective
immediately, the Secretary of Defense is the approval
authority for DC Government requests for the DCNG to provide
law enforcement support” to the District of Columbia if the
support is to be provided within 48 hours of the request or
if acceding to the request would require the DC National
Guard to engage directly in civilian law enforcement
activities, including “crowd control, traffic control,
search, seizure, arrest, or temporary detention.”
Memorandum, Secretary of Defense for Secretary of the Army,
“Authority to Approve District of Columbia Government
Requests for District of Columbia National Guard Support
Assistance,” (Dec. 30, 2021), available at
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/austin-streamlines-authority-to-deploy-dc-national-guard.
See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 10.
6. George Floyd was murdered on Monday, May 25, 2020. See
Catherine Thorbecke, “Derek Chauvin Had His Knee on George
Floyd’s Neck for Nearly 9 Minutes, Complaint Says,” ABC
News, (May 29, 2020)), available at
https://abcnews.go.com/US/derek-chauvin-knee-george-floyds-neck-minutes-complaint/story?id=70961042.
Over the ensuing days, weeks, and months, Americans
demonstrated in cities across the country. See Major Cities
Chiefs Association Intelligence Commanders Group, Report on
the 2020 Protests & Civil Unrest (Oct. 2020) at p. 8, Fig.
6,
https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf.
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 5.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 8.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 66.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 66.
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (June 2, 2021), pp. 67-68 (“[Trump] was very
upset at the news that had come out that he had been taken
down to the bunker in the preceding days, you know, when
some of the rioting right by the White House was at its
worst. He was very upset by this, and, as I recall, he
bellowed at everyone sitting in front of him in a semicircle
and he waved his finger around the semicircle saying we were
losers, we were losers, we were all fucking losers,” Barr
said. “[H]e then raised—you know, he talked about whether he
should invoke the Insurrection Act . . . And, you know, my
position was that the Insurrection Act should only be
invoked when you really need to invoke it as a last resort,
when you don’t really have other assets that can deal with
civil unrest.”).
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 86.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 20.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 20.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), pp. 47-48.
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 47.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 38.
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 18.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), pp. 17-18. “Brigadier
General Robert Kenneth Ryan was the joint task force
commander [who] authorized the—the helicopters to fly over
the crowd to observe and report, and the Secretary of the
Army approved that,” Major General Walker said. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 55. “Now, the pilots came a
little too close to the civilians on the ground.” Id., at
57.
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 14.
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 14.
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 18.
25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Esper, (Apr. 1, 2022), pp. 47-48.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Esper, (Apr. 1, 2022), pp. 47-48.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Apr. 1, 2022), p. 25.
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 242–43.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 14; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Donell Harvin, (Nov. 12,
2021).
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 24; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell
Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 24.
34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001680
(December 31, 2020, Letter from Mayor Bowser to Major
General Walker re: DCNG).
35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001679
(December 31, 2020, Letter from Dr. Christopher Rodriguez to
Major General Walker re: DCNG).
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 20.
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 26.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 14.
39. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 38.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 75.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 47.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 44.
43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 47.
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 49.
46. See Chapter 7.
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 79, 85.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 56.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 78-79, 80.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 78-79, 80.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 6.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 53-54.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 54.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 75.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 75-76.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 10.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 63; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher
Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), pp. 32-33.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 84.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 11.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 11-12.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 98.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 97.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 103.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 99.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 57.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 57.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 49.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark
Esper, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 22-23.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 12-13, 15.
72. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on
Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions, 117th Cong.,
1st sess., (May 12, 2021), Statement of Christopher C.
Miller, p. 4.
73. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on
Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions, 117th Cong.,
1st sess., (May 12, 2021), Statement of Christopher C.
Miller, p. 4.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 133.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 51.
78. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00005855–DoD
00005886 (December 18, 2021, email from General James C.
McConville to Curtis Kellogg re: HOT MEDIA FOX NEWS &
POLITICO MEDIA QUERY: Response to MG (R) Flynn’s remarks.).
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 51.
80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 54-55 (“Q: Were you ever told
you would be fired if you ever made such a statement again?
A: It was implied. It was implied that I was, you know, not
to do that again, . . . .”).
81. Lara Seligman (@laraseligman), Twitter, Dec. 18, 2021
11:27 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1339985580785086466.
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003488.
84. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003488.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.
86. Ashton Carter, Dick Cheney, William Cohen, Mark Esper,
Robert Gates, Chuck Hagel, James Mattis, Leon Panetta,
William Perry, and Donald Rumsfeld, “All 10 living former
defense secretaries: Involving the military in election
disputes would cross into dangerous territory,” Washington
Post, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/10-former-defense-secretaries-military-peaceful-transfer-of-power/2021/01/03/2a23d52e-4c4d-11eb-a9f4-0e668b9772ba_story.html.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 148.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 84.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 247.
93. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006
(January 4, 2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense
Christopher Miller to the Secretary of the Army Ryan
McCarthy).
94. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006
(January 4, 2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense
Christopher Miller to the Secretary of the Army Ryan
McCarthy); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 56.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 56.
96. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006
(January 4, 2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense
Christopher Miller to the Secretary of the Army Ryan
McCarthy); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD #2/000633,
(January 5, 2021, Colonel John Lubas email to Major General
William Walker with the subject, “Final Signed Memo to
DCNG,” at 7:54 a.m. ET).
97. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Lt. Col. David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 89.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 92.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 93.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 90.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 93–94.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 42.
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 133 (“Q: It doesn’t
sound to me, like, really, you’re pushing for it when you
raised the National Guard with Sergeant At Arms Irving or
Stenger? It would have been nice, but not essential for you
to be ready. Is that a fair characterization of your
personal position on that? A: Yes.”).
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 116-17.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 124.
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001766,
CTRL0000001766.0001 (Document from January 3, 2021, titled:
“Special Event Assessment: Joint Session of
Congress—Electoral College Vote Certification”); see also,
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 51-52.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 125.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 114.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 119.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 128.
117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 128.
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 9-10.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 35.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.
121. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 12.
122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 35.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 41.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 7-8, 45.
126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 52-53.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 131-32.
128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.
129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.
131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.
133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert
Ryan, (Dec. 9, 2022).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Dec. 9, 2022).
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Dec. 9, 2022).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 116.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 117.
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 31.
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 23.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 25, 27-28.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 130.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 26.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 45.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 109.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 29.
150. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003050
(January 5, 2021, email from John Lubas to William Walker
and Earl Matthews re: Final Signed Memo to DCNG).
151. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 33.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 49.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 65.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 22.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 31.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 31.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 31-32.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 31-32.
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 35.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 37.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 41.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 41.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 41-42.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 38-39. Text messages show that
Lieutenant Colonel Reinke texted Colonel Hunter, “Loading
buses now. Meeting police escort. Do you have destination.
Contact info?” at 2:43 PM. See Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Davie Reinke Production),
CTRL0000930918 (January 6, 2021, text messages).
174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 44-45. (He called his direct
supervisor, Brigadier General Robert Ryan: “The first
conversation with him, I first informed him, hey, sir, this
is where I am, this is who I’ve talked to, and they both
asked for assistance. And I asked for release of the QRF
now. And I asked for, basically send all the additional
forces, you know, that you have now. And his response to me
was, we are working on it. So he said he was going to
coordinate with General Dean and Major General Walker, but
they were working on it.”).
175. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Dec. 16, 2021).
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 78.
177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 78.
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 75-76.
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 148.
180. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 18.
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 7-8, 19.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 19, 53 (“[Q: T]he Speaker’s
office isn’t part of that process in terms of requesting the
National Guard, correct? A[:] Correct. It would just be on
the notification side.”).
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri
McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri
McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri
McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri
McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).
187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul
Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 21.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 148-50.
189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 152.
190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 57 (“I wasn’t speaking,
but I was there.”).
191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy
Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 98-99.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2022), p. 54.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99.
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt,
(Nov. 3, 2022), p. 56 (“And he immediately says, ‘I’m going
to get approval. Get me a plan,’ is what he tells me”).
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 84.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99. The Army at first denied
that General Flynn was present for the call at all. See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 98 (“I think
there was just confusion—I know some people are trying, you
know, to make it something else, but I think there was just
confusion. There were a whole bunch of meetings going on
because, you know, I didn’t think he was there, because when
I was there, he wasn’t there.”). General McConville said:
“And there was no intent to deceive anybody, or there’s no
conspiracy because of who Charlie Flynn’s brother is,”
General Michael Flynn. Id., at 99. General Flynn said he did
not speak on the call. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn,
(Oct. 28, 2021), p. 41 (“A [:] I did not speak on that call.
Q [:] Did you identify yourself as being on the call? A [:]
I did not. Now, if I said anything, if I—my recollection, if
I said anything, I may have tugged on General Piatt’s sleeve
and asked and said, “What’s going on here?” like, “What’s
the situation?” you know.” But others, like Colonel Matthews
listening in from the National Guard end of the call, said
both Generals Piatt and Flynn were the main interlocuters.
See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021). On Lt. Nick’s notes, at 2:35
p.m., General Flynn’s title is written down. See Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of
Defense Production), CTRL0000930917 (January 6, 2021,
handwritten notes taken by Lt. Timothy Nick). Lt Nick said,
“I was just trying to jot down who was on the call.” See
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy
Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021). General Flynn ultimately said he was
there for a short time. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn,
(Oct. 28, 2021), pp. 40, 42 (“It was—I was literally
there—the total time that I’m talking about was about 4 to 5
minutes. I was really around that phone call, rough order of
magnitude, for maybe a minute of that;” “it became clear to
me that I was in the wrong place. And so I made the decision
to leave because General Piatt had a handle on the
situation.”).
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 37.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 37.
202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 39.
203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 79-80.
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 83.
206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 81.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 85.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 70.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 70.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 40.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 81-82.
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 113.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 115.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 162.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 161.
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 160.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 80.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 80.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 156-57.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 156.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 156.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 61.
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 57.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 58.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 99.
231. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 105.
232. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 105.
233. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 81-82.
234. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 61.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.
240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 157.
241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.
242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 63.
243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 63.
244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.
246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 116-17.
247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 85.
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 59.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 160.
252. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 60.
253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 39.
254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 118.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 118.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 141.
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 141-42.
258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
259. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
261. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 141.
262. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 288.
265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 125.
266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 124.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 143.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 82 (“So at no time
did I and I am not aware of anyone in the Pentagon having a
conversation with President Trump on the day of the 6th.”).
270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 285.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 285.
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 95-96.
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 96.
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 96.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 97-98.
277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01.
278. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 102.
282. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM000789 (January 5,
2021, emails between Mark Meadows and John Aycoth, “Re: DC
mayor activates National Guard ahead of pro-Trump
demonstrations, The Hill”).
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 99-100.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 99-101. (Q: “[D]id
you take that as a request for you or an order to you to
deploy 10,000 troops? A[:] No, absolutely not. I interpreted
it as a bit of presidential banter or President Trump banter
that you all are familiar with, and in no way, shape, or
form did I interpret that as an order or direction.”);
(“Q[:] So I want to be clear here that—since then, in
February 2021, Mark Meadows said on Fox News that, quote:
Even in January, that was a given as many as 10,000 National
Guard troops were told to be on the ready by the Secretary
of Defense. Is there any accuracy to that statement? A[:]
I’m not—not from my perspective. I was never given any
direction or order or knew of any plans of that nature.”);
(Q: “To be crystal clear, there was no direct order from
President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for
January 6th, correct? A[:] No. Yeah. That’s correct. There
was no direct—there was no order from the President.”).
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 13.
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 78-79.
287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 252-53.
288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 253.
289. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.
290. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.
291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.
292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 113 (“So, at 3
o’clock, I gave the order to mobilize the entire District of
Columbia National Guard, however, big they are . . . .
everybody show up at the [Armory and], . . . move them to
the Capitol immediately to support local law enforcement.”).
293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 122.
294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 124. (emphasis added).
295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 120.
296. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 120.
297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).
298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy
Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).
299. The two letters referenced include Secretary Miller’s
January 4 memorandum setting restrictions on the Guard and a
follow-up letter from Secretary McCarthy on January 5
expounding on those limitations. See Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense
Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4, 2021, memorandum), DoD
Production DoD 00003493 (January 5, 2021 follow-up letter).
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 45.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 122.
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 123.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 104.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 47; Earl Matthews, “The
Harder Right: An Analysis of a Recent DoD Inspector General
Investigation and Other Matters,” (Dec. 1, 2021), available
at
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/january-6-clearinghouse-Colonel-Earl-G.-Matthews-An-Analysis-of-a-Recent-DoD-Inspector-General-Investigation-and-Other-Matters-December-1-2021.pdf.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 55.
307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 52.
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 125.
309. Aaron C. Davis (@byaaroncdavis), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021
2:55 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/byaaroncdavis/status/1346908166030766080.
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4 2022), p. 109, 127, 129.
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4 2022), p. 130.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 49. (“I mentioned that to Chief
Carroll. I said, hey, Chief, you know, I may just pull
everyone back. And he told me, he said, well, right now I
may need your Guardsmen who are on the traffic control
points, because all of my officers are here at the Capitol,
so I don’t have officers out there in the city right now, so
I may need to re-mission those guys for other things. Can
you just send me the personnel from the Armory here? You
know, so it was almost like we were talking about splitting.
We’ll use that 90 to support MPD on anything they needed in
the city, but I can still get, you know, another 200, 250
from the Armory to come to the Capitol now.”). But Assistant
Chief Carroll didn’t recall such a conversation. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jeffrey
Carroll, (Nov. 18, 2022) (“I don’t think it happened. It
doesn’t sound like something that would’ve happened.”)
Sergeant Major Brooks said it was him who made the
recommendation to hold the first shift at their posts.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Michael F.
Brooks, (Dec. 13, 2021).
313. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ken
Ryan, (Dec. 9, 2021) (“Those that were on the TCPs on the
6th did not go to the Capitol on the night of the 6th.”);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 81; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of James Charles McConville,
(Nov. 4, 2021), pp.88-89 (“Well, what I would think was
happening during that hour and a half is they’re . . .
leaving their check points, the traffic control points, the
30 traffic control points so that all of those vehicles,
they’re hopping in their cars and they’re driving back in
traffic through the [A]rmory and getting set.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General
Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 50 (“They were out on
traffic control points. They were doing another job. The QRF
was across the river. We brought them over to the Armory.
But they had to reconfigure, reorganize now to go into a
civil disturbance operation.”).
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
319. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
320. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13,
2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
321. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13,
2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 109; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III,
(Jan. 11, 2022), p. 86.
323. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 129.
324. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 121-22.
325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 108.
326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 108.
327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of James
Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 91-92.
328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.
329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 123.
330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 141.
331. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 121.
332. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 122. (emphasis added).
333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 67.
334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 65, 70.
335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 65.
336. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 121.
337. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 66.
338. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
339. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal
Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
340. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 134.
341. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 131.
342. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 131.
343. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 15.
344. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
345. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
346. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
347. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 133.
348. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
349. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4,
2021), p. 91 (“General LaNeve provided the link up location
and the lead.”).
350. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
351. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris
LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).
352. Earl Matthews, “The Harder Right: An Analysis of a
Recent DoD Inspector General Investigation and Other
Matters,” (Dec. 1, 2021), available at
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/january-6-clearinghouse-Colonel-Earl-G.-Matthews-An-Analysis-of-a-Recent-DoD-Inspector-General-Investigation-and-Other-Matters-December-1-2021.pdf
(“MG Walker denies that LaNeve called him at 4:25PM, or that
he spoke to LaNeve at anytime between the phone call from
Chief Sund at 1:49PM and the eventual DCNG deployment to the
Capitol at 5:08PM.”).
353. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 139.
354. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 60.
355. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 65-66.
356. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl
Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021) (“One reason I know that there is
no 4:30 call—is that I was sitting next to Gen. Walker”).
357. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Michael
F. Brooks, (Dec. 13, 2021).
358. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), CTRL0000930917
(January 6, 2021, handwritten notes taken by Lt. Timothy
Nick).
359. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 60.
360. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 60-61.
361. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy
Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).
362. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of James
Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 90-92.
363. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 140.
364. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
365. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
366. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001196
(January 8, 2021, Memorandum for Record from Office of the
Secretary of Defense re: Timeline for December 31,
2020–January 6, 2021), DoD 00001090 (January 7, 2021,
Memorandum for Record from the Secretary of the Army re:
Timeline For 31 December–7 January 2021), 00000490 (January
7, 2021, Memorandum for Record from Joint Force Headquarters
re: Timeline for Request for Assistance during Civil Unrest
on 6 January 2021 and DC National Guard Authorization to
Respond).
368. Text message from David Reinke to Colonel Hunter on
January 6, 2021.
369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David
Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).
370. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
371. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart
Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).
372. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 50-51.
373. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 51.
374. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig
Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 53.
375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 120.
376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 111-12.
377. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
378. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
379. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
380. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), pp. 67-68.
381. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.
382. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 73.
383. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 144.
384. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 111.
385. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan
McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 130.
386. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.
387. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p.71.
388. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William
Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 72.
APPENDIX 3: THE BIG RIP-OFF: FOLLOW THE MONEY
Introduction
This appendix will consider the extent to which President
Trump’s Campaign and related entities raised an
unprecedented amount of political donations using
inflammatory messaging alleging that the 2020 U.S.
Presidential election was fraudulent or stolen. It will
review what tools and methods were used to produce, transmit
and optimize these fundraising solicitations; who drafted
and approved the messaging and what they knew about the
accuracy of the messaging; who ultimately benefitted from
these donations; and the impact of these messages on their
recipients.
The Select Committee’s investigation demonstrates that
President Trump’s baseless claims of election fraud—the Big
Lie—served a dual purpose, forming the foundation of his
attempts to overturn the 2020 Presidential election and
launching a fundraising effort to fund the former
President’s other endeavors and to enrich his associates—the
Big Rip-off.
The false election fraud narrative embedded in fundraising
emails and text messages amplified the Big Lie by
perpetuating a belief that the 2020 election was stolen from
President Trump and effectuated the Big Rip-off by
misleading donors into thinking their donations could alter
the election results.
At the same time, the Big Lie helped President Trump and the
Republican National Committee (RNC) raise more than $250
million after the election, much of it from small-dollar
donors who were promised their money would “Stop the Steal.”
Despite what they told their supporters, however, most of
their money was not used to stop any purported steal—it was
diverted to accomplish the Big Rip-off. Millions of dollars
that were raised ostensibly for “election defense” and
“fighting voter fraud” were not spent that way at all.
Moreover, the Select Committee’s investigation shows that
the RNC knew that President Trump’s claims about winning the
election were baseless and that post-election donations
would not help him secure an additional term in office. Yet,
both the Trump Campaign and the RNC decided to continue
fundraising after the election, a decision that would have
come from President Trump himself.
In short, President Trump and his Campaign ripped off
supporters by raising more than $250 million by claiming
they wanted to fight fraud they knew did not exist and to
challenge an election they knew he lost.
Discussion
The Trump Campaign Fundraising Team
As detailed below, the Trump Campaign misled the American
public and President Trump’s donors on how they planned to
use, and did use, the donated funds while bombarding
supporters with hundreds of emails, as many as twenty-five
emails per day, stating the election had been stolen. In
those emails, they used inflammatory language accusing
Democrats of trying to “steal the election,” encouraged
supporters to join the “Trump army”; “Defend” the election:
and to “fight back” over, and over, and over again.1 They
sent these emails out because they knew they were effective
at raising money.2 This was made possible by the creation of
a fundraising machine powered jointly by the Trump Campaign
and the RNC.
A. The TMAGAC Fundraising Machine
During the 2020 election cycle, President Trump operated a
structure under which the Trump reelection campaign and the
RNC merged programs and raised money jointly through the
Trump Make America Great Again Committee (internally
referred to by its acronym TMAGAC, which RNC officials
pronounced “T-Magic”).3 TMAGAC was focused on raising money
online through small-dollar donations.4 Tim Murtaugh, the
Trump Campaign’s communications director, described the
TMAGAC fundraising operation as “an entity unto itself
within the campaign.” 5
The individual charged with leading the digital operation in
2020 was Gary Coby.6 Coby first started working with the RNC
in 2016 even before President Trump became the nominee.7
Coby explained that, as digital director, his role during
the 2020 Presidential election cycle was to “oversee the
digital operation.” 8 Similarly, senior staffers at the
Trump Campaign and the RNC all made clear that Coby was the
individual in charge of the TMAGAC digital team.9 Both
high-level staffers at the Trump Campaign and at the RNC
confirmed that Coby had the trust of Jared Kushner, the
President’s son-in-law.10
Coby explained that during the 2020 Presidential election
cycle, the TMAGAC digital team was a “big team with multiple
organizations and vendor teams all working together as one,
that include[d] RNC staff, [Donald J. Trump for President]
staff, [and] maybe a half dozen vendor teams.” 11 The RNC
digital team, a subset of the TMAGAC digital team, was led
operationally by Kevin Zambrano, Chief Digital Officer at
the RNC. In 2020, members of the digital staff of both the
RNC and Trump Campaign merged in an office building in
Arlington, Virginia, with some suites jointly hosting RNC
and Trump Campaign staff on the digital team, and other
suites hosting third-party companies, such as Opn Sesame and
Direct Persuasion.12 Thereafter, Zambrano assisted Coby in
managing the TMAGAC digital team.13 Zambrano explained, “The
majority of the staff was at the RNC doing both RNC and
TMAGAC work.” 14 This work was focused squarely on
fundraising.15
The RNC digital team included Austin Boedigheimer, who,
starting in January 2019, was the RNC’s digital deputy
director16 and technically served as Zambrano’s deputy.17 In
reality, Boedigheimer reported to both Zambrano and Coby.18
Boedigheimer also led the TMAGAC digital fundraising team,
which was comprised of all online fundraising efforts,
including fundraising emails and text messages.19 At the end
of the 2020 cycle, that team had 20 or 30 people within
smaller teams, such as the copy team, the text message team,
the data team, the advertising team, and the graphics
team.20
The RNC digital team also included a team of copywriters,
who were responsible for writing the fundraising emails and
text messages to solicit small-dollar donations through
TMAGAC.21 These copywriters reported to Hanna Allred, the
RNC’s Chief Copywriter.22 By mid-2020, there were three
copywriters who reported to Allred: Alex Murglin,23 Ethan
Katz,24 and Alex Blinkoff.25 Blinkoff and Katz worked in
that role from June 2020 until they were fired approximately
three weeks after the 2020 election, while Murglin remains a
copywriter at the RNC.
Although the TMAGAC team consisted of both Trump Campaign
and RNC staffers, TMAGAC operated as one entity working
towards one goal – raising as much money as possible.26
B. The Fundraising Assembly Line
The copywriting process worked like an assembly line, where
different individuals performed a task and passed on the
work product to someone else, including for internal
approval.27 To generate content for fundraising
communications, Allred explained, the copywriting
fundraising team was “watching the messaging coming out of
the committee [RNC] and the campaign and from the President
himself and what his family was talking about.” 28 For
example, in a November 2020 email, Boedigheimer stated to
Allred, “Good to include lines like [‘]we need the resources
to make sure they don’t try to steal this election. We saw
what happened on election night, we can’t let them take the
senate too.[’]” 29
It was evident that the copywriters “would draft a lot of
the content based on . . . what the President was
saying.” 30 And there was no mistaking it, President Trump
“was providing us [the copywriters] with a lot of content
online.” 31 Allred said Boedigheimer was encouraging her to
use this language because it would cause President Trump’s
supporters to donate by “giving a purpose to their
donation” 32 and that they used this repeatedly because it
worked.33 Boedigheimer did not dispute this, and reaffirmed
that such language had been successful at fundraising.34
Further, the emails that were signed by President Trump or
“Team Trump” were intentionally drafted to capture President
Trump’s voice, tone and messaging.35 Boedigheimer explained,
“[President Trump] obviously has a very aggressive[,]
excitable tone, and we would try to incorporate that in our
messaging as well.” 36 The goal was to make the millions of
recipients of aggressive, hyperbolic fundraising emails
believe that the emails were coming from President Trump
himself. In Zambrano’s words, the purpose was to give
recipients “red meat.” 37
C. The Approvals Process
The Structure
Draft emails were submitted for approval to a designated
group that handled approvals of all TMAGAC fundraising copy
(the “Approvals Group”).38 Boedigheimer retained
responsibility for ensuring that TMAGAC’s fundraising copy
was approved before being sent to the public.39
The Approvals Group consisted of three sets of stakeholders
from the RNC and the Trump Campaign,40 and included a
variety of other interested staffers, including Zambrano,
Boedigheimer, and Allred.41 TMAGAC’s fundraising copy could
not be sent without approval from the legal, communications
and research departments.42
Perceived Responsibilities
After election day, a small group of staffers in the
Approvals Group actively reviewed and approved the numerous
fundraising emails and text messages that spread false
election fraud claims. These staffers included:
RNC Legal: Justin Reimer, RNC Chief Counsel43 and Jenna
Kirsch, RNC Associate Counsel44
RNC Communications: Cassie Docksey, Deputy Communications
Director45
RNC Research: Michael Reed, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Communications46
Trump Campaign Legal: Alex Cannon, Deputy General Counsel47
Trump Campaign Communications and Research: Zach Parkinson,
Deputy Director of Communications and Director of Research48
Boedigheimer, as head of the fundraising team handling the
drafting and propagation of fundraising messaging, told the
Select Committee his understanding of the role the three
components of the Approvals Group (legal, communications,
and research) performed when reviewing emails and text
messages.
Regarding legal, Boedigheimer explained that he understood
Alex Cannon’s role, as the Trump Campaign’s Deputy General
Counsel, was to review the emails from a “legal perspective”
by “essentially making sure that there’s no legal issues
with the content.” 49
Regarding communications, Boedigheimer stated that the
communications staffers in the Approvals Group were
reviewing the content and “[m]aking sure that it’s on
message and good from a comms perspective.” 50
Lastly, Boedigheimer explained that the research team was
“looking for . . . things that are inaccurate.” 51
Although Boedigheimer provided only a vague explanation of
the role of the Approvals Group, he emphasized that he had
to “trust that the research, the comms, and the legal team
are going to do their processes to make sure it’s [the
TMAGAC fundraising copy was] accurate.” 52 He further noted,
“[I]t was the approval chain[’]s job to see what the
accuracy of the email is and whether it’s true or not. . . .
We were sending information and then leaning on our approval
chain to make sure that it’s accurate.” 53
The Select Committee’s investigation revealed that the
Approvals Group did not operate that way, however. The
Select Committee interviewed members of the Approvals Group
handling the communications, research, and legal functions
and confirmed that members of the Approvals Group typically
engaged only in cursory reviews of the fundraising messages
and did not review substantive claims of election fraud for
accuracy.
Zach Parkinson, the Trump Campaign’s Deputy Director of
Communications and Research Director, represented the Trump
Campaign’s communications and research functions in the
Approvals Group. Parkinson made clear, “Generally, our role
when it came to fundraising emails and texts was to approve
them for the communications team.” 54 Parkinson noted that
that he was typically the person who weighed in on behalf of
the Trump Campaign’s communications and research team.55 He
added, “we would review them for messaging consistency,
sometimes we would review them for factual accuracy, and
then we would provide the communications approval for
those.” 56
Parkinson clarified that the scope of review for “factual
accuracy” was limited. Specifically, his review of
fundraising emails and text messages for accuracy was
limited to questions concerning items such as time and
location.57
Critically, Parkinson did not review statements regarding
election fraud in the fundraising copy for accuracy because
“most political text messages and fundraising emails are
political rhetoric, and so a lot of them don’t necessarily
require fact checking.” 58 He added that “political
rhetoric,” such as “Democrats are trying to steal the
election,” was not something he and his team were
“necessarily tasked to say no to.” 59 Parkinson made clear
that he thought the legal department, namely Alex Cannon,
would handle reviewing for accuracy, noting “I deferred to
the legal team on the legitimacy and the ability to
substantiate claims that were made that were put through
these approvals and whether or not we could, again,
substantiate them or they were in line with our legal
efforts.” 60 Parkinson, as the head of the research team,
the very campaign team meant to fact-check and ensure
accuracy in the Trump Campaign’s statements, said he was
“simply looking for messaging consistency.” 61 Whether
Democrats were engaged in fraud to steal the election was a
“political argument” to Parkinson, which he did not review
for accuracy.62
Like Parkinson, Michael Reed, then the RNC’s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Communications, was not reviewing the TMAGAC
emails about election fraud for broader accuracy. Notably,
Reed could not recall a single email that he researched to
do a fact-check or follow up on to see if claims contained
in the email were, in fact, true.63
Boedigheimer and the copywriters believed the research
staffers were looking for messages that they believed were
inaccurate, but they were doing no such thing.
Alex Cannon, the Trump Campaign’s legal representative in
the Approvals Group, was no different—the TMAGAC fundraisers
thought he was doing far more than he was in fact doing. The
Select Committee received a November 4, 2020, email from
Nathan Groth, counsel for the Trump Campaign, to Alex
Cannon. This email reflected that Cannon was not tasked with
substantively reviewing fundraising emails like Boedigheimer
thought. Groth wrote to Cannon, “Matt [Morgan, Trump
Campaign’s General Counsel] has instructed me to hand off
all compliance matters, including approvals, to you.” 64
Cannon confirmed, “I saw myself as doing exactly what I was
instructed to do here, which is do what Nathan had
previously been doing. So it’s this. It’s compliance issues
like disclaimers and typos.” 65 Therefore, when Cannon
received emails that included claims such as “the Democrats
are trying to steal the election,” he viewed reviewing the
veracity of this statement as “outside the purview of what
[he] was tasked.” 66 When asked, Cannon stated that he did
not know who was tasked with ensuring that fundraising
emails were true and accurate.67
Boedigheimer, and other members of the digital fundraising
team he led, claimed to see the Approvals Group as a
guardrail of sorts in the fundraising effort to protect from
the dissemination of false messaging about the election, but
the Approvals Group served no such role. The very staffers
in the Approvals Group repeatedly told the Select Committee
that they did not review the claims about election fraud to
confirm whether they were even true.
When all was said and done, no one in the Trump Campaign
claimed to be responsible for confirming the accuracy of
President Trump’s words, or other allegations of election
fraud, before they were blasted to millions of Americans.68
Thus, after the election, the TMAGAC team drafted emails
filled with inflammatory and unfounded claims, and the
members of the Approvals Group tasked with fact checking
these claims did no such thing—effectively, President
Trump’s claims were treated as true and blasted to millions
of people with little to no scrutiny by those tasked with
ensuring accuracy. This process was a fertile ground for the
Big Lie to spread through hundreds of emails and text
messages.
D. Focus on Fundraising Metrics
Boedigheimer spoke with Coby and Zambrano often about how
much money TMAGAC was raising, and they provided feedback
regarding fundraising goals.69 Trump Campaign leadership was
fully aware of post-election fundraising totals. According
to Coby, President Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor
Jared Kushner “had the most interest in the digital program”
and “would just check in on [fundraising] results,” and
routinely received updates regarding fundraising from
Coby.70 Coby also made clear that Kushner was heavily
involved in the Campaign’s budget process71 and that he
updated Kushner on TMAGAC’s post-election fundraising
totals.72
The Select Committee received documents confirming Kushner’s
involvement. For example, on November 8, 2020, Kushner
requested that a daily tracker be created showing the Trump
Campaign’s financial position from election day forward.73
In an email, Kushner noted that the tracker would allow the
Campaign to consider its cash flow ahead of the creation of
“a new entity for POTUS[’s] other political activities.” 74
Just days after the election, and after the Campaign had
three of its four best fundraising days ever on November
4th, 5th, and 6th,75 Kushner was preparing for the launch of
President Trump’s new leadership PAC, Save America. Kushner
stated that he needed this new daily tracker because the
Trump Campaign was going to continue fundraising
post-election.76 Kushner continued to receive these detailed
daily trackers, which included Save America’s fundraising
hauls, through at least December 2020.77
2020 ELECTION: THE ROLE OF ELECTION FRAUD MESSAGING
A. The Decision to Continue Fundraising after Election Day
Heading into election night of the 2020 Presidential race,
as Americans across the country waited in line to vote on
election day, the Trump Campaign and the RNC were planning
what they would tell the American public about the results
in the upcoming days. On election day, Boedigheimer and
Darren Centinello, a Trump Campaign staffer, discussed the
three message options that the Trump Campaign had on the
table.78
The first option was to send out copy claiming President
Trump had won the 2020 election. But the Campaign knew this
message was false, and Boedigheimer told Centinello that he
could not get this messaging approved yet.79 The Trump
Campaign’s second option was an email stating they were
still waiting on the election results. This message would
have been the truth. The Campaign rejected this option.
Instead, the Trump Campaign chose a third option.
Boedigheimer confirmed that TMAGAC fundraisers had received
approval for copy claiming that the Democrats are going to
“try to steal the election” before election night.80
Zambrano confirmed that it would not surprise him that
TMAGAC was immediately claiming that Democrats were trying
to steal the election, because President Trump has been
pushing that message.81 Zambrano added, “That was the
President’s phrasing in the messaging that the team was
sourcing from.” 82 Importantly, Boedigheimer confirmed that
the TMAGAC copywriting team did not base its use of the
“trying to steal” language on any awareness of actual
fraud.83
B. Post-Election Fundraising Off the Big Lie
Both the Trump Campaign and the RNC directed TMAGAC to
continue fundraising after the election.84 Justin Clark, the
deputy campaign manager, explained that the decision to
continue fundraising after the election would have come from
President Trump himself.85
Starting after the election and until January 6th, the Trump
Campaign, along with the RNC, sent millions of emails to
their supporters, with messaging such as claiming that the
election was “RIGGED.” 86 The Trump Campaign viewed the
TMAGAC emails as another avenue to get out President Trump’s
post-election messaging about the alleged fraud.87 These
emails used false claims of voter fraud to create a sense of
urgency that the election was being stolen. The Trump
Campaign and the RNC told their supporters that their
donations could stop Democrats from “trying to steal the
election.” They consistently encouraged donors to give money
to continue “uncovering” fraud that had not occurred. These
emails were sent out after being reviewed and approved by
the Approvals Group.88
The TMAGAC fundraisers used inflammatory language and false
election fraud claims after the election because it was both
effective at fundraising and accurately captured President
Trump’s ongoing tone and messaging.89 When the digital
fundraising team drafted emails claiming, for example, that
“Democrats are trying to steal the election,” they did not
bother to confirm whether or not those inflammatory
statements were true, and instead they merely took President
Trump’s words and made an effective fundraising email.90 As
Zambrano stated, “the President issuing statements or tweets
would be the genesis of the copy that would then go into the
approval process for edits, for checks. That is why the
approval process worked.” 91 President Trump was the source
of the lies. Not only was President Trump’s fundraising
driven by his daily deluge of lies about the election, but
these lies were also able to go unchallenged before being
spread because TMAGAC had an ineffective process when it
came to scrutinizing and correcting those lies.
The TMAGAC fundraising machine continued to churn out
hundreds of fundraising emails and text messages regardless
of external developments. For example, Zambrano said that,
after former Vice President Biden was widely declared the
winner of the election, TMAGAC’s fundraising efforts moved
ahead the same way they had previously,92 even though he
“would say it wasn’t looking good” as soon as one week after
the election.93
ALARMS RAISED ABOUT TMAGAC FUNDRAISING CONTENT
A number of individuals and entities associated with the
TMAGAC fundraising campaign raised concerns about the
dangerous and inflammatory language used in the emails
issued for this campaign.
Concerns Raised in Internal RNC Review
Evidence obtained by the Select Committee shows that the RNC
knew that President Trump’s claims about winning the
election were baseless and that additional donations would
not help him secure an additional term in office. They
walked as close to the line as they dared—making several
changes to fundraising copy that seemingly protected the RNC
from legal exposure while still spreading and relying on
President Trump’s known lies and misrepresentations.
The Select Committee did not interview a member of the RNC
legal team due to concerns surrounding attorney-client
privilege, but the Select Committee nonetheless got insight
into their role from documents produced by Campaign and RNC
staff, as well as interviews with staffers. As detailed
below, the RNC lawyers were the only individuals who even
attempted to walk back the fundraising emails.
Allred and Katz both received direction from the RNC’s
lawyers shortly after the election to not say “steal the
election” and instead were told to use “try to steal the
election.” 94 Allred also recalled that, at some point, the
RNC legal team directed the copywriters not to use the term
“rigged.” 95
After the media called the election for former Vice
President Joe Biden on Saturday, November 7, 2020, the RNC
began to quietly pull back from definitive language about
President Trump having won the election and instead used
language of insinuation. For example, on November 10, 2020,
Justin Reimer, RNC’s then-chief counsel, revised a
fundraising email sent to the Approvals Group to remove the
sentence that “Joe Biden should not wrongfully claim the
office of the President.” 96 Instead, Reimer indicated the
email should read, “Joe Biden does not get to decide when
this election ends. Only LEGAL ballots must be counted and
verified.” 97 Both Alex Cannon and Zach Parkinson signed off
on Reimer’s edits.98
On November 11, 2020, Reimer again revised a fundraising
email sent to the Approvals Group. This time, he revised a
claim that “President Trump won this election by a lot” to
instead state that “President Trump got 71 MILLION LEGAL
votes.” 99 Once again Cannon and Parkinson signed off on
Reimer’s edits.100
Also on November 11, 2020, Jenna Kirsch, associate counsel
at the RNC, revised a fundraising email sent to the
Approvals Group to, among other things, remove the request
“to step up and contribute to our critical Election Defense
Fund so that we can DEFEND the Election and secure FOUR MORE
YEARS.” 101 Instead of “secure FOUR MORE YEARS,” Kirsch’s
revised version stated a contribution would “finish the
fight.” 102 Once again Cannon and Parkinson signed off on
these edits for the Trump Campaign.103 Regarding the change
to finish the fight, Zambrano conceded, “I would say this a
substantive change from the legal department.” 104 Kirsch
made numerous edits like this, in which she removed
assertions about “four more years.” 105 Such edits continued
into late November 2020.
Further, Boedigheimer stated that he took questions to RNC
legal in the post-election period about TMAGAC fundraisers
using the “steal the election” language.106 The RNC was
clearly aware that President Trump’s claims regarding the
election were not true and tried to have it both ways.
The private split between the RNC and the Trump Campaign
became even more pronounced when President Trump decided to
double down on his false election fraud claims and chose
Rudolph Giuliani to lead his legal efforts to overturn the
election.107 On November 19, 2020, Giuliani held a press
conference at the RNC’s headquarters in which he falsely
suggested that the Biden Campaign orchestrated an elaborate
nationwide voter-fraud scheme.108 Cassie Docksey, a senior
RNC staffer at the time, recalled that she spoke that day
with Michael Ahrens, then the RNC’s communications director,
about the diverging from the Trump Campaign.109 Ahrens told
her that the RNC would no longer automatically amplify or
replicate statements from the Trump Campaign or President
Trump’s legal team.110 Docksey understood Ahrens to be
relaying a decision made at the most senior levels of the
RNC.111
Ahrens asserted that the RNC was unwilling to adopt the
wide-ranging, baseless assertions President Trump’s legal
team was making and quietly decided to focus its
communication strategy elsewhere.112 Distancing the RNC from
President Trump’s false statements was a “regular course of
the job before the election,” and it “carried through after
the election” in relation to President Trump’s false claims
about the election.113 Starting at or before the November
19, 2020, press conference, the RNC senior leadership was in
agreement that they would not claim that President Trump had
won the election,114 although the RNC “frequently” had to
have internal discussions about President Trump’s false
statements about the election.115
According to Michael Reed, then the RNC’s deputy chief of
staff for communications, “there were conversations amongst
[RNC] legal and comms and digital to ensure that anything
that was being written by the digital team based off of
something President Trump or the Campaign said was something
we all were more comfortable with.” 116 RNC Chairwoman
McDaniel was a part of these conversations.117
RNC leadership knew that President Trump was lying to the
American people. Yet, they did nothing to publicly distance
themselves from his efforts to overturn the election. The
RNC’s response was merely to tinker around the edges of the
fundraising copy but never to fundamentally challenge the
one message that remained present in TMAGAC’s post-election
fundraising copy—President Trump’s Big Lie.
In the end, multiple senior RNC staffers approved
fundraising emails raising questions about the election
results even though they did not know of any evidence about
fraud impacting the winner of the 2020 Presidential
election. For example, Cassie Docksey stated that she was
not aware of any fraud that impacted the results of the
Presidential election.118 Ahrens conceded that “there was
not evidence that we [the RNC] had seen that he [President
Trump] won the election, that Biden had not won the
election.” 119
Similarly, Justin Clark was “not aware of [fraudulent
activity . . . to like defraud voters] by an individual or
an entity that would have [changed the outcome of an
election].” 120 Alex Cannon “did not find or see, in [his]
limited ability as one individual . . . evidence that would
be sufficient within the time period to change any sort of
election results in any of the States.” 121
Nonetheless, the RNC and the Trump Campaign continued to
send out hundreds of emails, spreading the Big Lie to and
fundraising off of millions of supporters. Even though the
RNC had closely held reservations about repeating the most
extreme and unsupportable claims of fraud, the RNC stayed
the course with a coordinated, single fundraising plan with
the Trump Campaign. The RNC privately and quietly softened
the most blatantly egregious claims written by its own
copywriters but publicly stood shoulder to shoulder with
President Trump and his Big Lie.
This is clearly evidenced by multiple TMAGAC emails in late
December 2020 that asserted that former Vice President Joe
Biden would be an “illegitimate President” when he took
office.122 These emails came after December 14, 2020, the
day electors from each State met to cast their votes for
President and Vice President. These emails came after Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell made it clear that he
accepted the electoral college’s certification of Biden’s
victory. These emails came after President Trump and his
allies had lost all but one lawsuit challenging the
election.123 None of this made a difference to TMAGAC. When
asked why TMAGAC would repeatedly send these emails stating
that former Vice President Biden would be an illegitimate
President, Hanna Allred, the chief copywriter, stated that
it would be because the emails were “effective” for
fundraising.124
Trump Campaign Discussions
Alex Cannon was so bothered by the emails he was reviewing
as a member of the Approvals Group that he took his concerns
to Justin Clark, the campaign’s deputy campaign manager.
Cannon explained that he had discussions with Clark about
the problematic tone of the post-election TMAGAC emails and
noted to Clark that the emails “seemed a little over the top
to [him].” 125 Cannon raised those concerns because, after
spending weeks researching which fraud claims were
verifiable and which were not, Cannon saw that the TMAGAC
emails were inconsistent with the fact that systemic fraud
did not exist.126 Cannon also recalled that he may have
expressed concern to Matt Morgan, the campaign’s general
counsel, regarding the difference between claims of election
fraud made in the TMAGAC fundraising emails and his
conclusion that there was not fraud that impacted the
election results.127 Cannon was not aware of any actions
taken to address the concerns he had with this
inconsistency.128
Justin Clark could not recall whether he looked at any
fundraising emails after Cannon raised these concerns or
whether Cannon spoke to Gary Coby about the substance of the
fundraising emails.129
Challenges From Within the Digital Team
In the days after the election, one junior copywriter
presented senior Campaign staffers with a template for a
more honest approach. Shortly after election night, Coby led
a meeting of the entire Trump digital team, which included
individuals from the Campaign, the RNC, Opn Sesame, Direct
Persuasion, and others. In that meeting, as Coby addressed
the staff and expressed that the digital team would continue
to work, Ethan Katz, an RNC staffer in his early twenties,
rose to ask a question:130 How were staffers supposed to
tell voters that the Trump Campaign wanted to keep counting
votes in Arizona but stop counting votes in other States
(like Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Michigan)?131
Katz said that Coby provided an answer without substance,
which caused Katz to reiterate his question. His question
made clear that the Campaign’s position was wildly
inconsistent.132 Allred and Boedigheimer corroborated that
Katz confronted leadership.133
Katz also recalled that, shortly after the election, Allred
directed him to write an email declaring that President
Trump had won the State of Pennsylvania before anyone had
called Pennsylvania for either party.134 Katz believed the
Trump Campaign wanted to send this email out to preempt a
potential call that was likely to be in former Vice
President Biden’s favor.135 He refused to write the email.
Allred was stunned, and instead assigned it to another
copywriter.136 Allred confirmed that Katz expressed
discomfort at writing such an email and that she relied on
another copywriter.137 On November 4, 2020, the Trump
Campaign sent out an email preemptively and falsely
declaring that President Trump won Pennsylvania.138
Katz was fired approximately three weeks after the
election.139 In an interview with the Select Committee, when
Allred was asked why Katz, her direct report, was fired, she
explained that she was not sure why because TMAGAC was
raising more money than ever after the election, but that
the decision was not hers to make.140
Concerns Raised by Trump Campaign Vendor Iterable
The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group
had blessed were being rejected by another email service
provider. After the election, the Trump Campaign attempted
to expand the reach of their false voter fraud emails. The
Trump Campaign formed a company named DataPier, owned by
Cannon and Sean Dollman.141 DataPier hired an outside
company named Iterable to deliver its emails.142 Cannon
tried to send “toned-down RNC emails,” through Iterable, but
they still had to be “further toned [] down through [an]
iterative process[.]” 143 For example, on November 7, 2020,
Seth Charles, who was then Iterable’s principal email
deliverability and industry relations manager, said that
there was an issue with the TMAGAC copy and offered line
edits.144 Two days later, Charles recommended to the Trump
Campaign staffers that they look for “modified copy there
[from TMAGAC emails] to be a little less threatening.” 145
Charles claimed that some TMAGAC copy “obviously insinuates
the so far unsubstantiated theory of voter fraud, as well as
contributions and legal actions will result in some sort of
different outcome.” 146
But Salesforce, TMAGAC’s original email service provider,
continued sending millions of Trump Campaign emails up until
January 6th.
Internal Complaints at Salesforce
The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group
had blessed were being rejected by Iterable. However, the
RNC continued to send millions of Trump Campaign emails
through Salesforce, TMAGAC’s original email service
provider, up until January 6th. Evidence uncovered by the
Select Committee shows that there were internal concerns at
Salesforce regarding the content of the TMAGAC emails.
The Select Committee interviewed an individual (“J. Doe”)
who worked at Salesforce during the post-election period
during which TMAGAC was sending out the fundraising emails
concerning false election fraud claims.147 Doe worked for
Salesforce’s privacy and abuse management team, colloquially
known as the abuse desk.148 An abuse desk is responsible for
preventing fraud and abuse emanating from the provider’s
user or subscriber network.
Doe indicated to the Select Committee that, as soon as early
2020, they recalled issues arising with the RNC’s use of
Salesforce’s services and that a “deluge of abuse would’ve
started in June-ish.” 149 Doe noted that Salesforce received
a high number of complaints regarding the RNC’s actions,
which would have been primarily the fundraising efforts of
TMAGAC.150 In the latter half of 2020, Doe noticed that the
emails coming from the RNC’s account included more and more
violent and inflammatory rhetoric in violation of
Salesforce’s Master Service Agreement (“MSA”) with the RNC,
which prohibited the use of violent content.151 Doe stated
that, near the time of the election, they contacted senior
individuals at Salesforce to highlight the “increasingly
concerning” emails coming from the RNC’s account.152 Doe
explained that senior individuals at Salesforce effectively
ignored their emails about TMAGAC’s inflammatory emails153
and Salesforce ignored the terms of the MSA and permitted
the RNC to continue to use its account in this problematic
manner.154 Doe said, “Salesforce very obviously didn’t care
about anti-abuse.” 155
Ultimately, the Trump Campaign and the RNC let the Big Lie
spread because they were making hundreds of millions of
dollars from President Trump’s supporters who believed that
lie. The Big Rip-off needed the Big Lie to motivate
unsuspecting individuals to donate their money to a lost
cause, and it worked.
WHERE DID THE MONEY GO?
The Trump Campaign and the RNC had three of their largest
fundraising days of the 2020 election cycle immediately
after the election.156 Together, the Trump Campaign and the
RNC raised more than one hundred million dollars in three
days, telling people they were raising the money for the
“Official Election Defense Fund.” According to the TMAGAC
fundraising pitches, the Trump Campaign and RNC team had
created a so-called “Official Election Defense Fund” to help
pay for legal challenges to the election results.157 But
there was no “Official Election Defense Fund” – it was
simply “a marketing tactic.” 158 The TMAGAC fundraisers did
not know where the donated money was actually going.159 The
TMAGAC copywriting team simply took the lies that President
Trump told them about the need to raise money to overturn
the election results and put them into emails to his
supporters.
The false claims of election fraud and the “Official
Election Defense Fund” were so successful President Trump
and his allies raised more than $250 million after the
election.160 However, the Trump Campaign was raising too
much money to spend solely on their legal efforts to
overturn the results of the 2020 election. The Trump
Campaign continued to publicly state the election had been
stolen by “the Left,” while behind closed doors they
prepared a new plan to spend their supporters’ money.
A. The Creation of the Save America PAC
On November 9, 2020, President Trump created a separate
leadership PAC called Save America that allowed him to keep
millions of dollars raised after the election and spend it
with very few restrictions in the future. Jared Kushner
worked with Alex Cannon, Deputy General Counsel for the
Trump Campaign, in creating the entity.161 Prior to the
formation of Save America, any money raised by the Trump
Campaign could effectively only be spent on recount and
election-contest related expenses, and to pay off campaign
debt.162 But now the money raised into Save America could
allow President Trump to pay for his personal expenses, such
as travel or hotel stays. After Save America was formed, it
was added to the TMAGAC joint fundraising agreement with the
RNC, and the percentage of the proceeds allocated to the
Trump Campaign began to flow to Save America.163
Importantly, Save America, as a leadership PAC, was not even
legally permitted to pay for recount and election-contest
related expenses in excess of the Federal Election Campaign
Act (“FECA”) limit of $5,000.164 Save America never hit that
limit in 2020, as it spent no money on recount and
election-contest related expenses.165
Several reporters noticed the switch and contacted the
Campaign asking about the “bait and switch” and the
“misleading” nature of the emails. One reporter said
directly: “it’s misleading to raise money for a committee
marked on the website as an ‘election defense fund’ if it’s
going to a leadership PAC.” 166 Another reporter asked, “Why
is the campaign telling its supporters they are contributing
toward an ‘Election Defense Fund’ if only a small percentage
of those funds are actually going toward funding legal
efforts?” and “How can the campaign justify directing 75% of
contributions intended for a 2020 legal fund toward the
President’s political action committee?” 167
The Trump Campaign came up with a messaging plan about this
tactic, which President Trump personally approved.168 Tim
Murtaugh, the Trump Campaign’s communications director,
repeatedly asked Justin Clark, the deputy campaign manager,
whether they should respond to the reporters.169 When
Murtaugh flagged that the communications team was not
responding to the reporters, Justin Clark said, “Good.
Don’t.” 170
B. Outlays to Trump-Associated Individuals and Companies
The Trump Campaign spent the money on President Trump,
giving donations to his associates, and keeping it for
himself in Save America. Hundreds of millions of dollars
that were raised to go towards “election defense” and
“fighting voter fraud” were not spent that way at all. To
the contrary, most of the funds remain unspent, and millions
have been paid to companies that are known affiliates of
President Trump, or payments to entities associated with
former Trump administration officials. Since the election,
former Trump officials who are still working for President
Trump’s PACs, and are publicly receiving salaries as
FEC-reported “payroll,” are also associated with these
companies.
For example, from July 2021 to the present, Save America has
been paying approximately $9,700 per month to Dan
Scavino,171 a political adviser who served in the Trump
administration as White House Deputy Chief of Staff.172 Save
America was also paying $20,000 per month to an entity
called Hudson Digital LLC. Hudson Digital LLC was registered
in Delaware twenty days after the attack on the Capitol, on
January 26, 2021,173 and began receiving payments from Save
America on the day it was registered.174 Hudson Digital LLC
has received payments totaling over $420,000, all described
as “Digital consulting.” 175 No website or any other
information or mention of Hudson Digital LLC could be found
online.176 Though Hudson Digital LLC is registered as a
Delaware company, the FEC Schedule B listing traces back to
an address belonging to Dan and Catherine Scavino.177
Nick Luna, President Trump’s former personal assistant and
“body man,” was being paid from April 2021 to December 2021
approximately $12,000 per month by Save America for
“payroll.” 178 The Make America Great Again PAC (MAGA PAC) –
formerly the authorized committee of President Trump’s
reelection campaign, Donald J. Trump for President – paid
$20,000 per month to a limited liability corporation called
Red State Partners LLC from April 2021 through October 2021,
and Save America paid Red State Partners LLC $20,000 in
February 2022.179 The company was registered in Delaware on
March 11, 2021180 and has received a total of $170,000.181
Though it is registered in Delaware, disclosures filed with
the Federal Election Committee (FEC) list Red State Partners
at an address in Miami, Florida, that is an address for Nick
Luna and his wife, Cassidy Dumbauld.182
Further, Vince Haley, Taylor Swindle, and Ross Worthington
are corporate officers of a company known as Pericles
LLC.183 Haley is a former policy advisor to President
Trump,184 Swindle is the Chief Financial Officer for
Gingrich 360185, and Ross Worthington is the former White
House speechwriter186 who wrote the speech President Trump
delivered on the Ellipse on January 6th.187 Pericles LLC was
registered on January 27, 2021,188 the day after Scavino’s
Hudson Digital LLC, and, since then, has received payments
from Save America totaling at least $352,700.189
Another former speechwriter for President Trump, Robert
Gabriel, Jr., has also been receiving payments from Save
America. Gabriel was involved in writing the speech
President Trump delivered on the White House Ellipse on
January 6th, and specifically told the speechwriters,
including Worthington, to reinsert previously removed
incendiary lines about Vice President Pence into the
speech.190 This direction came after Vice President Pence
told President Trump that he would not try to change the
outcome of the election.191 In September 2021, Gabriel
formed called Gabriel Strategies LLC,192 which began
receiving payments from Save America the following month.193
Since October 2021, Save America has paid Gabriel Strategies
LLC at least $167,674.00.194 For both Pericles and Gabriel
Strategies, the description of the payments is always for
“consulting” in political strategy or communications, and
some payments are purported to include travel expenses.
Through October 2022, Save America has paid nearly $100,000
in “strategy consulting” payments to Herve Pierre
Braillard,195 a fashion designer who has been dressing
Melania Trump for years.196
From January 2021 to June 2022, Save America has also
reported over $2.1 million in “legal consulting.” Many firms
perform different kinds of practice, but more than 67% of
those funds went to law firms that are representing
witnesses involved in the Select Committee’s investigation
who were subpoenaed or invited to testify.
Additionally, Save America has reported other expenditures,
like:
$1,000,000 donation to America First Policy Institute, home
to several former Trump officials and witnesses subpoenaed
to testify before the Committee.197
$1,000,000 donation to Conservative Partnership Institute, a
conservative nonprofit organization where Mark Meadows is a
senior partner.198
More than $10.6 million to Event Strategies, Inc., the
preferred staging company for President Trump that staged
the January 6th rally.199
More than $327,000 in payments to the Trump Hotel Collection
and Mar-A-Lago Club since the 2020 election.200
An “event sponsorship fee” of $165,937.50 to American
Conservative Union201, the Chairman of which is Matt
Schlapp. Schlapp and his wife have offered to pay the legal
fees of witnesses called to testify before the January 6th
Committee and have extensive ties with former President
Trump.
A little over $140,000 to National Public Affairs, LLC202, a
consulting company started by former Trump Campaign Manager
Bill Stepien and Deputy Campaign Manager Justin Clark.203
Stepien testified that he knew the claims of voter fraud
were false, that he didn’t think what was happening was
necessarily honest, and that he was stepping away from the
Trump Campaign.204 However, he continues to work and receive
hundreds of thousands of dollars consulting for President
Trump and several other congressional candidates who
continue to spread false voter fraud claims related to the
2020 election.205
C. Payments to 2M Management LLC
As described above, the Trump Campaign, after paying off its
general election debt, raised millions of dollars that
flowed into a segregated recount account (“Recount Account”)
by encouraging donors to help pay for legal challenges to
the election results. Pursuant to the FECA, the Trump
Campaign could only spend these funds on a few limited
purposes (e.g., for actual recounts and election-contest
expenses or, in the case of surplus funds, donations to
charitable organizations or transferring the funds to a
national party committee’s separate, segregated account for
election recounts).206
Justin Clark told the Select Committee that he understood
that, “[a]fter election day, . . . you can raise money for a
recount and to pay off debt,” 207 and that “[t]he money
going into the campaign, principal campaign committee, at
that point, [after the election] was dead money. It couldn’t
be spent on things.” 208 Alex Cannon agreed.209 That’s why,
after the election, the Trump Campaign set up the Recount
Account—“a segregated restricted account [held] by the
campaign” 210—and raised money for the Recount Account
through TMAGAC.211
In February 2021, the Trump Campaign was converted into MAGA
PAC.212 In March 2021, MAGA PAC began disclosing on required
FEC forms that it was paying millions of dollars to an
eDiscovery vendor called 2M Document Management & Imaging
LLC (“2M Management”) for what MAGA PAC described as
“recount” and “Recount: Research Consulting.” 213
Although the MAGA PAC reported that 2M Management was being
paid for recount-related expenses, 2M Management was
primarily processing and reviewing documents slated to be
produced by the National Archives and Records Administration
in response to subpoenas from (1) the House Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (“Covid
Subcommittee”) and (2) the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack.214
From just March 2021 to May 2021, MAGA PAC paid 2M
Management almost $1 million from the Recount Account to
review documents related solely to the Covid
Subcommittee.215 Alex Cannon confirmed that he understood
these payments to 2M Management came from the Recount
Account.216 Federal campaign finance law requires committees
to accurately report information related to expenditures,
including the purpose of payments. FEC regulations provide
that the “purpose” be described in relevant reports through
a brief statement of why the disbursement was made and must
be sufficiently specific to make the purpose of the
disbursement clear.217
IMPACT OF THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN’S FALSE CLAIMS
Between the election and January 6th, the Trump Campaign
sent out hundreds of emails urging President Trump’s
supporters to “fight the Liberal MOB” and “join the Trump
army.” Users on the same extreme social media platforms used
to plan the attack on the Capitol, repeatedly shared the
“Official Election Defense Fund” donation links in the week
following election day.218 Links to donate were often
accompanied by mentions of voter fraud and calls to save the
country, mirroring the language of the fundraising emails
and the countless discussions being held by the President’s
supporters of coming to Washington, DC, on January 6th to
“Stop the steal.” 219
On January 6th, while President Trump was speaking at the
Ellipse rally and directing his supporters to march to the
Capitol, his Campaign was also sending fundraising emails
inflaming people to “fight back.” One email stated, “100
Members of Congress . . . Join them in the FIGHT to DEFEND
the Election . . . This is our last line of defense.” 220
Another email stated, “TODAY will be a historic day in our
Nation’s history. Congress will either certify, or object
to, the Election results. Every single Patriot from across
the Country must step up RIGHT NOW if we’re going to
successfully DEFEND the integrity of this Election.” 221 A
third email stated, “TODAY. This is our LAST CHANCE . . .
The stakes have NEVER been higher. President Trump needs YOU
to make a statement and publicly stand with him and FIGHT
BACK.” 222
Thirty minutes after the last fundraising email was sent,
the Capitol was breached. It was then and only then that
TMAGAC fundraisers decided to stop sending emails containing
baseless claims of election fraud.223 Boedigheimer
explained, “And at some point during that time, I don’t know
if it was right then, if it was a little after, maybe a
little before, but either Gary or Kevin kind of directed us
to stop sending fundraising messages out.” 224 Cannon
stated, “[O]n January 6th, Gary called me and said, [‘]are
you seeing what’s happening? I’m obviously turning
everything off.[’]” 225
After raising $250 million dollars on false voter fraud
claims, mostly from small-dollar donors, President Trump did
not spend it on fighting an election he knew he lost.
Instead, a significant portion of the money was deposited
into the Save America account and not used for the purposes
the Campaign claimed it would be. President Trump got a war
chest with millions of dollars, and the American people were
left with the U.S. Capitol under attack.
There is evidence suggesting that numerous defendants
charged with violations related to the January 6th attack on
the U.S. Capitol and others present on the Capitol grounds
that day were motivated by false claims about the
election.226
Further, J. Doe, the Salesforce employee interviewed by the
Select Committee, provided insight into the action that
Salesforce took after the attack. Doe explained that after
they became aware of the ongoing attack, they (Doe) took
unilateral action to block the RNC’s ability to send emails
through Salesforce’s platform.227 Doe noted that the
shutdown lasted until January 11, 2021, when senior
Salesforce leadership directed Doe to remove the block from
RNC’s Salesforce account.228 Doe stated that Salesforce
leadership told Doe that Salesforce would now begin
reviewing RNC’s email campaigns to “make sure this doesn’t
happen again.” 229
Conclusion
In the weeks after the 2020 election leading up to January
6, 2021, President Trump’s Campaign and his allies sent his
supporters a barrage of emails and text messages pushing
lies about a stolen election and asking for contributions to
challenge the outcome of the election. In reality, the funds
raised went primarily towards paying down the Trump
Campaign’s outstanding 2020 debt, financing President
Trump’s newly created Save America PAC, and raising money
for the RNC.
Overall, only a small amount of the contributions ever went
to President Trump’s recount account or were otherwise
obviously used in connection with post-election recounts or
litigation. As President Trump used the Big Lie as a weapon
to attack the legitimacy of the 2020 election, his Campaign
used that same Big Lie to raise millions of dollars based on
false claims and unkept promises.
Not only did President Trump lie to his supporters about the
election, but he also ripped them off.
ENDNOTES
1. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 21,
2020, 5:30 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1330277503160741888
(“Democrats are attempting to STEAL this Election and the
White House. This Election is far from over as long as we
have YOU on our team to FIGHT BACK.”); Trump Fundraising
Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 21, 2020, 7:16 a.m. ET,
available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1330122927958859777
(“With your help, we will DEFEND the Election and keep
America America.”).
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 104 (“I do think those words are
effective, because people were upset and they wanted their
donation to go towards an effort to – the legal effort.”).
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard
Walters, (May 25, 2022), pp. 15-16; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr.
20, 2022), p. 9.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 28; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), p. 13.
5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy
Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 95.
6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 10. (noting that as digital
director he oversaw the digital operation).
7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 6-7; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27,
2022), p. 11.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 10.
9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 187 (naming Coby as person
controlling fundraising operation); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr.
20, 2022), p. 9 (“And then Gary Colby would have been the
kind of the lead of the entire digital team for the Joint
Fundraising Committee”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 81
(“Gary ran the campaign’s digital team”).
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 3 (Zambrano stated that Coby
expressed that he spoke with “the family,” meaning the
Trumps, and Zambrano believed that Kushner was the family
member to whom Coby spoke most frequently.); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William
Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 190; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Cole Blocker, (Dec. 29,
2021), p. 2 (Blocker stated that he knew Coby talked to
Jared Kushner a lot, and that their relationship was common
knowledge.).
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 13.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 11-13.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 15.
16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 7.
17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10 (“I think that’s
fair to say. I think my direct report was Kevin but then we
also viewed Gary as a leader of kind of the digital JFC
team”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of
Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (indicating Boedigheimer
reported to Coby but that there may have been additional
people between Boedigheimer and Coby).
18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10.
19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 7; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), p. 9; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 16-17 (“Austin led the
fundraising team . . [and] [o]versaw the variety of
fundraising channels and led that team.”).
20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 9-10.
21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 14 (Committee Staff: “Now, the
emails that Austin and Hannah and folks were working on,
those are primarily drafting emails for TMAGAC, correct?”
Zambrano: “Yes, I believe so.”).
22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz,
(Jan. 21, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal
Interview of Alex Murglin, (Mar. 17, 2022), p. 2; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Blinkoff,
(Feb. 7, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10.
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 11 (“Alex Murglin joined I
believe in March of 2020 . . . That summer, Ethan Katz and
Alex Blinkoff both joined.”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Murglin (Mar. 17, 2022),
p. 2.
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2.
25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 12.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9 (“So, we, as in
the RNC digital employees and then Campaign employees and
vendors as well, came to work together on the JFC. And the
general structure was all working together on that goal.”);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 3 (“ALLRED said that on the 5th
floor, the RNC and Campaign employees all worked together
for joint fundraising committee, and exactly who worked for
which entity kind of didn’t matter. . . . Rather, everyone
just referred to everything as TMAGAC.”).
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (“He explained that the
copywriting process worked like a Henry Ford style assembly
line, where different individuals performed a task and
passed on the work product to someone else.”).
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 15-16.
29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0003821, (Nov.
30, 2020 email from Austin Boedigheimer to Hanna Allred,
“Fwd: It’s happening again, Austin.”).
30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 20.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 30.
32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 103-104.
33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 112-113 (“On average, yes, you
repeat things that do well.”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr.
20, 2022), p. 21 (“[I]f you were sending it repeatedly[,]
it’s the understanding that it’s doing well so you want to
keep sending e-mails like that.”).
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 107-108
(“President Trump’s saying it, surrogates are saying it,
everybody’s saying it. So my, you know, I don’t remember
exactly this but it seems like it was, you know, we should
do something like that since it’s been working.”).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 23; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), p. 28; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 8 (agreeing
that copywriters sought to capture the voice and tone of
President Trump in its messaging); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20,
2022), p. 9 (agreeing that President Trump was focused on a
particular issue, copywriters they would also tend to focus
on similar issues).
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 12; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin
Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 45 (“I think we’ve
determined that it’s aggressive language. We would want to
use that for this.”).
37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 25-29.
38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 23-24.
39. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 14, 49 (“Austin would have
reviewed all the content before it would go up to the
approval chains or Hannah.”). Zambrano stated that, on a
day-to-day basis, he was not very involved in overseeing
Boedigheimer’s handling of the copywriting process. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 16.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 43.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 44.
42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 63-64.
43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 10; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1,
2022), pp. 9-10.
44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 10.
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 6 (“And then that’s also
where I started doing some of the approval for the
fundraising emails, the small-dollar fundraising emails.”);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael
Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), p. 8 (“To the best of my
recollection, that was primarily Cassie Docksey, Mike Reed,
who handled approvals on that content.”).
46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 7 (“I had a role in
approv[ing] them [the TMAGAC fundraising emails], yes.”).
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 138.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 80 (“There would be—I
don’t know if my team members were routinely getting those
emails as well or if they were just being directed to me,
but we were participants in them.”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), pp. 45-46 (“I know from the Trump Campaign, I
remember Zach Parkinson was someone who responded. I was
never sure if he was from research or comms, or maybe he did
both, I’m not entirely sure, but he would typically, if
something was wrong, like, inaccurate, he would flag it.”).
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 58.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60, 75-76 (“I
think what I said earlier was, at the time the election
wasn’t over, President Trump was saying those things. I
didn’t have a reason to believe it was false. So as far as
the accuracy of that in the approval chain, that was up to
them to decide.”).
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 78.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 77-78.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 86-87.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 88-89 (“I, as best I
recall, that is who I assumed would be doing that type of
review [about whether it was true that Democrats were trying
to steal the election].”).
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 91.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 96.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 54-55.
64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (Alexander Cannon production), AC-0001631, (Nov. 4,
2020, “Re: Hand-off on Compliance Review”).
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 138.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 140.
67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 140.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A.
Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 89.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 17.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 19-20.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 26.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 116.
73. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00367, (Nov. 8, 2020,
email from Jared Kushner to Sean Dollman, Gary Coby, Bill
Stepien, Justin Clark, and Eric Trump, at 5:51 pm, and Nov.
7, 2020 email from Sean Dollman to Jared Kushner at 2:54
pm).
74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00367, (Nov. 8, 2020,
email from Jared Kushner to Sean Dollman, Gary Coby, Bill
Stepien, Justin Clark, and Eric Trump, at 5:51 pm, and Nov.
7, 2020 email from Sean Dollman to Jared Kushner at 2:54
pm).
75. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00416, (Nov. 7, 2020,
text messages between Jared Kushner and Gary Coby).
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 200.
77. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Sean Dollman Production), DOLLMAN-0003821, (Dec.
23. 2020, emails between Jared Kushner, Sean Dolman, Gary
Coby, Justin Clark, and Cassie Dumbauld “Re: [EXTERNAL]Re:
12/22/20 Cash Position Update”). Despite email
communications showing his involvement in the Campaign’s
finances through late December 2020, Kushner claimed that,
from around November 13 onward, he was only “nominally
involved” with the Campaign’s budgeting and fundraising.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared
Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 205.
78. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823, (Nov.
3, 2020, Signal chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren
Centinello); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 54 (“Austin could
have. I’m not sure if people on the campaign instructed
anyone else on the campaign or anything, but I wouldn’t be
surprised if there were a couple different scenarios
floating around most people’s heads on that.”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 54 (“I don’t recall specific—I
don’t recall conversations around it, other than there may
have just been general [‘]we need to be ready for whatever
may come[’].”).
79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823, (Nov.
3, 2020, Signal chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren
Centinello).
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823 (Nov.
3, 2020, Signal chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren
Centinello); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 39 (“I’m
basically saying on the victory topic, which is the first
one that he covered. We’re waiting until closer to election
results are coming in to be able to get that approved and
then I’m giving him some copy about how they are trying to
steal the election that has already been approved.”).
81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 55.
82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 55; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27,
2022), p. 56 (“But, again, this was the President’s
messaging and his phrasing”).
83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 44 (“I didn’t have
a great understanding of what was going to happen or what
happened on the ground. I wouldn’t have really any knowledge
into that.”).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 52-53; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), p. 55; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 66 (“. . .
reported to Austin, so I would’ve received direction from
him”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 52-54.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 146 (“Well, it would have
been approval by the principal. So Mr. Trump would have had
to do that.”).
86. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov.
20, 2020 7:24 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1329762574494298112.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 104 (“Yeah, I think they [the
Trump Campaign] viewed that as helping to get the message
out, especially, you know, that’s the base, right?”).
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 57.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 56-57.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 57.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 67.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 86.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 86-87.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 4 (“Similarly, they could say the
Democrats were trying or tried to steal the election, but
not state that they were or had.”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021),
p. 2 (“KATZ recalled that Allred told him to say the
Democrats were “trying to” steal the elections. He added
that he did not have any discussions about why “trying to”
was important, but his impression was that it was used to
give some legal wiggle room and make the statement about
stealing the election to be ‘less false.’”).
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 75, (“I do remember at some
point we were told we could no longer use the word
‘rigged.’”).
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714, (Nov. 3,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL:
Pennsylvania & Election Poll”).
97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714 (Nov. 3,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL:
Pennsylvania & Election Poll”).
98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714 (Nov. 3,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL:
Pennsylvania & Election Poll”).
99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013757 (Nov. 10,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re:
FOR APPROVAL: Defend the Election & Vaccine”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 106 (Zambrano concedes that
the revision “creates a new sentence” that means something
different.); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 109 (In response
to whether fair to say that that this was a substantive
change, Parkinson states, “You could characterize it as
that, I guess, yeah.”).
100. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013757 (Nov. 10,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re:
FOR APPROVAL: Defend the Election & Vaccine”).
101. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re:
FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defense”) (emphasis in
original).
102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re:
FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defense”).
103. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re:
FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defense”).
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin
Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 101.
105. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013891 (Nov. 12,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL:
NC, GA Election Defense” at 3:08 a.m.); Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon
Production), AC-0013928 (Nov. 12, 2020, Fundraising email
approval chain, “Re: FOR APPROVAL: NC, GA Election Defense”
at 4:49 a.m.); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0014006 (Nov. 13,
2020, Fundraising email approval chain, “Re: [External]Re:
FOR APPROVAL: Defense Fund & GA/NC Victory”).
106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 84, 137.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 14-15.
108. Jane C. Timm, “Rudy Giuliani baselessly alleges
‘centralized’ voter fraud at free-wheeling news conference,”
NBC News (Nov. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/rudy-giuliani-baselessly-alleges-centralized-voter-fraud-free-wheeling-news-n1248273.
109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 37.
110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 37 (“So on that press
conference day, which I think is November 19th, Michael and
I talked after that where he was generally telling me, ‘Hey,
we don’t need to be out there. It’s not automatic that we’re
just going to go out there and parallel or mimic what the
campaign or what Rudy Giuliani or that legal team might be
saying. Don’t feel the need to put that through on the GOP
social channels.’”).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 38.
112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 15-16. Ahrens thought
this press conference was “embarrassing” and that other
members of the RNC leadership team shared his view. Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael
Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 28-29.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 19-20.
114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 21-22.
115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 25-27.
116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 56, 58 (“[T]here was a
conversation at some point in November, December with either
colleagues of mine or the legal team at the RNC” about the
messaging that was coming out of TMAGAC.”); Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20,
2022), p. 65, Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 66 (recalling
“that there were conversations at some point that the RNC
was more comfortable with more toned-down emails”).
117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 85, 86 (“I generally
remember in regards to these emails in the post-election
period conversations to make sure that the legal team and
the chairman’s office or whatever else was comfortable with
the language that was going out of the JFC.”).
118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 45.
119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), p. 22.
120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 202.
121. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 183.
122. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Dec.
20, 2020 12:20 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1341433522331017217;
Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Dec. 27,
2020 3:23 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1343291529943781378.
123. William Cummings, Joey Garrison and Jim Sergent, “By
the numbers: President Donald Trump’s failed efforts to
overturn the election,” USA Today, (Jan. 6, 2021), available
at
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/.
124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 117-118.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 144; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17,
2022), pp. 177-178 (“[I]n terms of people raising concerns
about it, Alexander Cannon, at one point, came into my
office and said something to the effect—and he was just
doing legal reviews. It was like, I can’t believe we’re
sending this stuff out, or something to that effect. I
said—I told him he should go talk to Gary and speak to him
about it, and I told him you don’t need to do legal reviews
on these anymore. . . It was just about information that he
knew wasn’t correct.”).
126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 178.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.
129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 178.
130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.
131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.
132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.
133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 69; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr.
20, 2022), p. 89.
134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.
136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 83-86. (Allred confirmed that
Boedigheimer would have given the directive to draft this
email); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86.
138. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov.
4, 2020, 9:42 a.m. available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1324180321676546050.
139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan
Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 3.
140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 7.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 176.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 116-117.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 137. Similarly, on
January 6th, DataPier stopped sending emails, and the list
went cold, and, therefore, DataPier is now defunct; see
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 122.
144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0002048 (Nov. 7,
2020, email from Seth Charles to Darren Centinello,
Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder, “FW:
[PROOF] Michael – increase your impact NOW”). (“Again this
comes in chorus with less inflammatory language that could
be misleading as accusatory or assuming intent upon a
particular population.”).
145. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0004724 (Nov. 9,
2020, email from Seth Charles to Darren Centinello,
Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder, “Re: FW:
[PROOF] Hanna – I need you.”).
146. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013741 (Nov. 11,
2020, email from Seth Charles to Darren Centinello,
Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder, “Re: FW:
[PROOF] BIG NEWS”).
147. J. Doe expressed safety concerns and a fear of
retaliation for cooperating with the Select Committee.
Accordingly, the Select Committee has not revealed their
identity.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), pp. 7-8.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), p. 30.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), pp. 30-31.
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), pp. 42-43.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), p. 46.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), p. 47.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), pp. 49-50.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), p. 25.
156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 49 (noting that the Trump Campaign
had “three of our best four fundraising days occur
immediately after the election”).
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86.
158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86 (“We frequently use funds as
a marketing tactic. . . So I don’t believe there is actually
a fund called the ‘Election Defense Fund,’ not that I’m
aware of.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 91-92.
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna
Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 87; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), pp. 96-97 (Allred noting that she only became aware
of Save America in February 2021); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr.
20, 2022), p. 92 (“From my understanding, the money was
going towards, I believe this is a TMAGAC e-mail. So it was
going to TMAGAC. And then how the money was spent from
there, you know, that’s not something that I would do or
have knowledge to.”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 94
(“I’m not sure how the funds went or how they were
allocated. I don’t know precisely.”).
160. Shane Goldmacher and Rachel Shorey, “Trump Raised
$255.4 Million in 8 Weeks as He Sought to overturn Election
Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 31, 2021), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/politics/trump-voter-fraud-fundraising.html
(“President Donald J. Trump and the Republican Party raised
$255.4 million in the eight-plus weeks following the Nov. 3
election, new federal filings show, as he sought to
undermine and overturn the results with unfounded
accusations of fraud.”).
161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 153.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 143 (“After election day .
. . you can raise money for a recount and to pay off
debt.”).
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary
Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 125; Jarrett Renshaw and Joseph
Tanfani, “Donations under $8K to Trump ‘election defense’
instead go to president, RNC,” Reuters, (Nov. 11, 2020),
available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-fundraising-insigh/donations-under-8k-to-trump-election-defense-instead-go-to-president-rnc-idUSKBN27R309
(“The emailed solicitations send supporters to an ‘Official
Election Defense Fund’ website that asks them to sign up for
recurring donations to ‘protect the results and keep
fighting even after Election Day.’ The fine print makes
clear most of the money will go to other priorities. A large
portion of the money goes to ‘Save America,’ a Trump
leadership PAC, or political action committee, set up on
Monday, and the Republican National Committee (RNC).”).
164. Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2006-24,
(Oct. 5, 2006), p. 6, available at
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2006-24/2006-24.pdf (The
Act “prohibits Federal officeholders and candidates, their
agents, and entities directly or indirectly established,
financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of
one or more Federal officeholders or candidates, from
soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending
funds for expenses related to a recount of the votes cast in
a Federal election, including the recount activities
described above, unless those funds are subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the
Act. . . . [A] Federal candidate’s recount fund must not
receive or solicit donations in excess of the Act’s amount
limitations . . . [A]ny recount fund established by a
Federal candidate may not receive donations that in the
aggregate exceed . . . $5,000 per multicandidate political
committee.”).
165. FEC Reported Disbursements in 2020 by Save America,
(last accessed on Nov. 18, 2022), available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?committee_id=C00762591&two_year_transaction_period=2020&data_type=processed.
166. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0011244, (Nov.
11, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark,
“Re: [EXTERNAL]Trump legal defense and leadership PAC”).
167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov.
24, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark,
“Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questions”).
168. When the Trump Campaign learned that reporters were
going to write about their misleading fundraising, Murtaugh
advised further comment from the Campaign would “serve to
highlight the argument that the fundraising pitch is
misleading.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0018627, (Dec. 1,
2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh, Jason Miller, Sean
Dollman, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien, “Re: [EXTERNAL
]$$$$$$”). Murtaugh further noted that “POTUS is on board
with how it will be described.” Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production),
XXM-0018627, (Dec. 1, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh,
Jason Miller, Sean Dollman, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien,
“Re: [EXTERNAL ]$$$$$$”).
169. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0011244, (Nov.
11, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark,
“Re: [EXTERNAL]Trump legal defense and leadership PAC”),
(Murtaugh asking Justin Clark, “Still ignoring?”); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh
Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails between
Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, “Re: [EXTERNAL]Re:
Fundraising questions”), (Murtaugh telling Justin Clark,
“FYI – Still not answering.”).
170. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov.
24, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark,
“Re: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questions”).
171. FEC Reported Disbursements to Daniel Scavino by Save
America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=scavino%2C+dan.
172. Katelyn Polantz and Ryan Nobles, “Trump’s former deputy
chief of staff, Dan Scavino, not ready to cooperate with
January 6 committee, attorney says,” CNN, (Oct. 21, 2021),
available at
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/20/politics/dan-scavino-january-6-committee/index.html.
173. “Hudson Digital LLC,” State of Delaware Division of
Corporations, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx
(search “Hudson Digital LLC” in the “Entity Name” field).
174. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save
America, (July 31, 2021), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699743.
175. FEC Reported Disbursements to Hudson Digital LLC, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=hudson+digital+llc.
176. An unrelated company, Hudson Digital, has operated for
approximately 10 years in Hudson, NY, over 80 miles from the
addresses associated with Hudson Digital LLC.
177. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save
America, (July 31, 2021), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699743.
178. FEC Reported Disbursements to Nicholas Luna by Save
America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=luna%2C+nicholas.
179. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC,
(last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=red+state+partners.
180. “Red State Partners LLC,” State of Delaware Division of
Corporations, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx
(search “Red State Partners LLC” in the “Entity Name”
field).
181. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC,
(last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=red+state+partners.
182. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Make
America Great Again PAC, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202112029469645374.
183. “Pericles, LLC,” District of Columbia Department of
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2022), available at
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184. “Vincent M. Haley,” ProPublica: Trump Town, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/trump-town/staffers/vincent-m-haley.
185. “Taylor Swindle,” Gingrich360, (last accessed on Nov.
10, 2022), available at
https://www.gingrich360.com/about/gingrich-360-team/taylor-swindle/.
186. “Ross Worthington,” ProPublica: Trump Town, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://projects.propublica.org/trump-town/staffers/ross-worthington.
187. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6, 2021, emails between Ross
Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and
others).
188. “Pericles, LLC,” District of Columbia Department of
Business Licensing Division, (last accessed on Dec. 9,
2022), available at
https://corponline.dcra.dc.gov/BizEntity.aspx/ViewEntityData?entityId=4292880.
189. FEC Reported Disbursements to Pericles LLC by Save
America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=pericles+llc.
190. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6, 2021, emails between Ross
Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and
others).
191. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, (National Archives Production),
076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6, 2021, emails between Ross
Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and
others).
192. The organization was originally formed as Believe in
America LLC, then changed its name the following day to
Gabriel Strategies LLC. See “Gabriel Strategies LLC”, State
of New Jersey Division of Revenue and Enterprise Search,
(last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at
https://www.njportal.com/DOR/BusinessNameSearch/Search/BusinessName
(search “Gabriel Strategies LLC” in the “Business Name”
field).
193. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save
America, (May 5, 2022), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202205059502664518.
194. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC by
Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=gabriel+strategies.
195. FEC Reported Disbursements to Herve Pierre Braillard by
Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=Herve+Pierre+Braillard.
196. Suzy Menkes, “Herve Pierre: Dressing the First Lady,”
Vogue, (Apr. 12, 2017), available at
https://www.vogue.pt/herve-pierre-dressing-the-first-lady;
Rosemary Feitelberg, “Melania Trump’s Former Stylist
Addresses $60,000 Save America Payment,” Women’s Wear Daily,
(Aug. 8. 2022), available at
https://wwd.com/fashion-news/designer-luxury/melania-trump-herve-pierre-60000-save-america-payment-1235294733/.
197. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save
America, (July 31, 2021), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699856.
198. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save
America, (May 5, 2022), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202205059502664847.
199. FEC Reported Disbursements to Event Strategies Inc by
Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=event+strategies+inc.
200. FEC Reported Disbursements to Trump Hotel and
Mar-A-Lago by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022)
available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=mar-a-lago&recipient_name=trump+hotel.
201. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save
America, (June 15, 2022), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202206159514906341.
202. FEC Reported Disbursements to National Public Affairs
by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available
at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=National+Public+Affairs.
203. “Meet Our Team,” National Public Affairs, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://natpublicaffairs.com/.
204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
205. FEC disclosures show that other than Save America,
National Public Affairs LLC received payments from only
three other organizations since 2021. All three are
campaigns for election deniers, Kelly Tshibaka (AK-Senate),
Jason Smith (MO-08), and Harriett Hageman (WY-AL). See FEC
Reported Disbursements to National Public Affairs LLC since
2021, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=national+public+affairs+llc&min_date=01%2F01%2F2021.
206. Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2019-02,
(Mar. 28, 2019), available at
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2019-02/2019-02.pdf.
207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 143.
208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 145.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 156 (“[G]enerally
after an election, you can raise money for debt retirement,
and you can raise money for recount.”).
210. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013889 (Nov. 12,
2020, emails between Alexander Cannon and Cleta Mitchell,
“Re: [External]Legal defense fund”).
211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013889 (Nov. 12,
2020, emails between Alexander Cannon and Cleta Mitchell,
“Re: [External]Legal defense fund”).
212. Statement of Organization FEC Form 1, filed by Make
America Great Again PAC, (Feb. 27, 2021), available at
https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/093/202102279429078093/202102279429078093.pdf#navpanes=0.
213. FEC Reported Disbursements to 2M Document Management
and Imaging, LLC by Make America Great Again PAC, (last
accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00580100&recipient_name=2m+document&two_year_transaction_period=2022.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Clarke (Aug. 4, 2022), p. 28 (agreeing that “the
vast majority of the work that 2M has done to date that has
been paid for by MAGA PAC relates to January 6th documents
or COVID-related documents coming from NARA”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander
Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), p. 31 (“There was a House Oversight
investigation into the administration’s COVID response, and
there were a large number of documents that were coming
through that needed to be processed.”).
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Matthew Clarke, (Aug. 4, 2022), pp. 31-32 (“During that
time, I believe all we were doing was work related to the
White House – the Trump administration’s response to
COVID.”).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 15-16 (noting his
understanding that “if the funds were raised to DJTFP and
they were not spent on debt retirement, any remaining funds
that were not spent on debt retirement would have gone to
this segregated, restricted account for recounts for MAGA
PA?”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview
of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), p. 16; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander
Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 37-38 (agreeing that if funds
paid to 2M are labeled recount then he would assume they
came from Recount Account).
217. See Statement of Policy: “Purpose of Disbursement”
Entries for Filings with the Commission, 72 Fed. Reg. 887
(Jan. 9, 2007) (citing 11 C.F.R. § § 104.3(b)(3)(i)(b),
(4)(i)(A)).
218. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Aug. 21, 2022, Memorandum regarding Fundraising
communication rhetoric’s influence on social media).
219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Aug. 21, 2022, Memorandum regarding Fundraising
communication rhetoric’s influence on social media).
220. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan.
6, 2021, 12:20 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346794824591093763.
221. Trump Fundraising Emails, (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan.
6, 2021, 1:31 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346887173438636032.
222. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan.
6, 2021, 11:29 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346856536338030601.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 42 (noting “yes, we
stopped sending emails on January 6”); Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30,
2022), p. 128 (“I believe we got some sort of message,
either on Microsoft Teams or Signal from Austin, saying
pause everything.”).
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 140.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 124.
226. See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Grayson, No.
1:21-mj-00163 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021); Criminal Complaint,
United States v. Fitzsimmons, No. 1:21-cr-00158-RC (D.D.C.
Feb. 1, 2021); (noting that the defendant in that case
“believed voter fraud occurred” and that “[c]onvinced that
the election results had been fraudulently reported, he was
moved by the words of then-President Trump to travel to the
District of Columbia for the ‘Save America Rally.’”).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), pp. 64-65.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), pp. 68-69.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20,
2022), p. 72.
APPENDIX 4: MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE
Introduction
In the wake of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election,
President Donald J. Trump and his apologists attempted to
blame his loss on foreign interference. They falsely claimed
that foreign-manufactured voting machines had been
manipulated so that votes cast for Trump were instead
recorded as votes for Joseph R. Biden, Jr.1 No one has ever,
either at the time or since, offered any evidence to support
Trump’s assertion. On the contrary, ample evidence collected
by the Intelligence Community (IC) and reviewed by the
Select Committee disproves those claims.
That is not to say foreign actors made no attempt to
influence the American political climate during and after
the 2020 Presidential election. This appendix evaluates the
role foreign influence played in the circumstances
surrounding the insurrection.2
Discussion
Election Meddling in 2020: Foreign Interference? No. Foreign
Influence? Yes.
In its postmortem assessment of the 2020 U.S. Presidential
election, the Intelligence Community comprehensively
examined two types of foreign meddling: interference and
influence. The distinction between the two is critical in
evaluating President Trump’s repeated public assertions that
there had been massive and widespread “fraud” that had the
effect of “stealing” the election for then-candidate Biden.
For its analytic purposes, the Intelligence Community
defines election interference as “a subset of election
influence activities targeted at the technical aspects of
the election, including voter registration, casting and
counting ballots, or reporting results.” 3 That definition
notes that election interference is a subset of election
influence, which the Intelligence Community defines to
include “overt and covert efforts by foreign governments or
actors acting as agents of, or on behalf of, foreign
governments intended to affect directly or indirectly a US
election—including candidates, political parties, voters or
their preferences, or political processes.” 4
The Intelligence Community’s Assessment (ICA) found no
factual basis for any allegation of technical interference
with the 2020 U.S. election: “We have no indications that
any foreign actor attempted to interfere in the 2020 US
elections by altering any technical aspect of the voting
process, including voter registration, ballot casting, vote
tabulation, or reporting results.” 5 Put simply, allegations
that foreign powers rigged voting machines and swapped
ballots were false and unsupported.
Although there is no evidence of foreign technical
interference in the 2020 election, there is evidence of
foreign influence. Specifically, the Intelligence
Community’s Assessment concluded that “Russian President
Putin authorized, and a range of Russian government
organizations conducted, influence operations aimed at
denigrating President Biden’s candidacy and the Democratic
Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining public
confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating
sociopolitical divisions in the US.” 6 The two Intelligence
Community analytic conclusions about the 2020 U.S.
Presidential election—that there was evidence of foreign
influence, but not foreign interference—are completely
consistent.
Malign Foreign Efforts to Influence the 2020 U.S. Elections
The 2020 U.S. elections saw an increase in the number of
foreign state and non-state entities that attempted to
influence the U.S. electorate. The U.S. Intelligence
Community suggests, as a possible explanation, that more
such foreign entities “may view influence operations as
important tools for projecting power abroad.” 7 More
ascertainably, “[t]he growth of internet and social media
use means foreign actors are more able to reach US audiences
directly, while the tools for doing so are becoming more
accessible.” 8
The United States’ principal foreign adversaries—Russia,
China, and Iran—all of them autocracies, engage, to varying
degrees, in disguised efforts to influence U.S. public
opinion.9 In the context of these overarching efforts,10
U.S. elections offer special opportunities.
For Russia, “[e]lections … often serve as an opportune
target. But attacks on elections are typically just one part
of ongoing, multi-pronged operations.” 11 The U.S.
Intelligence Community’s definitive post-election assessment
of foreign influence activities during the 2020 Presidential
election concluded that Russia was deeply engaged in
disinformation activities intended to influence the outcome
by supporting President Trump while disparaging
then-candidate Biden; Iran also engaged in efforts to
influence the election’s outcome, but unlike Russia, did not
actively promote any candidate; and that China considered
opportunities to influence the election’s outcome, but
ultimately decided that potential costs outweighed any
foreseeable benefits.12 Both Russia and Iran worked to
undermine the American public’s confidence in U.S.
democratic processes and to deepen socio-political divisions
in the United States.13
Russia’s Malign Influence Efforts Targeting the United
States
Russian malign disinformation efforts are both strategic in
scope and opportunistic in nature. They aim to corrode the
power and appeal of the U.S. democratic processes, worsen
U.S. domestic divisions, and weaken America at home and
abroad. The Intelligence Community’s February 2022
unclassified “Annual Threat Assessment” puts this sustained
Russian threat in a nutshell:
Russia presents one of the most serious foreign influence
threats to the United States, using its intelligence
services, proxies, and wide-ranging influence tools to try
to divide Western alliances, and increase its sway around
the world, while attempting to undermine U.S. global
standing, amplify discord inside the United States, and
influence U.S. voters and decisionmaking.14
Russian Disinformation and the 2020 Presidential Election
Foreign adversaries’ influence campaigns routinely push
disinformation to U.S. audiences. Elections offer an
important forum for Russia and other U.S. adversaries to
seek to deepen divisions within American society through
disinformation campaigns.15 The Intelligence Community
projects that both Russia and China will, for the
foreseeable future, continue to press their disinformation
campaigns attempting to undermine the U.S. population’s
confidence in their government and society.16 Russia
certainly did so in the period following the election and
preceding the January 6th attack.
The disinformation spread by Russia and its messengers
during that time was not, however, entirely original. The
Intelligence Community Assessment found that Russia’s
disinformation engine borrowed President Trump’s own words
to achieve its goals:
Russian online influence actors generally promoted former
President Trump and his commentary, including repeating his
political messaging on the election results; the
presidential campaign; debates; the impeachment inquiry;
and, as the election neared, US domestic crises.17
Indeed, President Trump’s messaging during and after the
2020 election was reflected in Russian influence efforts at
the time. In September of 2020, the Department of Homeland
Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis warned that
Russia was engaged in pre-election activity targeting the
U.S. democratic process.18 The bulletin advised that “Russia
is likely to continue amplifying criticisms of vote-by-mail
and shifting voting processes amidst the COVID–19 pandemic
to undermine public trust in the electoral process.” 19
Deliberately spreading disinformation to discredit a U.S.
election was not new to Russia’s influence arsenal. In the
judgment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, it is a tactic
Russia was prepared to deploy after the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election:
Even after the [2020] election, Russian online influence
actors continued to promote narratives questioning the
election results and disparaging President Biden and the
Democratic Party. These efforts parallel plans Moscow had in
place in 2016 to discredit a potential incoming Clinton
administration, but which it scrapped after former President
Trump’s victory.20
Russian influence efforts in the 2016 and 2020 elections,
while distinct in their particulars, shared some
similarities. Historically, Russia has engaged in
near-industrial scale online influence efforts.21 The
Intelligence Community Assessment states that in 2020,
Russia again relied on internet trolls to amplify divisive
content aimed at American audiences:
The Kremlin-linked influence organization Project Lakhta and
its Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm—commonly
referred to by its former moniker Internet Research Agency
(IRA)—amplified controversial domestic issues. LIR used
social media personas, news websites, and US persons to
deliver tailored content to subsets of the US population.
LIR established short-lived troll farms that used unwitting
third-country nationals in Ghana, Mexico, and Nigeria to
propagate these US-focused narratives. . . .22
The threats posed by Russia’s influence efforts are not new,
nor are they diminishing. The latest unclassified
Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment throws this
into sharp relief:
Moscow has conducted influence operations against U.S.
elections for decades, including as recently as the 2020
presidential election. We assess that it probably will try
to strengthen ties to U.S. persons in the media and politics
in hopes of developing vectors for future influence
operations.23
Proxies Among Us: Malign Foreign Influence and U.S.
Audiences
Tech-enabled or not, if ever there was a “people business,”
foreign influence is it. People working on behalf of a
foreign government—foreign government officials, their
agents, and proxies—work to influence, directly or
indirectly, a target audience in another country—its
officials and citizens at large. Most who are engaged in
those efforts act overtly: ambassadors, consuls general,
government delegations and so forth. Their foreign influence
efforts are not, however, focused on philanthropy or foreign
aid. Moreover, the perspectives they seek to embed in their
target audiences may be intentionally and materially
inaccurate, propagandistic, or driven by unstated motives.
In such instances, foreign influence may amount to injecting
foreign disinformation into the U.S. media ecosystem for
re-branding and onward transmission to an American
audience.24
Foreign state adversaries of the United States generally
disguise their efforts to influence U.S. audiences,
particularly when they seek to influence U.S. voters’ views
in the run-up to an election. Among the many ways of
concealing the foreign-state origin or sponsorship of such a
message is to use unattributable proxies—“cut-outs”—or fully
independent ideological allies in the United States as
messaging organs. A cooperative American messenger—a proxy
for the foreign government itself—may be needed to make the
foreign-origin message congenial to the target American
audience.
Malign foreign influencers, including foreign governments,
used an additional such masking tool during the Trump
administration: amplifying U.S.-originated messages so that
they reached a broader audience. These influencers often
took advantage of the algorithms by which social media
platforms bring congenial messages and other information to
users whose views are likely to be similar or compatible.
Shortly after the January 6th attack, the National
Intelligence Council summarized the scope and significance
of Russia’s use of proxies in the 2020 U.S. Presidential
election:
A key element of Moscow’s strategy this election cycle was
its use of proxies linked to Russian intelligence to push
influence narratives—including misleading or unsubstantiated
allegations against President Biden—to US media
organizations, US officials, and prominent US individuals,
including some close to former President Trump and his
administration.25
The success of the proxy depends on shielding its foreign
sponsorship. For that reason, it can be difficult or
impossible to determine conclusively whether someone
parroting a foreign government adversary’s point of view to
a U.S. audience is that government’s controlled proxy or a
volunteer taking full advantage of U.S. First Amendment
freedoms.
Anti-U.S. Foreign State Propaganda and the January 6th
Attack
U.S. adversaries use anti-American propaganda and
disinformation to advance their strategic foreign policy
objectives. They aim to corrode U.S. influence abroad while
diluting U.S. citizens’ trust in their democratic
institutions and processes. They hope to deepen and sharpen
the sociopolitical divisions in American society.26 In doing
so, foreign adversaries hope not only to limit U.S. ability
to influence the policy choices of other foreign states, but
also to help immunize their own populations against the
attractions of American-style democracy.
That matters, as Russia and other adversaries of the United
States well know. If the United States has long demonstrated
such a globally effective cultural power to attract, its
corrosion must be a primary strategic objective of Russia or
any other of the United States’ principal adversaries.
Accordingly, over the next 20 years, the Intelligence
Community expects that “China and Russia probably will try
to continue targeting domestic audiences in the United
States and Europe, promoting narratives about Western
decline and overreach.” 27 The January 6th attack played
into their hands.
President Trump and the 2020 Election as an Opportunity for
Foreign Influence
With President Trump in the White House, Russia benefited
from a powerful American messenger creating and spreading
damaging disinformation it could amplify. The Intelligence
Community’s comprehensive March 2021 assessment noted that
throughout the 2020 Federal election cycle, “Russian online
influence actors generally promoted former President Trump
and his commentary. . . .” 28
President Trump’s relentless propagation of the Big Lie
damaged American democracy from within and made it more
vulnerable to attack from abroad. His actions did not go
unnoticed by America’s adversaries, who seized on the
opportunity to damage the United States. According to the
Intelligence Community’s March 2021 assessment, “[e]ven
after the election, Russian online influence actors
continued to promote narratives questioning the election
results. . . .” 29 What President Trump was saying was, in
sum, exactly what the Russian government wanted said—but he
was doing it on his own initiative and from the trappings of
the Oval Office.
ENDNOTES
1. Taking the Trump conspiracy theory of manipulated
Venezuelan voting machines head-on in an overarching
assessment, the Intelligence Community’s definitive
post-election assessment stated: “We have no information
suggesting that the current or former Venezuelan regimes
were involved in attempts to compromise US election
infrastructure.” National Intelligence Council,
“Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10,
2021), p. 8, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
2. For case studies illustrating how such efforts may have
manifested at the Capitol on January 6th, see Staff Memo,
“Case Studies on Malign Foreign Influence,” (Dec. 19, 2022).
3. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
4. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
5. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. i, 1,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived) (emphasis removed).
6. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived) (emphasis removed).
7. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
8. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
9. The U.S. Intelligence Community is well aware of these
foreign influence campaigns, including in the context of
elections. See, e.g., National Intelligence Council,
“Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the
2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10,
2021), pp. 4–5, 7, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived) (“Russian state media, trolls, and online
proxies, including those directed by Russian intelligence,
published disparaging content about President Biden, his
family, and the Democratic Party, and heavily amplified
related content circulating in US media…”, p. 4; “Iran’s
election influence efforts were primarily focused on sowing
discord in the United States and exacerbating societal
tensions…”, p. 5; “China has long sought to influence US
policies by shaping political and social environments to
press US officials to support China’s positions and
perspectives.” p. 7). Over the next 20 years, the
Intelligence Community assesses that “China and Russia
probably will try to continue targeting domestic audiences
in the United States and Europe, promoting narratives about
Western decline and overreach.” National Intelligence
Council, “Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World,”
(March 2021), p. 94, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf
(archived).
10. The National Intelligence Council notes that “some
foreign actors may perceive influence activities around US
elections as continuations of broad, ongoing efforts rather
than specially demarcated campaigns.” National Intelligence
Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats
to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar.
10, 2021), p. 1, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
11. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, Hearing on
Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political
Influence, Testimony of Laura Rosenberger, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., (May 21, 2019), p. 1, available at
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20190521/109537/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-RosenbergerL-20190521.pdf.
Ms. Rosenberger was, at the time, Director of the Alliance
for Securing Democracy and Senior Fellow at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States. In an August 2018
briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Dr. John Kelly, the chief executive officer of Graphika, an
analytics firm that studies online information flows,
stated: “The data now available make it clear that Russian
efforts are not directed against one election, one party, or
even one country. We are facing a sustained campaign of
organized manipulation, a coordinated attack on the trust we
place in our institutions and in our media—both social and
traditional.” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open
Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media
Platforms, Statement of Dr. John W. Kelly, 115th Cong., 2d
sess., (Aug. 1, 2018), p. 1, available at
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/17963-john-w-kelly-chief-executive-officer-graphika.
12. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived). But see, John Ratcliffe, Director of National
Intelligence, “Views on Intelligence Community Election
Security Analysis,” (Jan. 7, 2021), available at
https://context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/6d274110-a84b-4694-96cd-6a902207d2bd/note/733364cf-0afb-412d-a5b4-ab797a8ba154.
(archived). In this memorandum, DNI Ratcliffe, who had been
in office seven months and lacked any prior intelligence
experience, said he felt the need to “lead by example and
offer my analytic assessment.” He argued that the ICA
majority’s “high confidence” view that “China considered but
did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the
outcome of the US presidential election” did not “fully and
accurately reflect[] the scope of the Chinese government’s
efforts to influence the 2020 U.S. federal elections.” Aside
from the DNI’s very willingness to conclude, in conformity
with then-President Trump’s contention but without reference
to any supporting data, that the IC’s combined analytic
judgment on China was wrong, this seems a very odd document
for the DNI to have chosen to issue the day after the
January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol.
13. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived).
14. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, “Annual
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” (Feb.
2022), at p. 12, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf
(emphasis removed).
15. The National Intelligence Council’s comprehensive
post-election assessment covers the spectrum, including not
only Russia, but also China, Iran, and others, as well as
certain non-state actors. See generally, National
Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment:
Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” ICA
2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(archived). See also, “Dual U.S. / Russian National Charged
With Acting Illegally As A Russian Agent In The United
States,” Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.
Dist. N.Y., (Mar. 8, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/dual-us-russian-national-charged-acting-illegally-russian-agent-united-states
(archived); “Russian National Charged with Conspiring to
Have U.S. Citizens Act as Illegal Agents of the Russian
Government,” Department of Justice, Office of Public
Affairs, (July 29, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-conspiring-have-us-citizens-act-illegal-agents-russian-government
(archived).
16. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
17. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
18. Department of Homeland Security, “Russia Likely to
Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process,”
Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available
at
https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/.
19. Department of Homeland Security, “Russia Likely to
Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process,”
Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available
at
https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/
(emphasis removed).
20. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4–5,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
21. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Russian Active
Measures Campaigns And Interference In The 2016 U.S.
Election,” Volume 2, (Nov. 10, 2020), pp. 18–19, available
at
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures.
22. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
23. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, “Annual
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” p.
12, (Feb. 7, 2022), available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
24. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. 1,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
25. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020–00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. i, Key
Judgment 2, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf
(emphasis removed).
26. National Intelligence Council, “Emerging Dynamics –
International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone
– Contested and Transforming International Order –
Increasing Ideological Competition,” Global Trends 2040, 7th
ed., (Mar. 2021), p. 95, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.
27. National Intelligence Council, “Emerging Dynamics –
International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone
– Contested and Transforming International Order –
Increasing Ideological Competition,” Global Trends 2040, 7th
ed., (Mar. 2021) , p. 94, available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.
28. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
29. National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community
Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections,” ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4,
available at
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf. |
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